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Champa Lal v. State Of Rajasthan And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 26, 2018
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Factual and Procedural Background

The litigation concerns the State of Rajasthan’s attempt to upgrade the Gram Panchayat of Napasar Village to a Nagar Palika (Class IV Municipality) by Notification dated 6-10-2008 issued under Section 3(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Ordinance, 2008. A chronology of the ensuing proceedings is as follows:

  • The 6-10-2008 notification was challenged in a writ petition and dismissed by a Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court. During the pendency of the writ appeal, the State withdrew the notification by issuing a further Notification dated 18-9-2009, rendering the appeal infructuous.
  • That withdrawal was itself challenged; a Division Bench, on 13-5-2015 (2015 SCC OnLine Raj 778; (2015) 3 RLW 2208), quashed the withdrawal and directed the State to take consequential steps. Special Leave Petition (SLP (C) No. 11091 of 2017) was filed against this judgment.
  • Pursuant to the High Court’s direction, the State issued a fresh Notification dated 2-6-2016 re-establishing the Nagarpalika. This too was challenged; the writ petition was dismissed on 3-8-2016 and the dismissal was affirmed in appeal on 12-9-2016 (2016 SCC OnLine Raj 9880). SLP (C) No. 38618 of 2016 was filed against this judgment.
  • Both SLPs were heard together by the Supreme Court, which granted leave and addressed the constitutional validity of the notifications and the High Court rulings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the absence of a valid notification under Article 243-Q(2) of the Constitution specifying “transitional,” “smaller urban” or “larger urban” areas with reference to the mandated parameters, the State of Rajasthan could constitutionally upgrade Napasar Gram Panchayat to a Nagar Palika.
  2. Consequently, whether the subsequent actions of the State and the High Court judgments upholding those actions were sustainable in law.

Arguments of the Parties

State of Rajasthan

  • Produced two notifications dated 4-7-1995 and 30-4-2012, issued under the erstwhile Rajasthan Municipality Act, 1959 and the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009, respectively, contending that these satisfied the requirement of Article 243-Q(2).

Non-State Respondents (in SLP (C) No. 11091 of 2017)

  • Urged the Court not to interfere, arguing that significant development (industries, educational institutions, hospitals) had occurred in the area and reversion to Gram Panchayat status could prejudice this progress by potentially causing industries to relocate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1963 SC 1356 Court’s duty to notice constitutional and legal provisions suo motu. Relied on to justify examining Article 243-Q(2) even though parties had not raised it before the High Court.
1955 SCC OnLine Bom 169 Same principle as above. Referenced in support of the Court’s proactive constitutional scrutiny.
(1960) 3 SCR 417 Same principle. Cited collectively for the Court’s obligation to apply the Constitution.
AIR 1960 SC 907 Same principle. Used to reinforce the constitutional duty of courts.
(1961) 1 SCR 210 Same principle. Referenced for completeness of the doctrinal support.
AIR 1961 SC 1633 Same principle. Part of the line of authority obliging courts to notice constitutional mandates.
(1961) 42 ITR 589 Same principle. Cited alongside the above cases for the same doctrinal point.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Part IX-A of the Constitution (Articles 243-P to 243-ZG) governs municipalities. Article 243-Q(1) envisages three categories of municipal bodies—Nagar Panchayat, Municipal Council and Municipal Corporation—corresponding to “transitional,” “smaller urban” and “larger urban” areas. Article 243-Q(2) mandates that the Governor, by public notification, specify these areas after having due regard to six factors: (i) population, (ii) population density, (iii) revenue generated for local administration, (iv) percentage of non-agricultural employment, (v) economic importance, and (vi) other relevant factors.

The Court found that:

  • The two notifications (4-7-1995 and 30-4-2012) relied upon by the State were issued solely under municipal statutes and classified areas exclusively on population criteria, ignoring the other constitutionally mandated factors.
  • Because they did not satisfy Article 243-Q(2), they could not serve as the constitutional foundation for designating Napasar as a “transitional area” warranting a Nagar Panchayat (or Nagar Palika).
  • Absent a valid Article 243-Q(2) notification, the initial upgrade notification dated 6-10-2008 was ipso facto unconstitutional. All subsequent governmental actions and the High Court judgments predicated on that notification were therefore vitiated.
  • The High Court decisions were declared per incuriam for having overlooked the constitutional prerequisite.
  • The apprehension advanced by the non-State respondents—that industries might relocate if the area reverted to Gram Panchayat status—was speculative, unsupported by pleadings, and thus rejected.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court declared the initial Notification dated 6-10-2008 unconstitutional, rendering all subsequent actions and related High Court judgments void; the appeals were accordingly disposed of.

Implications: Napasar reverts to its Gram Panchayat status unless and until the State issues a constitutionally compliant notification under Article 243-Q(2) and subsequently establishes the appropriate municipal body. The judgment underscores that States must strictly adhere to Article 243-Q(2)’s multi-factor criteria before constituting or upgrading municipal bodies; mere statutory notifications based on population alone will not suffice.

Show all summary ...

Jasti Chelameswar, J.— Leave granted. These two appeals are interconnected tossing up an important question of law regarding the interpretation of Article 243-Q of the Constitution of India.

2. It is not necessary for us to give the complete factual details and history of the case for the purpose of this order except the bare minimum. The litigation revolves around the upgradation by a Notification dated 6-10-2008 of Gram Panchayat of Napasar Village as Nagar Palika (Municipality) Class IV category by the State of Rajasthan purportedly in exercise of power conferred under Section 3(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Ordinance 2008. Legality of the said notification was challenged before the Rajasthan High Court in a writ petition. It was dismissed by a learned Single Judge. Aggrieved by the dismissal, the matter was carried in a writ appeal. During the pendency of the writ appeal, the impugned Notification dated 6-10-2008 was withdrawn by another State of Rajasthan by a Notification dated 18-9-2009. The writ appeal was, therefore, rendered infructuous.

3. Challenging the Notification dated 18-9-2009, another writ petition came to be filed. The said writ petition was allowed by a Division Bench by its judgment dated 13-5-2015 2015 SCC OnLine Raj 778, (2015) 3 RLW 2208 quashing the notification and directing the State to take consequential steps. Aggrieved by the same, SLP (C) No. 11091 of 2017 came to be filed. Pursuant to the direction 2015 SCC OnLine Raj 778, (2015) 3 RLW 2208 of the High Court, a fresh Notification dated 2-6-2016 came to be issued once again for establishing a Nagarpalika for Napasar Village. Challenging the said notification, another writ petition came to be filed before the Rajasthan High Court. It was dismissed by a judgment dated 3-8-2016. On appeal, the same was confirmed by the Division Bench by its judgment dated 12-9-2016 2016 SCC OnLine Raj 9880. Aggrieved by the same, SLP (C) No. 38618 of 2016 is filed.

4. The correctness of the two judgments 2015 SCC OnLine Raj 778, (2015) 3 RLW 2208 2016 SCC OnLine Raj 9880 of the High Court impugned in these two appeals, is questioned on various grounds. In our opinion, it is not necessary to examine the various submissions made before us. The impugned actions of the respondent State which culminated in the two impugned judgments 2015 SCC OnLine Raj 778, (2015) 3 RLW 2208 2016 SCC OnLine Raj 9880 of the High Court suffers from a fundamental infirmity which goes to the root of the matter.

5. The establishment of municipalities and their organisations is governed by Part IX-A (consisting of Articles 243-P to 243-ZG) of the Constitution of India inserted in the Constitution by the Constitution 74th (Amendment) Act, 1992 with effect from 1-6-1993. Article 243-P(e) defines the expression “Municipality” to mean an institution of self-government constituted under Article 243-Q. Article 243-Q of the Constitution of India declares as follows:

“243-Q. Constitution of Municipalities.—(1) There shall be constituted in every State—
(a) a Nagar Panchayat (by whatever name called) for a transitional area, that is to say, an area in transition from a rural area to an urban area;
(b) a Municipal Council for smaller urban area; and
(c) a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area,
in accordance with the provisions of this Part:
Provided that a Municipality under this clause may not be constituted in such urban area or part thereof as the Governor may, having regard to the size of the area and the municipal services being provided or proposed to be provided by an industrial establishment in that area and such other factors as he may deem fit by public notification, specify to be an industrial township.
(2) In this article, “a transitional area”, “a smaller urban area” or “a larger urban area” means such area as the Governor may, having regard to the population of the area, the density of the population therein, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors as he may deem fit, specify by public notification for the purposes of this Part.”

6. Article 243-Q contemplates the constitution of three different categories of bodies known as (i) Nagar Panchayat for a transitional area, (ii) Municipal Council for a smaller urban areas, and (iii) Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area.

7. It is declared under Article 243-Q(2) that the expressions “a transitional area”, “a smaller urban area” and “a larger urban area” (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Areas”) would mean such areas as may be specified by the Governor by a public notification for the purpose of Part IX-A of the Constitution of India. Article 243-Q(2) further obligates the Governor to have due regard to the various factors mentioned therein before specifying the Areas i.e. population of the area, the density of the population, the revenue generated in the area for local administration, percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors as he may deem fit.

8. It, therefore, appears from the scheme of Article 243-Q(2) that the Governor is not free to notify “Areas” in his absolute discretion but is required to fix the parameters necessary to determine whether a particular AREA is a transitional area or a smaller urban area or a larger urban area with due regard to the factors mentioned above. It is implicit that such parameters must be uniform for the entire State. It is only after the determination of the parameters, various municipal bodies contemplated under Article 243-Q(1) could be constituted.

9. In response to a specific query whether any notification contemplated under Article 243-Q(2) had been issued by the State of Rajasthan, Mr Guru Krishnakumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Rajasthan, produced two Notifications dated 4-7-1995 and 30-4-2012. On a plain reading of both the notifications, it appears that these notifications had been issued in exercise of the statutory powers conferred on the State Government by two different enactments known as the Rajasthan Municipality Act, 1959 (since repealed) and the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009. Apart from the declaration regarding the source of power for the issuance of these notifications to be authority conferred by the various provisions of the abovementioned two enactments, it appears from the tenor and scheme of the notifications that these notifications purport to classify municipalities only on the basis of population. The various other parameters to which regard is required to be had under Article 243-Q(2) were not taken into consideration for the purpose of classification made under the abovementioned two notifications. Therefore, in our opinion, these two notifications cannot be treated as notifications contemplated under Article 243-Q(2).

10. In the absence of any notification which meets the requirements of Article 243-Q(2), the entire exercise undertaken by the State of Rajasthan in upgrading the Napasar Village Gram Panchayat to be a Nagarpalika [that is equivalent to Nagar Panchayat as mentioned in Article 243-Q(1)(a)] is unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the requirements of the Constitution under Article 243-Q of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the initial Notification dated 6-10-2008 itself is unsustainable. Unfortunately, this aspect has not been noticed by the High Court obviously because it was not brought to the notice of the High Court. The fact that a litigant before the court does not point out the relevant principles and provisions of law does not prevent the court from examining the issues involved in the lis, more particularly, when the process which is the subject-matter of litigation before the court is inconsistent with the mandate of the Constitution. It is a settled principle of law that courts are bound to take note of the Constitution and the laws. AIR 1963 SC 1356, (AIR pp. 1387-88 & 1391, 1955 SCC OnLine Bom 169, (1960) 3 SCR 417, AIR 1960 SC 907, (1961) 1 SCR 210, AIR 1961 SC 1633, (1961) 42 ITR 589. We must

11. We, therefore, have no choice but to hold that the initial Notification dated 6-10-2008 is unconstitutional. Therefore, the legality of various actions which followed that notification and the judgments of the High Court which examined the legality of those actions, in our view, need not be examined. All such subsequent actions of the State which led to litigation suffer from a fundamental constitutional flaw. The impugned judgments 2015 SCC OnLine Raj 778, (2015) 3 RLW 2208 2016 SCC OnLine Raj 9880 of the High Court rendered without examining the true scope and scheme of Part IX-A of the Constitution and more particularly Article 243-Q(2) are per incuriam.

12. Mr A. Subba Rao, learned counsel appearing for the non-State respondents in SLP (C) No. 11091 of 2017 submitted that in view of the findings recorded by the High Court that in the interregnum, lot of development (such as the establishment of industries, educational institutions and hospitals, etc.) took place in the geographical area in question, and therefore, this Court may not interfere with the notification upgrading the area in question to a Nagarpalika as such interference would have the effect of reducing the Nagarpalika into a Gram Panchayat once again. Confronted with the question as to what would be the prejudice the non-State respondents would suffer by such consequence, Mr Rao submitted that there is a possibility of the industries being shifted away from the area in question. It is only an apprehension. We find no basis in the pleading for such apprehensions nor do we see any reason which might lead to such a possibility. Therefore, the submission is rejected.

13. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.