Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

M/s. Aban Investments Pvt Limited, CHENNAI v. DCIT, CHENNAI

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
Apr 17, 2012
Smart Summary (Beta)

Tribunal Opinion Summary — I.T.A. Nos. 573 & 658/Mds/11 (per Abraham P. George, Accountant Member)

Factual and Procedural Background

These are cross-appeals by the assessee and the Revenue against the order dated 5.1.2011 of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-III, Chennai, concerning the impugned assessment year. The primary factual nucleus concerns dividend income of ₹1,55,58,725 claimed as exempt under Section 10(34) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and interest payments totalling ₹3,39,39,120 for the assessment year. The assessee itself had considered ₹82,57,520 as pro rata interest attributable to earning exempt dividend income and admitted that amount for disallowance under Section 14A suo motu. The Assessing Officer (A.O.) disallowed a larger sum, applying Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, and arrived at a disallowance of ₹3,54,92,425 relying on a Special Bench decision (ITO v. Daga Capital Management (P) Ltd.). The assessee contended that certain investments were pending as share application money (no shares allotted) and therefore interest could not be attributed to earning dividend. The CIT(A) accepted that Rule 8D did not apply retrospectively (relying on Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Godrej & Boyce) and directed the A.O. to re-work the disallowance after excluding the ₹82,57,520 admitted by the assessee. The Revenue and the assessee both appealed to the Tribunal on different aspects of these directions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether disallowance under Section 14A (and the method under Rule 8D) can be applied to monies invested as share application money (where shares were not allotted), i.e., whether interest attributable to exempt dividend income can be disallowed in such circumstances and whether Rule 8D is applicable for the impugned year.
  2. Whether loan processing fees paid to M/s Cholamandalam DBS Finance Limited constitute "interest" within the meaning of Section 2(28A) of the Act and therefore attract liability to deduct tax at source under Section 194A, failure of which would invoke the consequences under Section 40(a)(ia).

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • With respect to Section 14A disallowance: Amounts invested with certain companies were only share application money and no shares were allotted; therefore interest could not be attributed to the earning of any dividend income and intention to earn dividend cannot be presumed while application money remains unallotted.
  • With respect to TDS on processing fees: Loan processing fees are charges levied by the lender and are not covered by definitions of interest under Section 194A; the definition of interest in Section 2(28A) cannot be transported to Section 194A to impose TDS liability.

Revenue's / Respondent's Arguments

  • Regarding Section 14A: Whether shares were allotted or not is not relevant; funds advanced for allotment were invested with the purpose of earning dividend income, and Rule 8D may be applied to compute disallowance (A.O. relied on Special Bench decision in ITO v. Daga Capital Management (P) Ltd.).
  • Regarding processing fees: Loan processing fees fall within the definition of "interest" under Section 2(28A); hence the payer was obliged to deduct tax under Section 194A and, having failed to do so, disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) is justified.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
ITO v. Daga Capital Management (P) Ltd. (117 ITD 169) — Special Bench of the Tribunal Application of Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 to compute disallowance under Section 14A. The A.O. relied on this Special Bench decision and applied Rule 8D to make a large disallowance. The Tribunal noted the A.O.'s reliance but concluded that applying Rule 8D in the impugned year was not correct in view of the Bombay High Court's ruling in Godrej & Boyce; thus the mere reliance on Daga (and consequent application of Rule 8D) was not sustained for the impugned year.
Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (328 ITR 81) — Hon'ble Bombay High Court Held that Rule 8D would not apply retrospectively and is applicable only from 2008-09; for earlier years disallowance under Section 14A may be made based on facts and circumstances. The Tribunal accepted the Bombay High Court's holding that Rule 8D is not retrospective and therefore the A.O.'s method of applying Rule 8D for the impugned year was incorrect. The Tribunal also relied on the Bombay High Court's observation that for years prior to 2008-09, disallowance under Section 14A can still be made based on facts and circumstances, prompting remand for factual examination regarding share application money.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal analyzed the two principal contested issues separately.

1) Section 14A disallowance and share application money:

  • The Tribunal observed that the A.O. had applied Rule 8D pursuant to the Special Bench decision in Daga, but noted that the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Godrej & Boyce held that Rule 8D does not operate retrospectively and applies only from 2008-09. Therefore, the A.O.'s method of applying Rule 8D for the impugned year was incorrect.
  • Nonetheless, the Bombay High Court also indicated that for earlier years disallowance under Section 14A can still be made after considering the facts and circumstances. The Tribunal therefore turned to the factual question whether amounts held as share application money could be attributed an intention to earn dividend income.
  • The Tribunal accepted the assessee's submission in principle that share application money by itself will not yield dividend until shares are allotted. The key question is whether the investment as share application money was made with the intention of earning dividend — which, the Tribunal said, is relevant only if there was a definite date for allotment of shares declared by the company.
  • The Tribunal found that Revenue had not examined whether the company (M/s North Chennai Power Company Limited) had declared any date for allotment, or whether the assessee was aware of any such date when it invested. Relevant share application forms and commitments by the company were not on record, and Revenue had not inquired whether, despite declared dates, the company had failed to allot shares on application money.
  • Accordingly, the Tribunal reasoned that where no known date for allotment exists, share application money cannot be equated with an investment made for the purpose of earning dividend income and could at best be considered a loan to the company; intention to earn dividend cannot be attributed absent a commitment for allotment.
  • Because these fact-specific aspects were not examined by the authorities below, the Tribunal set aside the orders and remitted the matter to the A.O. for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

2) Loan processing fees and TDS under Section 194A / Disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia):

  • The Tribunal reproduced the definition of "interest" under Section 2(28A), which expressly includes "any service fee or other charge in respect of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred" and "any credit facility which has not been utilized."
  • It found no dispute that the loan processing fee was in respect of loans raised from M/s Cholamandalam DBS Finance Limited and thus fell within the Section 2(28A) definition of interest.
  • The Tribunal reasoned that Section 194A does not define "interest" separately and, because Section 2 begins with "In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires," the definition in Section 2(28A) must be read into Section 194A unless the context requires otherwise. There was nothing in Section 194A's context to warrant a different meaning.
  • Consequently, the Tribunal held that the processing fees constituted interest for purposes of Section 194A. Since the assessee did not deduct tax at source and no exclusion under Section 194A applied, the rigours of Section 40(a)(ia) were attracted and the A.O.'s disallowance was justified.
  • The Tribunal did not find it necessary to interfere with the CIT(A)'s order on this point and dismissed the assessee's ground challenging that disallowance.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

1. The Tribunal set aside the orders below regarding the Section 14A disallowance and remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The Tribunal held that the A.O.'s application of Rule 8D for the impugned year was incorrect in view of the Bombay High Court's decision in Godrej & Boyce (Rule 8D not retrospective), and that factual inquiries into whether share application money involved a commitment or date for allotment (and thus an attributable intention to earn dividend) had not been carried out and must be undertaken.

2. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) in respect of loan processing fees of ₹5,61,200, concluding that such processing fees amount to "interest" under Section 2(28A) and therefore attract TDS obligations under Section 194A; the failure to deduct TDS justified the disallowance.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The matter relating to disallowance under Section 14A as applied to share application money is remitted to the A.O. for fact-specific inquiry (e.g., whether a definite allotment date or commitment existed), and the A.O. must re-work the disallowance accordingly. The A.O.'s prior application of Rule 8D for the impugned year was found to be incorrect in view of the Bombay High Court's ruling.
  • Direct effect: The Tribunal affirmed that processing fees charged in relation to loans are within the statutory definition of interest (Section 2(28A)) and, therefore, attract TDS under Section 194A; failure to deduct TDS warrants disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia).
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applies and follows the holding of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court that Rule 8D is not retrospective; the Tribunal did not purport to create new law beyond applying existing authority and remanding factual issues. The opinion does not claim to establish any novel legal principle beyond the court's factual determinations and application of cited authorities.
Show all summary ...

PER ABRAHAM P. GEORGE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER : These are cross appeals of the assessee and Revenue respectively, directed against an order dated 5.1.2011 of the

2 I.T.A. Nos. 573 & 658/Mds/11 Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-III, Chennai, for the impugned assessment year.

2. The sole ground taken by the Revenue in its appeal and one of the grounds taken by the assessee concerns direction of the CIT(Appeals) to the A.O. for re-working the disallowance under Section 14A of Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act'). Since this issue is common in both the appeals, it is dealt with first.

3. Short facts apropos are that assessee had claimed exemption under Section 10(34) of the Act on an amount of ` 1,55,58,725/- received as dividend. Though such dividend income was claimed as exempt, assessee had considered only a sum of ` 82,57,520/- as pro rata interest on investments made to earn such an exempt income. As per the A.O., the total interest payment for impugned assessment year was ` 3,39,39,120/-. A.O. also noted that out of the above amount, a sum of ` 82,57,520/- was considered by the assessee for disallowance under Section 14A of the Act suo motu. Submission of the assessee was that no shares were allotted to it for the investments made with M/s North Chennai Power Company Limited and the money invested in such company was lying as share application money. Therefore, according to assessee, interest could not be attributed to earning of any dividend income on such investments. However, the A.O. was

3 I.T.A. Nos. 573 & 658/Mds/11 not impressed. According to him, whether shares were allotted or not was not relevant. The funds having been advanced for allotment of shares, the investment was made with the purpose of earning dividend income. Such dividend income being exempt from tax, interest on borrowed funds had to be disallowed. Relying on the decision of Special Bench of this Tribunal in the case of ITO v. Daga Capital Management (P) Ltd. (117 ITD 169), A.O. applied Rule 8D of Income- tax Rules, 1962 and made disallowance of ` 3,54,92,425/-.

4. In its appeal before ld. CIT(Appeals), argument of the assessee was that the money invested in various companies were lying as share application money and no shares were allotted to it. Hence, it could not be presumed that the investments were made for the purpose of earning dividend income. Reliance was also placed on the decision of Honble Bombay High Court in the case of Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd vs. Dy. CIT (328 ITR 81). After going through the submission of the assessee, ld. CIT(Appeals) was of the opinion that borrowed money was invested in various companies and though shares were not allotted in some of such companies, the purpose for investment was only to earn dividend income. According to him, nature of borrowed fund would not change just because shares were not allotted. Nevertheless, he held that Rule 8D was not applicable for the impugned assessment year in view of the decision of Honble Bombay

4 I.T.A. Nos. 573 & 658/Mds/11 High Court in the case of Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd (supra). Ld. CIT(Appeals) directed the A.O. to re-work the disallowance after excluding ` 82,57,520/- suo motu admitted by the assessee for the impugned assessment year.

5. Now before us, Revenue is aggrieved regarding the direction of ld. CIT(Appeals) for excluding ` 82,57,520/-, whereas, assessee is aggrieved that investments which were lying as share application money were also considered while making disallowance under Section 14A of the Act.

6. Learned A.R. submitted that as long as the money was lying as mere share application money, no intention could be attributed for earning dividend income. According to him, this aspect was not considered by the authorities below.

7. Per contra, supporting the order of ld. CIT(Appeals), learned D.R. submitted that Rule 8D was correctly applied based on the decision of Special Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Daga Capital Management (P) Ltd. (supra).

8. We have perused the orders and heard the rival submissions. Insofar as application of the decision of Special Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Daga Capital Management (P) Ltd. (supra) is

5 I.T.A. Nos. 573 & 658/Mds/11 concerned, Honble Bombay High Court in the case of Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd (supra) has clearly held that Rule 8D would not apply retrospectively but only from 2008-09. So, the method adopted by the A.O. by applying Rule 8D does not appear to be correct. Nevertheless, Honble Bombay High Court has also observed that for earlier years also, a disallowance under Section 14A could be made considering the facts and circumstances of the case. Coming to the argument of the learned A.R. that share application money by itself will not yield any dividend, this, in our opinion, is absolutely true. As long as an investment remains as share application money, no dividend can be earned thereon. However, the question here is whether investment as share application money is with the intention of earning dividend, since shares will eventually get allotted against it. In our opinion, this question of intention of the assessee for earning dividend will be relevant only if there is a definite date for allotment of shares declared by the concerned company. Admittedly, here the amount was lying as share application money and no shares were allotted. Revenue has not examined as to whether any date for allotment of shares was declared by M/s North Chennai Power Company Limited nor has it examined as to whether assessee was aware of the possible date of allotment, at the point of time when it invested as share application money. Relevant share application forms are not available on record. Revenue has also not examined whether it is a case where

6 I.T.A. Nos. 573 & 658/Mds/11 despite such dates for allotment, being declared by the company, it had failed to issue shares on the application money placed by the assessee. Share application money with no known date on which shares are to be allotted, cannot be equated with an investment made for the purpose of earning dividend income. There is no question of any dividend unless and until the shares are allotted against the share application money. Assessee will not also be eligible for any interest on such money unless there is any agreement to that effect with the company. We are of the opinion that intention of the assessee for earning dividend income could not be attributed to the amounts invested in share application money, unless and until there is a commitment brought on record by the concerned company for allotment of shares. These aspects have not been looked into by the authorities below. If the concerned company in which assessee had made share application money, had given a definite date for allotment of shares but had failed to do so, no doubt, intention for earning dividend income can be attributed on the assessee. If no such date is there, no intention can be attributed, and the share application money can at the best be considered only as a loan given by the assessee to the said company. In our opinion, all these matters have to be looked into afresh. We, therefore, set aside the orders of authorities below and remit the issue back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

7 I.T.A. Nos. 573 & 658/Mds/11

9. Coming to the other ground taken by the assessee, which is regarding disallowance made by A.O. to the tune of ` 5,61,200/-, the said disallowance was made for a reason that assessee had not deducted tax at source on loan processing fees paid to one M/s Cholamandalam DBS Finance Limited. Explanation of the assessee was that payment of loan processing fees did not fall under the category of professional, consultancy, technical fees or contractual payments prescribed under Section 194J or 194C of the Act and therefore, these were not subject to TDS. However, Assessing Officer was not impressed. According to him, loan processing fees could be considered as interest in view of the definition of term interest given in Section 2(28A) of the Act. Payment of interest could be made only to banking companies as per Banking Regulations Act, 1949 without deduction of tax at source. Since M/s Cholamandalam DBS Finance Limited was not a banking company, as per the A.O., Section 2(28A) applied. Assessee having failed to deduct tax at source, disallowance as mandated under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act was made.

10. In its appeal before ld. CIT(Appeals), argument of the assessee was that fees for processing loans were charges levied by the lender and it could not be considered as interest covered by Section 194A of the Act. According to assessee, definition of interest under Section

8 I.T.A. Nos. 573 & 658/Mds/11 2(28A) of the Act could not be transported to Section 194A of the Act for casting on the assessee a liability to deduct tax at source on payment of processing fees. However, ld. CIT(Appeals) was not impressed. According to him, when a word was defined in the Act, such a definition was to be used for all the purposes of the Act and there was no necessary to define it again and again. Ld. CIT(Appeals) noted that the term interest was clearly defined in the Act and processing fees paid by the assessee, as per the said definition fell within the ambit of interest. Assessee having failed to deduct the tax at source, according to him, A.O. was justified in making the disallowance.

11. Now before us, learned A.R. reiterated the arguments put forth before ld. CIT(Appeals).

12. Per contra, learned D.R. strongly supported the order of ld. CIT(Appeals).

13. We have perused the orders and heard the rival submissions. The question is whether the processing fees against the loan taken from M/s Cholamandalam DBS Finance Limited has to be considered as interest or not and if it is to be considered as interest, whether it is covered under Section 194A of the Act. Interest as defined under Section 2(28A) of the Act, is reproduced hereunder:-

9 I.T.A. Nos. 573 & 658/Mds/11 Interest means interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation) and includes any service fee or other charge in respect of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit facility which has not been utilized. The definition is clear in that it includes all the charges in respect of moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit facility whether it has been utilized or not. There is no dispute that the loan processing fees paid by the assessee was in respect of loans being raised from M/s Cholamandalam DBS Finance Limited. Therefore, without doubt, such loan processing fee fell within the definition interest under Section 2(28A) of the Act. Now the question is whether the said definition of interest can be transported to Section 194A of the Act. Section 194A does not define interest as such. It simply casts a duty on a person who is responsible for paying to a resident any income by way of interest, to deduct tax at source at rates in force. So, it is clear that the person responsible for paying interest has to deduct tax at source, unless the payment fell within the exclusions provided in Section 194A. There is no case for the assessee that it fell under any of such exclusion. Section 2 of the Act start with the words In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires. Thus unless context otherwise requires interest mentioned, in Section 194A has to be understood in accordance with the definition of

10 I.T.A. Nos. 573 & 658/Mds/11 interest given under Section 2(28A) of the Act. There is nothing in the context of Section 194A which will warrant any different definition to be adopted. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the A.O. was justified in considering the processing fees paid as interest falling within the definition given in Section 2(28A) of the Act. Assessee was obliged to deduct tax at source which it had not done so. Rigours of Section 40(a)(ia) of Act is attracted. We do not find any necessity to interfere with the order of ld. CIT(Appeals). This ground taken by the assessee is dismissed.