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MR. BIPIN MATHURDAS ... v. SHRI SAMIR ALIAS SAM...

Bombay High Court
Feb 5, 2015
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Summary of the Opinion in CrRev 53/14 (U. V. Bakre, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision application challenges the judgment and order dated 20/09/2014 of the Additional Sessions Judge, South Goa, Margao in Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 2014, which affirmed the judgment and order dated 21/02/2014 of the Judicial Magistrate First Class (J.M.F.C.), Canacona in Criminal Case No. 4/OA/NI/2012. The petitioner (the accused in the criminal case) was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and sentenced to simple imprisonment for three months and ordered to pay compensation of Rs. 30,00,000/-, in default to undergo further imprisonment for six months. The respondent no.1 was the complainant in the underlying criminal proceedings.

The complainant alleged that the accused had executed a demand promissory note dated 01/11/2011 promising to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- within a month, and subsequently issued cheque no. 701475 dated 05/12/2011 for Rs. 25,00,000/-, which was dishonoured with the endorsement "opening balance insufficient". The complainant served (or attempted to serve) a legal notice dated 23/12/2011 which, according to the complainant, was returned unclaimed; the complainant then filed the complaint under Section 138 N.I. Act.

At trial the complainant testified as PW1 and produced documents. The accused gave a statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., and called three witnesses: a bank manager of Canara Bank (DW1), a senior manager of Syndicate Bank (DW2) and himself (DW3). The J.M.F.C. found the complainant had proved a legally enforceable debt and convicted the accused under Section 138. The Sessions Court dismissed the accused's appeal and maintained the conviction and sentence; the accused then filed the present revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the materials on record established that the cheque dated 05/12/2011 and the demand promissory note dated 01/11/2011 were issued/ executed towards a legally enforceable debt or liability within the meaning of Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
  2. Whether the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act in favour of the complainant was rebutted by the accused.
  3. Whether the legal notice dated 23/12/2011 was duly served (or could be deemed served) on the accused as required before initiating proceedings under Section 138.
  4. Whether the fact that earlier payments (allegedly cash or unaccounted) were made and not shown in income tax returns defeated the applicability of Section 138 (i.e., whether recovery by Section 138 is maintainable where the underlying debt was said to be unaccounted cash).
  5. Whether the accused's claim that the promissory note and cheque were obtained by coercion/force (and that the notary's role should have been investigated) undermined the prosecution's case.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Accused) Arguments

  • The accused contended that he had only borrowed Rs. 15,00,000/- in 2010 and had agreed to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- as Rs.15,00,000 principal plus Rs.10,00,000 as share of profit; he asserted the total Rs.25,00,000/- had already been repaid in installments, last on 10/08/2011.
  • He relied on admissions in PW1's cross-examination and evidence of DW1 and DW2 to show prior payments; urged that these earlier payments extinguished any liability connected to the cheque.
  • He argued there was no evidence of the complainant's capacity to advance Rs.25,00,000/- and that income tax returns did not show such amounts, implying the amount was unaccounted cash and Section 138 should not apply to unaccounted amounts.
  • The accused asserted the demand promissory note and cheque were forcibly taken from him; he argued the accused need not disprove consideration by direct evidence but only rebut the presumption under Section 139.
  • He relied on a series of judgments (including Sanjay Mishra and others) to support the contention that unaccounted cash or lack of documentary account could rebut the presumption under Section 139 and make Section 138 inapplicable.

Respondent no.1 (Complainant)'s Arguments

  • The complainant's counsel submitted there were two transactions in 2010 and that the earlier completed transaction(s) were unrelated to the subsequent demand promissory note and cheque executed in late 2011; admissions about earlier payments related to the earlier completed transaction.
  • He pointed out the chronology: last installment of earlier transaction was in August 2011, while promissory note and cheque were dated November and December 2011 respectively, and thus unrelated to the earlier payments.
  • The complainant denied any coercion: he emphasized that the notary (Adv. Sachin S. Kolwalkar) who attested the promissory note was not examined by the accused and that there was no evidence of threats or force; accordingly the defense allegation of forcible extraction was weak.
  • On the unaccounted cash point, the complainant relied on this Court's decision in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2012 (Krishna P. Morajkar v. Joe Ferrao) to argue Section 138 remains applicable even if the amount was unaccounted and that remedies under Income Tax law do not confer on the borrower a defence to non-payment.
  • Substantively, the complainant defended the trial court's and appellate court's findings and submitted no perversity or jurisdictional error warranted interference in revision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [(2010) 11 SCC 441] Recognizes an initial (rebuttable) presumption in favour of the complainant under Section 139 N.I. Act; overruled aspects of Krishna Janardhan Bhat. The Court relied on Rangappa to affirm that the presumption under Section 139 favours the complainant and is rebuttable; Rangappa's approach was used to reject the contrary aspects of Krishna Janardhan Bhat.
Sanjay Mishra v. Kanishka Kapoor [2009 All M.R. (Cri) 1080] Held that Section 138 cannot be resorted to for recovery of an unaccounted amount; failure to disclose large advances in income tax returns may rebut the presumption under Section 139. The petitioner relied on this decision. The Court reviewed Sanjay Mishra but observed that parts of it were based on Krishna Janardhan Bhat and may be excluded; the Court did not accept Sanjay Mishra as fully authoritative on the unaccounted cash point in light of subsequent higher authority.
Ramdas Hanumant Palankar v. N.D. Vernekar [2008 (2) Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 401] Held that complainant's lack of capacity to advance cash (absence of accounts/returns) can rebut presumption under Section 139. The Court distinguished that case from the present: here the complainant had admitted prior payments and thus had capacity to pay large sums, so Ramdas was not a parallel ground for acquittal.
K. S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka [(2013) 3 SCC 721] Explains how presumptions under the Evidence Act and the N.I. Act could be rebutted and the applicable standard of proof. The Court considered and accepted the propositions from this Apex Court authority regarding rebuttal of presumptions and standard of proof in Section 138 cases.
Ravindra Vassant Kenkre (Criminal Misc. Application No. 233 of 2011) (Order dated 28/06/2013) Relied upon Sanjay Mishra to hold that amounts not shown in income tax returns may indicate absence of legally enforceable debt. The petitioner cited this order; the Court noted the order but treated it in the context of the broader jurisprudence, including Rangappa and subsequent analysis denying that non-disclosure in IT returns automatically defeats Section 138.
M. S. Narayan Menon alias Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr [(2006) 6 SCC 39] Authoritatively explains the manner in which presumptions (under Evidence Act and N.I. Act) may be rebutted and standards of proof required. The Court acknowledged these propositions and considered them in assessing whether the accused had rebutted the presumption under Section 139.
Vinay Parulekar v. Shri Pramod Meshram [2008 (3) AIR Bom R 721] Discusses rebuttal of presumptions and the approach to evidence in N.I. Act matters. The Court observed and relied upon the guiding principles from this decision in its assessment of the evidence and the accused's burden.
M/s. Armstrong Builders & Developers v. Vishvanath Naik [2007 (1) All MR 167] Where a sender dispatches notice by post to correct address, service can be deemed unless recipient proves non-service or lack of responsibility for non-service. The Court applied this principle to hold that the legal notice was to be deemed served on the accused and that the accused failed to prove non-receipt; thus the notice requirement under Section 138 was satisfied as a matter of law.
Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde [2008 (4) SCC 54] Two-judge bench had held existence of legally enforceable debt was not a matter of presumption under Section 139 and suggested advances > Rs.20,000 should be by cheque. The Court noted that Krishna Janardhan Bhat's observations were impliedly overruled by the three-judge bench in Rangappa; accordingly Krishna Janardhan Bhat could not be taken to bar application of Section 138 where relevant facts pointed otherwise.
Krishna P. Morajkar v. Joe Ferrao (Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2012) (Judgment dated 19/07/2013) Held that non-disclosure in income tax returns does not render an amount irrecoverable and that infractions of Income Tax law do not permit a borrower to refuse repayment; respectfully disagreed with Sanjay Mishra on this point. The Court expressed respectful agreement with the observations in this decision and relied on them to conclude that non-disclosure in IT returns does not automatically make Section 138 inapplicable.
Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd & Ors [(2001) 6 SCC 463] Referenced in Sanjay Mishra's reasoning on factual assessment of unaccounted advances; cited as part of that debate. The Court observed that Sanjay Mishra quoted Dalmia Cement when considering unaccounted advances, but treated the Sanjay Mishra position in light of higher authority (Rangappa and Krishna P. Morajkar).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a stepwise analysis grounded in the trial record, statutory presumptions, and binding precedent:

  1. Found as an undisputed fact that the accused had signed the cheque dated 05/12/2011 and had executed a demand promissory note dated 01/11/2011 promising to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- with 12% interest within one month. The cheque was presented within validity and returned unpaid with endorsement "Opening balance insufficient".
  2. Applied the principle in Rangappa that Section 139 gives rise to a rebuttable presumption in favour of the complainant; it is then open to the accused to raise a defence contesting existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
  3. Addressed service of the legal notice: the complainant produced the legal notice, postal slip, and envelope; even though the envelope did not bear an endorsement explicitly stating "unclaimed", Armstrong Builders was applied to hold that dispatch to the correct address permits a deeming of service unless the recipient proves non-service. The accused's explanation (alleged absence) did not fit the timeline; the Court found the accused was duly intimated and failed to respond, attracting adverse inference.
  4. Considered admissions and documentary evidence of payments: PW1 admitted receipt of various installments totalling Rs. 25,00,000/- from May 2010 to August 2011. However, the Court accepted the complainant's submission that those earlier transactions were complete and unrelated to the demand promissory note (executed 01/11/2011) and the subsequently issued cheque (05/12/2011). The Court therefore treated prior receipts as not extinguishing the later promissory note/cheque obligation.
  5. Assessed the accused's coercion defence: the accused claimed the promissory note and cheque were forcibly obtained and stated that he had told the notary about pressure; however, the notary was not examined by the accused. The Court held there was no credible evidence of threats or force and observed there was no reason for a notary to take a signature obtained under coercion; thus the coercion defence failed on the evidence.
  6. Evaluated the unaccounted cash issue: the Court reviewed the line of authority represented by Sanjay Mishra and Krishna Janardhan Bhat but noted Rangappa's three-judge pronouncement effectively altered the earlier approach. The Court referred with approval to this Court's decision in Krishna P. Morajkar which held that non-disclosure in income tax returns does not render a debt irrecoverable and that infractions of the Income Tax Act are distinct matters. On that basis the Court rejected the absolute proposition that unaccounted cash necessarily defeats Section 138.
  7. Looked to accused's own statements: the accused (DW3) stated that on signing the promissory note he was supposed to pay some amount, a voluntary admission inconsistent with a complete prior discharge of liability; the Court treated this as reinforcing that the accused remained liable and had not rebutted the presumption under Section 139.
  8. Having considered the totality of evidence and the precedents (including guidance on rebuttal and standard of proof in decisions such as K. S. Panduranga, M. S. Narayan Menon, and Vinay Parulekar), the Court concluded there was no perversity or jurisdictional error in the findings of the trial and appellate courts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court DISMISSED the revision application. The impugned judgments (trial judgment dated 21/02/2014 and appellate judgment dated 20/09/2014) were held to be in accordance with law and without scope for interference.

Direct Consequences and Orders:

  • The Rule issued on the revision stands discharged.
  • The accused is directed to surrender before the learned J.M.F.C. to undergo the sentence imposed upon him within six weeks from the date of the opinion.
  • No perversity or jurisdictional error was found in the lower courts' findings; therefore conviction and sentence as earlier imposed remain effective.

Broader Implications: The Court's analysis reiterates that (i) the presumption under Section 139 is rebuttable but not lightly displaced, (ii) legal notice dispatched correctly may be deemed served under the principles cited, and (iii) non-disclosure in income tax returns does not automatically render Section 138 inapplicable (the Court followed the reasoning in the Krishna P. Morajkar decision and Rangappa rather than the narrower view in Sanjay Mishra). The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities.

Judgment delivered by: U. V. Bakre, J. — Revision Application dismissed; Rule discharged; surrender directed within six weeks.

Show all summary ...

Heard Mr. Shirodkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondent no.1. Parties submitted

2 CrRev 53/14 that copies of relevant documents are on record. Hence records and proceedings from the lower Courts are not called for.

2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent, heard forthwith.

3. This revision application has been filed against the judgment and order dated 20/09/2014 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, South Goa, Margao ('Appellate Court', for short) in Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 2014 and judgment and order dated 21/02/2014 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Canacona ( 'J.M.F.C', for short) in Criminal Case No. 4/OA/NI/2012. The petitioner was the accused in the said criminal case whereas the respondent no.1 was the complainant. Parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status in the said criminal case.

4. The complainant had filed the complaint against the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881( 'N.I. Act', for short). The case of the complainant was as follows: The complainant and the accused were known to each other as they were businessmen by profession. The accused owed an amount of ` 25,00,000/- to the complainant which the accused had taken for business purpose. The accused, in this regard, had executed a demand promissory note dated 01.11.2011 before Notary Public

3 CrRev 53/14 namely Advocate Shri Sachin S. Kolwalkar at Margao. As per the said demand promissory note, the accused was supposed to repay to the complainant the said amount of ` 25,00,000/- within a month. Towards repayment of the said amount the accused had issued a cheque bearing no. 701475 dated 05.12.2011 for the said amount of ` 25,00,000/-, drawn on the Syndicate Bank, Margao branch, Margao, Goa, in favour of the complainant. The complainant presented the said cheque for encashment with his bankers that is Syndicate Bank, Canacona branch, Nagorcem, Canacona. However, by letter dated 12.12.2011, the bank informed the complainant that the said cheque has been dishonoured with endorsement opening balance insufficient. The complainant by legal notice dated 23.12.2011 addressed by registered post to the accused demanded the said cheque amount within 15 days from the receipt of of notice. The said notice was returned back with endorsement unclaimed return to sender. Hence, the complaint.

5. After the substance of accusation was explained to the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried, the complainant examined himself as PW1 and produced the relevant documents. The statement of the accused under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code was recorded. The accused examined Reese Mathews, Senior bank manager of Canara Bank, Canacona Branch as DW1, Shri U. B. Surendranath, Senior Manager of Syndicate Bank,

4 CrRev 53/14 Margao as DW2 and himself as DW3.

6. Case of the accused was that the complainant had paid to him an amount of ` 15,00,000/- through bank transaction, in the month of April 2010, for trading in iron ore. It was further the case of the accused that there was oral commitment between him and the complainant that he would pay share of profit in respect of the said trade. It was the case of the accused that within an year of receiving the said amount, he repaid to the complainant an amount of ` 25,00,000/-: ` 15,00,000/- being principal amount and ` 10,00,000/- being the share in the profit. According to the accused he did not enter into any other transaction with the complainant. It is his case that the demand promissory note and the cheque dated 05/12/2011 were forcibly taken by the complainant from him.

7. Upon consideration of the entire evidence on record, the learned J.M.F.C. held that the complainant proved that the accused had issued the said cheque towards the discharge of legally enforceable debt. The J.M.F.C. held that the complainant proved his case beyond reasonable doubt. The accused was held guilty and was convicted of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and to pay compensation of ` 30,00,000/- to the complainant, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months.

5 CrRev 53/14

8. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the learned J.M.F.C., the accused filed Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 2014 before the Sessions Court at South Goa Margao. Vide the impugned judgment and order dated 20/09/2014, the Appellate Court dismissed the said appeal and maintained the judgment and order passed by the learned J.M.F.C.. The accused therefore has filed the present revision application.

9. Mr. Shirodkar, learned Counsel for the accused, submitted that in the year 2010 the complainant had borrowed only ` 15,00,000/- from the complainant and had agreed to pay ` 25,00,000/- namely ` 15,00,000/- towards principal amount and ` 10,00,000/- being the share in profit. He submitted that the said amount of ` 25,00,000/- was paid to the complainant in installments, the last being paid on 10/08/2011. He invited my attention to the cross-examination of PW1 where the payment of the said amount has been admitted. He also read out the evidence of DW1 and DW2. Learned Counsel submitted that there is no evidence on record to establish the capacity of the complainant to advance such an huge amount of ` 25,00,000/- to the accused. He urged that the demand promissory note and the cheque which were subject matter of the criminal case were taken forcibly from the accused. He submitted that insofar as the said amount of ` 25,00,000/-, is concerned, there is no mention of any earlier transaction either in the complaint or in the legal notice. He pointed out that no income tax returns have been filed in which the said

6 CrRev 53/14 amount was mentioned. He submitted that even if the said amount was paid by the complainant to the accused, the said amount was unaccounted cash and that the provision of Section 138 of N.I. Act is not applicable to such amount. Learned Counsel submitted that the accused need not disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence and the onus on the accused in not as heavy as that of the prosecution. He therefore urged that the petitioner was entitled to acquittal since he had rebutted the presumption arising out of section

139 of N.I. Act. Learned Counsel relied upon the following judgments:

(i) Sanjay Mishra v/s. Kanishka Kapoor reported in 2009 All M.R. (Cri) 1080

(ii) Ramdas Hanumant Palankar vs. N.D. Vernekar and another reported in [2008(2) Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 401],

(iii) K. S. Panduranga Vs. State of Karnataka reported in [(2013) 3 SCC 721]

(iv) Order dated 28/06/201323 in Criminal Misc. Application no. 233 of 2011 (Ravindra Vassant Kenkre (since deceased) through LR's (I) Smt. Sharmila Ravindra Kenkre and another v/s. Mrs. Nutan Damodar Prabhu and another),

(v) M. S. Narayan Menon alias Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr, reported in [(2006) 6 SCC 39]

(vi) Vinay Parulekar Vs. Shri Pramod Meshram, reported in [2008 (3) AIR Bom R 721]

7 CrRev 53/14

10. On the other hand, Mr. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the complainant submitted that there were two transactions both in the year 2010. He submitted that since the first transaction was completed and payments were made, no mention of the same was made in the complaint or in the legal notice. He submitted that the admission of PW1 regarding the payment in installments of the said sum of ` 25,00,000/- was regarding the said first transaction. He pointed out that the last installment of the said first transaction was paid in August, 2011 whereas the demand promissory note was executed on 01/11/2011 and the cheque was issued on 05/12/2011 which cannot have any connection with the amounts earlier paid. He submitted that the defence of the accused that the demand promissory note and cheque were forcibly taken has no force at all. He pointed out that the notary public namely Advocate Shri Sachin S. Kolwalkar had not been examined. Insofar as the contention regarding unaccounted cash, is concerned, the learned Counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2012 in the Case of Mr. Krishna P. Morajkar v/s. Mr. Joe Ferrao and another. He further submitted that the present is a revision application and no perversity or jurisdictional error has been shown with regard to the impugned judgment and order. He therefore submitted that the revision application deserves to be dismissed.

11. I have gone through the material on record and I have also

8 CrRev 53/14 considered the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties as also the judgments relied upon by them.

12. There is no dispute that cheque dated 05/12/2011 has been signed by the accused. As has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan, reported in [(2010) 11 SCC 441], there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant, which of course is in the nature of rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. In the present case, in addition to the cheque, there is demand promissory note admittedly executed by the accused. There is no dispute that the said cheque was presented for encashment during its validity period and that the same was returned back unpaid with endorsement Opening balance insufficient. According to the complainant, he thereafter issued legal notice dated 23/12/2011 by registered post A.D. to the accused demanding the said amount of ` 25,00,000/- within 15 days from the receipt of the notice and further intimating that failure to do so will result in filing of criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. According to the complainant, the said notice was returned by the postal authorities with endorsement unclaimed return to the sender. PW1 has produced on record copy of the said legal notice alongwith postal slip to prove that the same was duly posted. PW1 has also produced the unclaimed envelop containing the legal notice

9 CrRev 53/14 alongwith A.D. Card. However, according to the accused he did not receive the said notice. PW1 in his cross-examination has admitted that nowhere on the envelop at Exhibit 23 colly., it is written that the said envelop containing notice was unclaimed and to be returned to the sender. PW1 stated that he was informed by his advocate that the said envelope was returned back since it was unclaimed. Even if it is taken for granted that there is not endorsement made by the postal authorities on the envelope as unclaimed, return to the sender, then also, that is not sufficient to hold that the compliance of the provision of sending of notice was not done by the complainant. In the case of M/s. Armstrong Builders and Developers V/s. Mr. Vishvanath Naik, reported in 2007(1) All MR 167, it has been held that when the sender has dispatched the notice by post with the correct address written on it then it can be deemed to have been served on the sender unless he proves that it was not really served and that he was not responsible for non-service. In his deposition the accused stated that he was in Cochin for one month as his father had expired on 13/12/2010 and that he returned back on 15/01/2011. But. the legal notice is dated 23/12/2011 which is after the accused returned back. Therefore the alleged absence of the accused had nothing to do with the receipt or non-receipt of the legal notice. The evidence on record reveals that the accused was intimated on 26/12/2011 and 04/01/2012. Therefore, as has been rightly held by the learned J.M.F.C., it should be deemed that the accused was duly served and

10 CrRev 53/14 intimated about the legal notice under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The accused ought to have claimed the said notice and ought to have given an appropriate reply denying his liability which he has not done. Adverse inference is bound to be drawn against the accused. There is no dispute that within the prescribed time, the complainant filed the complaint before the learned High Court.

13. There is an admission by PW1 (complainant), in his cross- examination, that he had received from the accused a sum of ` 5,00,000/- on 24/05/2010; ` 5,00,000/- on 13/12/2010; ` 3,00,000/- on 05/04/2011; ` 2,00,000/- on 16/04/2011; ` 3,00,000/- on 25/04/2011; ` 2,00,000/- on 28/04/2011; ` 3,00,000/- on 28/07/2011 and ` 2,00,000/- on 10/08/2011. The evidence of DW1 and DW2 also establishes the said payment. The complainant thus received an amount of ` 25,00,000/- during the period from May, 2010 to August, 2011. However, the said payment cannot have any connection with the cheque which is the subject matter of the present case. The accused had executed demand promissory note on 01/11/2011 which is admittedly signed by him wherein he promised to pay to the complainant a sum of ` 25,00,000/- alongwith 12% interest per annum within one month from 01/11/2011. This demand promissory note had been executed before the notary, Advocate Shri Sachin S. Kolwalkar. Thereafter, on 05/12/2011, the accused issued the cheque bearing no. 701475 for ` 25,00,000/- which is the subject matter of the

11 CrRev 53/14 present case. Thus, the payment of ` 25,00,000/- made from May, 2010 till August 2011 has nothing to do with the subsequently issued cheque dated 05/11/2011, as has been stated by PW1. Since the said earlier transaction was complete, there was no need to make a mention of it in the complaint. The case of the accused, that the complainant pressurized him to sign the said promissory note by coming to his house along with some people and asked him to come to the notary's office to execute the said demand promissory note and to bring with him a cheque and that he signed the said promissory note and the disputed cheque, under pressure, is not acceptable at all since there is absolutely no reason for the accused to come under pressure to execute the said promissory note and the cheque. It is not the case of the accused that the complainant had threatened to kill him or his beloved family member/s or in any other manner had forcefully obtained the signature. According to the accused, he did not lodge any police complaint against the complainant or other persons who had forced him to sign the demand promissory note and who came to the notary public, by coming to his residence. Though according to the accused, he had told the notary Advocate Sachin S. Kolwalkar that he has been pressurized by the complainant to sign the promissory note and that inspite of the same, Advocate Sachin S. Kolwalkar drafted the promissory note and that he had refused to sign the promissory note twice, he has not examined the said notary Advocate Sachin S. Kolwalkar to establish the said facts. There is no

12 CrRev 53/14 reason for a notary public to take signature of the accused when he has been pressurized by other persons to do so. Therefore, as has been rightly held by the learned J.M.F.C., it is not at all proved that the demand promissory note and cheque were taken forcibly from the accused.

14. Though it is the case of the accused that he had borrowed ` 15,00,000/- from the complainant and that he had already repaid the said principal amount of ` 15,00,000/- along with ` 10,00,000/- towards share in profit ( total ` 25,00,000/- ) by 10/08/2011 and that there was no other transaction with the complainant, however, it is pertinent to note that in his cross-examination, DW3, the accused, has specifically stated that during signing of the promissory note he was supposed to pay to the complainant some amount and with that respect he had signed the promissory note. The above is the voluntary statement of the accused which means that even after 10/08/2011, the accused was supposed to pay some amount to the complainant. That explains the amount of ` 25,00,000/- as promised to be paid by way of the said demand promissory note dated 01/11/2011 and the cheque dated 05/12/2015. The accused has miserably failed to rebut the presumption arising in favour of the complainant under section 139 of the N. I. Act.

15. In the case of Sanjay Mishra (supra), the learned Single Judge

13 CrRev 53/14 of this Court has held that the provision of Section 138 of N.I. Act cannot be resorted to for recovery of an unaccounted amount. It has been held that a cheque issued in discharge of alleged liability of repaying unaccounted cash amount cannot be said to be a cheque issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability within the meaning of explanation of section 138 of the N.I. Act. The learned Single Judge in paragraph 7 of the judgment in the case supra has held thus :

7. It is true that merely because amount advanced is not shown in Income Tax Return, in every case, one cannot jump to the conclusion that the presumption under section 139 of the said Act stands rebutted. There may be cases where a small amount less than a sum of Rs.20,000/- is advanced in cash by way of loan which may be repayable within few days or within few months. A complainant may not show the said amount in the Income Tax Return as it is repayable within few days or few months in the same financial year. In such a case the failure to show the amount in the Income Tax Return may not by itself amount to rebuttal of presumption under section 139 of the said Act. If in a given case the amount advanced by the complainant to the accused is a large amount and is not repayable within few months, the failure to disclose the amount in Income-Tax return or Books of Accounts of the complainant may be sufficient to rebut the presumption under section 139 of the said Act.

16. In Criminal Misc. Application no. 233 of 2011 (Ravindra Vassant

14 CrRev 53/14 Kenkre (since deceased) through LR's (I) Smt. Sharmila Ravindra Kenkre and another v/s. Mrs. Nutan Damodar Prabhu and another), this Court relied upon the judgment in the case of Sanjay Mishra (supra) and held that since the amount was not shown in the income tax returns, it cannot be said that there was legally enforceable debt or liability.

17. The observations in the case of Sanjay Mishra (supra), with regard to unaccounted cash, are based on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna janardhan Bhat Vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde reported in 2008 (4) SCC 54. In the case of Krishna janardhan Bhat (supra), it was held that the existence of legally enforceable debt was not a matter of presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. However, the above observation in the Judgment in the case of Krishna janardhan Bhat (supra) has been overruled by a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Rangappa (supra). In the said case of Krishna janardhan Bhat (supra), decided by two judge Bench of the Supreme Court, it was further held that advance of more than ` 20,000/- was to be made only by way of an account payee cheque. However, in the case of Rangappa (supra), decided by the three judge Bench of the Apex Court, an advance of ` 45,000/- was made in cash in spite of which the Hon'ble Supreme Court proceeded to uphold the conviction. Thus, the judgment in the case of Krishna janardhan Bhat (supra), with regard to the advance of cash amount of more than ` 20,000/- without

15 CrRev 53/14 showing the same in income tax returns, has been impliedly overruled. Therefore, it cannot be said that merely because the amount advanced was not shown in the income tax returns, Section 138 of N.I. Act is not applicable.

18. Vide judgment dated 19/07/2013 passed In Criminal Appeal No.

6 of 2012 (Mr. Krishna P. Morajkar V/s Mr. Joe Ferrao and another), learned Single Judge of this Court has dealt with, in detail, the judgment in the case of Sanjay Mishra (supra). The learned Single Judge has observed thus:

22. As already observed, since Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) does not lay down any proposition of law, judgments which follow Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) would have to be ignored. This leaves question of advance not being reflected in books of account. The learned Counsel for the respondent relied on judgment in Sanjay Mishra V/s. Kanishka Kapoor @ Nikki & anr. reported at 2009 (3) Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 157 = 2009 (4) Mah.L.J. 155 where the question of unaccounted money is considered. In this judgment too, a learned Single Judge of this Court copiously quoted from the judgment of Supreme court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) in paragraphs 9, 10 & 11. It need not be restated that since Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) was expressly overruled on the nature of presumption under Section 139 and impliedly on the question of cash advances, it remains a decision on facts of that case and so the observations in Sanjay Mishra

16 CrRev 53/14 (supra) based on Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) may be safely excluded from consideration.

23. In Sanjay Mishra (supra) the Court had also noted in para 14 the observations of the Supreme Court in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd Vs. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd & Ors. reported at (2001) 6 Supreme Court Cases 463 and, ultimately, refused leave for filing an appeal against acquittal, possibly principally on account of the following facts noted by the Court in paras 6,7 & 8 of the judgment. '6. I have given careful consideration to the submissions. I have perused a copy of the complaint and notes of evidence. In the cross- examination, the applicant has categorically stated thus: ".... The entire amount was given in cash. The entire amount was my cash amount. The cash amount was kept at my Chembur's residence. At that time, it was unaccounted. I had not disclosed this amount to the Income Tax after giving the loan till date. There was no agreement for interest on the amount given. ....." (Emphasis added) The complaint was filed in the year 2005. The evidence of the applicant was recorded on 28th February 2006. The applicant admitted that the amount allegedly paid by him to the 1st respondent by way of loan was a cash amount kept at his residence and at that time it was an unaccounted amount. He categorically admitted

17 CrRev 53/14 that till date (i.e. till 28th February 2006) he has not disclosed the amount to the Income Tax. According to the case of the complainant, he had advanced loan on 14th September 2004 which was repayable within 90 days. Thus, on 14th September 2004 the amount allegedly paid by him to the 1st respondent was stated to be an unaccounted amount which was kept at the residence of the applicant. Moreover, till February 2006, when the evidence was recorded, the said amount was not disclosed in the Income Tax Returns of the applicant. Thus it continued to be an unaccounted amount.

7. It is true that merely because amount advanced is not shown in Income Tax Return, in every case, one cannot jump to the conclusion that the presumption under section 139 of the said Act stands rebutted. There may be cases where a small amount less than a sum of Rs.20,000/- is advanced in cash by way of loan which may be repayable within few days or within few months. A complainant may not show the said amount in the Income Tax Return as it is repayable within few days or few months in the same financial year. In such a case the failure to show the amount in the Income Tax Return may not by itself amount to rebuttal of presumption under section 139 of the said Act. If in a given case the amount advanced by the complainant to the accused is a large amount and is not repayable within few months, the failure to disclose the amount in Income-Tax

18 CrRev 53/14 return or Books of Accounts of the complainant may be sufficient to rebut the presumption under section 139 of the said Act.

8. In the present case, the amount was allegedly advanced in September 2004. The amount is a large amount of Rs.15 lacs. This is a case where not only that there is a failure to disclose the amount of loan in the Income Tax Return of the applicant till the year 2006 but there is a categorical admission on the part of the applicant that the amount was an "unaccounted" amount. (emphasis supplied).'

24. It may be seen that even in Sanjay Mishra (supra) failure to show the advances in income tax returns is not held to be always fatal. While observing that small amounts of less than Rs.20,000/- could be so advanced, the Court was obviously influenced by observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) and provisions of Sections 269SS and 271D of Income Tax Act, which as already pointed out, require a borrower to receive amount in excess of Rs.20,000/- only by cheques. In the case at hand, the amount was advanced in the last week of March, 2006 and was to be repaid by 30/09/2006 i.e. within 6 months. Thus, even observations in Sanjay Mishra (supra) (minus the ceiling of Rs.20,000/- which has no legal sanctity), would not make the appellant's case untenable.

19. The learned Single Judge in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2012 has

19 CrRev 53/14 observed that there is no provision of Income Tax Act, which makes an amount not shown in the income tax returns unrecoverable. It has been observed that if some amounts are not accounted for, the person would be visited with the penalty or at times even prosecution under the Income Tax Act, but it does not mean that the borrower can refuse to pay the amount which he has borrowed simply, because there is some infraction of the provisions of the Income Tax Act. It is further observed that infraction of provisions of Income Tax Act would be a matter between the revenue and the defaulter and advantage thereof cannot be taken by the borrower. It has been held that to say that an amount not disclosed in the income tax returns becomes irrecoverable would itself defeat the provisions of Section 138 of the N. I. Act. The learned Single Judge has respectfully disagreed with the observations made in the case of Sanjay Mishra (supra). No doubt, the above judgment dated 19/07/2013, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2013, has been set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 614-615 of 2014. But the setting aside was because the appellant (accused) had already paid the sum of ` 4,00,000/- in favour of the complainant. The findings of the learned Single Judge in said Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2013 have not been set aside. I am in respectful agreement with the observations made by the learned Single Judge (R. C. Chavan, J) in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2012. I am of the view that the provision of Section 138 of the N.I. Act does apply to the present transaction.

20 CrRev 53/14

20. In the case of Ramdas Hanumant Palankar (supra), it was found that the complainant did not have the capacity to advance loan of ` 2,00,000/- in cash at the relevant time. No returns of income tax, sales tax book of accounts were produced to show that he had capacity to advance the amount of ` 2,00,000/- in cash. On account of the above, it was held that the accused had discharged the burden of rebutting the presumption. In the present case, there is an admission that the complainant had paid to the accused an amount of ` 15,00,000/- sometime in April, 2010. The evidence on record proves that the payment of said amount was an earlier transaction. However, that shows that the complainant had capacity to pay huge amounts to the accused. Besides the above, there is evidence by way of demand promissory note.

21. In the cases of M. S. Narayan Menon alias Mani and Vinay Parulekar (supra), the Apex Court has explained as to how the presumptions under the Evidence Act as also under the N.I. Act could be rebutted and the concept of standard of proof, in cases under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. There can be no dispute about the propositions laid down in the above cases and I have duly considered the same.

22. In view of the above, no perversity or jurisdictional error has been shown with regard to the impugned judgment and order. The

21 CrRev 53/14 Judgment dated 21/02/2014 in Criminal Case No. 4/OA/NI/2012 and the Judgment and order dated 29/02/2014 in Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 2014 are in accordance with law and there is no scope for interference with the same. There is no merit in the present revision application which deserves to be dismissed.

23. In the result, the Revision Application is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. The accused shall surrender before the learned J.M.F.C., to undergo sentence imposed upon him, within a period of six weeks from today. U. V. Bakre,J.