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Sr. Tessy Jose And Others v. State Of Kerala .
Factual and Procedural Background
An FIR under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”) was registered after a minor became pregnant, allegedly due to rape by Accused 1 in 2016. When the victim experienced abdominal pain, her mother took her to a hospital on 7 February 2017, where she immediately went into labour and delivered a child.
The three appellants—Accused 3, 4 and 5 in Sessions Case No. 460 of 2017 before the Special Judge, Ernakulam—were medical professionals or an administrator at the hospital. They were charged under:
- Section 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC),
- Section 19(1) read with Section 21(1) of the POCSO Act, and
- Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
On 1 August 2018 the Supreme Court, after hearing the matter, orally allowed the appeal and quashed the proceedings, stating that detailed reasons would follow. The present opinion supplies those reasons.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellants possessed the “knowledge” contemplated by Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act so as to impose a legal duty to report the offence.
- Whether the available evidence created a grave suspicion sufficient to sustain charges under Section 201 IPC, Section 19(1) POCSO Act, and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act against the appellants.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- They first encountered the victim only on 7 February 2017 and had no prior knowledge of her rape or pregnancy.
- The medical records showed the victim was recorded as 18 years old at admission, providing no direct indication that she had been a minor at the time of conception.
- The statutory obligation under Section 19(1) arises only when a person actually knows of the commission of a POCSO offence; it does not require independent investigation or deduction.
Prosecution's Position
- The appellants, by noting the victim’s age and pregnancy, ought to have inferred that a sexual offence had occurred and reported it, thus their failure attracted criminal liability under Section 19(1) POCSO Act and related provisions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala (2004) 11 SCC 576 | Definition of “knowledge” in criminal statutes as awareness derived from direct perception appealing to the senses. | Used to hold that the appellants could not be presumed to have “knowledge” of the rape merely from the victim’s age and pregnancy; no direct information had reached them. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined the statutory language of Section 19(1) POCSO Act, emphasizing that “knowledge” requires actual awareness derived from information, not conjecture.
Key analytical steps:
- No evidence of disclosure: Statements of the victim and her mother contained no indication that they informed any appellant about rape or the identity of Accused 1.
- Professional context: Appellant 1, a gynaecologist, attended the victim only between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m. during active labour; Appellant 2, a paediatrician, saw only the newborn at 5:30 p.m.; Appellant 3, a hospital administrator, had no contact with either patient.
- Inference versus knowledge: The prosecution’s theory that the appellants “should have deduced” a POCSO offence was deemed “too far-fetched.” Section 19(1) does not impose a duty to investigate.
- Evidentiary threshold: Criminal proceedings require evidence generating at least a grave suspicion; mere possibility or conjecture is insufficient.
- Application of precedent: Relying on A.S. Krishnan, the Court reiterated that knowledge must stem from direct information appealing to the senses, which was absent here.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeals are allowed; all proceedings against the appellants in Sessions Case No. 460 of 2017 are quashed.
Implications: The decision relieves the appellants of criminal prosecution and underscores that medical professionals are criminally liable under Section 19(1) POCSO Act only when they possess actual knowledge of an offence, not when such knowledge must be inferred. The ruling turns on statutory interpretation rather than establishing new precedent.
Dr A.K. Sikri, J.— After hearing this matter on 1-8-2018, the following order was passed:
“Leave granted. We have heard the arguments. We are informed that the trial is in progress today before the trial court. Since, there is not enough time to dictate the judgment, we are allowing this appeal so that the decision is conveyed to the trial court. Reasons to follow. A copy of this order may be provided to the counsel for the parties.”
2. We are now stating our reasons which led us to allow the appeal of the appellants.
3. First information report under the provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short “Pocso Act”) has been registered in which charge-sheet has been filed and the case registered as Sessions Case No. 460 of 2017 is pending before the Special Judge, Ernakulam. The appellants herein are arrayed as Accused 3, 4 and 5. Insofar as the appellants are concerned, allegations against them are under Section 201 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”), Section 19(1) read with Section 21(1) of the Pocso Act and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
4. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that Accused 1 had raped the victim when she was a minor in the year 2016. As a result, she became pregnant. As per victim's mother, when the victim started complaining about pain in her stomach, thinking it to be some problem related to stomach, she brought her to the hospital where the appellants were working, on 7-2-2017. It was found that the victim was in advanced stage of pregnancy. In fact, soon after she was brought to the hospital, she went into labour. She delivered the child. Insofar as the appellants are concerned, their role is that they attended to the victim. Appellant 1 is a 66 years' old lady who is a Gynaecologist and had conducted the delivery. Appellant 2 is a Paediatrician who had attended to the baby of the victim after the delivery. Appellant 3, is a 69 years' old Hospital Administrative. She is roped-in in that capacity though she did not attend to the victim or the baby.
5. It is not the case of the prosecution that these appellants had any knowledge about the alleged rape of the victim allegedly committed by Accused 1 at any time earlier. In fact, they did not come into picture before 7-2-2017 when the victim was brought to the hospital. However, the charge against these appellants is primarily on account of purported commission of an act under Sections 19(1) of the Pocso Act. This section reads as under:
“19. Reporting of offences.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), any person (including the child), who has apprehension that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence has been committed, he shall provide such information to—
(a) the Special Juvenile Police Unit; or
(b) the local police.
(2) Every report given under sub-section (1) shall be—
(a) ascribed an entry number and recorded in writing;
(b) be read over to the informant;
(c) shall be entered in a book to be kept by the Police Unit.
(3) Where the report under sub-section (1) is given by a child, the same shall be recorded under sub-section (2) in a simple language so that the child understands contents being recorded.
(4) In case contents are being recorded in the language not understood by the child or wherever it is deemed necessary, a translator or an interpreter, having such qualifications, experience and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, shall be provided to the child if he fails to understand the same.
(5) Where the Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police is satisfied that the child against whom an offence has been committed is in need of care and protection, then, it shall, after recording the reasons in writing, make immediate arrangement to give him such care and protection (including admitting the child into shelter home or to the nearest hospital) within twenty-four hours of the report, as may be prescribed.
(6) The Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police shall, without unnecessary delay but within a period of twenty-four hours, report the matter to the Child Welfare Committee and the Special Court or where no Special Court has been designated, to the Court of Session, including need of the child for care and protection and steps taken in this regard.
(7) No person shall incur any liability, whether civil or criminal, for giving the information in good faith for the purpose of sub-section (1).”
6. As is clear from the aforesaid provision, a person who had an apprehension that an offence under the said Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence had been committed would be required to provide such information to the relevant authorities.
7. Thus, what is alleged against the appellants is that they had the knowledge that an offence under the Act had been committed and, therefore, they were required to provide this information to the relevant authorities which they failed to do.
8. After going through the record and hearing the counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that no such case is made out even as per the material collected by the prosecution and filed in the Court. The statement of the mother of the victim was recorded by the police. The statement of the victim was also recorded. They have not stated at all that when the victim was brought to the hospital, her mother informed the appellants that she had been raped by Accused 1 when she was a minor. Admittedly, the victim was pregnant and immediately went into labour. In these circumstances, it was even the professional duty of Appellant 1 to attend to her and conduct the delivery, which she did. Likewise, after the baby was born, Appellant 2 as a Paediatrician performed her professional duty.
9. The entire case set up against the appellants is on the basis that when the victim was brought to the hospital her age was recorded as 18 years. On that basis, the appellants could have gathered that at the time of conception she was less than 18 years and was, thus, a minor and, therefore, the appellants should have taken due care in finding as to how the victim became pregnant. Fastening the criminal liability on the basis of the aforesaid allegation is too far-fetched. The provisions of Section 19(1), reproduced above, put a legal obligation on a person to inform the relevant authorities, inter alia, when he/she has knowledge that an offence under the Act had been committed. The expression used is “knowledge” which means that some information received by such a person gives him/her knowledge about the commission of the crime. There is no obligation on this person to investigate and gather knowledge. If at all, the appellants were not careful enough to find the cause of pregnancy as the victim was only 18 years of age at the time of delivery. But that would not be translated into criminality.
10. The term “knowledge” has been interpreted by this Court in A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala (2004) 11 SCC 576 to mean an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. Further, a person can be supposed to know only where there is a direct appeal to his senses. We have gone through the medical records of the victim which were referred by Mr Basant R., Senior Advocate for the appellants. The medical records, which are relied upon by the prosecution, only show that the victim was admitted in the hospital at 9.15 a.m. and she immediately went into labour and at 9.25 a.m. she gave birth to a baby. Therefore, Appellant 1 attended to the victim for the first time between 9.15 a.m. and 9.25 a.m. on 7-2-2017. The medical records of the victim state that she was 18 years' old as on 7-2-2017. Appellant 1 did not know that the victim was a minor when she had sexual intercourse.
11. Appellant 2 had not even examined the victim and was not in contact with the victim. As per the medical records relied upon by the prosecution, the baby was attended to by Appellant 2 at 5.30 p.m. on 7-2-2017. He advised that the baby be given to the mother. Therefore, Appellant 2 had no occasion to examine/treat the victim.
12. Appellant 3 had not come in contact with the victim or the baby at all. Being the administrator of the hospital, it was not possible for her to be aware of the details of each patient. Considering that the victim was brought to the said hospital for the first time on 7-2-2017, it would not be possible for Appellant 3 to be aware of the circumstances surrounding the admission of the victim.
13. The knowledge requirement foisted on the appellants cannot be that they ought to have deduced from circumstances that an offence has been committed.
14. Accordingly, we are of the view that there is no evidence to implicate the appellants. Evidence should be such which should at least indicate grave suspicion. Mere likelihood of suspicion cannot be the reason to charge a person for an offence. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed and the proceedings against the appellants in the aforesaid Sessions Case No. 460 of 2017 are hereby quashed.
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