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Income Tax Officer v. K.C Saigal

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
Oct 3, 1989
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (A. Kalyanasundharam, A.M.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessees filed petitions seeking rectification of two Tribunal orders dated 28 February 1989 and 20 April 1989. The petitions alleged that the Tribunal's orders omitted facts and arguments presented at the hearing (initial pages 1–7 set out facts; later pages set out arguments), producing mistakes apparent from the record that warranted rectification. Because certain omissions/mistakes appeared to require the assistance of both parties, the matter was fixed for hearing on 1 September 1989. The parties thereafter presented extensive arguments concerning the claimed mistakes (the court refers to those arguments from paragraph 11 onwards).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal's orders of 28th Feb., 1989 and 20th April, 1989 contained mistakes apparent from the record that justified rectification under the applicable law.
  2. Whether the assessee had made "full and true disclosure of the primary facts" to the Assessing Officer, such that re-opening of assessments (under s.147/148 context) was justified or unjustified.
  3. Whether the existence of subsequent Tribunal/special bench authority (Eastern Bulk Services v. ITO) or the presence of profit & loss account entries could preclude re-opening or assessment reassessment on merits.
  4. Whether two assessment years (1971–72 and 1972–73) had become time-barred under section 148 and whether the Tribunal had given a finding on that point.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The Tribunal's order omitted facts and arguments presented at the hearing; these omissions were mistakes apparent from the record and warranted rectification or recall for rehearing.
  • The assessee followed a mixed/hybrid system of accounting (receipts on receipt basis; expenses on accrual), and this method was evident from Profit & Loss accounts placed in the paper book (pages cited).
  • The Delhi High Court had observed the right to adduce evidence and for the Tribunal to arrive at an independent conclusion, implying the Tribunal must consider all evidence.
  • The special bench decision in Eastern Bulk Services v. ITO (1983) 5 ITD 471 (Del SB) had sanctioned the assessee's system of accounting in a subsequent year; therefore, on merits there could be no unassessed income and reassessment should be quashed.
  • The ITO had accepted the system of accounting for subsequent assessment years, indicating no omission of material facts by the assessee.
  • Two assessment years (1971–72 & 1972–73) had become time-barred under s.148; the Tribunal had not given findings on that point.
  • The Tribunal erred by referring to the return form note in its order without putting that point to the assessee; Bombay High Court's D.R. Dhanwate v. CIT (1961) 42 ITR 253 (Bom) shows a mere note cannot be treated as failure to provide required particulars.
  • Supreme Court authority (Omar Salay Mohamed Sait v. CIT (1959) 37 ITR 151 (SC)) requires the Tribunal to consider all facts; Gemini Leather Stores v. CIT (1975) 100 ITR 1 (SC) supports that an Assessing Officer's oversight cannot be treated as failure on assessee's part to disclose.
  • Relief sought: rectification to incorporate omitted facts and amend conclusions accordingly, or recall the order for rehearing.

Revenue's (Respondent's) Arguments

  • The petitions seek effectively a review of the Tribunal's order; such review is outside the scope of section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act.
  • Legal rulings cannot be automatically applied; the facts and circumstances of each case must match before a precedent is applied.
  • The assessee did not specify the method of accounting either in the computation of income or to the ITO during regular assessment proceedings; therefore the ITO could not be said to have examined the method.
  • The Delhi High Court correctly observed that the ITO could not examine the accounting method because material to establish that method was absent from the record before him.
  • The mere presence of a Profit & Loss account showing a particular income (e.g., commission receipts) is insufficient to infer the method of accounting followed by the assessee.
  • Accordingly, the petition lacked substance and should be rejected.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Eastern Bulk Services v. ITO, (1983) 5 ITD 471 Del (SB) Used by assessee to show that the Tribunal (special bench) sanctioned the mixed/hybrid system of accounting in a subsequent year. The court noted the assessee relied on this decision, but held that the method of accounting for the years under consideration was yet to be determined and a comparison with the special bench decision could only follow after analysis; therefore the special bench decision did not preclude further inquiry for the years in question.
D.R. Dhanwate v. CIT, (1961) 42 ITR 253 (Bom) Proposition that a mere note appended to the return form cannot be treated as failure to provide required particulars. The court acknowledged the assessee's reliance but explained that the Tribunal referenced the return form only to rebut the assessee's blanket claim that there was no requirement to disclose the method of accounting; the mere note argument did not undermine the Tribunal's finding that the method was not specifically disclosed to the ITO.
Omar Salay Mohamed Sait v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, (1959) 37 ITR 151 (SC) Principle that the Tribunal must consider all relevant facts and that an order arrived at by improperly rejecting evidence may be set aside. The court relied on this ratio to state that the Tribunal must base conclusions on facts on record; it concluded that the Tribunal had considered the undisputed fact that the assessee never specifically disclosed its method of accounting and so its conclusion was properly based on the record.
Gemini Leather Stores v. CIT, (1975) 100 ITR 1 (SC) That when an Assessing Officer enquires about a fact but by oversight omits to add it to assessed income, one cannot always treat that oversight as failure by assessee to disclose (i.e., AO's oversight may preclude reopening under certain circumstances). The court distinguished the present facts: here there was no enquiry made by the ITO about the accounting method, so the Gemini Leather principle (relief where there was an AO enquiry and oversight) did not apply; thus reopening was not barred on that ground.
S.P. Mohan Singh v. CIT, (1983) 34 CTR (P&H) 277 : (1983) 141 ITR 440 (P&H) Relied on by the assessee to support the proposition that omission by the tax authorities cannot be treated as failure to disclose by the assessee. The court noted the assessee's reliance but concluded, on facts, that the assessee had not specifically disclosed its accounting method to the ITO and so the authority to re-open was not precluded by the precedents cited.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

After hearing rival contentions and examining the main Tribunal order, the court elected to add specific explanatory lines to paragraph 4 of the Tribunal's order (the text of the addition is set out in the opinion). The court's step-by-step analysis can be summarized as follows:

  1. The court identified two undisputed factual points: (a) the Assessing Officer (ITO) never inquired into or examined the method of accounting followed by the assessee; and (b) the assessee never specifically brought the method of accounting to the ITO's notice during the regular assessment proceedings.
  2. The court addressed the assessee's contention that the presence of the profit & loss account in the record meant the ITO was aware of and had examined the accounting method. The court rejected any inference that the ITO had examined and approved the method merely because the P&L was on record; absence of an explicit enquiry or notation to that effect in the assessment order meant the ITO had not examined the matter.
  3. The court examined the assessee's reliance on the return form and the Bombay High Court decision in Dhanwate. It held that the Tribunal referred to the return form only to rebut the assessee's blanket claim that there was no statutory requirement to disclose the accounting method; the Tribunal's use of the form did not amount to depriving the assessee of opportunity.
  4. Applying Omar Salay Mohamed Sait, the court reiterated that the Tribunal must consider facts on record. The court found the Tribunal had properly based its conclusion on the undisputed fact that the assessee never specifically disclosed the method of accounting and that the regular assessment order contained no mention of such a method.
  5. The court then considered Gemini Leather Stores and distinguished it: Gemini aids an assessee when the ITO made enquiries but omitted by oversight to add income; here there was no enquiry by the ITO, so there was no analogous oversight preventing reopening under the relevant provisions.
  6. On the merits point concerning the Eastern Bulk Services special bench decision, the court observed that the method of accounting for the years under consideration still required determination; only once that determination is made can a meaningful comparison with the special bench decision be made. Hence the special bench ruling could not be used as a short-cut to foreclose further inquiry.
  7. Regarding the two assessment years alleged to be time-barred (1971–72 & 1972–73), the court noted that a finding had not been given by the authorities and directed that this point be addressed (referenced as directed in paragraph 11 of the order).
  8. Ultimately, the court concluded there was no mistake in the Tribunal's appreciation of facts or in drawing the conclusion that there had been failure to make full and true disclosure of primary facts; accordingly, the re-opening was justified on the facts of this case.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The court added explanatory lines to paragraph 4 of the Tribunal's order and ALLOWED THE MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION IN PART (para 4.5). The Tribunal's conclusion that there had been failure to make full and true disclosure of primary facts (in particular, non-disclosure of the assessee's method of accounting to the ITO) was upheld; therefore re-opening of assessment was justified on the facts of the case.

Direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The Tribunal's order is clarified by the addition of specified lines to paragraph 4 (these lines explain the facts about the ITO not examining the accounting method and the assessee not specifically disclosing it).
  • The Tribunal's conclusion that re-opening was justified remains intact — the petition for rectification did not succeed to the extent of overturning that conclusion.
  • The miscellaneous application filed by the assessee was allowed in part to the extent described in the opinion (the court inserted explanatory matter and gave directions regarding the time-barred years), but the assessee's broader request to quash reassessment or to recall the matter for rehearing was not granted on the basis of the omissions alleged.
  • The matter of whether the assessment years 1971–72 and 1972–73 are time-barred under section 148 was left to be considered by the authorities as directed (reference made to para 11 of the order).

Broader implications: The opinion does not announce any new legal principle; it applies existing authorities and factual analysis to conclude that nondisclosure (in the sense of not specifically informing the ITO of the accounting method) justified reopening. No new precedent was proclaimed beyond the application of cited case law to the facts.

Show all summary ...

A. Kalyanasundharam, A.M:— The assessees have moved these petitions seeking rectification of the orders passed by the Tribunal dt. 28th Feb., 1989, and 20th April, 1989. The assessee had brought out in the initial pages 1 to 7, the facts as were submitted before the Tribunal at the time of hearing of the appeal and in the remaining pages, concentration had been made to point out the various arguments as were made at the time of hearing, which were omitted to be brought out in the order, resulting in mistakes in the order, which according to the assessee are of the nature of apparent from record and, therefore, the order could be rectified. On perusal of these petitions, since there appeared that there were certain omissions/mistakes, which required the assistance of both the parties and it was accordingly fixed for hearing for 1st Sept., 1989 and the parties' extensive arguments as regards the mistakes as brought out in the ptitions from paragraphs 11 onwards have been given our very careful considerations.

2. The assessee has summarised the arguments as were raised before the Tribunal at the time of hearing of the appeal in respect of (a) the method of accounting followed; (b) the observations of the Delhi High Court wherein direction was given or arriving at an independent conclusion, allowing the assessee to adduce all evidence in support of its contentions before the authorities; (c) existence of sufficient material like the Profit & Loss a/c which clearly depicted uniformly the various incomes, copies of which were placed at pages 47 to 49, 52 to 55 & 56-57 of the paper book from which it could be deduced the method of accounting followed by it; (d) observation made by the ITO regarding the gross receipts of commission from which he had allowed the deductions of expenses clearly; and (e) the computation of income starting with the net profit as per profit & loss a/c, all showed that he was aware of the hybrid system of accounting. The further pleading was that the system of accounting of the assessee had been given a detailed scrutiny in the case of Eastern Bulk Services by the special bench of the Tribunal reported in Eastern Bulk Services v. ITO, (1983) 5 ITD 471 Del (SB) to which reference was made at the time of the argument of the appeal and this was so made for the purpose that the re-opening though may have been valid otherwise but the system having the sanction of the Tribunal, there is no income which could have remained un assessed for these years, therefore on merits, the re-assessment proceedings must be quashed. It was also pleaded that the assessee's system of accounting has been accepted to be proper by the ITO himself, for the subsequent assessment years. The assessee had also raised the point of two of the assessment years, viz., 1971–72 & 1972–73 becoming barred by time for the purposes of s. 148 of the Act, on which there had been no finding given by the Tribunal. In the petition the assessee further had pleaded that the order of the Tribunal contained reference to the form of return of income prescribed by the rules in which the system of accounting as adopted by the assessee was required to be shown by way of a note, which was not put to the assessee at the time of appeal and had it been so put, the assessee would have brought out the irrelevance of the note and would have brought to the attention of the Tribunal the Bombay High Court ruling in D.R Dhanwate v. CIT, (1961) 42 ITR 253 (Bom), that a mere note to be appended to in the return of income form could not be held to mean that the assessee had not provided the required particulars. The learned counsel Sh. Dastur had drawn our attention to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Omar Salay Mohamed Sait v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras , (1959) 37 ITR 151 (SC) and specifically to the observations contained in page 170 of the report, for the proposition that the Tribunal is duty bound to consider all the facts while coming to its conclusion and any conclusion that has been arrived at by improperly rejecting the evidence, the order is bound to be set aside by the Courts. He also drew our attention to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Gemini Leather Stores v. CIT, (1975) CTR (SC) 127 : (1975) 100 ITR 1 (SC), for the proposition that when an Assessing Officer fails to draw his inference from the materials on record by oversight, it cannot be said that there was any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the material facts. For the same proposition the assessee had also placed his reliance on the ruling of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in S.P Mohan Singh v. CIT, (1983) 34 CTR (P&H) 277 : (1983) 141 ITR 440 (P&H). He also drew out attention to the various materials that had been placed in the paper book during the hearing of the appeal. He therefore pleaded that the order should either be rectified to the extent of incorporating of the fact as pleaded, and consequently the conclusion would need to be amended in the light of these facts, or that the order may be recalled for hearing it afresh.

3. The argument of the learned Sr. Deptl. Representative Sh. Subash Kumar, was that the assessee's entire petition is intended for review of the order passed by the Tribunal which is outside the scope of s. 254(2) of the Act. He pleaded that the facts of each case had to be appreciated in itself before proceeding to apply any ruling and merely for the reason that there exists a particular ruling, it does not become an automatic application, for it requires the facts and the circumstances to be identical to the one as was before the courts. His plea was that the assessee's emphasis is that the disclosure was full as it had shown the income from commission in its profit & loss a/c but it is not so disputed that he had not mentioned anywhere about the system of accounting followed either in the computation of income filed or having brought to the notice of the ITO during the course of the regular assessment proceeding. The Delhi High Court had rightly observed that the ITO could not have examined the correctness or otherwise of the system of accounting followed, since he never went into the question and the reason of he not going into that question is obviously the absence of the material as regards the method of accounting followed by the assessee. He also pleaded that from the examination of the profit & loss account showing a particular income, as is in the instant case the commission receipts, it is impossible to deduce or infer the method of accounting followed by the assessee. He accordingly pleaded that the petition is bereft of any substance and deserves only to be rejected.

4. After carefully considering the rival contentions, the petition as such and also the main order of the Tribunal dt. 28th Feb., 1989, we would add the following lines to para 4 of the order after line 6, ending with the words ‘assessment orders’:

“Referring to the order of the ITO for the asst. yr. 1984–85, it was pleaded that the department had knowledge of the fact that it had followed the mixed system of accounting, i.e, the receipts being accounted for on receipt while the expenses were accounted for on accrual. The assessee had also drawn our attention to the profit & loss account placed at pages 51 & 57 of the paper book, which showed on the income side ‘commission receipts’.

4.1 The undisputed facts are (a) the ITO never went into the question of the method of accounting followed by the assessee and (b) the assessee on his part never brought speifically to the notice of the ITO regarding the method of accounting of commission on receipt basis. The entire effort of the counsel had been that the ITO having the profit & loss a/c on his records, it should be deemed that he was aware of the system of accounting followed by the assessee and that he had examined the same and it was not at all fatal to the assessee's case for not having brought to the ITO's notice specifically about the system of accounting for the duty of the assessee is limited to put the primary and material facts and not lead the ITO, as to how to draw his conclusions. This argument is similar to a sword which has sharp edges on its either side and therefore cuts both ways. The ITO had not raised any objection at the time of the original assessment regarding the system of accounting followed is not in dispute but to claim that he had examined it and found to be proper cannot also be so inferred from his order, The assessee all through maintained that since there was no requirement under the Act to mention about the method of accounting followed by him, till the asst. yr. 1972–73. he had not brought to the notice of the ITO about the system of accounting. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the term ‘Fact’ is occurrence of event, things certainly known to have occurred or to be true, reality, true or existent”. Thus it can be concluded that the fact of the system of accounting followed not brought to ITO's notice and not so examined by him, could not be said to have known to him and since this fact was not specifically brought to the notice of the ITO, the assessee cannot be said to have made full and true disclosure of the primary facts.

4.2 The assessee had vehemently objected to the observation made of the form of the return of income considered by the Tribunal in para 8 of the order without allowing the assessee an opportunity and also that the ruling of the Bombay High Court in Dhanwate's (supra) a mere note cannot be made the basis of for coming to the conclusion that there was non-disclosure on the part of the assessee. The assessee in fact was not questioned with reference to the return form requiring the assessee to specify the method of accounting followed in a note during the course of the arguments, but this alone was not the singular factor for drawing of the conclusion that there was failure on the part of the assessee for making full and true disclosure of the primary facts. The purpose of bring out the return of income form in the body of the order was limited to highlight the wrong claim made by the assessee that there was no requirement at all to disclose the method of accounting followed by him which has been clearly so brought out in the paras 9.1 & 9.2 of the order. The Supreme Court's ratio in Omar Salay Mohamed Sait (supra) is clearly a guide to the proposition that the Tribunal must come to its conclusion based on facts on record and in the instant case the Tribunal has come to its conclusion that there was failure of true and full disclosure of the primary facts which is based on the undisputed fact that the assessee never specifically disclosed about its method of accounting and that there was no whisper in the order of the regular assessment about the method of accounting followed by the assessee. In Gemini Leather's case (supra), the Supreme Court had observed that when the ITO makes some enquiry about a fact, but by overight omits to add the same to the assessed income, he cannot resort to s. 147(a) or (b). In the present case, the situation is that there was never any enquiry made by the ITO, with which fact the assessee has no dispute and, therefore, it cannot be said that he had omitted to add any income on that account by oversight. Therefore even as per these two Supreme Court rulings, on the facts and circumstances of the case, there being failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all the material facts, the conclusion that could be drawn is that the re-opening was justified. Thus there is no. mistake as regards the appreciation of the facts and the conclusion drawn based on those facts.

4.3 The assessee's arguments on merits that the system of accounting having the sanction of the spcial bench of the Tribunal in the assessee's case for the subsequent assessment year, there would be no useful purpose served by remanding the issue back to the ITO is without any substance. The reason being (a) the method of accounting followed for these assessment years is yet to be determined and (b) and then only the next step of comparison of the system of accounting as adopted and followed for these assessment years with the one decided by the special bench would arise. There can be no short-cut method for the comparison of the two methods without analysing the methods as such.

4.4 The asst. yrs. 1971–72 & 1972-7??? becoming time-barred have not been given a finding by the authorities and the same had been so directed in para 11 of the order.

4.5 The miscellaneous application is allowed in part as above.