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STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANOTHER v. BRAHM PAL SINGH
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion analyzes the legal principles concerning the doctrine of precedent, specifically the concept of ratio decidendi versus obiter dictum, and applies these principles to a series of cases involving claims for pension benefits based on periods of work-charge service. The background involves claims by former work-charge employees, subsequently confirmed in service, seeking recognition of their work-charge service periods for pension computation. The matter involves challenges related to Article 370 and the 1961 Rules governing pensionable service in the State of Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand. The legal dispute includes the interpretation of Article 370, the applicability of Punjab Civil Services Rules, and whether the 1961 Rules were challenged or required to be read down. The procedural history includes appeals against High Court orders denying relief, references to prior Supreme Court decisions such as Habib Khan's case and Tiwaris case, and the rejection of a review petition by the State.
Legal Issues Presented
- What constitutes the binding ratio decidendi of a judgment as opposed to obiter dicta?
- Whether the period of work-charge service should be reckoned for the purpose of computing qualifying service for pension benefits.
- Whether Article 370 and the 1961 Rules governing pensionable service are pari materia and how their provisions affect claims for pension benefits.
- Whether a challenge to the 1961 Rules is necessary for relief to be granted, or if relief can be granted absent such challenge.
- Whether the principle of reading down applies to the 1961 Rules when they have not been challenged.
- The applicability and effect of prior Supreme Court decisions (Habib Khan's case, Tiwaris case) on the present appeals.
- The entitlement of similarly situated persons to relief under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners claimed entitlement to reckon the period of work-charge service for pension calculation without challenging Article 370.
- They relied on the note to Rule 3(8) of the 1961 Rules to argue that periods of service separated by certain types of non-pensionable service do not constitute interruption of service, thus supporting their claim.
- They contended that even though the 1961 Rules were not challenged, they should be read down to conform with constitutional provisions.
State's Arguments
- The State argued that the 1961 Rules were not challenged and hence relief based on those Rules should not be granted.
- The State filed a review petition against the prior Apex Court decision, which was rejected.
- The State contended that the writ petition lacked proper authorization as it sought relief for multiple persons not made parties, but the Court noted that court fees were paid on their behalf.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Krishena Kumar vs. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 207 | Clarification of the doctrine of precedent and ratio decidendi | Used to explain that only the necessary grounds of a decision (ratio decidendi) are binding, not all reasons or obiter dicta |
| Sanjay Singh vs. U.P. Public Service Commission, 2007 (3) SCC 720 | Distinction between final order and ratio decidendi | Emphasized that ratio decidendi forms precedent, not the final relief order |
| Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of Karnataka | Judgment interpretation and ratio decidendi | Judgment must be read as a whole; ratio decidendi is distinct from relief granted |
| Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N | Judicial utterances context and flexibility | Judgments are fact-specific; different facts can lead to different conclusions |
| General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co | Interpretation of words in judgments | Words in judgments are not statutes and must be interpreted accordingly |
| Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B | Binding nature of law declared by the Court | Law declared binds courts but the Court does not enact statutes |
| Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India | Reading conclusions with reasons | Conclusions must be read along with reasons in the body of the judgment |
| Habib Khan vs. State of Uttarakhand & Ors. | Entitlement to reckon work-charge service for pension | Held that work-charge service period must be counted for qualifying service |
| Tiwaris case (Supreme Court) | Application of Habib Khan's principles | Granted relief by directing computation of pension including work-charge service |
| Bangalore Development Authority Vs. M/s Vijaya Leasing Limited and Others, 2013 (14) SCC 737 | Limits on striking down unchallenged orders | Held that striking down unchallenged orders is impermissible; relief must be based on proper challenge |
| State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others, (2015) 1 SCC 347 | Principle of non-discrimination under Article 14 | All similarly situated persons must be treated alike and granted identical relief |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by elaborating on the doctrine of precedent, emphasizing that only the ratio decidendi—the principle or reason essential to the decision—is binding, whereas obiter dicta lack binding authority. The Court relied extensively on prior Supreme Court decisions to frame this principle.
Applying these principles, the Court analyzed the facts of the present cases involving work-charge employees seeking pension benefits. It noted that in Habib Khan's case, the Supreme Court had held that periods of work-charge service should be reckoned for pension computation, even though Article 370 and the relevant Rules were not challenged. The Court found that the provisions of Article 370 and the 1961 Rules were pari materia with analogous provisions considered in Punjab Civil Services Rules, which had been struck down in earlier cases.
The Court rejected the argument that the 1961 Rules, not being challenged, could be read down, stating that reading down is only permissible when a statute is challenged and capable of bearing a constitutionally valid interpretation. Since the Rules were not challenged in the present petitions, this principle did not apply.
The Court also considered the procedural posture, including the rejection of the State's review petition, and held that the relief granted in Habib Khan's case must be followed. It noted that the Division Bench of the Court had applied this principle and granted relief accordingly.
Addressing the State's argument regarding authorization of the writ petitions for multiple beneficiaries, the Court found that court fees had been paid on behalf of all concerned and relied on the principle under Article 14 that similarly situated persons must be treated alike, extending relief to all such persons.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the appeals lacked merit and should be dismissed, affirming the principle that work-charge service periods are to be counted for pension purposes as per the binding precedent.
Holding and Implications
The appeals are dismissed without any orders as to costs.
The direct effect of this decision is that the relief granted in prior decisions, specifically recognizing work-charge service periods for pension computation, stands affirmed. The Court reinforces that a challenge to statutory provisions or Rules is necessary before they can be struck down or read down, and relief cannot be granted absent such a challenge. The decision upholds the binding nature of ratio decidendi and emphasizes the principle of equal treatment under Article 14 for similarly situated persons. No new precedent is set; rather, the Court applies established principles to the facts before it.
binding authority. Clearly something said by a Judge about the law in his judgment, which is not part of the course of reasoning leading to the decision of some question or issue presented to him for resolution, has no binding authority however persuasive it may be, and it will be described as an obiter dictum. Precedents in English Law by Rupert Cross and JW Harris states - First, it is necessary to determine all the facts of the case as seen by the Judge; secondly, it is necessary to discover which of those facts were treated as material by the Judge. Blacks Law Dictionary, in somewhat similar vein to the aforegoing bisects this concept, firstly, as the principle or rule of law on which a Courts decision is founded and secondly, the rule of law on which a latter Court thinks that a previous Court founded its decision; a general rule without which a case must have been decided otherwise.
22. A Constitution Bench has also reflected on the true nature of ratio decidendi in Krishena Kumar vs. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 207, as is discernable from the following passages:
19. The doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain propositions wider than the case itself required. This was what Lord Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co.
v. Walkers Trustees and Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem. Sir Frederick Pollock has also said : Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision.
20. In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge-made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it.
23. The following paragraph from the determination of the Three-Judge Bench in Sanjay Singh vs. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad, 2007 (3) SCC 720, is instructive and is reproduced for this reason
10. The contention of the Commission also overlooks the fundamental difference between challenge to the final order forming part of the judgment and challenge to the ratio decidendi of the judgment. Broadly speaking, every judgment of superior courts has three segments, namely, (i) the facts and the point at issue; (ii) the reasons for the decision; and (iii) the final order containing the decision. The reasons for the decision or the ratio decidendi is not the final order containing the decision. In fact, in a judgment of this Court, though the ratio decidendi may point to a particular result, the decision (final order relating to relief) may be different and not a natural consequence of the ratio decidendi of the judgment. This may happen either on account of any subsequent event or the need to mould the relief to do complete justice in the matter. It is the ratio decidendi of a judgment and not the final order in the judgment, which forms a precedent.
24. We also commend a careful reading of the following paragraphs from the decision of the Constitution Bench in Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of Karnataka, which we shall reproduce for facility:
139. A judgment, it is trite, is not to be read as a statute. The ratio decidendi of a judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. (See Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division v. N.C. Budharaj)
140. In Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N it is stated: (SCC p. 540, paragraph 9) There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board(Sub nom British Railways Board v. Herrington). Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. (See also Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills)
141. In General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co it was held: (SCC p. 157, paragraph 20) As often enough pointed out by us, words and expressions used in a judgment are not to be construed in the same manner as statutes or as words and expressions defined in statutes. We do not have any doubt that when the words adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit were used by this Court in State of U.P. v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra the words were not used to take in every adjudication which brought to an end the proceeding before the court in whatever manner but were meant to cover only such adjudication as touched upon the real dispute between the parties which gave rise to the action. Objections to adjudication of the disputes between the parties, on whatever ground, are in truth not aids to the progress of the suit but hurdles to such progress. Adjudication of such objections cannot be termed as adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit. As we said earlier, a broad view has to be taken of the principles involved and narrow and technical interpretation which tends to defeat the object of the legislation must be avoided.
142. In Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B it was held: No doubt, the law declared by this Court binds courts in India but it should always be remembered that this Court does not enact. (See also Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab and Hameed Joharan v. Abdul Salam)
143. It will not, therefore, be correct to contend, as has been contended by Mr Nariman, that answers to the questions would be the ratio to a judgment. The answers to the questions are merely conclusions. They have to be interpreted, in a case of doubt or dispute with the reasons assigned in support thereof in the body of the judgment, wherefor, it would be essential to read the other paragraphs of the judgment also. It is also permissible for this purpose (albeit only in certain cases and if there exist strong and cogent reasons) to look to the pleadings of the parties.
144. In Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India this Court when faced with difficulties where specific guidelines had been laid down for determination of seniority in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers Assn. v. State of Maharashtra held that the conclusions have to be read along with the discussions and the reasons given in the body of the judgment.
145. It is further trite that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can be logically deduced therefrom. (emphasis supplied).
44. Having perused the aforesaid judgment, we may cull out the following inevitable elements of what constitutes ratio decidendi. Every judgment would consist of three parts. The facts and the pointed issue; the reasons for the decision; and the final order containing the said decision. The Honble Apex Court has laid down that the decision or rather the final order relating to the relief would not be ratio decidendi (See 2007 (3) SCC 720). Equally all the reasons, which may be given by the Court may not be ratio decidendi as propositions may be laid down, which may be wider than what the case is required (see 1990 (4) SCC 207). The enunciation of the reason or the principle upon which a question before the Court has been decided is alone binding as the precedent. In other words, the ratio decidendi has been held to be the principle which underlines, namely, on the ground, general reasons or the general grounds, on which the judgment is actually based. Ratio decidendi is to be ascertained on the analysis of the facts of the case; a process of reasoning, which involves the major premise and also the minor premise. The major premise would contain the preexisting rule of law either statute or judge made. The minor premise would contain the material facts under immediate consideration (again see 1990 (4) SCC 207). In fact, in the said judgment, the Court proceeds to hold that if it is not clear, it is not the duty of the Court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it. Still further, we may notice that a judgment is not to be read as a statute. It is distinct, as already noticed, from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. When the Court declares a law, it does not enact as it is a statute. The judgment may have to be read as a whole. It is also laid down that it is permissible for this purpose only in certain cases and if there exists strong and cogent reasons to look to the pleadings of the parties. Finally, we may also point out that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can be logically deduced therefrom.
45. It is in the light of these principles, we have to approach the question as to what is the ratio decidendi, which has been laid down by the Honble Apex Court in Habib Khans case. In order to appreciate this, we have to necessarily notice the facts, which we have already done. Again, we reiterate the case involved a claim by a former work-charge employee, who was subsequently confirmed and claimed the benefit of the period of work-charge service for calculating his beneficiary benefits. This, the claimant did without challenging Article 370. In fact, it could be said that the Court was not called upon to decide the vires of Article 370 as such.
46. The Honble Apex Court after stating the facts in paragraph no.
3 as aforesaid, proceeded to hold that the question is no longer res integra. The Honble Apex Court proceeded to compare the provisions of Article 370 and took the view that pari materia provision in Rule 317(ii) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules was struck down by the Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court. It was further found that the challenge by the State against the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench was negatived by the Court. The Court again recites a statement of fact that the matter came to be considered again in the Narata Singhs case, which we have already referred to. The Court holds that the Honble Apex Court has taken the view that the Punjab & Haryana High Court was perfectly justified in striking down Rule 3.17(ii) resulting in obliteration of distinction made in the Rules between the temporary and officiating service and work-charge service. On the said basis, the Court took the view that the period of work-charge service should be reckoned for the purpose of computing qualifying service. It is, thereafter, that in paragraph no.
7 the Court proceeds to take the view that the provisions of Article
370 in the State of Uttarakhand are pari materia with the provisions of the Rules concerned in the Punjab Rules. Thereafter, the Court says, if that is so, the Court did not find any reason why the period of service rendered as work-charge basis by the appellants, should not be counted for the purposes of computation of qualifying service for grant of pension. The pari materia provision having been interpreted and understood in above manner, the Court did not find any Rule for taking any other view except to hold that the appellants are entitled to reckon the period for the work-charge service for the purpose of computation of qualifying service. We have adverted to this decision to make the following observations: In the first place, this is a case where the Special Leave Petitions were converted as Civil Appeals. The decision of the Honble Apex Court is rendered after giving reasons. As far as paragraph no. 6 is concerned, it is in the form of a statement relating to what happened in regard to the rule in Punjabs case and how it was followed in the later decision. Coming to paragraph no. 7, however, the Court has taken the view that the provisions with which we are dealing, namely, Article 370 is pari materia with the provision considered in the Punjabs case. The Court further opines that there is no reason of taking any other view except to hold that they are also entitled.
47. We are conscious of the fact that the Habib Khans case did not involve a challenge to the Rule. In fact, that was the premise, on which the Division Bench of this Court allowed the writ petition filed by the State, leaving it open to the applicant to challenge. But we must here notice another development. The State filed a review petition; various contentions have been taken. The Honble Apex Court did not find favour with the review petition, which stands rejected. It is, thereafter, that we are dealing with the matter. In this case, as we have noticed in the very beginning, broadly speaking there are three categories of cases. In some of the cases Article 370 is called in question, in some of the cases Article 370 along with the Rules are called in question and finally in many of the cases neither Article 370 nor the Rules are called in question and merely the relief that is sought is to grant the benefits.
48. Next, we must notice that the Division Bench of this Court has applied the principle in Habib Khans case and directed relief to be granted. These are the facts, the law and the position with which we are confronted. Before we finally make a determination, it is our plain duty to advert to the arguments that 1961 Rules have not been called in question. In the appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, in the writ petition, there is no challenge to the Rules, undoubtedly. The answer given by Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for the writ petitioners, is essentially as follows: The Note to Rule 3(8) would come to his rescue.
49. Firstly, we will deal with the same. The note, in our view, has the following effect: It may so happen that a person may have two periods of temporary service in a pensionable establishment. In between those two periods of temporary service, it may further transpire that he may also have service in a non-pensionable establishment [traceable to Clause 3(8)(i)]. He may have the work experience in the period of service in the work-charge establishment in between two periods of temporary service in a pensionable establishment [traceable to 3(8)(ii)]. Finally, a person may have two periods of temporary service in a pensionable establishment, which is separated by periods of service in post paid from contingencies. Furthermore, a person may have the period of temporary service followed by any of the periods of service, which is mentioned in Rules 3(8)(i), 3(8)(ii) or 3(8)(iii) and finally followed by a permanent service in a permanent establishment. The note only declares that then it would not constitute an interruption of service. The words interruption of service is to be found in the proviso itself, namely, a person having continuous, temporary or officiating service in the State of Uttar Pradesh, which is followed without interruption by confirmation in the same or other post, is entitled to count the period for the purpose of mere pension. It is an ameliorative provision to enable a person to claim the benefit of the proviso that what would have otherwise been an interruption within the meaning of the proviso is declared to be not an interruption of service. In these cases, we are concerned with the facts where the writ petitioners were originally working as Muster Roll employees that is followed up by absorption as work-charge employees and, finally, it is followed up by confirmation/regularization (as contended for by the learned Chief Standing Counsel). Therefore, we see no merit in this argument and we have no hesitation in rejecting it.
50. The next argument, which is raised by Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for the petitioners is that even though 1961 Rules are not challenged, it should still be read down.
51. Striking down a law is a matter of last resort. The Court will call in aid many a presumption available to it in an attempt to sustain a law. This the Court does, having regard to the theory of separation of powers, the various principles, which have evolved over a period of time, which go in aid of sustaining a law rather than destroying it. We need not dwell into the detailed intricacies, which may arise from such presumptions and principles. Suffice it to say, striking down a law will be done, when the Court is left with no choice. Among the devices, which have been evolved by the Courts to avoid a situation where a law falls foul of the Constitution, is the principle of reading down. The principle of reading down is permissible in a case where a statute is capable of being read down. If the statute is without any potential for the Court taking a different view, either it has to be struck down or it has to be upheld. There is no halfway house in between the two. But, there may arise situations where it may be open to the Court to place an interpretation on the statute, which, it is capable of bearing, which brings it in conformity with the constitutional provisions. It is this process which is called reading down. But, the question of reading down a statute when the statute is not called in question cannot be resorted to. In these cases, if the Rules are not called in question, the concept of reading down is alien and we cannot resort to it. Then, we have the argument that it is a verbatim reproduction of Article 370, which has been called in question and the challenge allowed by the learned Single Judge. Even if a provision is challenged and such a device is not enlisted by the party also, the plea of reading down may not be available.
52. Now, the time has come to make a final determination. The determination, must, in our view, hinge upon two vital aspects. One is the decision, as we have noticed, of the Honble Apex Court in Habib Khans case. No doubt, in Habib Khans case the State of Uttar Pradesh was not a party. As far as the State of Uttar Pradesh is concerned, in the decision in Tiwaris case, relying upon the Habib Khans case, the Honble Apex Court has proceeded to give the relief. The following is the judgment:
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Special Appeal (defective) No. 24/16, dated 22.01.2016, whereby the High Court has denied relief to the appellant on the ground that there is no Rule or Scheme framed by the State to count the period when the employee worked on a work-charged basis.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant has brought to our notice the judgment and order of this Court in the case of Habib Khan vs. State of Uttarakhand & Ors. (C.A. No. 10806/2017) and connected matters, where this Court has held that the period of work-charged service must be reckoned for the purpose of computation of 'qualifying service' for grant of pension. We are in respectful agreement with the afore-mentioned decision.
4. Hence, the impugned order is set aside and the respondents are directed to compute the pension of the appellant after taking into account the period of work- charged service.
5. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
53. We have three choices before us. We did toy with the idea of sustaining the judgment insofar as it relates to challenge to Article 370 and remitting it back to the learned Single Judge so that the parties may amend the writ petition where it is necessary and call in question the Rules to the extent that they are aggrieved by the same. There are cases where, in fact, the Rules have been called in question, but there is no relief granted in those cases vis--vis the Rules as such. It is not seen pressed as such also from the body of the judgment. The other choice open to us is to dismiss the Appeals on the basis that these are cases, which are to be treated as to be governed by the decision in Habib Khans case and Tiwaris case. And the last choice available to us is to allow the Appeals on the ground that the 1961 Rules have not been called in question.
54. It is, no doubt, true that when a statute stands in between a party and the relief, which he claims, it is incumbent upon him to mount a properly constituted challenge to the statute. In this regard, we may notice one decision, which is relied on by Mr. M.C. Pant learned counsel for the petitioners in the case of Banglore Development Authority Vs. M/s Vijaya Leasing Limited and Others reported in 2013 (14) SCC 737. In the said case, the learned Single Judge has struck down a de-notification, which was not even challenged. The Division Bench allowed the Appeal. Allowing the further appeal filed by the Authority, the Court inter alia held as follows:
17. Therefore, while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the learned Single Judge came across the above incongruities in the proceedings of the Honble Minister which resulted in the issuance of denotification dated 5-10-1999. We fail to note as to how the ultimate order of the learned Single Judge in setting aside such a patent illegality can be held to be beyond the powers vested in the constitutional court. The conclusion of this Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes case that judicial daring is not daunted when glaring injustice demands even affirmative action and that authorities exercising their powers should not exceed the statutory jurisdiction and correctly administer the law laid down by the statute under which they act are all principles which are to be scrupulously followed and when a transgression of their limits is brought to the notice of the Court in the course of exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, it cannot be held that interference in such an extraordinary situation to set right an illegality was unwarranted.
55. Ordinarily, when a challenge is made to a statutory provision, it is to be made where it stands as an obstacle for obtaining a relief, which is denied under the said statute. It is after giving proper opportunity of pleading to the parties that the Court can be requested to sit in judgment over the vires of the statute. It is for this purpose, we did think that the matter should be remitted back for that purpose.
56. However, in these cases, we are confronted with the decision in Habib Khans case. In Habib Khans case, we have already noticed, the statements, which have been made in paragraph nos. 6 & 7. We again further notice that the matter reached the Honble Apex Court in the form of an appeal from judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, apart from the judgment of the Full Bench. The judgment of the Division Bench was premised on the reasoning that the claimant had not sought to declare Article 370 as bad in law. It is without challenge to Article 370 that the Honble Apex Court has made a comparison between Article 370 and the corresponding provision in the Punjabs case. The Honble Apex Court has taken the view that the decision is pari materia. It refers to the decision of the Honble Apex Court in the subsequent judgment in Narata Singhs case and found no reason to take a different view.
57. In such circumstances, particularly, after the rejection of the review petition, we would take the judgment as it is and come to the following conclusion: The Court granted the relief based on its reasoning, even when there is no challenge to the 1961 Rules or Article 370. This was despite the fact that in the body of the judgment of the Division Bench, it was specifically the case of the State, which was accepted by the Division Bench, that there was no challenge to the Rules. We would, in such circumstances think that, particularly in the case where the Article 370 itself is challenged and when the review is also rejected, it may not be appropriate for us to take a different view even if we were inclined to. We would think that the challenge as far as to Article 370, which was successfully prosecuted by the writ petitioners before the learned Single Judge, should not meet with a different fate at our hands, having regard to what is laid down in Habib Khans case. There can be no doubt that the provision is absolutely pari materia with the provision contained in the Punjabs Case. The next hurdle, as we have already noticed, is the Rules of 1961 not being challenged. We would again notice that the Bench decision, which was before the Honble Apex Court, involved a case where there was no challenge to Article 370 and yet the Honble Apex Court has granted the benefit. The review petition filed by the State was also rejected. In the review petition filed by the State, one of the grounds taken is about the 1961 Rules in the manner it was taken. We may further notice the most important aspect. The Rule 3(8) contains provisions, which are, in turn, pari materia with Article
370. Article 370, in turn, as we have found, is pari materia with the provision in the Punjabs Case. We also notice that there are Division Bench rulings of this Court, which have been rendered, we may in fact notice that even without challenge various provisions have been made; we may notice in this regard also that in Satpal Singhs case SLP was dismissed. In this regard, we may notice the following developments also as contained in the judgment in State of Uttarakhand & ors. Vs. Ramswarup & another passed in Special Appeal No. 70 of 2018 (hereinafter referred to as Ram Swarups case). It is brought to our notice, in fact, that in the judgment in Ram Swarups case, the writ petitioners had challenged the 1961 Rules and that is allowed in terms of the Habib Khans case and Special Leave Petition No. 2210 of 2017 has been dismissed. It is true that there is no discussion in the judgment relating to the Rule as such. It is brought to our notice, in fact, that in the judgment in the case of Satpal Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand passed in Special Appeal No. 108 of 2014, which is referred to in Ramswarups case, there is no challenge to the 1961 Rules or Article 370 and still the case was decided in terms of the Habib Khans case and the Special Leave Petition was rejected.
58. One of the arguments raised by the learned Advocate General for the State of Uttar Pradesh is that the writ petition is without any authorization. We notice that the argument is that apart from the writ petitioner several other persons are sought to be roped in as beneficiaries, as their names have been taken in the writ petition. But, we scanned the order sheet of the writ petition. We, in fact, find that in this case though they were not made parties as writ petitioners, the Learned Single Judge directed that they will pay court fees on behalf of those persons also and what is more, the Court fees has been paid by them. At this juncture, we may notice the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347. Therein, though the issue was relating to effect of latches, the Honble Apex Court inter alia held as follows: 22.1 The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. In fact, the relief, we notice, is to give to the petitioners.
59. In such circumstances, the upshot of the above discussion is that the appeals fail; they are dismissed without any orders as to cost. (Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.) (K.M. Joseph, C.J.) 26.04.2018 26.04.2018 Rahul
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