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Commissioner of Income-tax v. Daksha Ramanlal
Judgment Summary — Nanavati, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment arises from a reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal referred the following question to the Court: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to claim deduction of Rs. 25,000 paid by her for redemption of the mortgage for the purpose of computing the capital gains?"
Briefly, the factual matrix is:
- Surottam Hathising owned land measuring 584 sq. yards. He gifted half (292 sq. yards) to the assessee and the other half to Automi Harsha Hathising.
- The assessee sold her 292 sq. yards during the accounting year ending 19-10-1971 for Rs. 59,956 and disclosed capital gain of Rs. 29,125.
- The gifted land was subject to a mortgage. The assessee paid Rs. 25,000 to the mortgagee to redeem the mortgage and claimed that amount as a deduction in computing capital gains.
- The Income-tax Officer (ITO) rejected the deduction as not being a liability that increased the cost of the land. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) agreed with the ITO and dismissed the appeal.
- The Tribunal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the assessee had, in effect, purchased the mortgagee's interest by paying Rs. 25,000 and therefore that sum formed part of the cost of acquisition under clause (ii) of section 48. The Tribunal directed the ITO to deduct Rs. 25,000 as cost of acquisition.
- The revenue aggrieved by the Tribunal's decision obtained the reference under section 256(1).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to claim deduction of Rs. 25,000 paid by her for redemption of the mortgage for the purpose of computing the capital gains?
Arguments of the Parties
Revenue's Arguments
- Capital gains are to be computed in the manner provided by sections 48, 49 and 55 of the Income-tax Act. Where an asset becomes the property of the assessee by gift, section 49 (and section 55(2)(ii) where applicable) governs the cost of acquisition.
- If the asset became the property of the previous owner before 1-1-1954, the cost of acquisition for the assessee is the cost to the previous owner or the fair market value on 1-1-1954, at the assessee's option. The assessee had not exercised any such option or produced material as to the previous owner's cost.
- The Tribunal erred by computing capital gains in terms of section 48 and allowing the Rs. 25,000 payment as a deduction, instead of applying section 49 and section 55(2)(ii) as applicable to gifted assets.
- The revenue relied upon decisions (including Echukutty Menon v. Commissioner of Income-Tax and Commissioner of Income-Tax, Tamil Nadu-V v. V. Indira) which, according to the revenue, support the view that sums spent in discharging encumbrances by successors-in-interest are not deductible as cost of acquisition to the assessee under section 48/49/55.
Assessee / Tribunal's Position (as described in the opinion)
- The Tribunal took the view that the assessee did not merely sell the capital asset received by way of gift but sold also the additional interest purchased from the mortgagee by her payment of Rs. 25,000.
- When the assessee redeemed the mortgage by paying Rs. 25,000, she effectively purchased the mortgagee's interest; that expenditure increased her cost of acquisition and should be taken into account when computing capital gains under section 48 (clause (ii)).
- The Tribunal therefore allowed the deduction of Rs. 25,000 as forming part of the cost of acquisition and directed the ITO to allow it.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Echukutty Menon v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Kerala High Court [1978] 111 ITR 880 | Held that where heirs discharged a mortgage created by a previous owner, the sum spent did not represent the cost of acquisition within the meaning of section 48 read with section 55(2); case governed by section 49. | The Supreme Court noted the Kerala decision supports the revenue but observed that the cited judgment did not contain reasons for some of its conclusions and therefore was of limited assistance in resolving the present question. |
| Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Tamil Nadu-V v. V. Indira, Madras High Court [1979] 119 ITR 837 | Held that where an asset was received by way of gift, cost of acquisition must be computed under section 49(1); sums paid to perfect title (paid by the donee) could not be treated as cost to the previous owner nor as cost of improvement under section 48. | The Supreme Court recorded that this decision supports the revenue's contention (i.e., that the Rs. 25,000 cannot be allowed as cost of acquisition in the assessee's hands under section 49), but the Court ultimately disagreed with that line of reasoning on the facts of the present case. |
| Smt. S. Valliammai v. CIT, Full Bench, Madras High Court [1981] 127 ITR 713 | Question concerned whether estate duty paid could be deducted when computing capital gains. | The Supreme Court considered this decision not relevant to the present case because payment to discharge a mortgage is different in nature from payment of estate duty. |
| Dhun Dadabhoy Kapadia v. CIT, Bombay [1967] 63 ITR 651 (SC) | Principles that in working out capital gains/loss, commercial practice and ordinary business computation principles may be applied. | The Supreme Court stated that it was not necessary to consider this decision for deciding the present question. |
| Commissioner Of Income-Tax, A.P.-II, Hyderabad v. Bilquis Jahan Begum [1984] 150 ITR 508 (AP) | Related to principles for computation of capital gains and commercial practice. | The Supreme Court indicated it was unnecessary to consider this decision for the present ruling. |
| CIT v. C.V. Soundararajan, Madras High Court [1984] 150 ITR 802 | Held that sums paid to obtain relinquishment of a third-party right (life interest) could be excluded in computing capital gains; where purchaser pays for extinguishment of a third-party right and does not derive benefit, that sum is excludible for capital gains computation. | The Supreme Court regarded this decision as supportive of the Court's view that payments to purchase or extinguish third-party rights are relevant to the computation and treatment of capital gains in the present context. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining the statutory scheme in sections 45, 48, 49 and 55 of the Income-tax Act and considered how those provisions apply to a gifted asset that is subject to a mortgage.
Key steps in the Court's analysis:
- The Court set out the relevant provisions: section 45 (chargeability), section 48 (mode of computation—deducting expenditure wholly and exclusively in connection with transfer, cost of acquisition and cost of improvement), section 49(1) (deemed cost to the assessee where asset becomes property by specified modes) and section 55(2) (meaning of 'cost of acquisition' for sections 48 and 49, including rules where asset became property before 1-1-1954).
- The revenue's primary contention was that because the asset was received by gift, section 49 (and the corresponding subsection of section 55) governs, and therefore the cost of acquisition to be taken into account is the cost to the previous owner or the fair market value as on 1-1-1954 where applicable; the Tribunal had overlooked this and wrongly applied section 48 to allow the Rs. 25,000 deduction.
- The Court considered the High Court authorities relied upon by the revenue (Kerala and Madras decisions) which had held in various ways that amounts spent in discharging a mortgage or in perfecting title by a donee were not allowable as cost of acquisition to the donee under section 49/section 55. The Court found parts of those authorities supportive of the revenue but noted limitations in their reasoning (for example, absence of detailed reasoning in the Kerala case and factual distinctions in another).
- The Court disagreed with the narrow construction applied by those High Court decisions. It emphasized that 'property' for the purposes of the Act includes rights, title or interest in property, and a transfer of mortgaged property by a donor conveys only the rights that the donor possessed at the time—i.e., the transferee takes the property subject to encumbrances.
- Therefore, when the assessee paid Rs. 25,000 to redeem the mortgage, she did not merely discharge an encumbrance; she purchased the mortgagee's right or interest in the property which the donor had not transferred. That payment was an expenditure to acquire an interest in the property and so formed part of the cost of acquisition to the assessee.
- On that basis the Court concluded that the case was not fully governed by section 49(1)(ii) or section 55(2)(ii) because the asset did not become the property of the assessee solely by one of the modes specified in section 49(1). The acquisition was partly by the mode specified (gift) and partly by purchase of the mortgagee's interest.
- The Court explained that the matter would accordingly be governed either by section 48 read with section 55(2)(i) or partly by section 48(1)(ii) and partly by section 49(1) read with section 55(2)(i), but in either view the payment of Rs. 25,000 was to be regarded as part of the cost of acquisition to the assessee and therefore had to be taken into account in computing capital gains.
- The Court also noted supportive authority (CIT v. C.V. Soundararajan) for the principle that payments to obtain extinguishment/relinquishment of third-party rights have a relevant effect on capital gains computation in appropriate circumstances.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The question referred is answered in the affirmative — in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Court held that the Rs. 25,000 paid by the assessee to redeem the mortgage formed part of the cost of acquisition and was properly allowable in computing capital gains.
Implications:
- Direct consequence for the parties: The assessee's claim for deduction of Rs. 25,000 as part of the cost of acquisition is upheld; the revenue's challenge to that allowance is rejected. The reference is answered in favour of the assessee.
- The Court recorded the answer with no order as to costs.
- The opinion discusses statutory interpretation regarding 'property' (including rights, title or interest) and the applicability of sections 48, 49 and 55 where part of the asset was acquired by gift and part by extinguishment/purchase of a third-party interest; the Court disagreed with certain earlier High Court rulings on analogous facts. The judgment states the legal reasoning but does not, in terms recorded in the opinion, state a separate order creating distinct procedural directions beyond answering the reference and recording no order as to costs.
This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.
JUDGMENT
Nanavati, J. - In this reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act. 1961 ('the Act'), the Tribunal has referred the following question to this Court:
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to claim deduction of Rs. 25,000 paid by her for redemption of the mortgage for the purpose of computing the capital gains?"
2. The facts giving rise to that question, briefly stated, are as under:
3. One Surottam Hathising was the owner of land, admeasuring 584 sq. yards. He gifted half of that land to the assessee and the other half to Automi Harsha Hathising. Thus, the assessee received 292 sq. yards and became the owner of it. She sold the same during the accounting year ending on 19-10-1971, for Rs. 59,956. In the return filed for that year, she disclosed capital gain of Rs. 29,125 on the sale of the said land. Apart from other deductions, with which we are not concerned, the assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 25,000 paid by her to the mortgagee, as the land, which was gifted to her, was subject to a mortgage. The ITO rejected the assessee's claim for deduction of that amount, as he was of the view that it was not a liability which increased cost of the land. The appeal filed by the assessee to the AAC was dismissed, as the AAC agreed with the view of the ITO that the assessee's claim for deduction of Rs. 25,000 paid to the mortgagee was not valid. The assessee then approached the Tribunal by preferring an appeal. The Tribunal held that the assessee did not sell the capital asset that she had received by way of gift; what she had sold was something more than that, viz., the interest, which the donor had transferred to the mortgagee. As she was required to redeem the mortgage and for that purpose, she had to pay Rs. 25,000 to the mortgagee, being the mortgage amount, the said cost of acquisition was also required to be taken into account while computing the capital gain. Taking that view, the Tribunal further held that the assessee was entitled to deduction of the said sum of Rs. 25,000 under clause (ii) of section 48 of the Act. The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal and directed the ITO to deduct Rs. 25,000 paid by the assessee to the mortgagee as the cost of acquisition. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the revenue has got the reference made by the Tribunal of the question set out earlier.
4. What is submitted by the learned counsel for the revenue is that, according to the scheme of the Act, total income is required to be computed in the manner laid down in the Act. As capital gain is deemed to be income, it is required to be computed in the manner laid down in sections 48, 49 and 55 of the Act. It was submitted that as the capital asset in this case became the property of the assessee under a gift, section 49, and not section 48, would be attracted and, therefore, the cost of acquisition was required to be computed in accordance with section 55(2)(ii). Thus, what was required to be considered was the cost of acquisition of the capital asset to the previous owner and the fair market value as on 1-1-1954. The Tribunal, overlooking these provisions, and computing the capital gain in terms of section 48, committed an error and wrongly held that the sum of Rs. 25,000 paid by the assessee to the mortgagee was deductible as cost of acquisition of the asset.
5. In order to appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the revenue, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 45 of the Act makes any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year chargeable to income-tax. Capital gains is deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the transfer took place. Section 48 provides for the mode of computation and deduction. It provides that the income chargeable under the head 'Capital gains' shall be computed by deducting from the full value of the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset the expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer, the cost of acquisition of the capital asset and the cost of any improvement there to. Section 49(1) provides that where the capital asset becomes the property of the assessee by any of the modes of acquisition (specified in the said section), the cost of acquisition of the assets shall be deemed to be the cost at which the previous owner of the property acquired it, as increased by the cost of any improvement of the assets incurred or borne by the previous owner or the assessee, as the case may be. Section 55 defines the expressions 'cost of improvement' and 'cost of acquisition' for the purposes of sections 48 and 49. Sub-section (2) of that section, so far as it is material for the purpose of this case, reads as under:
"Meaning of 'adjusted', 'cost of improvement' and 'cost of acquisition'.— (1) ******
(2) For the purposes of sections 48 and 49 'cost of acquisition', in relation to a capital asset,—
(i)
where the capital asset became the property of the assessee before the 1st day of January, 1954, means the cost of acquisition of the asset to the assessee or the fair market value of the asset on the 1st day of January, 1954 at the option of the assessee;
(iii)
where the capital asset became the property of the assessee by any of the modes specified in sub-section (1) of section 49, and the capital asset became the property of the previous owner before the 1st day of January, 1954, means the cost of the capital asset to the previous owner or the fair market value of the asset on the 1st day of January, 1954, at the option of the assessee;"
6. On a combined reading of the above provisions, it can be said that, if the capital asset, sale of which has resulted in capital gains, became the property of the assessee under a gift, and if the capital asset became the property of the previous owner before 1-1-1954, then the cost of acquisition of such capital asset would be the cost of capital asset of the previous owner or the fair market value of the asset on 1-1-1954, depending upon the option that may be exercised by the assessee in this behalf. What is submitted by the learned counsel for the revenue is that, in this case, the land became the property of the assessee under a gift and that the said capital asset had become the property of the previous owner before 1-1-1954. The assessee had not exercised the option available to her and no material was brought on record to show as to what was the cost of the capital asset of the previous owner. The ITO, therefore, noted the fair market value of the asset on 1-1-1954 and computed the capital gain accordingly. It is submitted that the Tribunal overlooked this provision and committed an error in computing the capital gains in the mode provided by section 48(1)(ii). In support of his submission, the learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Kerala High Court in Echukutty Menon v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax [1978] 111 ITR 880 . In that case, what had happened was that the assessee and his co-heirs had inherited a property, which was earlier mortgaged by the previous owner. The assessee, along with his other co-heirs, discharged the mortgage. The said property was then sold and as the assessee had one-fifth share in the property, he declared the capital gain after deducting the amount paid for clearing the encumbrance. The said deduction was claimed as the cost of acquisition. The ITO accepted the said method of computation and completed the assessment. Before the AAC, it was contended that the amount expended on discharging the mortgage ought to have been treated as the cost incurred by the assessee in effecting an improvement in the capital asset and deduction ought to have been allowed in respect of the said amount, but that contention was rejected. The matter was then carried to the Tribunal, which also agreed with the view taken by the AAC. On a reference made to the High Court, the High Court held that the case was governed by section 49 and the cost of acquisition of the asset was deemed to be the cost at which the previous owner of the property had acquired it. As regards the claim for deduction under the head 'Cost of improvement', the High Court held that in order to entitle the assessee to claim a deduction in respect of the cost of any improvement,-the expenditure should have been incurred in making any additions or alterations to the capital asset that was originally purchased by the previous owner. If subsequent to the purchase of the property by the previous owner, it was mortgaged by him and that mortgage was later discharged either by himself or by his successor-in-interest, that would not constitute an improvement to the capital asset, which originally became the property of the previous owner. Thus, that was a case where the only question which arose for consideration was whether the amount spent by the assessee in order to discharge the mortgage created by the previous owner could be regarded as the cost of effecting any improvement to the capital asset. Even though we do not find any discussion in that judgment as regards question No. 1, while answering the question, the High Court did hold that the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum spent by the assessee did not represent the cost of acquisition of the capital asset within the meaning of section 48, read with section 55(2). Thus, though the said decision of the Kerala High Court supports the learned counsel, with respect, it has to be stated that it does not contain the reasons for taking that view and, therefore, the said decision is not of much help to us.
7. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Madras High court in Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Tamil Nadu-V v. V. Indira [1979] 119 ITR 8371. In that case, the assessee was required to pay a certain sum by way of compromise in a suit, wherein title to the property, which was gifted to her by her father, was challenged. While computing the capital gains arising from the sale of the property by the assessee, the sum paid by way of compromise was treated as cost of improvement to the property, and on that basis, a claim for deduction was made. That claim was rejected by the ITO as well as by the AAC. The Tribunal, however, held that by paying that amount, the assessee had perfected her title to the property by removing the cloud cast on it by a rival claimant and this amounted to both addition and improvement to the title to the capital asset and, thus, constituted cost of acquisition, within the meaning of section 49(1). The Madras High Court, in a reference made at the instance of the Commissioner, held that, as the asset had become the property of the assessee by way of gift, the cost of acquisition was required to be computed in accordance with section 49(1) and, therefore, the sum paid by the assessee could not have been treated as cost to the previous owner and, therefore, it did not qualify for deduction as cost of acquisition of the property. It was held that the said amount could not have been allowed as a deduction as 'cost of any improvement thereto', as the expression 'thereto' would cover a case, where the amount is expended on the asset itself. As the amount had been paid only to improve the title of the owner rather than improving the asset as such, there was no scope for deducting the amount in the computation of the capital gains. This decision does support the contention raised by the learned counsel for the revenue.
8. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Smt. S. Valliammai v. CIT [1981] 127 ITR 7132.
The question, which had arisen in that case for consideration, was whether the amount paid as estate duty in respect of the property sold by the assessee could be deducted while computing the capital gains arising on the sale of such properties. In our opinion, the said decision is not relevant for our purpose, as payment by an assessee for discharging the mortgage is quite different in nature from payment made by way of estate duty.
9. Though the Madras and Kerala High Courts have taken the view that, when a capital asset is received by an assessee by one of the modes specified by section 49, what has to be taken into consideration is the cost of acquisition to the previous owner and any sums paid by the assessee for removing any encumbrance thereon cannot be deducted while computing the capital gains on sale of such property. With due respect to them, we cannot agree with that view. In our opinion, what has been overlooked in those cases is that the word 'property' does not mean merely the physical property, but also means right, title or interest in it. In case of a mortgage or lease, different persons will have different rights in the same property. If a person is an absolute owner of the property, then it. can be said that he has all the rights and interest in that property. If the property is mortgaged or leased, then the owner of the property would possess only those rights, which are not transferred to the mortgagee or the lessee, as the case may be. When a person, who has mortgaged the property, transfers it to another person, what he transfers is only those rights, which he possesses. The transferee would get the property subject to the rights created by the previous owner in favour of others. This aspect does not appear to have been considered while deciding those cases. If we are right in taking this view, then it follows that when the previous owner gifted the mortgaged property to the assessee, what he had transferred to the assessee was the right, title or interest, which he had in that property. When the assessee discharged the mortgage by paying Rs. 25,000 to the mortgagee, what he did was to purchase that right or interest, which the mortgagor did not then possess and which the mortgagee had in the property. When the assessee sold the property, he did not merely sell the right, title or interest, which he had received from the donor, but also the right, title or interest, which he had purchased from the mortgagee. For this reason, the case would not be covered by section 49(1)(ii) nor by section 55(2)(ii) for the purpose of computation of the capital gains.
Section 55(2) can have application only in those cases where the capital asset becomes the property of the assessee by any of the modes specified by sub-section (1) of section 49. The capital asset, which the assessee sold, had not become the property of the assessee by one of the modes specified by sub-section (1) of section 49. It was partly by that mode and partly by purchasing the interest of the mortgagee in the property. Therefore, the case, in our opinion, will be governed, either by section 48, read with section 55(2)(i) or partly by section 48(1)(ii) and partly by section 49(1), read with section 55(2)(i).
In either case, what is required to be considered is the cost of acquisition of the asset to the assessee. Payment of Rs. 25.000 to the mortgagee for removing that encumbrance was certainly the cost of acquisition of the interest of the mortgagee and, therefore, that was required to be taken into account for the purpose of computing the total cost of acquisition of the property, which the assessee sold and thereby made capital gains.
10. As we are taking this view, it is not necessary to consider the two decisions in Dhun Dadabhoy Kapadia v. Cit, Bombay [1967] 63 ITR 651 (SC) and Commissioner Of Income-Tax, A.P-Ii, Hyderabad v. Bilquis Jahan Begum. [1984] 150 ITR 508 (AP)1 , relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of his contention that in working out the capital gains or loss, the principles that have to be applied are those which are a part of the commercial practice or which an ordinary man of business will resort to when making computation for his business purpose.
11. The view which we have taken also gets support from the decision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. C.V. Soundararajan [1984] 150 ITR 802. In that case, the assessee had paid a certain sum to his mother in order to obtain relinquishment of her right of residence in the property, which the assessee sold. While computing the capital gains arising from the sale of that property, the assessee claimed deduction for the sum paid to the mother. The ITO allowed that claim, but the Commissioner, exercising his revisional powers, set aside the order giving deductions. The Tribunal held that the money received by the mother was for extinguishment of her right of residence in the property and, hence, it could not be taken into the computation of capital gains and, accordingly, directed its deduction, As the Tribunal refused to draw up a case and refer the same to the Madras High Court, the Commissioner filed an application to the Madras High Court. While dismissing that application, the High Court held that as the assessee did not have the benefit of the sum which, in fact, had been paid to the mother as consideration for relinquishing her life interest in the property, the said sum was required to be excluded for the purpose of computation of capital gains. The High Court observed that when the interest of the mother in the property in question had been purchased by getting a relinquishment for a consideration, the sum paid as consideration could not be taken to be consideration paid in respect of the interest of the assessee. Thus, the sum which the son was required to pay to the mother was held excludible while computing the capital gains.
12. For the reasons stated above, the question is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue, with no order as to costs.
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