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Madhav Prasad Aggarwal And Another v. Axis Bank Limited And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants, prospective purchasers of flats in the “Orbit Heaven” project at Nepean Sea Road, Mumbai, began paying instalments to the developer, Orbit Corporation Ltd. (in liquidation), from 2009 without any registered agreements. In 2013 the developer mortgaged the entire project to Axis Bank Ltd. for a loan of ₹150 crore. The appellants learned of this mortgage only through a public notice dated 13-9-2016. Alleging that the mortgage jeopardised their rights, they instituted suits in the Bombay High Court seeking specific performance, declarations, injunctions, damages and other reliefs against the developer and several defendants, including Axis Bank (arrayed as Defendant 15).
Axis Bank filed identical notices of motion in each suit, asking the High Court to reject the plaints qua the Bank under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) on the ground that the suits were barred by Section 34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act). A learned Single Judge dismissed the motions on 26-7-2017, holding that the bar in Section 34 did not apply. On appeal, a Division Bench reversed that decision on 26-10-2018, allowed the motions and dismissed the suits as against Axis Bank.
The present appeals were filed by four of the original plaintiffs before the Supreme Court, challenging the Division Bench’s judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, a court can reject a plaint only against one defendant while permitting the suit to proceed against the remaining defendants.
- Consequent to the answer to Issue 1, whether the suits filed by the appellants were barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act because the Bank had initiated measures under the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Order 7 Rule 11(d) permits rejection of a plaint only in its entirety; it cannot be invoked to excise one defendant. Reliance was placed on Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd. (2018) 11 SCC 780.
- The suits fall within the “excepted category” recognised in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 4 SCC 311, because they involve third-party rights protected by the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963, and allegations of fraud.
- Axis Bank is at least a proper party, if not a necessary one, to the suits seeking specific performance and related reliefs.
Respondent 1 (Axis Bank) Arguments
- The Division Bench correctly held that civil jurisdiction is barred by Section 34 SARFAESI; the appellants’ remedy lies before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
- The appellants are investors who took commercial risks; their reliance on unregistered allotment letters confers no enforceable right under the 1963 Act.
- Allegations of fraud in the plaints are vague and unsubstantiated; hence the suits do not fall within the Mardia Chemicals exception.
- Because the Bank is neither a necessary nor a proper party to suits for specific performance against the developer, the plaints should be rejected against the Bank alone.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd., (2018) 11 SCC 780 | A plaint cannot be rejected piecemeal; Order 7 Rule 11(d) applies only to the plaint as a whole. | Formed the cornerstone of the Supreme Court’s holding that the Bank’s request to reject the plaint only against itself was jurisdictionally impermissible. |
| Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311 | Civil courts retain jurisdiction in cases involving fraud or rights outside SARFAESI’s purview. | Cited to frame (but not decide) whether the appellants’ suits fell within the “excepted category.” |
| Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal, (2014) 1 SCC 479 | Scope of Sections 17 and 34 SARFAESI and the bar on civil jurisdiction. | Referred to in the High Court; noted by the Supreme Court without adjudicating upon it. |
| SBI v. Jigishaben B. Sanghavi, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1868 | Interaction between MOFA rights and SARFAESI remedies. | Mentioned as part of the Single Judge’s analysis; not determinative for the Supreme Court. |
| Arasa Kumar v. Nallammal, 2004 SCC OnLine Mad 250 | Civil jurisdiction despite SARFAESI proceedings in specific contexts. | Cited in the High Court; Supreme Court noted but did not rely on it. |
| MV “Sea Success I” v. Liverpool & London Steamship P&I Assn., AIR 2002 Bom 151 | Earlier view that a plaint could be rejected against some defendants. | Relied upon by the Single Judge but overruled in effect by the Supreme Court through Sejal Glass. |
| Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. HSBC, (2009) 8 SCC 646 | Limits of DRT jurisdiction; inability to grant civil-court-type decrees. | Supreme Court expressly left questions based on this precedent open for future consideration. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, writing for the Supreme Court, focused on the limited relief sought by Axis Bank—rejection of the plaint solely against the Bank. The Court reasoned as follows:
- Order 7 Rule 11 CPC contemplates rejection of a plaint only when, on its face, it is defective or barred; critically, the provision operates on the plaint as a whole.
- Sejal Glass authoritatively establishes that partial rejection—whether of certain causes of action, properties or defendants—is impermissible. If any part of the plaint survives, the entire suit must proceed to trial.
- Because the suits clearly survived against the developer and other defendants, the Bank’s motion invited the court to do what Sejal Glass forbids—excise one defendant while retaining the rest. Granting such relief amounted to a “jurisdictional error.”
- Questions regarding the statutory bar under Section 34 SARFAESI, allegations of fraud, or the propriety of reliefs could be addressed through alternative procedural mechanisms (e.g., Order 6 Rule 16 CPC) at an appropriate stage, but not via Order 7 Rule 11(d).
- Consequently, the Division Bench’s contrary view, and its assessment of SARFAESI-related questions, stood vitiated and had to be set aside.
Holding and Implications
Appeals ALLOWED; Division Bench judgment set aside; Single Judge order dismissing Axis Bank’s notices of motion restored.
Direct Effect: The suits against Axis Bank revive and will proceed on merits in the Bombay High Court; the Bank may pursue other procedural remedies permitted by law. Broader Implication: The decision reinforces that Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot be used to prune a plaint selectively against some defendants, thereby providing clear guidance to trial courts faced with similar applications. No new substantive precedent on SARFAESI was set; those questions remain open for adjudication in appropriate proceedings.
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.— Leave granted. These appeals take exception to the common judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction) in Axis Bank Ltd. v. Madhav Prasad Aggarwal 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 3891, (2018) 6 Bom CR 738 dated 26-10-2018, whereby the notice of motion(s) filed by Respondent 1, Axis Bank Ltd. [one of the defendants in the suits filed by the respective appellant(s)] came to be allowed and as a result of which, the suit filed by the appellant(s) concerned had been dismissed as against Respondent 1 Axis Bank Ltd., by invoking the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code (for short “CPC”).
2. The appellant(s) being the original plaintiff(s) in the respective suit(s) wanted to purchase flats in a project known as “Orbit Heaven” (for short “the project”) being developed by Orbit Corporation Ltd. (In Liq.) (for short “the builder”), at Nepean Sea Road in Mumbai and in furtherance thereof parted with huge amounts of money to the builder ranging in several crores although the construction of the project was underway. The appellant(s) had started paying instalments towards the consideration of the flats concerned from 2009. Admittedly, no registered agreement/document for purchase of flats concerned has been executed in favour of the respective appellant(s). The appellant(s), however, would rely on the correspondence and including the letter of allotment issued by the builder in respect of the flats concerned — to assert that there was an agreement between them and the builder in respect of the earmarked flat(s) mentioned therein and which had statutory protection.
3. The Respondent 1 Bank gave loan facility to builder against the project only around year 2013, aggregating to principal sum of Rs 150 crores in respect of which a mortgage deed is said to have been executed between the builder and the bank. That transaction came to the notice of the plaintiff(s) concerned only after publication of a public notice on 13-9-2016 in Economic Times, informing the general public that the said project (Orbit Heaven) has been mortgaged. The sum and substance of the assertion made by the appellant(s) is that the appellant(s) were kept in the dark whilst the mortgage transaction was executed between the builder and the bank whereunder their rights have been unilaterally jeopardised, to receive possession of the flats concerned earmarked in the allotment letter(s) and in respect of which the appellant(s) concerned have paid substantial contribution and the aggregate contribution of all the plaintiff(s) would be much more than the loan amount given by the bank to the builder in terms of the mortgage deed for the entire project. In this backdrop, the appellant(s) concerned had asked for reliefs not only against the builder but also the parties concerned joined as the defendant(s) in the suit(s) filed by them and including Respondent 1 Bank.
4. The reliefs claimed by the appellant(s) concerned in separate suit(s) filed by them are more or less similar. We may presently refer to the reliefs claimed in Suit No. 8 of 2017 filed by Padma Ashok Bhatt [appellant in civil appeal arising from SLP (C) No. 30900 of 2018], the same read thus:
“The plaintiff therefore prays:
(a) That Defendant 1 be ordered and decreed to complete Flats Nos. 2302 and 2402 in the Project “Orbit Haven” situate at Darabshaw Lane, Nepean Sea Road, Mumbai 400036 as per the agreement being letter of confirmation dated 16-4-2009 and receipts executed by Defendant 1 in favour of the plaintiff and hand over the possession of Flats Nos. 2302 and 2402 to the plaintiff and that Defendant 1 and Defendant 15 be jointly and/or severally be ordered and directed to comply with all the obligations under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act including, but not limited to, (i) the execution of the agreement in terms of Section 4 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, (ii) completing the building as per the sanction plan as sanctioned by Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, (iii) to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the respective flats, (iv) to form the Society or body of the Corporation as provided under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act and to convey the land along with the building in favour of the Society or body of Corporation as per the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act.
(b) That the plaintiff is also entitled for a declaration that there is no legal, valid enforceable lien, charge or mortgage in favour of Defendant 15 in respect of the building or any part thereof known as Orbit Haven, situated at Darabshaw Lane, Nepean Sea Road, Mumbai 400036.
(c) Defendant 1 be also ordered and directed to disclose all their assets, properties including the personal properties of the Directors and its sister concern particularly M/s Apex Hotel Enterprise Pvt. Ltd. on affidavit before this Hon'ble Court, within the period of two weeks or such other time as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper.
(d) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass an order of injunction restraining Defendant 1 from in any manner creating any third-party rights in respect of all the properties that may be disclosed by Defendant 1, pursuant to the orders of this Hon'ble Court on affidavit.
(e) The plaintiff is also entitled for an order and direction that Defendant 1 be ordered and directed to give clear and marketable title in respect of flat being Flats Nos. 2302 and 2402 and the building Orbit Haven, situated at Darabshaw Lane, Nepean Sea Road, Mumbai 400036 and to enter into and register the agreement as provided under the provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act.
(f) Defendant 1 be also ordered and directed to indemnify the plaintiff in respect of all claims, charges that may be made by anybody in respect of Flats Nos. 2302 and 2402 at Orbit Haven, situated at Darabshaw Lane, Nepean Sea Road, Mumbai 400036 and keep the same indemnified till the registration of the agreement and conveyance of the land in favour of the Society that may be formed:
(f-1) Without prejudice to the reliefs as claimed hereinabove and in the alternative and in the event this Hon'ble Court comes to the conclusion that the specific performance of the suit flat cannot or ought not to be granted, in such an event, the plaintiff is entitled for refund of the amount of Rs 9,23,50,000 (Rupees nine crores twenty-three lakh fifty thousand only) paid by the plaintiff to Defendant 1 along with interest thereon @ 12% from the date of payment till repayment and cost.
(f-2) It be declared that the payment of the amount as stated in Prayer (f-1) stands validly charged on the land and in Flats Nos. 2302 and 2402.
(f-3) In the event of failure to pay the amount as stated in Prayer (f-1), directions be issued for enforcement of the plaintiff's charge upon the suit plot of land and Flats Nos. 2302 and 2402.
(f-4) In addition to the amount as prayed in Prayer (f-1) the defendant be also ordered and decreed to pay damages of Rs 15,00,00,000 (Rupees fifteen crores only) to the plaintiff.
(g) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to appoint Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay, as Receiver under all powers under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in respect of suit building Orbit Haven and the plot of land being Plots Nos. 12, 8, Darabshaw Road, Off Nepean Sea Road, admeasuring 1105.00 sq yd i.e. 923.92 sq m or thereabouts and registered with Collector of Land Revenue under Collector's Old Nos. 573 and 104-A and Collector's New Nos. 2736 and 11317 Old Survey No. 48 and New Survey Nos. 3 and 4/7139 and Cadastral Survey Nos. 8/593 of Malabar Hill and Cumballa Hill Division bearing Municipal Ward No. D-3326 (4) and Street No. 76(a), to do following things and/or such other things as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper:
(i) To take complete charge of the said building;
(ii) To call for the balance money from the flat purchasers as mentioned in Exhibit ‘E’, being plaintiff and Defendants 2 to 14;
(iii) To execute the agreement for and on behalf of Defendant 1 with the plaintiff as provided under the provisions of MoFA on payment of stamp duty, registration charges and all other incidental charges to be paid by the plaintiff;
(iv) To pay all requisite fees to Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai as may be required for further progress of the work;
(v) To appoint the existing architect, who are the architect to complete the said Project;
(vi) To appoint the existing contractor of the said building, to complete the work;
(vii) To appoint the existing Structural Engineer who have already been the Structural Engineer of the said Project;
(viii) To pay all fees/charges in respect of the aforesaid persons;
(ix) To regularly submit report to this Hon'ble Court with regard to the progress and any other measures that may be required for completion of the Project;
(x) To make all application to Corporation and all other Semi-Government Authorities as may be required for completing the said building Orbit Haven;
(xi) After completion of the Project, to apply for occupancy certificate and completion certificate;
(xii) To hand over the flats after completion to the plaintiff.
(h) Interim and ad interim in terms of Prayers (c) to (g) be granted.
(i) Cost of the suit be provided.
(j) Such further and other reliefs as the nature and circumstances of the case may require be granted.”
5. Respondent 1 Bank (Defendant 15) appeared in the suit concerned and filed a notice of motion for identical relief, as claimed in Notice of Motion No. 1206 of 2017 in Suit No. 8 of 2017. The relief claimed in the subject notice of motion(s) was limited to reject the plaint qua Respondent 1 herein, in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground that the suit(s) against the said respondent would be barred by provisions of Section 34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short “the 2002 Act”). The reliefs claimed in Notice of Motion No. 1206 of 2017 in Suit No. 8 of 2017, read thus:
“(a) that the plaint in Suit No. 8 of 2017 be rejected qua the applicant, Defendant 15;
(b) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the notice of motion the suit be stayed;
(c) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the notice of motion the status quo granted vide order dated 3-3-2017 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9971, of this Hon'ble Court be vacated;
(d) for ad interim relief in terms of Prayers (b) and (c) above;
(e) for such further and other relief as the nature and circumstances of the case may require; and
(f) costs.”
(emphasis supplied)
As aforementioned, the reliefs claimed in the plaint and the notice of motion in the respective suit(s) which are the subject-matter of the present set of appeals are similar, albeit with minor variation. That, however, need not detain us from considering the common question which has arisen for our consideration in the present appeals.
6. Be that as it may, the notice of motion(s) in the appeals concerned came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court by a common judgment dated 26-7-2017 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 7740, (2017) 6 Mah LJ 102, on the finding that there was no bar from entertaining civil suit(s) in respect of any other matter which is outside the scope of matters required to be determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (for short “DRT”) constituted under the 2002 Act. The learned Single Judge held that the facts of the present case clearly indicate that the cause of action and the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff(s) concerned fell within the excepted category and the bar under Section 34 read with Section 17 of the 2002 Act would be no impediment in adjudicating the subject-matter of the suit concerned. The learned Single Judge referred to the decisions of this Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 4 SCC 311, Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal (2014) 1 SCC 479 and of the High Courts in SBI v. Jigishaben B. Sanghavi 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1868, (2011) 3 Bom CR 187 and Arasa Kumar v. Nallammal 2004 SCC OnLine Mad 250, (2005) 2 BC 127. However, the learned Single Judge rejected the argument/objection raised by the appellant(s) that it is impermissible to reject the plaint only against one of the defendant(s), in exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC by relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the same High Court in MV “Sea Success I” v. Liverpool and London Steamship Protection and Indemnity Assn. Ltd. 2001 SCC OnLine Bom 1019, AIR 2002 Bom 151 As the notice of motion moved by Respondent 1 Bank came to be dismissed, Respondent 1 carried the matter in appeal before the Division Bench by way of separate five appeals in the suit concerned. All these appeals came to be allowed by the Division Bench vide the impugned judgment 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 3891, (2018) 6 Bom CR 738.
7. The impugned judgment has reversed the opinion of the learned Single Judge that bar under Section 34 will not come in the way of the appellant-plaintiffs. The Division Bench also opined that the averments in the plaint concerned do not spell out the case of fraud committed by the Bank and/or the builder. As a result of which, the Court held that the suit(s) instituted by the appellant(s) did not come within the excepted category predicated in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. (2004) 4 SCC 311 and thus the plaint against Respondent 1 Bank was not maintainable, being barred by Section 34 of the 2002 Act.
8. Feeling aggrieved, out of the five plaintiff(s) only four of them have chosen to file the present appeals. They have assailed every reason assigned by the Division Bench both on facts and the law. It is urged that the plaint cannot be rejected only against one of the defendant(s) but it could be rejected as a whole. To buttress this contention reliance has been placed on Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd. (2018) 11 SCC 780 According to the appellant(s), even otherwise the decisions considered by the High Court to hold against the appellant(s) that the suit(s) filed by them were barred by Section 34 of the 2002 Act were inapplicable to the fact situation of the present case being a case of third party claiming right under an agreement which has the statutory protection under the provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 (for short “the 1963 Act”). The appellant(s) would also urge that the bar under Section 34 has no bearing on the subject-matter of the suit filed by the respective appellant(s) and the nature of reliefs claimed by them including against Respondent 1 Bank. The presence of Respondent 1 in the said suit would be proper, even if not a necessary party. It is urged that the impugned judgment cannot be countenanced.
9. Per contra, Respondent 1 Bank would urge that the Division Bench was justified in allowing the notice of motion filed by Respondent 1 Bank to reject the plaint qua the Bank being barred by Section 34 of the 2002 Act. According to the said respondent, the appellant(s) are not genuine home buyers but are investors of developers i.e. Orbit Corporation Ltd. (In Liq.). Due to the close acquaintance/business relationship, the appellant(s) concerned took commercial unsecured risk by purportedly investing huge amount under the guise of purchasing flats and entered into transactions which were contrary to the provisions of the 1963 Act. Thus, the appellant(s) cannot claim any right merely on the basis of a self-serving allotment letter pertaining to the flat concerned, purportedly given by the builder. Noticeably, contends the learned counsel for Respondent 1 that the averments in the plaint(s) regarding allegation of fraud played upon the appellant(s) are vague and general. The same are baseless and unsubstantiated. Rather, no case can be culled out from the averments in the plaint so as to hold that the suit filed by the appellant(s) concerned comes within the excepted category predicated in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. (2004) 4 SCC 311 Respondent 1 has supported the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and would contend that the Bank is not a necessary or even a proper party to suit for specific performance of the alleged agreement and including in relation to alternative relief of damages claimed against the developers.
10. We do not deem it necessary to elaborate on all other arguments as we are inclined to accept the objection of the appellant(s) that the relief of rejection of plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC cannot be pursued only in respect of one of the defendant(s). In other words, the plaint has to be rejected as a whole or not at all, in exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. Indeed, the learned Single Judge rejected this objection raised by the appellant(s) by relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the same High Court. However, we find that the decision of this Court in Sejal Glass Ltd. (2018) 11 SCC 780 is directly on the point. In that case, an application was filed by the defendant(s) under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC stating that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. The civil court held that the plaint is to be bifurcated as it did not disclose any cause of action against the Director's Defendant(s) 2 to 4 therein. On that basis, the High Court had opined that the suit can continue against Defendant 1 company alone. The question considered by this Court was whether such a course is open to the civil court in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. The Court answered the said question in the negative by adverting to several decisions on the point which had consistently held that the plaint can either be rejected as a whole or not at all. The Court held that it is not permissible to reject plaint qua any particular portion of a plaint including against some of the defendant(s) and continue the same against the others. In no uncertain terms the Court has held that if the plaint survives against certain defendant(s) and/or properties, Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC will have no application at all, and the suit as a whole must then proceed to trial.
11. In view of this settled legal position we may now turn to the nature of reliefs claimed by Respondent 1 in the notice of motion considered by the Single Judge in the first instance and then the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay. The principal or singular substantive relief is to reject the plaint only qua the applicant, Respondent 1 herein. No more and no less.
12. Indubitably, the plaint can and must be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC on account of non-compliance with mandatory requirements or being replete with any institutional deficiency at the time of presentation of the plaint, ascribable to clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC. In other words, the plaint as presented must proceed as a whole or can be rejected as a whole but not in part. In that sense, the relief claimed by Respondent 1 in the notice of motion(s) which commended to the High Court, is clearly a jurisdictional error. The fact that one or some of the reliefs claimed against Respondent 1 in the suit concerned is barred by Section 34 of the 2002 Act or otherwise, such objection can be raised by invoking other remedies including under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC at the appropriate stage. That can be considered by the Court on its own merits and in accordance with law. Although, the High Court has examined those matters in the impugned judgment the same, in our opinion, should stand effaced and we order accordingly.
13. Resultantly, we do not wish to dilate on the argument of the appellant(s) about the inapplicability of the judgments taken into account by the Division Bench of the High Court or for that matter the correctness of the dictum in the judgment concerned on the principle underlying the exposition in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpn. (2009) 8 SCC 646 to the effect that DRT and also the appellate authority cannot pass a decree nor is it open to it to enter upon determination in respect of matters beyond the scope of power or jurisdiction endowed in terms of Section 17 of the 2002 Act. We leave all questions open to be decided afresh on its own merits in accordance with law.
14. A fortiori, these appeals must succeed on the sole ground that the principal relief claimed in the notice of motion filed by Respondent 1 to reject the plaint only qua the said respondent and which commended to the High Court, is replete with jurisdictional error. Such a relief “cannot be entertained” in exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. That power is limited to rejection of the plaint as a whole or not at all.
15. In view of the above, these appeals are allowed. Resultantly, the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court in the appeals concerned are set aside and instead the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the notice of motion(s) in the suit(s) concerned, is restored. Thus, the notice of motion taken out by Respondent 1 in the suit(s) concerned are dismissed with liberty to Respondent 1, as aforementioned. All pending interim applications are also disposed of. No order as to costs.
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