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M/S S K TRANSLINES P... v. THE STATE OF MAHARAS...

Bombay High Court
Jan 16, 2018
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of the Opinion: Writ Petition No.14847 of 2017 (with Civil Application No.447 of 2018)

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises out of a licence awarded to the petitioner, M/s S.K. Translines Pvt. Ltd., pursuant to a tender for running parcel, allied services and courier operations on State Transport buses of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (MSRTC) for the period 1.11.2015 to 31.10.2018. Respondent No.4 communicated an order dated 16.12.2017 (received by the petitioner on 17.12.2017) terminating the licence with effect from 18.12.2017, forfeiting the security deposit and bank guarantee, and imposing penalties. The petitioner challenged that termination by filing the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition was heard before a Division Bench (S.V. Gangapurwala and Arun M. Dhavale, JJ.) on 16.01.2018.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain the petition in a contractual matter involving the State and its instrumentality.
  2. Whether, by agreement between parties (clause in the licence deed), the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 can be restricted (i.e., whether a clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts at Mumbai can bar the High Court's writ jurisdiction).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. P.M. Shah, Senior Advocate)

  • The termination order dated 16.12.2017 was passed without notice and without following principles of natural justice; clause 41 of the licence deed mandates a process (notice to remove cause of dissatisfaction and a 30-day cure period followed by 15 days' notice of termination) which was not followed.
  • When a State or an instrumentality of the State enters into contracts, the High Court's power of judicial review under Article 226 continues to subsist; reliance placed on authorities to that effect.
  • Where termination of contract entails civil consequences (forfeiture, penalty, disqualification/blacklisting), an opportunity of hearing is required; reliance placed on relevant Supreme Court authority.
  • Availability of an alternate remedy (and absence of arbitration clause) does not bar invocation of writ jurisdiction; and an agreement cannot oust Article 226 jurisdiction.
  • The action of the Respondents was arbitrary and mala fide, and the stated breaches were either trivial or factually incorrect (e.g., GST registration issue where the petitioner had provided a screenshot proof and later furnished physical certificate on 18.12.2017).

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Mr. V.J. Dixit, Senior Advocate)

  • Clause 53 of the licence deed provides that the Courts located at Mumbai shall alone have jurisdiction to try disputes between the parties; parties can by agreement restrict jurisdiction where two or more courts have concurrent jurisdiction (reliance on case law).
  • Writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to interfere in contractual matters: interpretation and implementation of contract terms are generally not matters for writ jurisdiction (reliance on Supreme Court authorities).
  • The petitioner had been repeatedly notified of breaches (references to letters dated 15.07.2017, 11.09.2017 and notice of 07.10.2017) and had been penalised earlier for specific lapses; the Respondents contend the termination was in bona fide exercise of contractual rights and clause 6 permits forfeiture of security/bank guarantee without further notice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. & others v. Super Highway Services & another, (2010) 3 SCC 347 Requirement of fair procedure and service of notice before terminating dealership/contract; non-service of notice offends principle that no person should be condemned unheard. The Court relied on this authority to emphasize that termination affecting contractual rights requires fair adherence to procedural requirements and notice; used to support requirement of hearing/notice here.
Rajesh Sadanand Patil v. The Additional Collector & others / Rajesh Sadanand Patil v. Dadasaheb Kisan Suryawanshi, AIR 2003 Bombay 304 Article 14 and contractual obligations can co-exist; State action in contractual matters is not entirely immune from judicial review on grounds of fairness. The Court cited this Division Bench decision to support the proposition that contractual obligations of the State can be subject to judicial review for arbitrariness and unfairness under Article 14.
Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa & another, (2006) 10 SCC 236 Contractual matters involving the State remain amenable to limited judicial review; where Article 14 violations, mala fides or ulterior motives are alleged, writ jurisdiction may be invoked. The Court used this authority to confirm that writ jurisdiction can be exercised in contractual disputes where malafide or arbitrariness is alleged; thus contractual nature alone does not automatically oust Article 226.
Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project, BSNL & others, (2014) 14 SCC 731 When termination of contract entails civil consequences, an opportunity of hearing is required before termination. The Court relied on this principle to hold that because termination here resulted in forfeiture and penalties (civil consequences), prior hearing/notice was necessary.
P.R. Transport Agency v. Union of India & others, AIR 2006 Allahabad 23 Agreement cannot oust or curtail jurisdiction under Article 226; an agreement restricting jurisdiction of the High Court is not effective to bar constitutional remedy. The Court relied on this High Court view to support its conclusion that clause 53 (jurisdiction at Mumbai) cannot circumscribe the writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
Sun TV Network Ltd. & others v. Union of India & others, (2016) 5 Mh.L.J. 198 Agreement cannot circumvent constitutional jurisdiction; similar view that jurisdiction under Article 226 is sacrosanct. Cited as a supporting High Court decision for the proposition that parties cannot by agreement exclude Article 226 jurisdiction.
Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Rama Mishra, 2002 (9) SCC 613 Parties may, by agreement, restrict the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts where concurrent jurisdiction exists (principle relied on by respondents). The Court noted this authority was relied upon by respondents, but distinguished it on the basis that Article 226 jurisdiction is constitutional and cannot be ousted by agreement.
Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corp. Ltd., 2013 (9) SCC 32 Enforcement of forum-selection clauses / agreements conferring exclusive jurisdiction on specified courts in commercial contracts. The respondents relied on this authority to support clause 53; the Court recognized it but held that such contractual restriction does not extend to ousting extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226.
Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation v. Gayatri Construction Company, LEX(SC) 2008 822 Interpretation and implementation of contractual clauses ordinarily are not matters for writ jurisdiction. The Court acknowledged this principle but limited its applicability: while merits of contract interpretation are generally not suited to writ, the Court may review the decision-making process and arbitrariness.
Empire Jute Co. Ltd. v. Jute Corporation of India Ltd., LEX(SC) 2007 1061 Where an agreement contains an arbitration clause, judicial review should ordinarily not be exercised to decide contractual disputes. The Court considered this rule but noted that in the present case arbitration was expressly negated by clause 50 and that the Court was confining itself to review of the process rather than merits.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bridge and Roof Co. India Ltd., LEX(SC) 1996 845 Writ petitions to restrain government action under contracts (such as deductions/withholdings) are generally not maintainable; contractual disputes are ordinarily not amenable to writ relief. The Court referenced this authority to show the general rule but proceeded to distinguish on facts where procedural fairness and Article 14 considerations justified limited intervention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court confined its inquiry to the decision-making process followed by the Respondents and expressly declined to examine the merits of the Respondents' findings on the alleged contractual breaches. The reasoning proceeded in the following steps (based on the record and submissions):

  1. The Court reproduced and analysed the relevant contractual provisions: Clause 41 (Notice of termination) which prescribes a two-step process — (i) a written notice indicating causes of dissatisfaction and 30 days to remedy; and (ii) if not remedied, 15 days' notice to terminate the deed — and Clause 53 (jurisdiction clause conferring jurisdiction on Courts at Mumbai only). Clause 50 (decision by VC & Managing Director, not arbitration) was also noted.
  2. Factual findings from the record: the licence covered 1.11.2015 to 31.10.2018; Respondents sent letters in July and September 2017 asking compliance with clause 36 (setting up parcel office) and issued a notice on 7.10.2017; however, the termination letter dated 16.12.2017 referred to earlier breaches (dated 13.3.2016 and others) and terminated the licence effective 18.12.2017, forfeiting security and bank guarantee and imposing penalties. The petitioner received the termination letter on 17.12.2017 in the evening.
  3. Application of legal principles: the Court acknowledged the general rule that courts are reluctant to entertain writ petitions challenging contractual matters (citing Pimpri Chinchwad, Empire Jute, Bridge & Roof). However, the Court emphasized that limitations on review do not mean absolute immunity where procedural fairness, Article 14 violations, mala fides or arbitrariness are alleged (citing Rajesh Sadanand Patil, Noble Resources and Hindustan Petroleum).
  4. Assessment of procedure followed: the Court found that the Respondent did not comply with Clause 41's mandatory procedure — specifically, the Respondents did not issue a written notice indicating that causes of dissatisfaction had not been removed after the 30-day cure period and then give 15 days' notice of termination. Instead, the Respondents directly issued termination, forfeited security/bank guarantee and levied penalties.
  5. Consequences of termination: the Court noted that the termination carried civil consequences (forfeiture of funds, penalties, and disqualification/blacklisting implications) and therefore required observance of fair process and prior notice (invoking Kulja and Hindustan Petroleum authorities).
  6. Jurisdictional contention: while respondents relied on clause 53 and supporting Supreme Court precedents (Shriram City, Swastik Gases) to argue that parties can agree on exclusive forum, the Court held that Article 226 is a constitutional, extraordinary jurisdiction that cannot be ousted by agreement; Section 28 of the Contract Act (or statutory forum-selection restrictions) does not apply to constitutional remedies (citing P.R. Transport Agency and Sun TV High Court view).
  7. Relief fashioned: on the basis that the decision-making process was flawed and clause 41 was not followed, the Court set aside the termination communication dated 16.12.2017, treated that communication as a notice to which the petitioner must respond, directed the petitioner to file its reply within ten days, directed Respondents to consider the reply on merits and decide appropriately, restrained the Respondents from proceeding with the fresh tender process until a decision is taken, and disposed of the writ petition and connected civil application subject to the directions. The Court kept the effect of its judgment in abeyance for four weeks to permit Respondents an opportunity to avail further remedy, but reiterated that the tender process shall not proceed in the meanwhile.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court set aside the termination/communication dated 16.12.2017 and held that the termination was procedurally flawed for non-compliance with Clause 41 and for violating principles of natural justice; accordingly the communication is to be treated as a notice, and the parties are to follow the prescribed process before any final decision is taken.

Direct consequences and directions imposed by the Court (as recorded):

  • The order/communication dated 16.12.2017 terminating the licence is set aside.
  • The contents of that communication (regarding alleged breaches) are to be treated as a notice; the petitioner must file its reply within ten (10) days addressing remediation of the causes of dissatisfaction.
  • On receipt of the petitioner's reply, the Respondents shall consider the same and take an appropriate decision on merits.
  • Till such decision is taken pursuant to the petitioner's reply, any further tender process for the work shall be kept in abeyance and shall not be proceeded with.
  • The Writ Petition (and the connected Civil Application) is disposed of in terms of these directions, with no order as to costs.
  • Effect of the judgment is kept in abeyance for four (4) weeks (to permit Respondents to avail further remedy), but the Respondents are expressly restrained from proceeding with the fresh tender during this abeyance period.

Broader implications: The Court reaffirmed that while contractual disputes are generally not amenable to writ relief, the High Court may exercise its Article 226 jurisdiction to examine the decision-making process and to intervene where procedural lapses, arbitrariness, mala fides or violations of Article 14 are alleged. The opinion underscores that parties cannot by private agreement oust the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226.

Show all summary ...

1 W.P.No.14847/17

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE

AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD.

WRIT PETITION NO.14847 OF 2017

WITH

CIVIL APPLICATION NO.447 OF 2018.

IN

WRIT PETITION NO.14847 OF 2017

M/s S.K.Translines Pvt. Ltd. 17/19, 1st floor,

Suresh Dada Jain Complex, Ajintha Road, Jalgaon, through its Authorised Representative

Prakash Dnyaneshwar Baviskar, Age 30 years, Occ.Service, R/o Jalgaon. ... Petitioner. Versus

1. The State of Maharashtra, through Secretary,

Transport Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai-32.

2. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Central Office - Mharashtra Vahatuk Bhavan,

Dr.Anandrao Nair Marg, Mumbai-400 008

through its Chairman,

3. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Central Office - Maharashtra Vahatuk Bhawan,

Dr.Anandrao Nair Marg, Mumbai-400 008,

through its Vice Chairman- Managing Director,

1

4. General Manager, (Planning & Marketing), Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Maharashtra Vahatuk Bhawan, Dr.Anandrao Nair Marg, Mumbai-400 008.

5. General Manager(Traffif), Maharashtra State Road Transport Corproation, Maharashtra Vahatuk Bhawan, Dr.Anandrao Nair Marg, Mumbai-400 008. ... Respondents.

...

Mr.P.M.Shah, Senior advocate holding for Mr.A.N.Sikchi, advocate for the petitioner. Mrs.Vaishali Patil Jadhav, A.G.P. for the State. Mr.V.J.Dixit, Senior advocate holding for Mr.D.S.Bagul, advocate for Respondent Nos.2 to 5. Mr.S.U.Chaudhari, advocate for Applicant- Intervener.

...

CORAM : S.V.GANGAPURWALA AND

ARUN M. DHAVALE,JJ.

Date : 16.01.2018.

ORAL JUDGMENT (Per S.V.Gangapurwala,J.)

1. The substratum of the matter is based on following grounds :

(i) The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain the petition in contractual matter.

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(ii) Whether by an agreement the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be restricted.

2. Pursuant to the tender process, the petitioner was the successful bidder and was awarded work order by Respondent No.5 for carrying out the business of transportation of parcel, specific allied services and couriers by the State Transport Buses of Respondent Corporation for the period 1.11.2015 to 31.10.2018 on the terms and conditions subscribed to in the licence deed and the tender document.

3. Under order dated 16.12.2017, communicated to the petitioner on 17.12.2017, the Respondent No.4 terminated licence granted to the petitioner for transportation of parcels, couriers and allied services with effect from 18.12.2017. Respondent No.4 in said order forfeited security deposit and Bank guarantee, and also imposed penalty. The petitioner has assailed aforesaid order in present Petition.

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4. Mr.P.M.Shah, learned Senior advocate for the petitioner in his usual erudite disposition, put forth following submissions :

(a) The order terminating the licence granted to the petitioner by Respondent No.4 for transportation of parcels, couriers and allied services is without notice to the petitioner and without following the principles of natural justice. Clause 41 of the Licence deed requires the Respondents to give 30 days notice, if they want to prematurely terminate the contract. According to learned Senior advocate, principles of natural justice are required to be followed in such matters. The learned Senior advocate relies on judgment of the Apex Court in the case of

"Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and others Vs. Super Highway Services and another" reported in

(2010) 3 SCC 347. The learned Senior advocate also relies on judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of "Rajesh Sadanand Patil Vs. The Additional Collector and others" reported in AIR 2003 Bombay 304.

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(b) The learned Senior advocate further submits that in contractual matters involving the State and instrumentality of the State, powers of this Court of judicial review subsist. To buttress his submission, he relies on judgment of the Apex Court in the case of "Noble Resources Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa and another"

reported in (2006) 10 Supreme Court Cases 236.

(c) It is further contended that when the effect of the termination of the contract entails civil consequences then opportunity of hearing is must. He relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in a case of "Kulja Industries Limited Vs. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and others" reported in (2014) 14 Supreme Court Cases 731.

(d) The availability of alternate remedy would be no bar to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. In present case even Arbitration clause does not exist. The learned Senior advocate further submits that by an agreement jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of

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the Constitution of India, can not be restricted. He relies on judgment of the Apex Court in the case of "P.R.Transport Agency Vs. Union of India (UOI) and others" reported in AIR 2006 Allahabad 23 and judgment of learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of "Sun TV Network Ltd. and others Vs. Union of India and others"

reported in (2016) 5 Mh.L.J. 198.

e) The action is arbitrary and malafide. It is submitted by learned Senior advocate that reasons referred to in the order for termination are in fact non-existent. The alleged breaches were trivial and were in respect of earlier period. The grievance of the Respondent with regard to registration under GST, the petitioner had provided screen-shot to the Respondents showing that it is registered under GST. The petitioner had not received the certificate in physical form. While the same was received on 18.12.2017, it was immediately submitted to the Respondents. Even opinion of the Chartered Accountant of the Respondents is that GST would not apply.

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5. Mr.Dixit, learned Senior advocate for the Respondents in a lucid manner canvassed following propositions :

(a) That the parties under clause 53 had agreed that if any dispute arises between them then the Court located at Mumbai alone shall have jurisdiction to try and decide the dispute between the parties. The learned Senior Advocate submits that if two or more Courts have jurisdiction, the parties by an agreement can restrict the jurisdiction to any one Court. The learned Senior advocate relies on judgment of the Apex Court in the case of "Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Limited Vs. Rama Mishra"

reported in 2002 (9) SCC 613, so also on case of

"Swastik Gases P. Ltd. Vs. Indian Oil Corp.Ltd."

reported in 2013 (9) SCC 32.

(b) Learned Senior advocate further submits that in contractual matters,this Court would not exercise its jurisdiction of its judicial review. The matter between the parties arises out of the terms and conditions of contract. This Court

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would not entertain a Writ Petition against termination of contract in its writ jurisdiction. The learned Senior advocate relies on judgment of the Apex Court in the case of "Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation Vs. Gayatri Construction Company" reported in LEX(SC) 2008 822, so also on the case of "Empire Jute Co. Ltd Vs. Jute Corporation of India Ltd." reported in

LEX(SC) 2007 1061. Learned Senior advocate also places reliance on the case of "State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Bridge and Roof Company India Limited" reported in LEX(SC) 1996 845.

(c) Learned Senior advocate further submits that considering breaches committed by the petitioner from time to time, notices were issued to the petitioner. The petitioner went on committing breaches of the terms of the license deed. It is not that the petitioner was not made aware of the lapses on its part. The lapses on the part of the petitioner as enumerated in the order of termination were communicated to the petitioner on each and every occasion and lastly, the petitioner was also directed to provide the

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details of GST registration. The petitioner failed to provide the same. The petitioner was required to get itself registered under GST. Failure on the part of the petitioner to get itself registered under GST is fatal. The Respondents had rightly exercised its right and terminated the contract to avoid further defaults.

(d) The learned Senior advocate further submits that for forfeiture of security deposit, bank guarantee, the license deed does not provide for issuance of notice and the right has been given to the Respondent-Corporation to forfeit the security deposit, bank guarantee as contained in clause 6 of the Licence Deed. According to learned Senior advocate the right has been exercised by the Respondents, on account of breach committed by the petitioner. Action has been taken bonafide and can not be termed as arbitrary or malafide and prays for dismissal of the Writ Petition.

6. We have considered submissions of the

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respective learned Senior counsel for the parties.

7. Before proceeding further it would be necessary to reproduce the clause relied by the parties. Clause 41 reads as under :

"41. Notice of termination of License Deed

If during the period of deed remains in force,the General Manager (Traffic) has reason to be dissatisfied with the service or the manner of the implementation of the contract and/or the representatives of the Licencee, the Licensor may by notice in writing call upon the Licencee to remove the cause of such dissatisfaction in the way to be indicated in the notice and if the Licencee fails for a period of 30 days after the receipt of such notice to remedy such causes of

dissatisfaction to the satisfaction

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of the General Manager (Traffic) then notwithstanding anything contained in the agreement to the contrary the General Manager (Traffic) shall be at liberty to any time thereafter to terminate this deed by giving the Licencee 15 days notice in writing and the deed, shall, on expiry of the notice period, stand cancelled and the Licencee shall be liable to pay the guaranteed revenue of balance period of deed and also security deposit liable to be forfeited. Clause 53. Jurisdiction of Court at Mumbai only

The Court located at Mumbai shall only have jurisdiction to try and decide any matter/dispute between the parties."

8. The contract between the Respondents and petitioner is for a period of three years starting from 1.11.2015 and ending on 31.10.2018.

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The Respondents claim to have issued letters on 15.7.2017 and 11.9.2017 to the petitioner for starting parcel office/Booking at Bus stand as per clause 36 of the Licence deed and that petitioner did not comply. According to Respondents, the petitioner violated clauses 16,17.3 and 19 of the Licence deed and notice dated 7.10.2017 was issued. The breaches alleged by the Respondents are disputed by the petitioner. The grievance of the Respondents is also about non-registration under GST by the petitioner. The petitioner claims to have provided with the screen shot of its registration from the web-site. The Respondents were not convinced and the Respondents issued letter dated 16.12.2017, terminating the contract w.e.f. 18.12.2017 and said letter is received by the petitioner on 17.12.2017 in the evening at about

8.21 p.m.

9. The terms of the Licence deed are binding on both the parties.

10. Clause 41 of the Licence deed mandates

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that if the Respondent is dissatisfied with the service or the manner of the implementation of the contract by licensee or its representative then the Licensor/Respondent is required to indicate in writing to the licencee to remove the causes of dissatisfaction and if the licencee fails within 30 days after the receipt of notice to remedy the causes of dissatisfaction then the Respondent is required to give 15 days notice in writing to terminate the licence.

11. This Court would be loath to exercise its jurisdiction to judicial review decision taken by a party under the contract may be largely a position, yet due adherence to the decision making process can be a concern for this Court.

12. We have to make it clear that we are not examining the decision of the Respondents on merits and are confining ourselves to the decision making process.

13. In the case of "Pimpri Chinchwad

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Municipal Corporation Vs. Gayatri Construction Company" (supra) the Apex Court observed that Interpretation and implementation of clauses in contract can not be the subject matter of the Writ Petition. In the case of "State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Bridge and Roof Company India Limited" (supra) it is held that Writ Petition for restraining Government from deducting or withholding particular sum payable to Respondent company under contract is wholly misconceived and not maintainable. In the case of "Empire Jute Co.Ltd. Vs. Jute Corporation of India Ltd."

(supra) the Apex Court observed that when there is agreement between parties containing Arbitration Clause the power of judicial review should not be exercised.

14. The Apex Court in a case of "Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and others Vs. Super Highway Services and Another" (supra) has observed as under :

"17. The cancellation of dealership agreement of a party is a serious business and cannot be taken

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lightly. In order to justify the action taken to terminate such an agreement, the concerned authority has to act fairly and in complete adherence to the rules/guidelines framed for the said purpose. The non-service of notice to the aggrieved person before termination of his dealership agreement also offends the well-established principle that no person should be condemned unheard. It was the duty of the petitioner to ensure that the Respondent No.1 was given a hearing or at least serious attempts were made to serve him with notice of the proceedings before terminating his agreement."

A Division Bench of this Court in the case of

"Rajesh Sadanand Patil Vs. Dadasaheb Kisan Suryawanshi" (supra) has observed that requirements of Article 14 and contractual obligations are not alien concepts which can not

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co-exist. It is difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters, after contract has been made from the purview of judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

15. The Apex Court in a case of "Noble Resources Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa and another"

(supra) has observed that contractual matters of the State are not totally beyond the scope of judicial review albeit its ambit is limited. Each case has to be decided on its own facts. Where State violates Article 14 or malafides or ulterior motives are attributed, judicial review would be permissible. Even existence of a disputed question of fact or availability of an alternate remedy are not ipso facto a bar to the exercise of High Court's writ jurisdiction.

16. The Respondent has failed to abide by clause 41. The Respondent in its letter of termination of contract dt.16.12.2017 has referred to the breach committed by the petitioner on 13.3.2016, for which petitioner was

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imposed fine of Rs.1000/- (Rupees one thousand). The other lapse is of twice allowing parcel weighing more than 500 Kg. for which petitioner was imposed fine of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand) by the Respondent on 21.6.2016, the petitioner had allowed parcel containing acid and the petitioner was imposed fine of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees one thousand). The other cause of dissatisfaction is non-registration under GST. The Chartered Accountant of the petitioner had opined that the transportation of parcel under the Licence deed would not deduct GST provided petitioner is registered under The Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The petitioner had provided the screen shot from the web-site to show that it is registered under GST. The petitioner till then had not received the certificate in the physical form. It is only on 18.12.2017, the petitioner could receive the certificate in physical form and on 18.12.2017, gave the copy in physical form, it being registered under GST Act.

17. The Respondent at no point of time ever

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issued notice in writing to the petitioner that the cause of dissatisfaction has not been removed and straightway issued notice of termination of contract and forfeited security deposit, bank guarantee and levied penalty.

18. The Respondent miserably failed to abide imperative stipulation of giving 15 days notice terminating contract, according to clause 41 of the Licence deed. The Respondent did not even give an opportunity to the petitioner to blink and straightaway resorted to the drastic step of terminating the contract, so also forfeiting security deposit, bank guarantee and levying penalty of almost Rupees twelve crore and further on 19th December 2017 floated fresh tender inviting offer for said work. The action of the Respondent recks arbitrariness.

19. The termination of contract entailed civil consequences. The security deposit is forfeited and also the Bank guarantee. The penalty is levied. The forfeiture of security, Bank guarantee and levy of penalty has the effect

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of disqualifying the petitioner from participating in any other tender process in a way Blacklisting the petitioner. Even on this count prior notice was necessary in due observance of principles of natural justice.

20. The Respondent-Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation is an instrumentality of the State. An instrumentality of the State is expected to act as a model litigant. Fair play is expected on the part of the Corporation. Any action that is arbitrary is unsustainable. Arbitrariness has no role in the society governed by the Rule of law. Arbitrariness is antithesis to the Rule of law, fair play justice, equity and good conscious.

21. In the present case it is undisputed that Arbitration clause does not exist. Clause 50 of the Licence deed specifically negates arbitration. It states that in event of any dispute and/or interpretation of terms and conditions arises the same shall be referred to the Vice Chairman & Managing Director,

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Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and decision of the Vice Chairman and Managing Director shall be final and binding on both the parties. However, this shall not be treated as arbitration under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996.

22. The Respondent has instantly terminated the contract and on the very next day issued fresh tender for the same work. We have initially made it clear that we are entertaining the Petition only to the extent of due adherence to the decision making process.

23. The contract has been terminated without adhering to clause 41 of the License deed, so also transgressing the principles of natural justice. The decision making process is flouted. The writ jurisdiction of this Court can be exercised.

24. Much emphasis was laid by the Respondents on clause 53 of the License deed to submit that if any dispute arises between the

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parties then the jurisdiction is restricted to the Court at Mumbai. Reliance was placed on the judgments of Apex Court in the case of "Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Limited Vs. Rama Mishra" reported in 2002 (9) SCC 613, so also on case of "Swastik Gases P. Ltd. Vs. Indian Oil Corp. Ltd." reported in 2013 (9) SCC 32 (supra). In said cases the Apex Court was considering the agreement restricting the jurisdiction of civil Court.

25. The Constitution of India is Suprema Lex. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct. It is an extra-ordinary jurisdiction. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can not be circumvented and circumscribed by an agreement.

26. If two or more Courts have concurrent jurisdiction by virtue of Section 28 of Contract Act, the jurisdiction can be restricted to one Court. The said Section would apply to ordinary Tribunals exercising jurisdiction provided by the

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statute. Section 28 would not extend to the constitutional remedy. Even statute can not abrogate the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, much less an agreement by the parties. Similar view has been taken by Allahabad High Court in the case of "P.R.Transport Agency Vs. Union of India (UOI) and others" reported in AIR 2006 Allahabad 23 and the Madras High Court in the case of "Sun TV Network Ltd. and others Vs. Union of India and others" reported in (2016) 5 Mh.L.J.198 (supra).

27. In view of the aforesaid, we pass the following order :

a) The order/communication dated 16.12.2017 is set aside.

b) The contents of communication dated 16.12.2017 with regard to the breaches shall be considered as a notice to the petitioner. The petitioner shall file its reply with the Respondents within a period of ten (10) days about remedying the dissatisfaction of the

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Respondents.

c) On receipt of reply, the Respondents shall take appropriate decision upon it, on its own merits.

d) Till the decision is taken by Respondents, pursuant to the reply filed by the petitioner, the further tender process shall be kept in abeyance and shall not be proceeded with.

e) The Writ Petition is disposed of with aforesaid observations and directions with no order as to costs.

f) In view of disposal of Writ Petition, the Civil Application also stands disposed of.

28. At this stage, Mr.Bagul, learned advocate for the Respondent Nos.2 to 5 requests for keeping the present judgment in abeyance for a period of four (4) weeks. Mr. Sikchi, the learned advocate for the petitioner opposes the

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said request.

29. With a view to give opportunity to Respondents to avail further remedy, the effect of this judgment is kept in abeyance for a period of four (4) weeks, however, the Respondents shall not proceed with the tender process initiated as directed above.

Sd/- Sd/-

(ARUN M.DHAVALE,J.) (S.V.GANGAPURWALA,J.)

asp/office/wp14847.17

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