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Commissioner of Income-tax v. Smt. Archana R. Dhanwatey

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
Jan 18, 1981
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — CHANDURKAR, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee was a co-owner, with other family members, of the "Sandoz Building" in Bombay. The co-owners entered into an agreement to sell the property to the trustees of H.M. Dr. Syedna Sahar Saifuddin Memorial Foundation ("the purchasers") for Rs. 35 lakhs in the assessment year 1973-74. No sale deed was executed in that year, and the property remained in the names of the co-owners.

On 1-1-1973 the co-owners received Rs. 21 lakhs as part sale consideration. The parties agreed, by a solicitors' letter dated 20-12-1972, that pending registration the co-owners would pay Rs. 30,000 per month "by way of compensation out of the rental income" of the property to the Trust. For the accounting period relevant to the present assessment (1-1-1973 to 31-3-1973) the co-owners paid Rs. 90,000 in aggregate; the assessee's share of that payment was Rs. 7,200.

The assessee returned total income including house property and other incomes and claimed a deduction of Rs. 7,200 from income from the house property. The ITO disallowed that deduction under sections 23 and 24 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and included the amount in the assessee's total income (noting that, although the ITO thought it might be allowable against interest income, no such claim was made by the assessee). The AAC deleted the addition, finding an overriding obligation to pay out of property income. The Tribunal upheld the AAC, holding there was diversion of income by an enforceable legal obligation and also criticized the ITO for not considering the claim against other income.

The department sought a reference to this Court on two questions concerning (1) whether there was an overriding obligation diverting the source of income entitling the assessee to the deduction of Rs. 7,200 and (2) whether a deduction can be allowed from income from other sources though not claimed by the assessee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, considering the agreement dated 29-12-1977, there was an overriding obligation which diverted the source of income on account of which the assessee was entitled to claim a deduction of Rs. 7,200?
  2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, a deduction can be allowed from income from other sources though not claimed by the assessee?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments (as presented)

  • Shri Joshi, for the revenue, relied on the pre-1976 wording of section 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, emphasizing that the annual value for house property is a notional amount (sum for which the property might reasonably be expected to be let).
  • He argued that deductions in respect of income from house property are confined to those expressly provided in section 24; the only potentially relevant provision was clause (iv) of section 24(1) (deduction for an annual charge where the property was subject to an annual charge not created voluntarily by the assessee or a capital charge).
  • He contended that the Rs. 7,200 paid was not an "annual charge" and hence not deductible under section 24, and that chapters 22–27 dealing with income from house property are self-contained so that the concept of diversion at source by overriding title should not be read into them for allowing such deductions.

Assessee's Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 7,200 from income from house property on the basis that the payment to the Trust represented a diversion of the rental income by an enforceable legal obligation arising from the agreement between the co-owners and the purchasers.
  • The AAC and the Tribunal accepted that there was an overriding obligation and that the payment amounted to a diversion of income such that the assessee could claim the deduction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Seth Motilal Manekchand v. CIT [1957] 31 ITR 735 Observation that when a deduction is not provided specifically by statute, the ITO must consider whether the amount treated as income is the taxpayer's real income (i.e., whether charges reducing the actual income exist). The Court noted these observations but said it was not necessary to decide generally whether the concept of diversion at source by overriding title can be imported into the house property provisions; Seth Motilal was cited as persuasive on the point that tax assessment should reflect the "real income."
CIT v. D.R. Naik [1939] 7 ITR 362 Earlier Division Bench decision dealing with income from immovable property being subject to payments under a decree and the treatment of such payments in assessing real income. Referred to with approval in Seth Motilal and cited as supporting authority for treating income net of legally enforceable charges as the real taxable income.
Bejoy Singh Dudhuria v. CIT [1933] 1 ITR 135 (Privy Council) Held that where income from immovable property is subject to charge in favour of another (e.g., a widow), the "real income" liable to tax is the income subject to the deductions in respect of those charges even if such charges are not deductible under the statute. Quoted by the Division Bench in Seth Motilal and invoked to illustrate the principle that legally enforceable charges on property income may reduce the assessable income.
CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas [1961] 41 ITR 367 (Supreme Court) Announces the "true test" for diversion of income by an overriding charge: whether the amount sought to be deducted in truth never reached the assessee. The Court applied this test to the facts: since no sale deed had been executed and the co-owners retained legal title and the right to recover rent, the amount in question was not shown to be an amount that in truth never reached the assessee; consequently, deduction from income from house property was not allowable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining (a) the legal ownership and contractual arrangement, and (b) the legal principles governing when a diversion of income by an overriding title can reduce the assessable income from property.

Key factual/legal points and steps in the analysis:

  1. Ownership and formalities: No sale deed had been executed in the year in question; therefore the co-owners remained the legal owners and had the legal right to receive the entire rent from tenants.
  2. Nature of the payments: The Rs. 30,000 per month (aggregate Rs. 90,000 for the relevant period) was described in the agreed statement as "by way of compensation out of the rental income" to the Trust and was paid because the purchasers had parted with Rs. 21 lakhs. The Court emphasised that this payment was compensation for retention of funds and not the consequence of any title in the purchasers.
  3. Application of the controlling test: Relying on the Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas, the Court applied the "true test" for diversion by an overriding charge — whether the amount sought to be deducted in truth never reached the assessee. Because the co-owners retained the legal entitlement to rent and could have paid the compensation from other sources of income, there was no superior or overriding title in the purchasers to any part of the rent.
  4. Conclusion on first question: On these facts the Tribunal was not justified in treating the amount as deductible from income from the property; there was no diversion at the source by an overriding title. The Court therefore answered Question No. 1 in the negative (in favour of the revenue).
  5. Duty of the ITO on claims affecting total income: On the second issue, the Court agreed with the Tribunal that the ITO has the jurisdiction and duty to compute total income according to law and that if, in fact and in law, the assessee is entitled to a deduction which would affect the total taxable income the ITO should consider it even though the assessee had not expressly claimed the deduction against another head of income. The Tribunal's criticism of the ITO as being "too technical" in refusing to consider the possibility of allowing the deduction against income from other sources was upheld.
  6. Practical consequences drawn: The Court therefore answered Question No. 2 in the affirmative (against the revenue), instructing that the ITO ought to consider allowable deductions which properly affect total income even if not pleaded under the particular head originally claimed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • Question No. 1 — Answered in the negative (in favour of the revenue): On the facts, there was no overriding obligation creating a diversion of rental income such that the assessee could deduct Rs. 7,200 from income from the house property.
  • Question No. 2 — Answered in the affirmative (against the revenue): The ITO has a duty to consider whether a deduction can be allowed against income from other sources even if the assessee did not specifically claim that deduction under that head.

Implications:

  • Direct consequence for the parties: The Rs. 7,200 is not deductible from income from the house property because, on the facts, the payment did not represent an overriding charge on the rental income; however, the ITO must consider whether any such deduction is allowable against other heads of income when computing total income.
  • Costs: Given the split outcome (partial success and failure for the department), the Court ordered no costs for the reference.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applies and reiterates existing principles (notably the "true test" from CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas) to the facts; the decision does not purport to create a new general rule beyond the application to these facts. (The opinion does not state that a new precedent is being set.)

This summary is confined to information expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or argumentation beyond the text.

Show all summary ...

CHANDURKAR, J. - The assessee in this case, along with some other members of the family, was a co-owner of a building known as "Sandoz Building" at Bombay. The owners entered into an agreement with the trustees of a Trust known as H.M. Dr. Syedna Sahar Saifuddin Memorial Foundation (hereinafter referred to as "the purchasers"), according to which the property was agreed to be sold to the purchasers for a consideration of Rs. 35 lakhs in the assessment year in question which is 1973-74. The property admittedly stood in the name of the co-owners who were the owners, and no sale deed was executed in that year in favour of the purchasers. On 1-1-1973, the co-owners received Rs. 21 lakhs as part of the sale price and it was further agreed between the purchasers and the co-owners that pending the registration of the sale deed, the co-owners would pay Rs. 30,000 per month by way of compensation out of the rental income of the said property to the trust. This arrangement is contained in a letter dated 20-12 1972 addressed by the solicitors of the purchasers to the solicitors of the co-owners. During the accounting year in question, the period for which, so far as the present assessment is concerned, is only 1-1-1973 to 31-3-1973, the co-owners paid a total amount of Rs. 90,000 to the purchasers and each one of the co-owners in his assessment claimed deduction of his proportionate share. The share of the assessee comes to Rs. 7,200.

2. The assessee returned an income of Rs. 63,554 which included income from house property, share income and income from other sources. Before the ITO the assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 7,200 from the assessee's share, of income from the house property, namely, Sandoz Building. This claim was negatived by the ITO, as not being permissible by the express provisions of sections 23 and 24 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The ITO, however, observed that "the claim of the assessee could be allowed as a deduction out of the interest income received by the assessee as her share of the part of the sale consideration received by the co-owners" and in respect of which income by way of interest was declared by the assessee. The ITO, however, found that since the assessee did not make such a claim for deduction from income from other sources, the amount of Rs. 7,200 was liable to be included in the total income of the assessee.

3. In appeal filed by the assessee, the AAC took the view that there was an overriding obligation to pay out of the property income and there was no question of deducting that amount from interest income. The addition of Rs. 7,200 made by the ITO was, therefore, deleted.

4. The department took the matter to the Tribunal in appeal. The Tribunal upheld the view of the AAC that the assessee was entitled to claim the deduction of Rs. 7,200 as there was a diversion of income on account of an enforceable legal obligation created by an agreement. The Tribunal further observed that the ITO was not justified in not considering the claim of the assessee against her income from other sources merely because such a claim was not made before him and that the ITO had taken too technical a view of the matter. The Tribunal observed that if a claim for deduction was made before the ITO and if he held that the claim could not be considered by way of deduction from income from the property, but could be considered against income from other sources, nothing prevented him from considering the claim against any other income.

5. The revenue, being dissatisfied with the finding recorded by the Tribunal, had sought reference in respect of two questions which has been made, the questions being as follows :

"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circum-stances of the case, considering the agreement dated 29-12-1977, there was an overriding obligation which diversed the income of source on of which ( sic) the assessee was entitled to claim a deduction of Rs. 7,200 ?

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, a deduction can be allowed from income from other sources though not claimed by the assessee ?"

Shri Joshi, appearing on behalf of the revenue, has referred us to the provisions of section 23 as they were in force prior to the amendment by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from 1-4-1976 and has contended that the annual value of the property, which is to be determined for the purpose of determining the income from house property, was, under section 23(1), a notional amount being a sum for which the property might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year. The learned counsel then contended that the only deductions permissible in the case of income from house property were those provided by section 24, and, according to the learned counsel, the only provision, which could be relevant for the purpose of the nature of the deduction sought by the assessee, was the one contained in clause (iv) of section 24(1) which provided for a deduction by the amount of the charge, where the property was subject to an annual charge (not being a charge created by the assessee voluntarily) or a capital charge. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that the amount of Rs. 7,200, which is now claimed by way of a deduction, is not an annual charge and on which there is no dispute and, therefore, apart from the provisions of section 24, no further deductions would be permissible. It was also argued that since sections 22 to 27 of the Act constitute a self-contained chapter with regard to the determination of income from house property which could be brought to tax, the concept of diversion at the source by overriding title could be imparted into these provisions. Now, having heard the counsel for the revenue and the assessee, it does not appear to us to be necessary to go into the question as to whether, in a given case, it is not permissible for the assessee to urge that even in respect of income from house property, there can be a diversion at the source by an overriding title, though it does appear from certain observations made by a Division Bench of the Court in Seth Motilal Manekchand v. CIT [1957] 31 ITR 735 that where such a deduction is sought by the assessee, the deduction is not sought on the footing that it is permissible deduction specifically provided by the provisions of the Act and that the ITO has to consider whether the amount, which he wants to treat as income of the assessee from the house property, is his real income. The Division Bench in that case has referred with approval to an earlier decision of a Division Bench in CIT v. D.R. Naik [1939] 7 ITR 362 in which the income of the assessee from immovable property was subject to certain payments which he had to make under a decree of the court to widows of the joint family and these payments were claimed by the assessee as not constituting his income. The Commissioner had rejected the claim on the ground that they were not deductions which fell within section 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and the Division Bench had observed as follows :

"But, in my opinion, the answer to the learned Commissioner's view is to be found in the decision of the Privy Council in Bejoy Singh Dudhuria v. CIT [1933] 1 ITR 135 . Their Lordships there were dealing with a very similar case, in which the assessee's income, derivable in part from immovable property, was subject to charge in favour of a widow, and their Lordships held that although those charges could not be deducted under section 9, the question really was whether the income of the assessee was the whole income of the immovable property, or the income of the immovable property less the deduction, and they held that the real income, which was liable to tax, was the income subject to the deductions in respect of the charges." (p. 743)

6. The facts of the present case would show that the amount of Rs. 30,000 per month which was payable to the purchasers was not because of any title to the property which was agreed to be purchased. No sale deed having been executed, the co-owners continued to be in law the owners of property. They had, therefore, a right to receive the entire rent. As observed by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas [1961] 41 ITR 367, the true test for the application of rule of diversion of income by an overriding charge is whether the amount sought to be deducted, in truth never reached the assessee. No part of the rent could be claimed by the purchasers in the absence of an execution and registration of the sale deed. If the co-owners were the only persons entitled to recover the entire rent and no right vested in the purchasers to any part of the rent, the entire rent has to be treated as the income of the co-owners. It is no doubt true that the amount of Rs. 30,000 was payable to the purchasers, but as it stated in the agreed statement of the case, it was "by way of compensation out of the rental income of the said property to the Trust". This compensation was obviously payable to the purchasers, because the purchasers had parted with a large sum of Rs. 21 lakhs which was available for utilisation by the co-owners, by arrangement between the co-owners and the intending purchasers, the payment was to be made because of retention of certain funds by the co-owners. The fact that the amount was paid out of rent did not mean that there was any overriding title created in favour of the purchasers in respect of the amount of rent which was legally recoverable from the tenants exclusively by the co-owners. As a matter of fact, the co-owners could have paid this amount out of their other income also. So far as their liability was concerned, the liability was only to pay this amount. From where they paid this amount was wholly irrelevant. The important fact which has some impact on the nature of the liability is that it is by way of compensation for retention of a sum of Rs. 21 lakhs. Such a transaction cannot, therefore, be construed on the facts of the present case to be creating any superior title to a part of the rent in favour of the purchasers. Consequently, in our view, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the amount of Rs. 7,200 was deductible out of the income from property.

7. So far as the second question is concerned, it is difficult to see what fault could be found with the order of the Tribunal when the Tribunal held that there was a duty on the part of the ITO to consider whether the assessee was entitled to a deduction from income from other sources, though no such specific claim was made by the assessee. The jurisdiction of the ITO is to compute the total income which could be brought to tax in accordance with law. It is obvious that the Tribunal's observations that the ITO had been too technical are clearly justified, because, if in fact and in law, the assessee was entitled to a deduction which would have ultimately affected his or her total taxable income, the assessee could not be assessed on a large income.

8. In the view which we have taken, the two questions referred to this Court are answered as follows :

Question No. 1 - In the negative and in favour of the revenue.

Question No. 2 - In the affirmative and against the revenue.

In view of the equal success and failure of the department, there would be no order as to costs of this reference.