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Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi v. Bharat Hotels Ltd.

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
Sep 6, 2018
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion by S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal by the Revenue arising from assessments for Assessment Year 2000-01. The Assessing Officer (AO) made three principal adjustments:

  • The AO treated amounts totalling Rs. 1.2 crores as "deemed dividend" under Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961; the CIT(A) confirmed those additions and the matter was appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), which re-appraised the records and deleted the additions.
  • The AO disallowed employer deductions in respect of employees' Provident Fund (EPF) and Employees' State Insurance (ESI) contributions that had been deducted from salaries but not deposited with statutory authorities within the stipulated periods; the CIT(A) confirmed the disallowances but the ITAT granted complete relief.
  • The AO disallowed three items of expenditure amounting in aggregate to Rs. 74,01,771/-. These included expenditure on construction of a hotel in Srinagar (treated 75% capital : 25% revenue by the assessee and accepted by the CIT), salary expenditure claimed as revenue, and interest on loans used to create infrastructure in Mumbai and Goa; the ITAT had granted relief on the latter two items.

The Court framed three questions of law arising from these facts and disposed of the appeal: it answered Question No.1 and Question No.3 against the Revenue, partly allowed the Revenue's appeal on Question No.2 (directing the AO to examine the dates of deposit and grant relief only where deposits fell within prescribed periods), and finally dismissed the appeal except for the partial relief on Question No.2.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law and on the facts of the case in deleting the addition of Rs. 1.2 crores made by the Assessing Officer as deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?
  2. Whether the payment of provident fund and employees state insurance dues deposited by the Assessee within the grace period would qualify for deduction under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act, 1961?
  3. Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in deleting the disallowance of Rs. 74,01,771/- on the ground that it was a revenue expenditure?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Revenue) — principal contentions recorded in the opinion

  • On Question No.1 (deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e)): The Revenue argued that a review of the pattern of income and investments of the two lending companies (M/s Deeksha Holdings Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Jyotsana Holdings Pvt. Ltd.) showed that money-lending formed only a fraction of their activities and did not amount to a "substantial business" of money lending. Specific figures relied upon were that interest income for M/s Deeksha was only 8.18% of investments, and lending comprised 18.77% of its investments; lending for M/s Jyotsana was about 32% of its investments. Revenue relied on the Reserve Bank of India circular interpreting Section 45-1A of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (which describes what constitutes an NBFC) and urged that because money-lending constituted less than 50% and was not the predominant business, the amounts could not be excluded by proviso (ii) to Section 2(22)(e).
  • On Question No.2 (EPF/ESI deposits): The AO (representing Revenue's assessment position) treated amounts deducted from employees' salaries but deposited after the prescribed period as disallowable; the AO tabulated contributions deducted and actually deposited and disallowed the entire amounts not timely deposited.
  • On Question No.3 (revenue expenditure): Revenue appealed aspects of the ITAT/CIT(A) decisions, contesting the characterisation of certain expenditures as revenue (and thus deductible) rather than capital.

Respondent (Assessee) — principal contentions recorded in the opinion

  • On Question No.1: The assessee contended that the loans received were from two companies which were concededly Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) and that those companies were engaged in non-banking financial activities (including investments, lease funding etc.) such that the loans were covered by the exceptions in proviso (ii) to Section 2(22)(e) and should not be treated as deemed dividend.
  • On Question No.2: The assessee contended that contributions deducted from employees' salaries which were in fact deposited within the period prescribed by the EPF / ESI statutes and related notifications (including the grace periods) qualified for deduction and should not have been disallowed.
  • On Question No.3: The assessee accepted a 75%:25% capital:revenue split in respect of hotel construction costs, claimed salary expenditure as deductible revenue expenditure, and relied on the law governing interest deductibility (Section 36(1)(iii) as applicable for the year in question) for interest incurred on borrowed funds used for infrastructure.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
CIT v. Parle Plastics Ltd. [2010] 8 taxmann.com 155 / [2011] 196 Taxman 62 / 332 ITR 63 (Bombay High Court) The factors and approach to determine what constitutes a "substantial" part of a company's business (substantiality test), including consideration of turnover, profit contribution, capital employed, manpower, and other relevant circumstances. The Court relied on this authority to support the view that the 50% benchmark (as generally used by RBI/NBFC definitions) is not the sole determinative test of substantiality under proviso (ii) to Section 2(22)(e); percentages such as ~19% and ~30% in the present case can constitute a substantial part depending on context and other factors.
India Cements Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras [1966] 60 ITR 52 (Supreme Court) Principle that there can be no distinction between different types of expenditure when dealing with borrowed funds and the treatment of interest thereon (relevance to deductibility of interest for borrowed funds used in business). The Court applied this precedent to hold that interest expenditure for loans used to create infrastructure (for the relevant year, governed by Section 36(1)(iii) as it then stood) could not be disallowed on the basis relied upon by the Revenue; the question of law was answered in favour of the assessee.
CIT v. Bharat Hotels Ltd. [2015] 64 taxmann.com 14 (Delhi) Reflects the appellate outcome upholding the ITAT order concerning the capital/revenue characterisation of certain hotel construction expenditure (the matter to which an appeal by Revenue related). The Court noted that the ITAT's order dismissing Revenue's appeal was the subject of that appeal and was upheld in the cited decision; accordingly, the issue relating to the Srinagar hotel construction (treated 75% capital : 25% revenue) was decided in favour of the assessee.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered each question separately and applied the relevant statutory provisions, factual findings and precedents as follows:

Question No.1 — Deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e)

The AO had taxed Rs. 1.2 crores as deemed dividend, rejecting the assessee's reliance on proviso (ii) to Section 2(22)(e). The CIT(A) confirmed the AO; the ITAT, on re-appraisal, disagreed with the lower authorities and deleted the additions after finding the funds were received from two lending companies (Deeksha and Jyotsana) which carried out non-banking financial activities.

The Revenue argued that lending was not the predominant business of those companies: for Deeksha interest income was only 8.18% of investments and lending constituted 18.77% of its investments; for Jyotsana lending was about 32%. Revenue relied on the RBI definition of NBFCs (Section 45-1A of RBI Act) and the 50% benchmark for classifying entities as NBFCs.

The Court concluded that the ITAT's findings could not be faulted. It held that the statutory test of "substantial" business is not confined to the RBI's general 50% benchmark and that an entity may carry out multiple non-banking financial activities; in such situations the 50% test as a rigid benchmark would fail. Given that one lender had about 19% and the other about 30% of activities falling within the proviso, and considering the multi-activity nature of the companies, the Court accepted ITAT's approach. The Court expressly referred to the Bombay High Court's discussion in CIT v. Parle Plastics Ltd. on the multi-factorial approach to "substantiality" (considering turnover, profit, capital employed, manpower, etc.) and applied that reasoning to the facts before it.

Result: Question No.1 answered against the Revenue; the ITAT's deletion of the deemed dividend addition was sustained.

Question No.2 — EPF and ESI contributions and Section 43B / Section 36(1)(va)

The issue involved the timing of employer deposits of employees' statutory contributions (EPF and ESI) that had been deducted from employees' wages and whether deposits made within prescribed periods (including the relevant grace periods provided by statutory notifications) qualified for deduction.

The AO had disallowed contributions not deposited within the stipulated time; the CIT confirmed the disallowances; the ITAT granted full relief to the assessee. The Court examined the provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds Act and the Employees' State Insurance Act (and the relevant notifications granting a grace period — 15 days + 5 days for EPF (the 5-day grace recently withdrawn on 08.01.2016) and 21 days or three weeks for ESI deposits) and concluded that the ITAT's blanket grant of relief was incorrect.

The Court held that amounts deposited within the prescribed period (including the statutory/notification-granted grace periods) should be treated as duly deposited and are eligible for deduction; amounts deposited beyond such stipulated periods are not deductible. The Court directed the AO to re-examine the contributions with reference to the actual deposit dates and to grant relief only to contributions that qualified under the prevailing provisions and notifications. The Court also clarified that the assessee is entitled to the deduction under Section 36(1)(va) where the statutory requirements are satisfied.

Question No.3 — Disallowance of Rs. 74,01,771/- claimed as revenue expenditure

Three items were in issue:

  • The expenditure on construction of a hotel in Srinagar: the assessee had accepted a 75% capital : 25% revenue split and the CIT had confirmed this treatment. The ITAT dismissed Revenue's appeal and the subsequent appeal (CIT v. Bharat Hotels Ltd.) upheld the ITAT. The Court therefore answered this issue in favour of the assessee.
  • Salary expenditure claimed as revenue: the ITAT had allowed this and the Court found no infirmity in characterising the salaries as revenue expenditure.
  • Interest on loans used to create infrastructure in Mumbai and Goa: the period in question was governed by Section 36(1)(iii) as it stood prior to amendment in 2003. The Court applied India Cements Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras (1966) which held that no distinction can be made between expenditures of different kinds when considering borrowed funds and interest thereon. On this basis the Court answered this question of law against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Appeal dismissed except for a partial allowance in favour of the Revenue on Question No.2.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • On Question No.1 the ITAT's deletion of the addition of Rs. 1.2 crores as deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) is sustained; the addition is answered against the Revenue.
  • On Question No.2 the Revenue's appeal is partly allowed: the AO is directed to re-examine EPF/ESI contributions with reference to the actual deposit dates and to grant deduction only where deposits fell within the periods prescribed by the statutory provisions and notifications (e.g., EPF 15 + 5 days; ESI 21 days plus any applicable grace). Amounts deposited within the prescribed/grace periods qualify for deduction; amounts deposited beyond such periods do not.
  • On Question No.3, the Court upheld the treatment of the Srinagar hotel expenditure (75% capital : 25% revenue) in favour of the assessee; salary expenditures were upheld as revenue expenditure; interest on borrowed funds for the relevant year was allowed in light of India Cements (1966).

Broader implications:

The decision applies existing principles (as discussed in the cited precedents) to the facts of this case. The Court emphasised a contextual and multi-factorial approach to the question of "substantial" business for the purposes of proviso (ii) to Section 2(22)(e) rather than an inflexible 50% benchmark. The ruling emphasises that statutory grace periods under EPF/ESI schemes are material to the deductibility of employer-deposited contributions for income-tax purposes. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond application of the cited authorities; its practical effect is to resolve the specific assessments before the Court in favour of the assessee on Questions No.1 and No.3 and to require limited reexamination by the AO on Question No.2.

Disposition (as recorded): Save and except the partial relief granted in Question No.2, the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.

Show all summary ...

ORDER

S. Ravindra Bhat, J. - Three questions of law arise in this case:—

  • "(1) Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law and on the facts of the case in deleting the addition of Rs.1.2 crores made by the Assessing Officer as deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?
  • (2) Whether the payment of provident fund and employees state insurance dues deposited by the Assessee within the grace period would qualify for deduction under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act, 1961?
  • (3) Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in deleting the disallowance of Rs.74,01,771/- on the ground that it was a revenue expenditure?"
  • Question No.1

    2. The facts here are that the Assessing Officer (hereafter 'AO') brought to tax a total amount of Rs. 1.2 crores for the relevant Assessment Year (A.Y.) 2000-01 holding that these denoted amounts as deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereafter 'the Act'). The AO rejected the assessee's contention that these amounts were not covered by the exceptions stipulated by the statute i.e. proviso (ii) to Section 2(22)(e) of the Act. The CIT(A) confirmed the additions. Upon the assessee's appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereafter 'ITAT') re-apprised the records and found that the amounts were received from two companies M/s Deeksha Holdings Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Jyotsana Holdings Pvt. Ltd. The ITAT disagreed with the findings of facts rendered by the lower authorities to the effect that since the business of the said lender companies did not involve substantial money lending, the amounts did not fall within the proviso (ii) to Section 2(22)(e) of the Act but rather were taxable as deemed dividend.

    3. Learned counsel for the Revenue contended that a bare look at the pattern of income and investments of the two lending companies would show that money lending constitutes a fraction of their activities. With reference to M/s Deeksha Holdings Pvt. Ltd. it was pointed out that the total income from interest was only to the tune of 8.18% of the investments. Likewise, it was stated that of the total investments, lending constituted only 18.77% of M/s Deeksha Holdings Pvt. Ltd.'s business. As far as M/s Jyotsana Holdings Pvt. Ltd.'s investments went, the AO had noticed that the lending business was to the tune of about 32%. Counsel for the Revenue relied upon the circular of the Reserve Bank of India, which spells out as to what constitutes a "Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC)" in terms of Section 45-1A of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. It was urged that since in this case the business of money lending constituted less than 50% and was in any case did not constitute the pre-dominant business of the lending companies, the amounts received, could not be excluded by virtue of proviso (ii) to Section 2(22)(e) of the Act.

    4. The assessee in this case - as the record reveals, sought exclusion from the treatment of the income as deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) of the Act stating that the loan received was from two companies (M/s Deeksha Holdings Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Jyotsana Holdings Pvt. Ltd.), which were concededly NBFC. The record would show that these two companies were also engaged in other activities, some of which constitute non-banking financial activities, such as investments, lease funding in different sectors etc. Apparently, some part of the activities was also investments in paintings and commodities.

    5. In this Court's opinion the ITAT's findings cannot be faulted given that almost 19% of the investments of one lender and over 30% of the business activities of the other lending company, fell within the expression mentioned in proviso (i) to Section 2(22)(e) of the Act. The test of substantiality, in our opinion, is not confined to what the RBI declares it to be, generally. There can be NDFC and NBFC - i.e. an entity which may carry out more than one financial non-banking activity. In the present case too these companies carry on more than one non-banking financial activity - up to 3 or 4. In such event, the 50% test to benchmark whether the amounts fall within or outside the 2nd proviso to Section 2(22)(e) of the Act would fail. This Court notices that this view is reflected in the judgment of the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Parle Plastics Ltd. [2010] 8 taxmann.com 155/[2011] 196 Taxman 62/332 ITR 63 .

    The Court had then held as follows:—

    'As rightly observed in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, it is not possible to give any fixed definition of the word "substantial" in relation to "a substantial business of a company". Any business of a company which the company does not regard as small, trivial, or inconsequential as compared to the whole of the business is substantial business. Various factors and circumstances would be required to be looked into while considering whether a part of the business of a company is its substantial business. Sometimes a portion which contributes a substantial part of the turnover, though it contributes a relatively small portion of the profit, would be a substantial part of the business. Similarly, a portion which relatively a small as compared to the total turnover, but generates a large, say more than 50 per cent, of the total profit of the company would also be a substantial part of its business. Percentage of turnover in relation to the whole as also the percentage of the profit in relation to the whole and sometimes even percentage of a manpower used for a particular part of business in relation to the total man power or working force of the company would be required to be taken into consideration. Employees of a company are now called its "human resources" and, therefore, the percentage of "human resources" used by the company for carrying on a particular division of business may also be required to be taken into consideration while considering whether a particular business forms a substantial part of its business. Undisputedly, the capital employed by a company for carrying on a particular division of its business as compared to the total capital employed by it would also be relevant while considering whether the part of the business of the company constitutes "substantial part of the business" of the company.'

    6. In view of the above discussion, the first question of law is answered against the Revenue.

    Question No.2

    7. The issue here concerns the interplay of Section 2(24)(x) of the Act read with Section 36(1)(va) of the Act alongside provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (especially Regulation 38 of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952) and the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The AO had brought to tax amounts which were deducted by the employer/assessee from the salaries and wages payable to its employees, as part of their contributions. It is not in dispute that the employer's right to claim deductions under the main part of Section 43-B of the Act is not an issue. The question the AO had to then decide was whether the amounts deducted from the salaries of the employees which had to be deposited within the stipulated time (in terms of notification/circular dated 19.03.1964 which was modified on 24.10.1973), as far as the EPF contribution went and the period of three weeks as far as the ESI contributions went. The AO made a tabular analysis with respect to the contributions deducted and actually deposited. The cumulative effect of notifications under the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 and the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 was that in respect of the EPF Scheme contributions the deductions were to be deposited within 15 days of the succeeding wage period with a grace period of 5 days; for ESI contributions the deposit with the concerned statutory authority had to be made within three weeks of the succeeding wage month/period. The CIT in this case confirmed the additions - made by the AO based on the entire amounts that were disallowed. The ITAT however granted complete relief.

    8. Having regard to the specific provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds Act and ESI Act as well as the concerned notifications which granted a grace period of 5 days (which appears to have been late withdrawn recently on 08.01.2016), we are of the opinion that the ITAT's decision in this case was not correct. The assessee undoubtedly was entitled to claim the benefit and properly treat such amounts as having been duly deposited, which were in fact deposited within the period prescribed (i.e. 15 + 5 days in the case of EPF and 21 days + any other grace period in terms of the extent notification). As far as the amounts constituting deductions from employees' salaries towards their contributions, which were made beyond such stipulated period, obviously the assessee was not entitled to claim the deduction from its returns.

    9. In view of this discussion, the Revenue's appeal is partly allowed. The AO is directed to examine the contributions made with reference to the dates when they were actually made and grant relief to such of them which qualified for such relief in terms of the prevailing provisions and notifications. We also clarify that the assessee would be entitled to deduction in terms of Section 36(1)(va) of the Act.

    Question No.3

    10. On this issue we notice that three amounts were sought to be disallowed by the AO. The first item pertains to expenditure incurred by the assessee for the construction of a hotel in Sri Nagar. In appeal the CIT noticed that the assessee had conceded to a ratio of 75%:25%, as constituting the capital and Revenue streams and confirmed such treatment. The Revenue appealed against this decision to the ITAT which dismissed it, by a separate order of 02.06.2006. That order was the subject matter of an appeal (by the Revenue) being CIT v. Bharat Hotels Ltd. [2015] 64 taxmann.com 14 (Delhi) . In the judgment of 31.07.2015 the ITAT's decision was upheld. As a consequence, the question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue (which has appealed against the rejection in the appeal filed by the assessee).

    11. So far as the other two amounts - noting the expenditure on account of salary (which the assessee claimed was expenditure towards salary which was claimed as a deduction and the interest paid for loans, that were used for creating infrastructure in Mumbai and Goa; the ITAT had granted complete relief to the assessee. This Court finds no infirmity with the treatment of salaries as Revenue expenditure. As far as the interest expenditure goes, this Court notices that the period in question is covered by the provisions of Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment in 2003. In respect of that provision, the law as it existed at the relevant time i.e. in A.Y. 2000-01, was governed by India Cements Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras. [1966] 60 ITR 52 (SC) which held that there can be no distinction between expenditure of one kind or the other, when it came to borrowed funds and the treatment of interest thereon. Consequently, this question of law has to be and is answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

    12. For the above reasons, save and except the partly relief granted in question no.2 the appeal is dismissed.

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