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Manish Anand Petitioner v. Manish Sinha Petitioner
Judgment Summary: High Court of Delhi — Navin Chawla, J. — 21 February 2018
Factual and Procedural Background
These petitions were filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by a number of petitioners (including Manish Anand, Manish Sinha, Birendra Kumar, Gaurav Kumar, Murlidhar, Vikas Gupta and Narayan Chandra Bishal) challenging the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator by the respondent, FIITJEE Ltd., on the ground that the respondent had unilaterally appointed the Sole Arbitrator pursuant to Clause 21(a) of the "Supplementary Rules for the Employees of Fiitjee".
Clause 21(a) (the arbitration agreement) provides that "All disputes and differences ... shall be referred to the Sole Arbitrator appointed by the company i.e. FIITJEE" and states that the arbitration shall be conducted under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 with the venue being Delhi/New Delhi. The petitioners challenged (a) the enforceability of a clause vesting unilateral appointment power in the company and (b) the eligibility of the appointed Arbitrator on the ground of inadequate disclosure under Section 12(1) of the Act.
The petitions were heard and determined by the Court; the petitions were dismissed by the High Court with liberty to the petitioners to pursue other remedies regarding the Arbitrator's independence or impartiality before the Arbitrator or in other proceedings available in law. There was no order as to costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the arbitration clause (Clause 21(a) of the Supplementary Rules) that vests power in the respondent to unilaterally appoint a Sole Arbitrator is unenforceable and invalid.
- Whether the Sole Arbitrator so appointed is de jure ineligible to proceed because he did not make the disclosure required by Section 12(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (as amended) and the Sixth Schedule.
- Whether this Court has jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act to appoint another arbitrator where the appointment has been made in accordance with the procedure agreed between the parties.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The arbitration agreement is void or unenforceable insofar as it vests unilateral power in the respondent (company) to appoint the Sole Arbitrator; such a provision cannot be enforced.
- The Arbitrator appointed by the respondent did not give a disclosure in terms of Section 12(1) and the Sixth Schedule of the Act; therefore, he is de jure ineligible to act as Arbitrator.
- The petitioners relied on this Court's judgment in Dream Valley Farms Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Religare Finvest Ltd. & Ors. (2016 SCC Online Del 5584) to contend that a defective or misleading disclosure can render the arbitrator disqualified and justify intervention under Section 11.
The opinion does not contain a detailed, separate statement of the respondent's arguments in support of the appointment in the text supplied.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
OMP (T) (COMM) 101/2017 Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Oriental Structural Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (judgment pronounced the same day) | The judgment rejected the contention that a clause vesting unilateral power in a company to appoint a sole arbitrator is unenforceable. | The Court stated that it had already rejected the petitioners' contention in that judgment and relied on the reasons recorded therein to refuse to accept the petitioners' challenge to the clause empowering FIITJEE to appoint the Sole Arbitrator. |
Pallav Vimalbhai Shah & Ors. v. Kalpesh Sumatibhai Shah & Ors., MANU/GJ/1396/2017 (High Court of Gujarat) | Emphasised the importance of disclosure under Section 12(1); if circumstances exist and disclosure is not made, the appointment may be rendered wholly non-est; mere failure to use the Sixth Schedule format is not necessarily fatal. | The Court cited the decision for the proposition that disclosure is crucial and that non-disclosure, where circumstances exist, can render appointment invalid. The Court used it to explain that consequences of non-disclosure depend on facts of each case. |
HRD Corporation v. Gail (India) Limited, 2017 SCC Online SC 1024 (Supreme Court) | The Supreme Court refused to allow a belated challenge based on alleged incomplete disclosure by an arbitrator where the point was not raised earlier; it observed that if nothing contrary is indicated, it may be assumed the arbitrator can devote sufficient time. | The Court relied on this decision to support the view that failure to provide a disclosure in the exact prescribed form or to state particular matters may not be fatal where the substance of the disclosure indicates absence of disqualifying circumstances and where the challenge was not timely raised. |
Dream Valley Farms Private Limited & Anr. v. Religare Finvest Limited & Ors., 2016 SCC Online Del 5584 (High Court of Delhi) | Where an arbitrator's disclosure was ex facie misleading and involved suppression of material facts (e.g., being presiding arbitrator in many matters relating to the respondent), the arbitrator was held to be de jure disqualified and the Court appointed a replacement under Section 15. | The petitioners relied on this case. The Court distinguished Dream Valley on its facts, noting the arbitrator there engaged in conduct amounting to suppression and misleading behaviour, which is not present in the current case. |
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Raja Transport Pvt. Ltd., (2009) 8 SCC 520 (Supreme Court) | Summarises the scope of Section 11, including when the Chief Justice/designate may exercise powers under various sub-sections of Section 11 and the limits where the parties have agreed an appointment procedure that has been followed. | The Court cited the summary to conclude that because the Arbitrator had been appointed in accordance with the agreed procedure (Clause 21(a)), this Court did not have jurisdiction under Section 11 to appoint another arbitrator in the present circumstances. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a structured manner:
- The Court first identified the arbitration clause (Clause 21(a)) which vests appointment of a Sole Arbitrator in the company (FIITJEE) and set out the petitioners' challenges: (a) that such a unilateral appointment clause is unenforceable; and (b) that the appointed Arbitrator did not make the disclosure required by Section 12(1), rendering him de jure ineligible.
- On the first challenge (unenforceability of unilateral appointment), the Court noted that it had already rejected a similar contention in a separate judgment pronounced the same day (Bhayana Builders v. Oriental Structural Engineers) and, for the reasons recorded in that judgment, declined to accept the petitioners' submissions that the clause was unenforceable.
- On the second challenge (non-disclosure under Section 12(1)), the Court reviewed the amended Section 12(1) and the Sixth Schedule and emphasised the legislative purpose: the amendment and schedules were intended to promote independence and impartiality by requiring specific disclosures by a person approached for appointment as arbitrator.
- The Court examined the statutory scheme and the Law Commission's 246th Report commentary. The Court concluded that, although disclosure is important and the Sixth Schedule prescribes the form and matters to be disclosed, the legislature did not prescribe that non-disclosure or an incorrect disclosure would automatically terminate an arbitrator's mandate in every case.
- The Court held that the consequence of improper or incomplete disclosure depends upon the facts of each case; automatic disqualification is not mandated by the statute. The Court cited Pallav Shah (Gujarat HC) to support the position that non-disclosure of existing circumstances can render an appointment non-est, but that mere failure to use the Sixth Schedule format is not necessarily fatal.
- The Court also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in HRD Corporation v. Gail (India) Ltd. to observe that an objection based on incomplete disclosure cannot necessarily be entertained at any stage, especially where the substance of disclosure indicates absence of disqualifying circumstances or the point was not timely raised.
- The Court noted the actual disclosure given by the appointed Arbitrator in the present case: "Please be informed that there exist no circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubts as to my independence or impartiality in resolving the disputes referred in this regard." While not in the Sixth Schedule format, the Court viewed this statement as disclosing the “most vital aspect” required by Section 12(1).
- The Court observed that if the petitioners were dissatisfied with the form or content of that disclosure, the proper course would have been to request further or fuller disclosure from the Arbitrator or to raise the matter promptly rather than institute a Section 11 petition. The Court distinguished Dream Valley on the ground that Dream Valley involved ex facie misleading conduct and suppression by the arbitrator (which is not alleged here).
- Finally, the Court considered jurisdiction under Section 11. Relying on the Supreme Court's exposition in Indian Oil v. Raja Transport, the Court held that where an arbitrator has been appointed in accordance with the parties' agreed procedure, the Court does not have jurisdiction under Section 11 to appoint another arbitrator. Because the appointment here followed the agreed clause, the Court concluded it could not substitute an arbitrator under Section 11.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petitions under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were dismissed.
Implications and consequences:
- The Court refused to invalidate the arbitration clause that allowed the respondent to unilaterally appoint the Sole Arbitrator and declined to set aside the appointment on the facts of this case.
- The Court held that the Arbitrator's disclosure — though not in the exact Sixth Schedule form — contained the essential statement that no circumstances exist giving rise to justifiable doubts about independence or impartiality; that, combined with the absence of any alleged ex facie misleading conduct, was not sufficient to render the Arbitrator de jure ineligible.
- The Court made clear that whether an improper or incomplete disclosure renders an arbitrator ineligible depends on the facts of each case; automatic termination of mandate is not mandated by the statute.
- The petitioners were left free to raise challenges regarding the Arbitrator's independence or impartiality before the Arbitrator himself or in any other proceedings available in law; the Court declined to exercise Section 11 powers to appoint another arbitrator because the appointment had been made according to the agreed procedure.
- No order as to costs was made.
The opinion does not announce a novel legal rule displacing existing authority; it applies statutory text, legislative history and existing case law to the specific facts and denies relief on those facts.
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+th Reserved on: 8 February, 2018 st
Date of decision: 21 February , 2018
+ ARB.P. 654/2017 & I.A. No.11965/2017 ARB.P. 655/2017 & I.A. No.11967/2017 ARB.P. 656/2017 & I.A. No.11970/2017 ARB.P. 657/2017 & I.A. No.11972/2017 ARB.P. 658/2017 & I.A. No.11974/2017 ARB.P. 659/2017 & I.A. No.11976/2017 ARB.P. 814/2017 & I.A. No.15007/2017 MANISH ANAND ..... Petitioner MANISH SINHA ..... Petitioner BIRENDRA KUMAR ..... Petitioner GAURAV KUMAR ..... Petitioner MURLIDHAR ..... Petitioner
VIKAS GUPTA ..... Petitioner NARAYAN CHANDRA BISHAL ..... Petitioner Through: Mr.Manish Sharma, Ms.Mayuri Raghuvanshi, Mr.Vyom
Raghuvanshi and Mr.Ninad Dogra, Advs.
versus
FIITJEE LTD ..... Respondent Through Mr.Mukesh M.Goel and Ms.Arti Rawat, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
1. These petitions under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') have been filed by the petitioner challenging the appointment of the Arbitrator by the respondent unilaterally.
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2. The Arbitration Agreement between the parties is contained in Clause 21(a) of the "Supplementary Rules for the Employees of Fiitjee", which is reproduced herein under:-
"21(a) All disputes and differences of any nature with regard to FIITJEE service manual and the interpretation & adjudication of clauses and claims respectively shall be referred to the Sole Arbitrator appointed by the company i.e. FIITJEE. The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and statutory modifications thereof and rules made thereunder. The award of Arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the parties. The award of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on every matter arising hereunder. It is further agreed that in spite of the fact that the Sole Arbitrator may be known to any of the Directors or shareholders and that he may have been dealing with the company or had occasion to deal with any matter of this agreement shall not disqualify him. Even if the Arbitrator may have expressed opinion in similar matter earlier shall also not render him disqualified. The venue of the arbitration shall be Delhi / New Delhi only."
3. It is the contention of the petitioner that the Arbitration Agreement, so far as it vests power in the respondent to unilaterally appoint a Sole Arbitrator for adjudicating the disputes between the parties is unenforceable and in valid. I have already rejected the said contention in judgment pronounced today in OMP (T) (COMM) 101/2017 Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Oriental Structural Engineers Pvt. Ltd. and for the reasons recorded therein I am unable to agree with the submissions made by the petitioner.
4. It is further contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the Arbitrator so appointed by the respondent has not given his disclosure in
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terms of Section 12(1) of the Act and therefore, he is de jure ineligible to proceed with the arbitration.
5. Section 12(1) of the Act is reproduced herein under:-
"12. Grounds for challenge.— [(1) When a person is approached in connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in writing any circumstances,—
(a) such as the existence either direct or indirect, of any past or present relationship with or interest in any of the parties or in relation to the subject-matter in dispute, whether financial, business, professional or other kind, which is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality; and
(b) which are likely to affect his ability to devote sufficient time to the arbitration and in particular his ability to complete the entire arbitration within a period of twelve months.
Explanation 1.—The grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule shall guide in determining whether circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator.
Explanation 2.—The disclosure shall be made by such person in the form specified in the Sixth Schedule.]
6. Prior to its amendment by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, Section 12(1) read as under:-
"12. Grounds for challenge.— [(1) When a person is approached in connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in writing any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality."
7. The Sixth Schedule of the Act is also reproduced herein under:-
"The sixth schedule
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Name:
Contact Details:
Prior experience (including experience with arbitrations):
Number of ongoing arbitrations:
CIRCUMSTANCES DISCLOSING ANY PAST OR
PRESENT RELATIONSHIP WITH OR INTEREST IN ANY
OF THE PARTIES OR IN RELATION TO THE SUBJECT-
MATTER IN DISPUTE, WHETHER FINANCIAL,
BUSINESS, PROFESSIONAL OR OTHER KIND, WHICH
IS LIKELY TO GIVE RISE TO JUSTIFIABLE DOUBTS AS
TO YOUR INDEPENDENCE OR IMPARTIALITY (LIST
OUT):
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE LIKELY TO AFFECT
YOUR ABILITY TO DEVOTE SUFFICIENT TIME TO THE
ARBITRATION AND IN PARTICULAR YOUR ABILITY TO
FINISH THE ENTIRE ARBITRATION WITHIN TWELVE
MONTHS (LIST OUT):"
8. Law Commission in its 246threport had explained the reasons for introduction of 12(1) to the Act as under:-
"NEUTRALITY OF ARBITRATORS
53. It is universally accepted that any quasi-judicial process, including the arbitration process, must be in accordance with principles of natural justice. In the context of arbitration, neutrality of arbitrators viz. their independence and impartiality, is critical to the entire process.
54. In the Act, the test for neutrality is set out in Section 12(3) which provides—
'12. (3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if—
(a) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality.…'
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55. The Act does not lay down any other conditions to identify the "circumstances" which give rise to "justifiable doubts", and it is clear that there can be many such circumstances and situations. The test is not whether, given the circumstances, there is any-actual-bias for that is setting the bar too high; but, whether the circumstances in question give rise to any- justifiable apprehensions-of bias.
xxxxx
59. The Commission has proposed the requirement of having specific disclosures by the arbitrator, at the stage of his- possible-appointment, regarding existence of any relationship or interest of any kind which is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts. The Commission has proposed the incorporation of the Fourth Schedule, which has drawn from the red and orange lists of the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, and which would be treated as a
"guide" to determine whether circumstances exist which give rise to such justifiable doubts. On the other hand, in terms of the proposed Section 12(5) of the Act and the Fifth Schedule which incorporates the categories from the red list of the IBA Guidelines (as above), the person proposed to be appointed as an arbitrator shall be -ineligible- to be so appointed, - notwithstanding - any prior agreement - to the contrary. In the event such an ineligible person is purported to be appointed as an arbitrator, he shall be de jure deemed to be unable to perform his functions, in terms of the proposed Explanation to Section 14. Therefore, while the disclosure is required with respect to a broader list of categories (as set out in the Fourth Schedule, and as based on the red and orange lists of the IBA Guidelines), the-ineligibility-to be appointed as an arbitrator (and the consequent de jure inability to so act) follows from a smaller and more serious sub-set of situations (as set out in the Fifth Schedule, and as based on the red list of the IBA Guidelines)."
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9. The Law Commission in its Report further added a Note after its recommendation to add the two Explanation(s) to Section 12 (1) of the Act as under:
"[NOTE: This amendment is intended to further goals of independence and impartiality in arbitrations, and only gives legislative colour to the phrase "independence or impartiality" as it is used in the Act. The contents of the Fourth Schedule incorporate the Red and Orange lists of the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration. While Mr.Malhotra was of the view that the said provisions should not apply to the public sector, excluding the public sector will render the provision susceptible to a challenge under article 19 of the Constitution of India.]"
10. Reading of Section 12(1) of the Act with the Sixth Schedule would clearly demonstrate the importance of the disclosure to be made by the proposed Arbitrator who is approached by the parties with his possible appointment as an Arbitrator. The disclosure is relevant and necessary as independence and impartiality of the Arbitrator are the hallmark of any arbitration proceedings. The amended provision is enacted to identify 'circumstances' which give rise to 'justifiable doubt' about the independence and impartiality of the Arbitrator.
11. Having appreciated and re-emphasized the importance of the disclosure under Section 12(1) of the Act, the question is whether an improper disclosure, as in the present case would render the Arbitrator so appointed ineligible or de jure incapable of proceeding with the arbitration proceedings. The answer to this, in my opinion, has to be in the negative. The legislature, while emphasizing on the disclosure under Section 12(1) of the Act, has not further stated that the consequence of
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such non-disclosure would be automatic termination of the mandate of the Arbitrator so appointed. In absence of such a legislative consequences, in my opinion, it would depend on the facts of the given case whether the mandate of the Arbitrator would stand terminated upon non-disclosure or giving a false disclosure under Section 12(1) of the Act.
12. In Pallav Vimalbhai Shah & Ors. Vs. Kalpesh Sumatibhai Shah & Ors. MANU/GJ/1396/2017, High Court of Gujarat held as under:-
"38. In this context, the necessity of disclosure envisaged in sub- section (1) of Section 12 becomes important. Only when such a disclosure is made, that the parties can judge for themselves, if circumstances exist to give justifiable doubts as to the impartiality of an arbitrator. Upon disclosure being made any one of the following situations may arise. First is, where the parties may agree that no such circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts as to the impartiality of the arbitrator exist or the parties may despite such circumstances existing, go ahead and appoint him as an arbitrator or in face of disagreement between the parties on this issue, one of them, as per the procedure envisaged in the arbitration clause, may proceed to appoint such a person as an arbitrator. Whatever be the fall out, it cannot be denied that disclosure of existence of any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to independence or impartiality of an arbitrator, would be of great importance. Not making any disclosure even though such circumstances exist, would render the appointment of an arbitrator without following the mandatory procedure. This is not to suggest that even though no such circumstances exist, mere failure to make a disclosure or in a format different from that provided in the Sixth Schedule by itself would be fatal to the appointment of the arbitrator. This is also not to suggest that if a party objecting to appointment of arbitrator is aware about existence of such circumstances before the appointment is made, he could challenge the same at a later time on the ground that disclosure was not made. Such a situation
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would be clearly covered by sub-section (3) of section 12. This is only to suggest that if circumstances exist and disclosure is not made, appointment of an arbitrator would be wholly non-est. In such a situation a party making appointment of an arbitrator without following such mandatory procedure cannot, by referring to section 13 of the Amending Act, drive the opponent to challenge his appointment before the Arbitrator Tribunal itself and if such a challenge before the Tribunal was unsuccessful, to submit to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal and to challenge the award in accordance with Section 34 inter-alia on the ground of incompetence of the arbitrator."
13. In HRD Corporation Vs. Gail (India) Limited 2017 SCC Online SC 1024, Supreme Court negated an argument challenging the appointment of an Arbitrator on the ground that the Arbitrator had not made a complete disclosure in his disclosure statement. The Supreme Court held as under:-
"29. The appointment of Justice Doabia was also attacked on the ground that he had not made a complete disclosure, in that this disclosure statement did not indicate as to whether he was likely to devote sufficient time to the arbitration and would be able to complete it within 12 months. We are afraid that we cannot allow the Appellant to raise this point at this stage as it was never raised earlier. Obviously, if Justice Doabia did not indicate anything to the contrary, he would be able to devote sufficient time to the arbitration and complete the process within 12 months."
14. In the present case the Arbitrator has given the disclosure in terms of Section 12(1) of the Act (though not in the form prescribed in the Sixth Schedule) as under:-
"Please be informed that there exist no circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubts as to my independence or impartiality in resolving the disputes referred in this regard."
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15. Though the above disclosure is not in terms of the Sixth Schedule of the Act, the same discloses the most vital aspect of the same. In any case, if the petitioner(s) were not satisfied with the said disclosure they should have made a request to the Arbitrator so appointed for making a proper disclosure or of other circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubt as to his independence and impartiality. Instead of doing so, the petitioner(s) have filed the present petition(s) under Section 11 of the Act.
16. The petitioner(s) have placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Dream Valley Farms Private Limited & Anr. Vs. Religare Finvest Limited & Ors. 2016 SCC Online Del 5584 to contend that in the absence of a proper disclosure by the Arbitrator, a petition under Section 11 of the Act would be maintainable. I am unable to accept the said argument. In Dream Valley (Supra) the Court was faced with a situation where the disclosure given by the Arbitrator was ex-facie misleading. The Court, in view of the conduct of the Arbitrator in seeking to mislead the petitioner therein and suppress, in the first instance the fact of his being a presiding Arbitrator in 27 matters relating to the respondent therein which in the opinion of the Court smacked of dishonesty and non- becoming of an Arbitrator, is held that the Arbitrator had become de jure disqualified as continuing as an Arbitrator and thereafter proceeded to appoint an Arbitrator in exercise of its power under Section 15 of the Act. The said judgment is therefore, distinguishable on facts of its own case.
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17. In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Raja Transport Pvt. Ltd.
(2009) 8 SCC 520, the Supreme Court summarized the scope of Section 11 of the Act as under:-
"48. In the light of the above discussion, the scope of Section 11 of the Act containing the scheme of appointment of arbitrators may be summarised thus:
(i) Where the agreement provides for arbitration with three arbitrators (each party to appoint one arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators to appoint a third arbitrator), in the event of a party failing to appoint an arbitrator within 30 days from the receipt of a request from the other party (or the two nominated arbitrators failing to agree on the third arbitrator within 30 days from the date of the appointment), the Chief Justice or his designate will exercise power under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act.
(ii) Where the agreement provides for arbitration by a sole arbitrator and the parties have not agreed upon any appointment procedure, the Chief Justice or his designate will exercise power under sub-section (5) of Section 11, if the parties fail to agree on the arbitration within thirty days from the receipt of a request by a party from the other party.
(iii) Where the arbitration agreement specifies the appointment procedure, then irrespective of whether the arbitration is by a sole arbitrator or by a three-member Tribunal, the Chief Justice or his designate will exercise power under sub-section (6) of Section 11, if a party fails to act as required under the agreed procedure (or the parties or the two appointed arbitrators fail to reach an agreement expected of them under the agreed procedure or any person/institution fails to perform any function entrusted to him/it under that procedure).
(iv) While failure of the other party to act within 30 days will furnish a cause of action to the party seeking arbitration to approach the Chief Justice or his designate in cases falling under sub-sections (4) and (5), such a time-bound requirement is not found in sub-section (6) of Section 11.
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The failure to act as per the agreed procedure within the time-limit prescribed by the arbitration agreement, or in the absence of any prescribed time-limit, within a reasonable time, will enable the aggrieved party to file a petition under Section 11(6) of the Act.
(v) Where the appointment procedure has been agreed between the parties, but the cause of action for invoking the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice or his designate under clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sub-section (6) has not arisen, then the question of the Chief Justice or his designate exercising power Under Sub-section (6) does not arise. The condition precedent for approaching the Chief Justice or his designate for taking necessary measures Under Sub-section (6) is that
(i) a party failing to act as required under the agreed appointment procedure; or
(ii) the parties (or the two appointed arbitrators) failing to reach an agreement expected of them under the agreed appointment procedure; or
(iii) a person/institution who has been entrusted with any function under the agreed appointment procedure, failing to perform such function.
(vi) The Chief Justice or his designate while exercising power Under Sub-section (6) of Section 11 shall endeavour to give effect to the appointment procedure prescribed in the arbitration clause.
(vii) If circumstances exist, giving rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the person nominated, or if other circumstances warrant appointment of an independent arbitrator by ignoring the procedure prescribed, the Chief Justice or his designate may, for reasons to be recorded ignore the designated arbitrator and appoint someone else." Thus, as laid down in sub-para (v) of para 48, unless the cause of action for invoking jurisdiction Under Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Sub-section (6) of Section 11 of 1996 Act arises, there is no question of the Chief Justice or his designate exercising power Under Sub-section (6) of Section 11."
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18. In the present case as the Arbitrator has been appointed in accordance with the procedure agreed to between the parties in the Arbitration Agreement, therefore, this Court would not have jurisdiction to exercise its power under Section 11 of the Act to appoint another Arbitrator for adjudicating the disputes between the parties.
19. In view of the above, I find no merit in the present petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed, however, leaving it open to the petitioner(s) to agitate all other contentions regarding the impartiality or independence of the Arbitrator before the Arbitrator himself or in such other proceedings as may be open to it in law. There shall be no order as to cost.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J
FEBRUARY 21, 2018/rv
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