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Anil Kumar v. Union Of India
Factual and Procedural Background
The applicant is a government employee posted at Mumbai who approached this Tribunal seeking relief against an impugned transfer order. The learned counsel for the applicant was heard on two preliminary matters: (a) admittance of the OA for the purpose of issuance of notice and (b) interim relief. A question arose regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Bench to hear the matter instead of the Mumbai Bench. The applicant's counsel produced a copy of a Delhi High Court judgment in Dr. K.P. Verma (CW No.517/2003 dated 23.07.2003) and relied on a Supreme Court decision (State of Rajasthan v. M/s Swaika Properties) to support the contention that jurisdiction could lie where the order originated.
The record shows the applicant and his wife are both employees of the respondent department. The impugned order posted the applicant's spouse to Chennai (shifted from CIT (A)-12 to CIT-10 at Chennai). The applicant relied on CBDT transfer/placement guidelines (CBDT-2010) claiming his present posting was an "exempted post" whose tenure should not count toward computation of his tenure at Mumbai, and therefore his case was not ripe for transfer. Annexures in the OA (A-1, A-4, A-6 and certain OMs) were placed on record to support these contentions. It was also noted that the applicant's spouse had obtained an interim stay from the Mumbai Bench and had continued at Mumbai despite a substantive posting to Chennai.
A coordinate bench decision (OA No.289/2013, Shri R.K. Sharma vs. Union of India & Another) was also relied upon by the applicant as supporting the sacrosanct nature of transfer policy. The Tribunal considered these factual and procedural matrices, reviewed precedent, and proceeded to decide the matter on the basis of applicable Supreme Court authority.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Principal Bench of this Tribunal has territorial jurisdiction to admit and hear the OA (rather than the Mumbai Bench) in view of the origin of the transfer order and the precedents relied upon.
- Whether the impugned transfer of the applicant should be interfered with by the Tribunal at the admittance/interim relief stage, having regard to CBDT transfer guidelines (including the applicant's claim of an "exempted post" and tenure computation) and Government guidelines for posting husband and wife at the same station.
- Whether the Tribunal should follow the coordinate bench decision in OA No.289/2013 (Shri R.K. Sharma) that upheld the transfer policy as sacrosanct, or whether it is bound by Supreme Court precedent which restricts interference in transfer orders.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The Principal Bench has jurisdiction because the transfer order was issued from Delhi; reliance placed on the Delhi High Court judgment in Dr. K.P. Verma (CW No.517/2003) and on the Supreme Court decision in State of Rajasthan v. M/s Swaika Properties (AIR 1985 SC 1289) to support jurisdiction where an original order is issued.
- The applicant claimed his present posting was an "exempted post" under CBDT transfer/placement guidelines (CBDT-2010), so the tenure of that exempt post should not count towards the 14-year tenure at Mumbai; therefore, his case was not ripe for transfer. Annexure A-4 and other annexures were relied on for this submission.
- Government of India OMs relating to posting of husband and wife at the same station were placed on record; although the spouse has been substantively posted to Chennai, an interim stay obtained by her from the Mumbai Bench resulted in her continuing at Mumbai—this fact was relied upon to argue conjoint posting considerations.
- The applicant relied on a coordinate bench decision (OA No.289/2013, Shri R.K. Sharma) that had upheld the transfer policy and held it to be sacrosanct.
The opinion does not set out detailed arguments put forward on behalf of the respondent; therefore the respondent's specific submissions are not recorded in the provided text.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dr. K.P. Verma vs. Union of India & Others, Delhi High Court, CW No.517/2003 (Judgment dated 23.07.2003) | The High Court held that if a transfer order was issued from Delhi, a part of the cause of action arose in Delhi, supporting jurisdiction where the order originated. | The Tribunal relied on this decision to lay to rest the question of territorial jurisdiction for the Principal Bench in this case. |
| State of Rajasthan & Others vs. M/s Swaika Properties and Another, AIR 1985 SC 1289 | Tribunals/Courts at the place from where an original order is issued have full jurisdiction to entertain the matter. | Cited by applicant's counsel in support of jurisdiction; the Tribunal considered this principle in relation to the jurisdiction question. |
| K. Balaji vs. Integral Coach Factory, Chennai : 2002 (3) ATJ 438 (Division Bench, Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal) | Decision in the context of appointment to a government post (applicant to a post). | The Tribunal observed that K. Balaji was not applicable to the present case (which involves a serving government employee), and therefore did not rely on it. |
| OA No.289/2013 Shri R.K. Sharma vs. Union of India & Another (Coordinate Bench decision) | Held the transfer policy relied upon by the applicant to be sacrosanct and not to be violated. | The applicant relied on this decision, but the Tribunal expressly declined to follow it in view of controlling Supreme Court authority. |
| Shilpi Bose vs. State of Bihar & Others, AIR 1991 SC 532; 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659 | Court should not interfere with transfer orders made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless they violate mandatory statutory rules or are mala fide; a government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain at one station. | Quoted to emphasize the principle that transfer orders are ordinarily not to be interfered with unless mala fide or violative of statutory rules; the Tribunal applied this principle. |
| Union of India vs. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357 | Who should be transferred is for the appropriate authority to decide; courts cannot interfere unless transfer is vitiated by mala fides or statutory violation; authorities must keep guidelines in mind. | Relied upon by the Tribunal to support the conclusion that judicial interference is limited and that administrative authorities have primary competence. |
| National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. vs. Shri Bhagwan, 2001(8) SCC 574 | No government servant has a legal right to be posted permanently at one place; transfers are a condition of service and courts/tribunals should not interfere unless mala fide or in violation of statutory provisions. | Affirmed by the Tribunal as part of the settled Supreme Court ratio restricting interference in transfer matters. |
| Major General J.K. Bansal vs. Union of India and others, (2005) 7 SCC 227 | Adopted the view that transfers ordinarily should not be interfered with except on limited grounds (mala fides/statutory violation). | Noted by the Tribunal as a further Supreme Court authority endorsing the restrictive approach to judicial review of transfers. |
| State of M.P. & Another vs. S.S. Kourav & Others, (1995) 3 SCC 270 | High Court's superintendence involves factual adjudication to assess if transfer was in public interest; again reiterates that transfers are incident of service and not to be lightly interfered with unless mala fide or statutory violation. | Cited to reinforce that transfer decisions depend on administrative exigencies and that courts should not substitute their view for that of the competent authority. |
| State of Punjab vs. Joginder Singh Dhatt, AIR 1993 SC 2486 | Supreme Court disapproves lower courts interfering with transfer orders; ordinarily courts have no jurisdiction to interfere in transfers. | Quoted to show consistent Supreme Court stance against routine interference with transfers. |
| N.K. Singh vs. Union of India: (1994) 6 SCC 98 (cited in related cases) | Affirms that transfers as an incident of service should not be interfered with unless arbitrary, mala fide or in violation of professed norms. | Referred to in the chain of authority cited by the Tribunal to support the non-interference rule. |
| Abani Kanta Ray vs. State of Orissa: 1995 (supp) 4 SCC 169 | Reiterates that transfers are an incident of service and should not be interfered with unless clearly arbitrary, mala fide or in infraction of any norm. | Used by the Tribunal as part of the consistent Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting judicial interference. |
| Mohd. Masood Ahmed vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 150 | Summarizes scope of judicial review under Article 226: transfers form part of service conditions and courts should not ordinarily interfere unless mala fide, prohibited by service rules, or authority was incompetent. | Invoked to emphasize the settled principles and to support dismissal of the OA in line with controlling authorities. |
| State of U.P. vs. Gobardhan Lal, 2004 (11) SCC 402 | Administrative guidelines for transfer do not confer legally enforceable rights; courts should not substitute their view for administrative decisions unless mala fide or statutory violation is shown. | Specifically relied upon by the Tribunal to hold that administrative guidelines cannot be used to restrain the competent authority from effecting transfers; the Tribunal stated it was duty bound to follow this ratio. |
| Union of India vs. Janardhan Debanath (cited in related SCC authorities) | Referred to in the context of confirming the principle that orders of transfer made in administrative exigency and public interest are not to be interfered with absent mala fide or statutory violation. | Mentioned in the opinion as part of the array of authorities reinforcing the restraint on judicial interference. |
| Rajendra Rao vs. Union of India (1993) 1 SCC 148; and State Bank of India vs. Anjan Sanyal (2001) 5 SCC 508 (cited within Mohd. Masood Ahmed) | These cases form part of the jurisprudential foundation summarised in Mohd. Masood Ahmed regarding judicial review of transfer orders under Article 226. | Referred to via Mohd. Masood Ahmed as part of the settled principle limiting interference in transfer matters. |
| Vijay Pal Singh and Onkarnath Tiwari (Allahabad High Court decisions, cited in Mohd. Masood Ahmed) | High Court decisions applying the principle that transfer orders should not be interfered with except on limited grounds. | Mentioned in the opinion by reference through Mohd. Masood Ahmed to illustrate how High Courts have applied the settled Supreme Court principles. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Tribunal proceeded in a stepwise manner:
- Admittance and Interim Relief: The learned counsel for the applicant was heard on admittance for issuance of notice and on interim relief. The Tribunal addressed preliminary questions including territorial jurisdiction before considering interim measures.
- Territorial Jurisdiction: The Tribunal observed that the territorial jurisdiction of its Benches is not congruent with that of High Courts. The applicant relied on the Delhi High Court decision in Dr. K.P. Verma and the Supreme Court decision in Swaika Properties to argue jurisdiction for the Principal Bench. The Tribunal found that, in view of the Delhi High Court order in Dr. K.P. Verma, the jurisdictional question was laid to rest in favour of admitting the matter before the Principal Bench.
- Factual Matrix on Tenure and Spouse Posting: The Tribunal examined annexures and the applicant's service history. It noted that the applicant had been posted at Mumbai initially from 14.06.1988 to 02.06.1998, had other postings, and returned to Mumbai on 24.06.2005 and had been serving there continuously thereafter. The Tribunal also recorded that the applicant's spouse was substantively posted to Chennai but had an interim stay from the Mumbai Bench that led her to continue at Mumbai.
- Applicant's Reliance on Transfer Guidelines: The applicant relied on CBDT-2010 guidelines and OMs about spouse postings to claim his posting was an exempted post and that his tenure computation should exclude the exempted post; this would, in his submission, make the transfer not yet ripe. The Tribunal set out these factual and documentary contentions but proceeded to consider legal precedents governing interference in transfer matters.
- Precedential Survey: The Tribunal reviewed an extensive line of Supreme Court authority (including Shilpi Bose, S.L. Abbas, National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan, Major General J.K. Bansal, State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, Mohd. Masood Ahmed and others) emphasizing the settled principle that transfer orders made in public interest and for administrative reasons should not be interfered with by courts or tribunals except when vitiated by mala fides, arbitrariness, or violation of statutory provisions.
- Rejection of Coordinate Bench Reliance: Although the applicant relied upon a coordinate bench decision in OA No.289/2013 (Shri R.K. Sharma), the Tribunal held itself bound by the controlling Supreme Court ratio and therefore declined to be persuaded by the coordinate bench decision.
- Conclusion from Binding Authority: Citing the consistent Supreme Court ratios, the Tribunal concluded that it was duty bound to follow the apex court's jurisprudence restricting judicial interference with transfer orders and therefore was not inclined to grant the relief sought by the applicant.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Tribunal dismissed the Original Application in limine. The operative conclusion recorded was:
OA DISMISSED IN LIMINE
Direct Consequences: The OA was dismissed and the Tribunal ordered that there would be no costs. The dismissal means the impugned transfer was not set aside by the Tribunal in this proceeding.
Broader Implications: The Tribunal explicitly relied upon and followed the settled Supreme Court position limiting interference with transfer orders (i.e., only in cases of mala fides, arbitrariness or statutory violation). The opinion did not purport to lay down any new legal principle or precedent; it applied existing Supreme Court authority to the facts and dismissed the OA accordingly.
Heard the learned counsel for the applicant on the point of admittance of the case for the purpose of issuance of notice and also on the point of interim relief.
2. It is seen that the applicant is posted at Mumbai. When a question was asked regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Bench of this Tribunal to hear the case, instead of Mumbai Bench, the learned counsel has produced a copy of Honble Delhi High Courts judgment dated 23.07.2003 in CW No.517/2003 in the matter of Dr.K.P.Verma vs. Union of India & Others, in which the High Court had held that even if the order of transfer had been communicated to the applicant within the State of Maharashtra, since the order was issued from Delhi, a part of cause of action did arise in Delhi. He has also relied upon the Honble Apex Courts judgment in State of Rajasthan & Others vs. M/s Swaika Properties and Another (AIR 1985 SC 1289) to submit that the Tribunals/Courts at the place from where an original order is issued have full jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
3. The territorial jurisdiction of various Benches of this Tribunal is not congruent with the jurisdiction of the Honble High Court at the same place, since the High Courts have much vast Constitutional powers. However, the learned counsel relies upon a Division Bench judgment of the Bangalore Bench of this Tribunal in K.Balaji vs. Intregal Coach Factory, Chennai : 2002 (3) ATJ 438 which was in the context of an applicant to a particular Government post, and not in the case of a person who was already a Government employee. Therefore, the Bangalore Bench/judgment in the case of K. Balaji is not applicable in the present case. However, in view of the order of the Honble Delhi High Court in Dr.K.P.Verma (supra), the question of jurisdiction is laid to rest.
4. The applicant, and his wife, both are employees of the respondent-department. From Annexure A-6, at pages 63-64, and Annexure A-1 at page 25 of the Paper Book, it is seen that the spouse of the applicant is already posted in Chennai and that by the same impugned order, she has been shifted from CIT (A)-12 to CIT-10 at Chennai itself.
5. The learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon the transfer/placement guidelines for officers of the Indian Revenue Service CBDT-2010 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes on 16.02.2010, under which he claims to being posted in an exempted post, the tenure where does not count towards computation of his tenure at Mumbai, through Annexure A-4 pages 53 to 57 of the OA, and has pleaded that as a result the applicants case is not yet ripe for transfer, as he has not yet completed the full tenure of 14 years at Mumbai, after including his present exempt posts tenure. However, it is seen from page 54 of the OA that the applicant was posted at Mumbai for his very first postings from 14.06.1988 to 02.06.1998 and after completing his postings at Baroda and Ahmedabad/Gandhinagar, he returned to Mumbai on 24.06.2005. He has been serving at Mumbai continuously since then. In fact, in his entire career, he has been given postings only in Mumbai and Ahmedabad Regions, and nowhere else.
6. The applicant has also annexed copies of O.M. dated 03.04.1986 at pages 116 A to D and O.M. dated 12.06.1997 at pages 116 E to H relating to Government of India Guidelines regarding the posting of husband and wife at the same station. On this, the learned counsel for the applicant submits that even though the wife of the applicant has been substantively posted to Chennai, by virtue of the operation of interim stay, which she had obtained from the Mumbai Bench of this Tribunal, she had continued to be posted at Mumbai, instead of joining her substantive posting at Chennai.
7. The learned counsel has also submitted that in the judgment delivered on 12.02.2013 by a Coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in OA 289/2013 Shri R.K.Sharma vs. Union of India & Another, the transfer policy which the applicant relies upon has been held to be sacrosanct, and it has been held that it cannot be violated.
8. However, in Shilpi Bose vs. State of Bihar & Others: AIR 1991 SC 532: 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659, the Honble Apex Court had observed as follows:- 4. In our opinion, the Courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the Competent Authority do not violate any of is legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department.
9. In Union of India vs. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357, para-7, the Supreme Court observed that: 7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the Court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration..
10. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Limited vs. Shri Bhagwan, 2002 (1) SLJ 86= 2001(8) SCC 574, wherein at para 5 at page 577 it was held that: 5.no Government servant or employee of Public Undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they are the Appellate Authorities substituting their own decision for that of the Management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned
11. A three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Major General J.K. Bansal vs. Union of India and others, (2005) 7 SCC 227 has also adopted the aforesaid view.
12. In State of M.P. and Another vs. S.S. Kourav and Others, 1995(2) SLJ 109 [SC]= (1995) 3 SCC 270, the Supreme Court observed that: 5.The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. No Government servant or employee of Public Undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they are the Appellate Authorities substituting their own decision for that of the Management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This position was highlighted by this Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Shri Bhagwan.. 6. The above position was recently highlighted in Union of India vs. Janardhan Debanath. It has to be noted that the High Court proceeded on the basis as if the transfer was connected with the departmental proceedings. There was not an iota of material to arrive at the conclusion. No malafides could be attributed as the order was purely on administrative grounds and in public interest.
13. In State of Punjab vs. Joginder Singh Dhatt: AIR 1993 SC 2486, the Honble Apex Court had in para 3 of its judgment observed as follows:- "We have heard learned counsel for the parties. This Court has time and again expressed its disapproval of the Courts below interfering with the order of transfer of public servant from one place to another. It is entirely for the employer to decide when, where and at what point of time a public servant is transferred from his present posting. Ordinarily the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of transfer. The High Court grossly erred in quashing the order of transfer of the respondent from Hoshiarpur to Sangrur. The High Court was not justified in extending its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a matter where, on the face of it, no injustice was caused"
14. Following its earlier ratio laid down in N.K.Singh vs. Union of India:(1994) 6 SCC 98=1994 SCC (L&S) 1304=(1994) 28 ATC 246, in the case of Abani Kanta Ray vs. State of Orissa:1995(supp)4 SCC 169=1996 SCC 169=1996 Lab IC 982=1996 AIR SCW 797=1996 SCC (L&S) 175=(1996) 32 ATC 107 the Honble Apex Court observed as follows in para 10 of its judgment:- "It is settled law that a transfer which is an incident of service is not to be interfered with by the Courts unless it is shown to be clearly arbitrary or vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm or principle governing the transfer. (See N.K. Singh vs. Union of India)"
15. In Mohd. Masood Ahmed vs. State of U.P.& Ors.: 2007) 8 SCC 150=JT2007 (11) SC 540=2007 (10) SCR 72 = (2007) 11 Scale 271, the Honble Apex Court observed in para-7 as follows: 7. The scope of judicial review of transfer under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been settled by the Supreme Court in Rajendra Rao vs. Union of India (1993) 1 SCC 148; (AIR 1939 SC 1236), National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. vs. Shri Bhagwan (2001) 8 SCC 574; (AIR 2001 SC 3309), State Bank of India vs. Anjan Sanyal (2001) 5 SCC 508; (AIR 2001 SC 1748). Following the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the Allahabad High Court in Vijay Pal Singh vs. State of U.P. (1997) 3 ESC 1668; (1998) All LJ 70) and Onkarnath Tiwari vs. The Chief Engineer, Minor Irrigation Department, U.P. Lucknow (1997) 3 ESC 1866; (1998 All LJ 245), has held that the principle of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions is that an order of transfer is a part of the service conditions of an employee which should not be interfered with ordinarily by a Court of law in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 unless the Court finds that either the order is mala fide or that the service rules prohibit such transfer, or that the authorities who issued the orders, were not competent to pass the orders.
16. Again, the Honble Supreme Court has in State of U.P. vs. Gobardhan Lal, 2004(3) SLJ 244=[2004] 11 SCC 402=2004(3) SCALE 574, in Paragraphs 7 and 8, observed thus:- 7. It is too late in the day for any Gov-ernment servant to contend that once ap-pointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident in-herent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra in the law governing or condi-tions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statu-tory provision (an Act or Rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an or-der of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulat-ing transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the of-ficer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the offi-cial status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emolu-ments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in trans-gression of administrative guidelines can-not also be interfered with, as they do riot confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. 8. A challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the Courts or Tri-bunals as though they are Appellate Authori-ties over such orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative needs and requirements of the situation concerned. This is for the reason that Courts or Tribu-nals cannot substitute their own decisions in the matter of transfer for that of compe-tent authorities of the State and even alle-gations of mala fides when made must be such as to inspire confidence in the Court or are based on concrete materials and ought not to be entertained on the mere making of it or on consideration borne out of conjec-tures or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no interference could ordinarily be made with an order of trans-fer. (Emphasis supplied).
17. In para 8 of the judgment in State of U.P. vs. Gobardhan Lal, (supra), the Honble Apex Court has held that a challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the Courts or Tri-bunals as though they are Appellate Authori-ties over such orders. Also, in para 7 of the same judgment, the Honble Apex Court has specifically held even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies may at best afford an opportunity to represent to superiors, but a competent authority can still order a transfer of the employee to any place as is found necessitated by exigencies of service, and such an order of transfer cannot be interfered with (by Courts/Tribunals) on the ground of it having been made even in transgression of any administrative or policy guidelines.
18. In view of this specific ratio laid down by the Honble Apex Court, I am duty bond to obey it, and am not inclined to be persuaded by the decision of concurrent bench in OA No.289/2013 Shri R.K.Sharma (supra). Therefore, I am duty bound to dismiss the present case in limine, in obedience of the ratio as laid down by the Honble Apex Court. The OA, therefore, stands dismissed accordingly. No costs. (Sudhir Kumar) Member (A) /kdr/
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