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Mahesh Kumar (S) v. State Of Haryana (S).

Supreme Court Of India
Aug 7, 2019
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal challenges a High Court judgment dated 21.01.2009 that affirmed the appellant’s conviction under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) while reducing his sentence from ten to seven years, considering a protracted trial of over 15 years. The prosecution was initiated on the statement of PW3 Sohan Lal (father of the deceased Omwati). Omwati married the appellant Mahesh Kumar on 26.05.1991. The complainant alleged post-marriage harassment by the husband, father-in-law Rajpal, mother-in-law Savitri Devi, and sister-in-law Kamlesh on account of dowry demands. He asserted that despite giving dowry to the best of his ability, including a gold chain after one year, the harassment continued. A letter from the deceased prompted the complainant to visit her matrimonial home; an apology was allegedly tendered by the in-laws, and a written memorandum was said to have been executed, promising better treatment. The complainant also stated he paid Rs. 1,000 at one stage, later there was a demand for Rs. 5,000, and on 03.02.1994 he paid Rs. 2,000 with a promise to pay the balance. On 08.02.1994, he received information that Omwati had died at Civil Hospital, Gurgaon, allegedly due to administration of poison. An FIR was lodged on 09.02.1994 against the husband and in-laws.

Investigation was conducted by PW9 Assim Khan. All four accused were arrested and charged under Section 304-B IPC. The prosecution examined ten witnesses. The trial court convicted the appellant (husband) and Savitri Devi (mother-in-law), finding that letters written by the deceased and the testimony of PW3 and PW4 (Rajbir, brother of the deceased) established continuous harassment related to dowry; Rajpal and Kamlesh were acquitted for want of specific roles. On appeal, the High Court acquitted Savitri Devi giving her benefit of doubt, and reduced the appellant’s sentence to seven years. The appellant then preferred the present appeal, which the Court allowed by setting aside his conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution proved, as required by Section 304-B IPC, that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment “for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry” soon before her death.
  2. Whether the letters relied upon and the oral testimony of PW3 and PW4 sufficiently established a proximate nexus between dowry-related harassment and the death.
  3. Whether the failure to examine independent witnesses (such as Panchayat members allegedly present at a memorandum/settlement) rendered the prosecution evidence inadequate.
  4. Whether the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act could be invoked on the facts proved.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC were not proved.
  • The letters produced by the prosecution do not relate to a demand for dowry; the gold chain demand was made about two years prior to the death and cannot qualify as “soon before her death.”
  • No evidence shows any dowry demand by the family soon before the death; hence, Section 304-B IPC is not attracted.

State's Arguments

  • The deceased died within seven years of marriage and suffered an unnatural death due to organophosphorus pesticide.
  • The record sufficiently establishes that she was subjected to continuous cruelty after marriage on account of dowry.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 8 SCC 633 Interpretation of “soon before her death” in Section 304-B IPC; requirement of a perceptible nexus between death and dowry-related harassment; “dowry” has the meaning in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Applied the proximity/nexus requirement to hold that the prosecution failed to show dowry-related cruelty “soon before” the death based on the letters and evidence presented.
Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 80 Necessity of material showing cruelty or harassment “soon before” death; the proximity test; conditions for presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Used to emphasize that “soon before” is a relative concept necessitating a proximate and live link; concluded that such a link was not established and the Section 113-B presumption did not arise.
Sakatar Singh v. State of Haryana, (2004) 11 SCC 291 Assessment of letters written by the deceased; absence of any dowry demand in such letters undermines a Section 304-B charge. Relied upon to evaluate the letters on record and find they did not disclose dowry demands, thereby not supporting the prosecution’s case under Section 304-B.
Major Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 5 SCC 201 Where independent witnesses (e.g., Panchayat members) are available but not examined, the prosecution version may be disbelieved. Invoked to note that Panchayat members allegedly present for a settlement were not examined; the memorandum was not proved, weakening the prosecution case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

  • The Court identified the central statutory requirement under Section 304-B IPC: the death must occur within seven years of marriage and, crucially, it must be shown that “soon before her death,” the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relatives in connection with dowry demand.
  • Reiterating the principles from binding precedents, the Court emphasized the proximity test: there must be a perceptible, proximate nexus between dowry-related harassment and the death; remote or stale incidents do not satisfy “soon before her death.”
  • Assessment of oral evidence: The conviction by the courts below had rested on the testimonies of PW3 (father) and PW4 (brother). The Court found these statements insufficient to establish dowry-related cruelty “soon before” the death, especially in the absence of independent corroboration that was available but not presented.
  • Independent corroboration not produced: A memorandum (Ex. PE/1, dated 25.01.1992) allegedly executed by the in-laws in the presence of Panchayat members was relied upon by the prosecution. However, none of the Panchayat members were examined to prove this settlement. This omission undermined the prosecution’s version, consistent with the approach in Major Singh.
  • Examination of letters:
    • Ex. PF/1: A letter asking that a gold chain not be given and that cash be given instead; it did not show a demand by the appellant, and its date was not proved, preventing any finding that it was written “soon before” the death.
    • Ex. PK/1: A letter stating the husband beats her daily; its date was not proved, and it did not support an inference of dowry demand.
    • Ex. PG/1 (25.05.1992): A letter stating unhappiness and harassment, including complaints about the mother-in-law disliking her cooking; it did not indicate a dowry demand.
    Collectively, the letters did not establish dowry-related harassment proximate to the death.
  • Applying Satvir Singh and Hira Lal, the Court held that the “soon before” element and the proximate nexus to death were not established. Consequently, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act did not arise.
  • Given these deficiencies, the Court concluded that the essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC were not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed. The conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC was set aside, and he was directed to be set at liberty if not required in any other case; bail bonds were discharged.

Implications: The immediate consequence is the appellant’s acquittal. The decision applies established principles on Section 304-B IPC—especially the necessity of demonstrating a proximate nexus between dowry-related harassment and the death “soon before” the occurrence, and the limits on invoking the presumption under Section 113-B absent such proof. No new legal rule was announced; the ruling reinforces the requirement for reliable, preferably independent, evidence when available, and for documentary evidence (such as letters) to demonstrate clear dowry-related demands and temporal proximity to the death.

Show all summary ...

Hemant Gupta, J.:— This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 21.01.2009, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, by which the High Court has allowed the appeal of Savitri Devi, mother of the appellant and affirmed the conviction of the appellant passed by trial court on 12.12.1995 for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. However, the High Court has reduced the sentence of the appellant from ten years to seven years looking to the fact that the appellant had suffered a protracted trial of more than 15 years.

2. The prosecution was set in motion on the statement of PW3 Sohan Lal/Complainant - father of the deceased as recorded by the Investigating Officer Assim Khan PW9. The Complainant stated that Mahesh Kumar got married to the deceased Omwati on 26.05.1991. But soon after the marriage, she was illtreated by her husband Mahesh Kumar, father-in-law Rajpal, mother-in-law Smt. Savitri and sister-in-law Kamlesh, as they demanded dowry. Complainant further claims that he gave dowry more than his capacity, even gave the accused a gold chain after one year of marriage, but they were still not satisfied and therefore they would beat the deceased. The deceased sent a letter to the complainant informing him about the same, after which, the complainant went to the village where his daughter was residing, met her and her in-laws and informed them that he was unable to satisfy their demand of dowry as it was beyond his capacity and that his daughter should not be harassed for bringing insufficient dowry. The complainant states that the deceased's in-laws had tendered an apology at that time and her father-in-law executed the same in writing and promised to send her to her parental home on Raksha Bandhan. Subsequently, after the festival, she was sent back to her matrimonial house with the appellant, and at that time the complainant had given them a sum of Rs. 1,000/- in cash. After about ten months, the appellant left the deceased at her brother Rajbir's house and demanded Rs. 5,000/-. It is further claimed that, on 03.02.1994, the Complainant paid Rs. 2,000/- to the appellant when he came to take the deceased back with him and promised to pay the remaining amount soon, after arranging the same. At that time, the deceased had apparently expressed apprehension that her in-laws would not allow her to live, lest the demands are met. It was on 08.02.1994, that the complainant received information that his daughter, had expired in Civil Hospital, Gurgaon, and alleges that the same was caused by the administration of poison by the accused. An FIR was thus lodged on 09.02.1994, against the appellant, the deceased's father-in-law Rajpal, mother-in-law Smt. Savitri and sister-in-law Kamlesh.

3. The investigation was conducted by Investigating Officer Assim Khan PW9 and all the four accused were arrested. After completing investigation, a report was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gurgaon who committed the case to the trial court. The charge was framed against all the four accused under Section 304-B IPC. All the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined ten witnesses in all.

4. The trial court held that the letters written by the deceased with oral evidence in the form of statements of Complainant PW3 - Sohan Lal and PW4- Rajbir, brother of the deceased, are sufficient to establish that deceased was continuously harassed and met with cruelty on account of dowry and as such it is a case of dowry death. The trial court had come to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case only against Appellant/Mahesh Kumar, husband of the deceased and Savitri Devi, mother-in-law of the deceased whereas in respect of accused Rajpal and Kamlesh, the trial court held that no specific role is assigned to them and, therefore, they were given benefit of doubt and were acquitted.

5. Aggrieved against the order of trial court, accused Mahesh Kumar and Savitri Devi filed an appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The High Court, while granting benefit of doubt to accused Savitri Devi, allowed her appeal and acquitted her of the charges whereas sentence of appellant Mahesh Kumar was reduced to seven years.

6. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, appellant Mahesh Kumar is in appeal before this Court.

7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends that the essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC have not been proved by the prosecution. The letters produced by the prosecution do not relate to demand of dowry, and any demand for a gold chain was made two years before the death, and therefore, it cannot be said to be soon before the death of the deceased. There is no evidence that there was any demand for dowry on the part of the family of the appellant soon before the death. Thus, offence under Section 304-B is not made out against the appellant.

8. The learned counsel appearing for the State contends that there is no dispute about the fact that the deceased died within 7 years of marriage and met with an unnatural death due to organo phosphorus pesticide. It is pointed out that the evidence on record is sufficient to establish beyond doubt that she was met with cruelty continuously after marriage on account of dowry.

9. The first and foremost question that arises in this case, and in respect of the necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, is whether there is a proximate nexus between the death of the deceased with the cruelty or harassment inflicted upon her in respect of the demand of dowry. Section 304-B reads as under:

“304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”

10. This Court in Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 8 SCC 633 examining the significance and implication of the use of the words ‘soon before her death’ in Section 304-B, has held as under:

“20. Prosecution, in a case of offence under Section 304-B IPC cannot escape from the burden of proof that the harassment or cruelty was related to the demand for dowry and also that such cruelty or harassment was caused “soon before her death”. The word “dowry” in Section 304-B has to be understood as it is defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. That definition reads thus:

“2. In this Act, ‘dowry’ means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly—

(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or

(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person;

at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim personal law (Shariat) applies.”

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22. It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304-B is to be invoked. But it should have happened “soon before her death”. The said phrase, no doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either immediately before her death or within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words “soon before her death” is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry-related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or cruelty and her death is wide the court would be in a position to gauge that in all probabilities the harassment or cruelty would not have been the immediate cause of her death. It is hence for the court to decide, on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval in that particular case was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept “soon before her death”.”

11. In Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi (2003) 8 SCC 80, this court held that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances. It was held as under:—

“9. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of “death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances”. The expression “soon before” is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by the prosecution. “Soon before” is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression “soon before her death” used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression “soon before” is not defined. A reference to the expression “soon before” used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods “soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for their possession”. The determination of the period which can come within the term “soon before” is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression “soon before” would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.”

12. In Sakatar Singh v. State of Haryana (2004) 11 SCC 291, the Court was examining as to whether, letter written by the deceased discloses an offence under Section 304 B of the IPC. It was held that:

“11. In the above background, we will now consider the evidence led by the prosecution to establish the charge levelled against the appellants. In this process, we will first examine the letter written by the deceased to her mother. Though this letter does not mention the date, there is no dispute that the same was posted on 20-5-1986 which is evident from the postal seal found on the envelope which would be a date prior to the incident leading to the death of Devinder Kaur and the children. The contents of the letter indicate what transpired during her mother's visit to her in-laws' house and does not anywhere even remotely indicate any demand made by her in-laws. It only reflects the attitude of the deceased towards her in-laws and that she entertained a feeling that her mother was not properly treated by her mother-in-law during her last visit…..”

13. In Major Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 5 SCC 201, the Court disbelieved the prosecution's story for the reason that no independent witnesses were examined, even though, the witnesses deposed that the Members of Panchayats were informed about the harassment.

14. In the present case, the prosecution relies upon the statement of PW3 Sohan Lal - father and PW4 Rajbir - brother of the deceased which has been made basis of conviction by courts below. However, we find that such statements are not sufficient to prove that the deceased was treated with cruelty relating to demand of dowry soon before her death in the absence of independent evidence though available but not examined. A memorandum Ex.PE/1 dt. 25.01.1992 was relied upon and said to be executed by the in-laws of the deceased in the presence of members of Panchayat. But none of the Panchayat Members have been examined to prove the settlement arrived at. Therefore, the oral statements cannot be relied upon in view of the letters produced by the prosecution.

15. The prosecution also relies upon letter Ex. PF/1 written by the deceased to her father. The letter is to the effect that her in-laws have started hating and suspecting the deceased's father, therefore, he should not give them the gold chain but only cash. Such letter does not show that anything was demanded by the appellant. The date of sending such letter has not been proved by the prosecution, therefore, it cannot be said that such letter was written soon before her death. Similarly, another letter produced by the prosecution is Ex. PK/1 which is a letter of the deceased to her brother-in-law(sisters-husband) stating that she has no problem with her mother-in-law and sister-in-law but her husband beats her daily. The date of this letter has not been proved nor does such letter lead to any inference for the demand of dowry by the husband of the deceased. Further, an additional letter relied upon by the prosecution is Ex. PG/1 dated 25.05.1992, wherein the deceased has written that she is unhappy and harassed by her in-laws in as much as her mother-in-law does not like the food she cooks. Again, there is no inference of any demand of dowry in such letter as well. Therefore, the documentary evidence in the shape of letters does not support the story of the prosecution.

16. In view of the judgments referred to above, the prosecution has failed to prove either the demand of dowry or that any such demand was raised soon before her death. Therefore, the essential ingredients of offence under Section 304-B of IPC are not proved by the prosecution. The prosecution has even failed to prove the initial presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.

17. We find that the prosecution has failed to prove the allegations levelled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, we allow the present appeal and set aside the conviction of the appellant and set him at liberty as long as he is not involved in any other case. Bail bonds shall stand discharged.