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SHASHI BHUSAN PRASAD v. INSPECTOR GENERAL, CISF
Facts:
1. The appellant, Sashi Bhusan Prasad, was a Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) stationed at the Rourkela Steel Plant.
2. On November 30, 1992, a criminal case was initiated against him (Plant Site PS Case No. 378 of 1992) under Section 25(1) of the Arms Act, 1959. The allegation was that he provided a country-made revolver to Subash Chandra Agarwalla, who subsequently used it to murder his aunt.
3. Concurrently, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the appellant for gross misconduct in the performance of his duties, with a memorandum and charge-sheet issued on February 9, 1993, under Rule 34 of the CISF Rules, 1969.
4. A disciplinary inquiry was conducted, adhering to the principles of natural justice, resulting in a finding of guilt against the appellant, which was reported on April 27, 1994.
5. The disciplinary authority, after reviewing the inquiry report and affording the appellant an opportunity to be heard, upheld the findings and dismissed him from service on May 21, 1994.
6. The appellant appealed this dismissal, arguing that his acquittal in the related criminal case (judgment dated September 12, 1995) rendered the disciplinary action unsustainable.
7. The High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the dismissal on July 17, 2008, leading to the present appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether the acquittal in the criminal case impacts the validity of the disciplinary proceedings and the dismissal from service.
2. The distinction between the standards of proof in criminal proceedings and departmental inquiries.
Legal Principles:
- The standard of proof in departmental proceedings is based on a "preponderance of probabilities," whereas in criminal law, it is "beyond a reasonable doubt."
- Acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically absolve an employee from disciplinary action.
- Departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with criminal proceedings, and the outcome of one does not necessarily dictate the outcome of the other.
Arguments:
- The appellant contended that the charges in the departmental inquiry were based on the same facts as the criminal case, and his acquittal should negate the disciplinary findings.
- The respondent maintained that the nature of the evidence and the standards of proof differ significantly, and the disciplinary authority acted within its rights to dismiss the appellant based on the inquiry's findings.
Conclusion:
The High Court found that the appeal lacked merit. It emphasized that the departmental inquiry's findings were valid and that the disciplinary authority's actions were justified, given the different standards of proof and the nature of the allegations. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the dismissal from service.
Ajay Rastogi, J.— This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 17-7-2008 2008 SCC OnLine Ori 544, 2008 Lab IC 3733 passed by the High Court of Orissa dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
2. The brief seminal facts which may be relevant for consideration of the present appeal are that while serving as Constable in Central Industrial Security Force (in short “CISF”) Unit, Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela, a criminal case was instituted against the appellant in Plant Site PS Case No. 378 of 1992 under Section 25(1) of the Arms Act, 1959 and he was arrested on 30-11-1992 on the allegation that he had provided a country-made revolver to Subash Chandra Agarwalla, who murdered his aunt with it, giving rise to Sessions Trial No. 188/41 of 1993. At the same time, for a gross misconduct being committed by him in discharge of his duties, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him by serving a memorandum along with the charge-sheet dated 9-2-1993 under Rule 34 of the CISF Rules, 1969.
3. After holding disciplinary inquiry in terms of the procedure prescribed under the scheme of the 1969 Rules, the enquiry officer after due compliance of the principles of natural justice, recorded a finding of guilt and the charge against the delinquent appellant stood proved as it reveals from the report of inquiry (Annexure P-4 of the paper book) dated 27-4-1994. After copy of the inquiry report was made available to the appellant and after affording him an opportunity of hearing, the disciplinary authority concurred with the finding recorded by the enquiry officer and while upholding the guilt inflicted him with a penalty of dismissal from service vide order dated 21-5-1994.
4. It may be relevant to note that the Sessions Trial No. 188/41 of 1993 was also proceeded against him and it reveals from the record that since the material prosecution witnesses stood hostile, he was acquitted by the competent court of jurisdiction vide judgment dated 12-9-1995.
5. Being dissatisfied with the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority, the appellant preferred departmental appeal primarily on the ground that since he has been acquitted in the criminal case which is based on the same set of facts and evidence, the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority is not legally sustainable. The appeal was rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 24-4-1996 which was further assailed before the revisional authority that also met with the fate of its dismissal. That came to be challenged in a writ petition before the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court of Orissa, on appraisal of the material on record and taking note of the submission alleged by the appellant of his acquittal in the criminal trial vide judgment dated 12-9-1995 still had faced the order of dismissal by the disciplinary authority being not sustainable but the High Court after examining in totality the facts and circumstances of the case, dismissed the writ petition vide judgment dated 17-7-2008 2008 SCC OnLine Ori 544, 2008 Lab IC 3733 which is the subject-matter of appeal before us.
6. The main thrust of submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since both the criminal/departmental proceedings were based on same set of facts and evidence, and after he has been acquitted by the court of competent jurisdiction vide judgment dated 12-9-1995, the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority was under an obligation to give precedence of the judicial proceedings and in the given circumstances, inflicting penalty of dismissal from service based on the report of inquiry was not legally sustainable and further submitted that the error has not only been committed by the departmental authorities but also by the High Court in not appreciating the submission made by the appellant in its right earnest and in the given circumstances, the judgment impugned dated 17-7-2008 2008 SCC OnLine Ori 544, 2008 Lab IC 3733 deserves to be interfered by this Court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 679 and G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat (2006) 5 SCC 446.
7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, while supporting the finding recorded by the High Court under the impugned judgment dated 17-7-2008 2008 SCC OnLine Ori 544, 2008 Lab IC 3733 further submits that the charge in a departmental enquiry and in the criminal case stood against the appellant were totally different, in the criminal case he was charged for committing an offence under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act, while in the departmental enquiry, the charge was of a delinquency which he committed in discharge of his duties in handing over an unlicensed firearm with ammunitions (a country-made revolver) concealed in a brief case at the residence of Constable S.P. Patel on 19-11-1992 which has facilitated Subash Chandra Agarwalla (accused) in a criminal case again in committing an offence under Sections 302/392 IPC and under Section 27 of the Arms Act.
8. According to the learned counsel, both the allegations are based on different sets of facts and evidence having no co-relationship and once the appellant has been held guilty in a disciplinary inquiry, has been rightly punished with the penalty of dismissal from service, having no nexus with the judgment of acquittal passed by the court of competent jurisdiction.
9. The learned counsel further submits that what is being urged by the appellant has been examined by the High Court and this being the settled principle of law that in a disciplinary inquiry one has to proceed on the “preponderance of probability” whereas in the criminal case, the charge is to be “proved beyond reasonable doubt” being based on two sets of fundamental principles which has been examined by the High Court in extenso needs no interference by this Court.
10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the material available on record.
11. At the outset, it may be apposite to take note of the article of charge which was imputed against him in the departmental proceedings:
“No : 884481265 Constable Sashi Bhushan Prasad is charged with gross misconduct and serious breach of discipline unbecoming of a member of the armed force in that he handed over an unlicensed firearm with ammunitions (a country-made revolver) concealed in a brief case at the residence of No. 88441220 Constable S.P. Patel on 19-11-1992 in the evening by suppressing the fact that the same was used in a case of murder in the same day.”
12. Disciplinary inquiry was held against him under Rule 34 of the CISF Rules, 1969 for the gross misconduct and serious breach committed by him in discharge of his official duties in handing over unlicensed firearm with ammunitions (a country-made revolver) concealed in a brief case at the residence of Constable S.P. Patel on 19-11-1992 and in support of the charge, the statement of PW 5 Smt Laxmi Patel w/o Constable S.P. Patel was recorded. In the course of disciplinary inquiry, she had categorically stated that the appellant Constable came to her house in the evening and handed over small brief case to her for keeping it in the house. When she asked the appellant at the time of handing over of the brief case as to what it contained, the appellant replied that it contained clothes. When her husband came back from duty, she told him of the brief case handed over to her by the appellant for keeping it in the house. Her husband PW 4 Constable S.P. Patel also narrated the fact which was reported by his wife PW 5 Laxmi Patel when he returned back on 19-11-1992.
13. There was further allegation against him that he had suppressed the fact that the country-made revolver was used in the murder case the same day. After an independent inquiry was conducted by the enquiry officer the charge stood proved against him and it was confirmed by the disciplinary authority, after affording him an opportunity of hearing, and being a serious misconduct on the part of the appellant, which he had committed in discharge of duties, penalty of dismissal was inflicted upon him, after due compliance of the principles of natural justice in terms of the scheme of the CISF Rules, 1969 and that came to be confirmed on rejection of his appeal/revision by the appellate/revisional authority and also by the High Court on dismissal of the writ petition vide judgment dated 17-7-2008 2008 SCC OnLine Ori 544, 2008 Lab IC 3733.
14. At the same time, in the criminal case which was instituted against him, the charge against the appellant was “Accused Sashi Bhusan Prasad stands charged under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act”.
15. So far as the charge in the departmental enquiry and the charge in the criminal case is concerned, indubitably it was different having been inquired on an independent set of facts and evidence in a departmental/judicial proceedings. That apart, the fact which reveal from the judgment of acquittal passed by the court of competent jurisdiction dated 12-9-1995 that Shankar Prasad Patel and his wife Laxmi Patel had appeared in a criminal case as PW 4 and PW 5 and both were declared hostile. Apart from that, the other material witnesses were also declared hostile and that was the reason for which the Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove the charge against him while acquitting him vide judgment dated 12-9-1995.
16. The facts noticed by us which have been inquired in a disciplinary inquiry and in the judicial proceedings undisputedly are based on different allegations and the set of evidence not based on the same facts and circumstances and in the given situation, the very submission made by the appellant of taking the benefit of acquittal in a judicial proceedings instituted against him on the plea of having nexus with the disciplinary inquiry loses its foundation.
17. The scope of departmental enquiry and judicial proceedings and the effect of acquittal by a criminal court has been examined by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya (1997) 2 SCC 699. The relevant paragraph is as under:
“8. … The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. The enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections 304-A and 338 IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in staying the proceedings.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. The exposition has been further affirmed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 764 This Court held as under:
“11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order 2004 SCC OnLine Cal 59, (2004) 4 LLN 512 dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. We are in full agreement with the exposition of law laid down by this Court and it is fairly well settled that two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on an offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. Even the rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, he cannot be convicted by a court of law whereas in the departmental enquiry, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal by the court of competent jurisdiction in a judicial proceeding does not ipso facto absolve the delinquent from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the authority. This what has been considered by the High Court in the impugned judgment 2008 SCC OnLine Ori 544, 2008 Lab IC 3733 in detail and needs no interference by this Court.
20. The judgment in M. Paul Anthony case (1999) 3 SCC 679 on which the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance was a case where a question arose for consideration as to whether the departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case on the basis of same sets of facts and evidence can be continued simultaneously and this Court answered in para 22 as under:
“22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are:
(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.
(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.
(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet.
(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.
(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.”
21. It may not be of assistance to the appellant in the instant case for the reason that the charge levelled against the appellant in the criminal case and departmental proceedings of which detailed reference has been made were on different sets of facts and evidence having no nexus/co-relationship. The kind of criminal act/delinquency which he had committed in discharge of his duties in the course of employment. That apart, much before the judgment of the criminal case could be pronounced, the departmental enquiry was concluded and after the enquiry officer had held him guilty, he was punished with the penalty of dismissal from service.
22. The judgment in G.M. Tank case (2006) 5 SCC 446 on which the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance was a case where this Court had proceeded on the premise that the charges in the criminal case and departmental enquiry are grounded upon the same sets of facts and evidence. This may not be of any assistance to the appellant as we have observed that in the instant case the charge in the criminal case and departmental enquiry were different having no nexus/co-relationship based on different sets of facts and evidence which has been independently enquired in the disciplinary proceedings and in a criminal trial and acquittal in the criminal proceedings would not absolve the appellant from the liability under the disciplinary proceedings instituted against him in which he had been held guilty and in sequel thereto punished with the penalty of dismissal from service.
23. It is not the case of the appellant that any error committed in the procedure prescribed under the scheme of the CISF Rules, 1969 has been violated or opportunity to hearing has not been afforded or the principles of natural justice has been violated, in absence thereof, it is otherwise not open for the courts to interfere in the disciplinary proceedings under its limited scope of review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
24. Consequently, in our considered view, the appeal is without substance and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
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