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Panchsheel Construct... v. Davinder Pal Singh C...

Delhi High Court
Feb 15, 2019
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed by the petitioner seeking appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate disputes arising from the Collaboration Agreement dated 30.04.2011 between the parties. The respondents contended that no binding arbitration agreement existed within the Collaboration Agreement and thus the petition was not maintainable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the clause in the Collaboration Agreement, stating that the parties "should try to solve the problem to any Arbitrator," constitutes a binding arbitration agreement under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
  2. Whether the use of non-mandatory language such as "try to solve" or "may" in dispute resolution clauses negates the enforceability of an arbitration agreement.
  3. Whether the presence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause for Delhi courts affects the binding nature of the arbitration clause.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • There is no binding arbitration agreement contained in the Collaboration Agreement.
  • The phrase "try to solve the problem" indicates a non-binding obligation, hence arbitration cannot be compelled without respondents' consent.
  • Reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in Wellington Associates Ltd. v. Kirit Mehta, AIR 2000 SC 1379 to support the contention that arbitration requires a mandatory agreement.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The phrase "try to solve the problem" does not negate the binding nature of the arbitration agreement.
  • Reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in M/s Zhejiang Bonly Elevator Guide Rail Manufacture Co. Ltd. v. Jade Elevator Components, (2018) 9 SCC 774 to argue that arbitration clauses providing options to arbitrate or litigate are valid and enforceable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Wellington Associates Ltd. v. Kirit Mehta, AIR 2000 SC 1379 Arbitration agreement must be mandatory and unequivocal; use of words like "may" or "try" indicate non-binding arbitration requiring fresh consent. The Court applied this principle to hold that the clause "try to solve the problem" does not constitute a binding arbitration agreement and requires fresh consent for arbitration.
M/s Zhejiang Bonly Elevator Guide Rail Manufacture Co. Ltd. v. Jade Elevator Components, (2018) 9 SCC 774 Where an agreement provides an option to resolve disputes either by arbitration or court, the parties' discretion to choose arbitration must be respected. The Court distinguished this precedent, holding it inapplicable as the present arbitration clause was not an option but a non-binding attempt to arbitrate.
B. Gopal Das v. Kota Straw Board Clauses using "may be referred" to arbitration require fresh consent for arbitration to proceed. The Court cited this case to reinforce that non-mandatory language does not create a binding arbitration agreement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the arbitration clause stating parties "should try to solve the problem to any Arbitrator" and found it did not constitute a binding arbitration agreement. The language indicated a mere attempt or option to arbitrate rather than an unequivocal commitment. The presence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause for Delhi courts further suggested that disputes could be adjudicated by courts, not mandatorily by arbitration.

The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Wellington Associates Ltd., which held that arbitration agreements must mandatorily require appointment of arbitrators and cannot be permissive or conditional. The Court noted that the use of words like "try" or "may" postulates the need for fresh consent before arbitration can proceed, which was absent here.

The petitioner’s reliance on M/s Zhejiang Bonly Elevator Guide Rail Manufacture Co. Ltd. was distinguished because that case involved an option to arbitrate or litigate, whereas the present clause did not provide a clear choice but a non-binding attempt at arbitration.

The Court emphasized that arbitration being an alternative dispute resolution mechanism requires clear and unequivocal consent to bypass courts, which was missing in the present clause.

Holding and Implications

The Court dismissed the petition for appointment of an arbitrator, holding that the clause relied upon does not constitute a binding arbitration agreement.

The petitioner was left free to pursue its claims through appropriate legal remedies before the courts. The decision does not set any new precedent but applies established principles requiring arbitration agreements to be mandatory and unequivocal. There was no order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

$~1 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+ ARB.P. 380/2018

th Date of Decision : 15 February, 2019

PANCHSHEEL CONSTRUCTIONS THROUGH: ITS

ATTORNEY BALIK RAM GAUTAM ..... Petitioner Through: Mr.Devinder Chaudhary, Adv. versus

DAVINDER PAL SINGH CHAUHAN & ANR. ..... Respondents

Through: Mr.Piyush Mishra, Adv. for R-1.

Mr.Naveen Kumar, Adv. for

R-2.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA

NAVIN CHAWLA, J. (Oral)

1. This petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been filed by the petitioner seeking appointment of an Arbitrator for adjudicating the disputes that have arisen between the parties in relation to the Collaboration Agreement dated 30.04.2011 executed between the parties.

2. Learned counsels for the respondents submit that there is no binding Arbitration Agreement between the parties contained in the

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Collaboration Agreement and therefore, the present petition is not maintainable.

3. The alleged Arbitration Agreement relied upon by the petitioner in support of the present petition is reproduced hereinbelow:

"That in case of any difference of opinion between the first party/owner and second party/builder in regard to the interpretation or scope of his agreement of any part thereof they should try to solve the problem to any Arbitrator." (Emphasis Supplied)

4. The Collaboration Agreement also contains another clause which is reproduced hereinbelow:

"That this transaction has taken place at New Delhi and as such Delhi courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain any dispute arising out or in any way touching or concerning this Deed."

5. Learned counsels for the respondents submit that by use of the words "try to solve the problem", there is no binding Arbitration Agreement between the parties. In absence of any such binding agreement, the arbitration proceedings cannot take place without the consent of the respondents to agree to such arbitration. They rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Wellington Associates Ltd.v. Kirit Mehta, AIR 2000 SC 1379 in support of their contention.

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6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that mere use of the words "try to solve the problem" does not in any manner denude the Arbitration Agreement of its binding nature. He places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s Zhejiang Bonly Elevator Guide Rail Manufacture Co. Ltd. v. Jade Elevator Components, (2018) 9 SCC 774 in this regard.

7. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties. In my opinion, the above referred clause does not constitute an Arbitration Agreement between the parties. The Agreement merely states that the parties should try to solve the disputes through arbitration. This, therefore, would not give a binding effect to the arbitration agreement, in the true sense of the word. The Agreement further states that the disputes, if any, arising between the parties shall be adjudicated through Courts at Delhi.

8. In Wellington Associates Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court was confronted with the following clause which was being relied upon as an Arbitration Agreement between the parties:

"5. It is also agreed by and between the parties that any dispute or differences arising in connection with these presents may be referred to arbitration in pursuance of the Arbitration Act, 1940 by each party appointing one arbitrator and the arbitrators so appointed selecting an umpire. The venue of arbitration shall be at Bombay."

9. The Supreme Court, held as under:

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"The words in sub-section (1) of Section 7, "means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration", in my opinion, postulate an agreement which necessarily or rather mandatorily requires the appointment of an arbitrator/arbitrators. Section 7 does not cover a case where the parties agree that they "may" go to a suit or that they "may" also go to arbitration. xxx

22. It is contended for the petitioner that the word

"may" in clause 5 has to be construed as "shall". According to the petitioner's counsel, that is the true intention of the parties. The question then is as to what is the intention of the parties. The parties, in my view, used the words "may" not without reason. If one looks at the fact that clause 4 precedes clause 5, one can see that under clause 4 parties desired that in case of disputes, the civil courts at Bombay are to be approached by way of a suit. Then follows clause 5 with the words "it is also agreed" that the dispute "may" be referred to arbitration implying that parties need not necessarily go to the civil court by way of suit but can also go before an arbitrator. Thus, clause 5 is merely an enabling provision as contended by the respondents. I may also state that in cases where there is a sole arbitration clause couched in mandatory language, it is not preceded by a clause like clause 4 which discloses a general intention of the parties to go before a civil court by way of suit. Thus, reading clause 4 and clause 5 together, I am of the view that it is not the intention of the parties that arbitration is to be the sole remedy. It appears that the parties agreed that they can "also" go to arbitration in case the aggrieved party does not wish

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to go to a civil court by way of a suit. But in that event, obviously, fresh consent to go to arbitration is necessary. Further, in the present case, the same clause 5, so far as the venue of arbitration is concerned, uses the word "shall". The parties, in my view, must be deemed to have used the words "may" and "shall" at different places, after due deliberation.

23. A somewhat similar situation arose in B. Gopal Das v. Kota Straw Board. In that case the clause read as follows:

"That in case of any dispute arising between us, the matter may be referred to arbitrator mutually agreed upon and acceptable by you and us." It was held that fresh consent for arbitration was necessary. No doubt, the above clause was a little clearer there than in the case before me. In the above case too, the clause used the word "may" as in the present case. The above decision is therefore directly in point.

xxx

25. Suffice it to say, that the words "may be referred" used in clause 5, read with clause 4, lead me to the conclusion that clause 5 is not a firm or mandatory arbitration clause and in my view, it postulates a fresh agreement between the parties that they will to go to arbitration. Point 2 is decided accordingly against the petitioner."

10. In my opinion the judgment would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. The use of the word "try to solve" does not give a binding effect to the purported Arbitration Agreement between the parties. It, in fact, does not even give a binding effect to the decision

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that may be taken on such so called arbitration. What if after an Award the losing party says that it tried to solve the problem through arbitration, however, as the same has not been solved, it will now go and file a suit.

11. In any case, arbitration being an alternate dispute resolution mechanism, where the regular Courts are bypassed and challenge to an Award is permitted only within a very narrow scope, clear words expressing an unequivocal intent to accede to such a mechanism is a prerequisite before a party is referred to arbitration. In the present case, such words are missing.

12. In M/s Zhejiang Bonly Elevator Guide Rail Manufacture Co. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the following clause:

"15. Dispute handling.—Common processing contract disputes, the parties should be settled through consultation; consultation fails by treatment of to the arbitration body for arbitration or the court."

13. The Supreme Court has held as under:

"10. In the case at hand, as we find, Clause 15 refers to arbitration or court. Thus, there is an option and the petitioner has invoked the arbitration clause and, therefore, we have no hesitation, in the obtaining factual matrix of the case, for appointment of an arbitrator ……"

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14. A reading of the above would show that the Supreme Court held that where the Agreement gives an option to the parties to either have the dispute resolved through arbitration or Court, there can be no further embargo placed on such discretion of the parties. The parties have discretion to chose to have their disputes resolved either through arbitration or Court and having such option, the same has to be given effect to. The said judgment, would therefore have no application to the facts of the present case where the Arbitration Agreement relied upon by the petitioner is very distinct.

15. In view of the above, I find no merit in the present petition and same is dismissed, leaving it open to the petitioner to agitate its claim by way of an appropriate legal remedy. There shall be no order as to cost.

NAVIN CHAWLA, J

FEBRUARY 15, 2019/Arya

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