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Malaichamy And Another v. State Of Tamil Nadu .
Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns the murder of Harish Kumar, aged about 17 years, son of P.W.1 Velusamy, who was then a Member of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 are distantly related to P.W.1. The prosecution alleged multiple sources of animosity: a prior monetary transaction between Pattai Muniasamy (the paternal uncle of Accused Nos. 1 and 2) and P.W.1; a failed attempt to arrange a marriage between Mohankumar (son of Pattai Muniasamy) and Kalaiselvi (daughter of P.W.1’s cousin, P.W.12), which led to a complaint under Section 417 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act; the refusal by P.W.1 to include Muniasamy as a partner in his liquor business; and the termination of Accused No. 2 from employment allegedly secured on P.W.1’s recommendation. On the early morning of 21.06.1998, Accused Nos. 1 to 3 allegedly trespassed into P.W.1’s house and murdered Harish Kumar.
Accused No. 3 was a juvenile and was dealt with under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 were tried in S.C. No. 250 of 2000 before the First Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai, and convicted under Sections 449 IPC and 302 read with 34 IPC. They were sentenced to three years’ rigorous imprisonment for Section 449 and life imprisonment for Section 302/34. The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, in Crl.A. No. 884 of 2001, confirmed the conviction and sentence by judgment dated 23.09.2008. The present appeal to the Supreme Court challenges those concurrent findings. The prosecution case rests solely on circumstantial evidence; there were no eyewitnesses.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution established a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances that excludes any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC.
- Whether the “last seen” circumstance, based on the testimonies of P.W.4 and P.W.5, was credible and proved.
- Whether the alleged motive advanced by the prosecution was sufficiently strong and directly connected to the victim to support the chain of circumstantial evidence.
- Whether the recovery of two knives purportedly under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, was proved in accordance with law and, if so, whether it could by itself sustain the conviction.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa, (1991) 3 SCC 27 | In circumstantial evidence cases, the chain of circumstances must be complete and must exclude a reasonable likelihood of innocence. | Used to set the evaluative framework for assessing the prosecution’s three circumstances (last seen, motive, recovery) and to insist on a complete, reliable chain. |
| Vijay Kumar Arora v. State Government of NCT of Delhi, (2010) 2 SCC 353 | Same principle on the rigorous standard for circumstantial evidence. | Reinforced the requirement that each circumstance be proved and collectively form an unbroken chain. |
| Munish Mubar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 10 SCC 464 | Standard for conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence. | Guided the Court’s scrutiny of the credibility and reliability of each alleged circumstance. |
| Dhan Raj v. State of Haryana, (2014) 6 SCC 745 | Need for a complete chain excluding innocence in circumstantial cases. | Supported the conclusion that deficiencies in key links (like last seen and recovery) are fatal to the prosecution. |
| Nizam v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 1 SCC 550 | Reiterated the stringent test for circumstantial evidence. | Applied to hold that the prosecution’s chain was incomplete and did not meet the requisite standard. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by reaffirming the well-settled standard governing convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence: the prosecution must prove each circumstance clearly, and the totality must form a complete chain that excludes any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
- Last seen circumstance:
- The High Court had accepted the “last seen” link based on P.W.4 and P.W.5. The Supreme Court scrutinized their testimonies and found multiple infirmities.
- P.W.4 and P.W.5 did not claim to have seen the victim in the company of the accused; they only stated they saw the accused in front of P.W.1’s house around 5:15 A.M. on 21.06.1998. This weakens the classic “last seen with the deceased” inference.
- There was a material discrepancy concerning when their statements were recorded. Although P.W.4, P.W.5, and the Investigating Officer (P.W.22) indicated the statements were recorded on 22.06.1998, the Judicial Magistrate’s seal and signature on those statements bear the date 01.07.1998. P.W.22 admitted these dates and could not satisfactorily explain the delay.
- The Court viewed this approximately one-week delay as highly unnatural conduct, especially given that P.W.4 and P.W.5 hoped to seek a recommendation from P.W.1 and would have had an immediate reason to report such vital information upon learning of the murder.
- P.W.5 also gave contradictory statements about whether he stayed at P.W.12’s house on the relevant night, and P.W.22’s cross-examination indicated vital improvements by P.W.4 and P.W.5 during trial.
- Given these inconsistencies and the delayed statements, the Court found the “last seen” evidence unreliable and not proved.
- Motive:
- The prosecution’s suggested motives—the earlier Rs. 13,00,000 custody transaction (since returned in instalments), the failed marriage proposal between Mohankumar and Kalaiselvi, P.W.1’s refusal to include Muniasamy in his business, and P.W.1’s non-intervention after Accused No. 2’s termination—were assessed collectively.
- The Court held these strands were not directly connected to the victim and, on the facts, were too weak to constitute a credible motive for murdering the son of P.W.1. The circumstances did not disclose sufficiently strong reasons to commit the offence.
- Recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act:
- The recovery of two knives was attributed to a disclosure by Accused No. 1. The Investigating Officer admitted that, after seizure, the knives were not sealed; they were merely placed in a box and sent to the Judicial Magistrate.
- The Court characterized this procedure as highly improper and illegal, as the unsealed box could have been opened and the weapons tampered with or replaced at any stage. Consequently, the recovery was not proved in accordance with law.
- Even otherwise, the Court emphasized that recovery from Accused No. 1 alone, in the face of otherwise unreliable evidence, could not sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC.
Applying the governing principle for circumstantial evidence, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken and credible chain of circumstances. The deficiencies in the “last seen” account, the weak motive, and the flawed recovery collectively warranted extending the benefit of doubt to the accused.
Holding and Implications
Appeal allowed; convictions and sentences set aside; appellants acquitted. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment dated 29.08.2001 in S.C. No. 250 of 2000 as affirmed by the High Court’s judgment dated 23.09.2008. The appellants (Accused Nos. 1 and 2) were directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
Implications: The direct consequence is the acquittal of the appellants on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence. The opinion applies settled principles on circumstantial evidence and does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond reaffirming the existing standards.
Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.:— Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The judgment dated 23.09.2008 passed by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in Crl.A. No. 884 of 2001 confirming the judgment dated 29.08.2001, passed in S.C. No. 250 of 2000 by the First Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai is called in question in this appeal by Accused Nos. 1 and 2. It is relevant to mention here that Accused No. 3 was a juvenile and was dealt with by a different forum under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
3. The case of the prosecution in brief is that the deceased, Harish Kumar, is the son of P.W.1 Velusamy and at the time of the offence Velusamy was a member of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 are distantly related to P.W.1. One Mr. Pattai Muniasamy, the paternal uncle of Accused Nos. 1 and 2, had given a sum of Rs. 13,00,000/- (Rupees thirteen lakhs only) to P.W.1 for safe custody, which he got back in instalments. There was a relationship between Mohankumar (the son of Pattai Muniasamy) and one Kalaiselvi, who is the daughter of P.W.1's cousin Kannuchamy (P.W.12). Though attempts were made to get them married, Mohankumar's family refused the proposal. P.W.1 was requested by the father of Kalaiselvi to intervene and settle the matter and hence P.W.1 intervened and attempted settlement, but the same proved to be a futile exercise. In that regard, Kalaiselvi had lodged a complaint against Mohankumar under Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
4. It is also the case of the prosecution that Muniasamy requested P.W.1 to take him as a partner in his liquor shop business but the same was refused by P.W.1. Accused No. 2 got employment in a Fair Price Shop run by the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation on the recommendation of P.W.1. However, the service of Accused No. 2 was terminated due to misconduct, and though P.W.1 was requested to intervene yet again, he declined to do so.
5. In view of the aforementioned motive, Accused Nos. 1 to 3 grouped together and committed the murder of P.W.1's son, namely, Harish Kumar, aged about 17 years. The accused allegedly committed the offence during the early hours of 21.06.1998 by trespassing into the house of P.W.1.
6. The Accused Nos. 1 and 2 were tried and convicted for the offences under Sections 449 and 302 of the IPC read with Section 34 of the IPC, and sentenced to 3 years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 449 of the IPC and life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The High Court confirmed the judgment of conviction.
7. There are no eye witnesses to the incident in question and the case of the prosecution rests solely upon circumstantial evidence.
8. Before we proceed further, it would be worthwhile to recall that it has been settled through a catena of decisions that the Court should satisfy itself that the various circumstances in the chain of evidence must have been established clearly and that the completed chain is such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. (For example, see: Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa, (1991) 3 SCC 27; Vijay Kumar Arora v. State Government of Delhi NCT, (2010) 2 SCC 353; Munish Mubar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 10 SCC 464; Dhan Raj v. State of Haryana, (2014) 6 SCC 745; Nizam v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 1 SCC 550). It is in light of this position of law that the circumstantial evidence in the instant case needs to be examined.
9. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are as follows:
(a) The last seen circumstance;
(b) motive for the commission of the offence; and
(c) the recovery of two knives based on the confession made by Accused No. 1 before the Police Officer, as per Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
10. The first of the above, i.e. “the last seen circumstance” is spoken to by P.W.4, P.W.5, P.W.8 and P.W.9. The High Court rightly disbelieved the evidence of P.W.8 and P.W.9. However, believing the evidence of P.W.s 4 and 5, the High Court held the “last seen circumstance” proved.
11. We have perused the evidence of P.W.4 and P.W.5 meticulously. P.W.4 has deposed that after he secured an interview for the post of Conductor in the Marudhupandi Transport Corporation, in order to get a recommendation from P.W.1, who happened to be an M.L.A. at that point of time, P.W.4 along with P.W.5 had come to the house of P.W.1 at 10.00 P.M. on 20.06.1998 and found that P.W.1 was not available. Hoping to meet P.W.1 the next morning, P.W.4 and P.W.5 had proceeded to the house of P.W.12, which was situated on the same street as P.W.1's house, and stayed there for the night. At about 5.15 A.M. on 21.06.1998, P.W. 4 looked down from the terrace to see whether the door of the house of P.W.1 was open, but found the door closed. However, soon after, he saw Accused Nos. 1 to 3 in front of the house of P.W.1. P.W.5 has deposed that he saw the accused outside the victim's house on the morning of the incident, when he was leaving the house of P.W.12 with P.W.4. It has not been deposed by P.W.4 and P.W.5 that they saw the victim in the company of these accused; rather, it is their specific deposition that they only saw the accused in front of the house of P.W.1. Curiously, the Investigating Officer (P.W.22), in his cross-examination, has deposed that the statements of P.W.4, P.W.5, P.W.8 and P.W.9 were recorded on 22.06.1998, which is corroborated by the testimony of P.W. 4 and P.W. 5. But the depositions of P.W.22, P.W.4 and P.W.5 in this respect are belied by the fact that the seal and signature of the Judicial Magistrate found on the statements of P.W.4 and P.W.5 is dated 01.07.1998. P.W.22, on being confronted with the date of receipt during his cross examination, admitted these dates and failed to give a satisfactory explanation as to the delay in receipt of these statements by the Court. This strongly suggests that the statements of P.W.4 and P.W.5 were in fact recorded around 01.07.1998, and not on 22.06.1998 as they have deposed.
12. The above conclusion also casts serious doubts on the veracity of the testimony of P.W.s 4 and 5 as a whole, since a delay of one week in giving their statements to the police amounts to highly unnatural conduct on their part. Moreover, P.W. 5 also gave contradictory statements as to whether or not he stayed in P.W. 12's house on the relevant night. If P.W.4 and P.W.5 had really stayed at P.W. 12's house and seen Accused Nos. 1 to 3 in front of the house of the victim at about 5.15 A.M. on 21.06.1998, they would not have missed the opportunity to state this vital fact before the M.L.A. or the Investigating Officer immediately, upon the discovery of the offence, more particularly when they wanted a recommendation from the M.L.A. Thus, it appears that though the news of the murder of the victim became known to the public at large immediately, P.W.4 and P.W.5, instead of intimating the same to the family members of the victim, gave their statements only on 01.07.1998. Additionally, in the cross-examination of P.W.22, he has given certain answers in favour of the accused based on the material on record which clearly reveal that vital improvements were made by P.W. 4 and P.W. 5 during the course of their evidence. Hence, in our considered opinion, the testimony of P.W.4 and P.W.5 is unreliable, and therefore cannot be held to have been proved by the prosecution satisfactorily.
13. The evidence to prove the ‘circumstance of motive’ is also very shaky.
14. All the alleged facts indicating motive relied upon by the prosecution, i.e. the affair of Mohankumar with Kalaiselvi, the money transaction, the dismissal of Accused No. 2 from temporary service, etc. are not directly connected to the victim and are merely projected as grouses against his father leading to the murder of the son. Even if it is possible that a person might be murdered by an individual on account of a grouse against his parents, the circumstances on hand do not disclose strong enough reasons to do so. Firstly, even according to the case of the prosecution, the money given by Pattai Muniasamy to P.W.1 for safe custody, i.e., Rs. 13,00,000/- (Rupees thirteen lakhs only), had already been returned in instalments. Secondly, the alleged relationship between Kalaiselvi and Mohankumar does not directly concern the family of P.W.1 or the victim. Though P.W.1 admitted that he intervened to convince the boy's family to get the couple married, this does not in any way amount to a motive for killing his son when the marriage did not come through and problems arose therefrom. The third alleged motive, that P.W.1 had failed to intervene after Accused No. 2 was fired from his job due to misconduct, is also unconvincing. Similar is the case for the alleged motive that P.W.1 had refused to make Muniasamy a partner in his liquor business.
15. Hence, considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the aspect of ‘motive’, as put forth by the prosecution, appears to be very weak, and the same cannot be believed as a reason to commit the murder of the victim.
16. So far as the recovery of two knives is concerned, it is based on the alleged statement made by Accused No. 1. The Investigating Officer deposed that after the seizure of the knives, the same were not sealed at all, and he merely put them in a box and sent the same to the Judicial Magistrate. Such procedure adopted by the prosecution is highly improper and illegal, inasmuch as the box could have been opened at any stage by anybody and the weapon tampered with or replaced. Hence, the aspect of recovery is also not proved in accordance with law. Even otherwise, the circumstance of recovery from Accused No. 1 alone will not be sufficient to convict him for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, when all the remaining evidence of the prosecution is unbelievable.
17. Thus, the accused are entitled to get the benefit of doubt and are entitled to be acquitted.
18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and the judgment dated 29.08.2001 passed by the First Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai in S.C. No. 250 of 2000 as affirmed by the High Court is set aside, and the appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
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