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P.S. Pushparaj Petit... v. The Authorized Offic...

Madras High Court
Oct 3, 2017
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Court's Opinion (W.P. No.4867 of 2017)

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petitioner is the erstwhile Director of M/s. D.G. Power and Electrical Projects Pvt. Ltd. and had offered certain land (R.S.No.128/5/1, 128/11 & 129/4 pt β€” approx. 1,56,060 sq.ft) as security by depositing title deeds as a guarantor. A loan taken by the company had become a Non-Performing Asset and the Bank of India (1st respondent) issued a notice dated 30.09.2013 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The bank wrote an intimation dated 14.12.2013 (demanding handover of possession under Section 13(12)) calling for possession on 20.12.2013.

The petitioner challenged these proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chennai in S.A. No.116 of 2015. The DRT allowed the application in S.A. No.116 of 2015 on procedural grounds (finding that the bank had not followed the procedure in serving a possession notice), but at the same time recorded a factual finding that the subject lands were put to industrial use (i.e. not used for agricultural operations), based on an Advocate Commissioner's report and other materials. The petitioner then filed the instant writ petition in the High Court challenging the DRT's recorded finding that the land was industrial.

The High Court heard counsel for both sides and, after analysis, dismissed the writ petition, holding that the petitioner should pursue the alternate remedy of appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The writ petition was dismissed with no costs and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person who is aggrieved by a finding recorded by the Debts Recovery Tribunal in proceedings under Section 17 (even if the final order otherwise favours that person) qualifies as an "any person aggrieved" and can prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
  2. Whether the SARFAESI Act can be invoked in relation to a security interest in agricultural land (i.e., whether the subject property being agricultural would exclude application of SARFAESI).
  3. Whether a writ petition is maintainable in respect of disputed factual findings recorded by the Debts Recovery Tribunal when there exists an effective and alternate remedy of an appeal to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. K.V. Subramanian, Senior Counsel)

  • Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act allows appeal only from a final order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 and not from a mere finding recorded against a person; since the final order in the DRT was in favour of the petitioner, Section 18 cannot be invoked to challenge the tribunal's adverse finding.
  • The SARFAESI Act's provisions should not apply to security interests in agricultural land; petitioner relied on documentary materials (Settlement Registers, Pondicherry Ground Water Authority permission for a bore-well) and section 31(1) of the Act and the Advocate Commissioner's report to assert agricultural character.
  • Relied on paragraphs of Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India (AIR 2004 SC 2371; 2004(4) SCC 311) to contend that where Article 300-A of the Constitution is infringed, a writ under Article 226 is maintainable.
  • Contended that res judicata principles and provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Order 41, Rule 22) as to objections/cross-objections in appeals under CPC are not directly applicable to the SARFAESI statutory framework.

Respondent Bank's Arguments (Mr. F.B. Benjamin George)

  • Although the DRT's final order was in favour of the petitioner in setting aside an intimation dated 20.12.2013, if the tribunal has recorded a finding in subsequent proceedings that attracts res judicata principles, that finding is appealable; thus, a person aggrieved by a finding can appeal under Section 18.
  • Invoked Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar (1974) 2 SCC 393 to support the contention that findings in earlier proceedings which affect subsequent litigation can be challenged by appeal/cross-objection.
  • Made a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition, arguing that an effective alternate remedy (appeal under Section 18) exists, and therefore the writ is not the appropriate remedy to challenge the tribunal's finding on disputed facts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 2371; 2004(4) SCC 311 Authority cited by petitioner to support that infringement of Article 300-A may render a writ under Article 226 maintainable. The decision was relied upon by the petitioner as part of the argument for writ jurisdiction; the Court noted the reliance but did not accept that this justified entertaining the writ in lieu of the statutory appellate remedy.
Neel Madhav Mining P. Ltd. & Ors v. Union Bank of India & Ors, III (2006) BC 311 (DB) Decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh addressing related issues under SARFAESI (invoked by petitioner). The High Court observed that this decision (and the similarly cited Eshwar Purushothaman Gardens decision) would not lend support to the petitioner's case at this stage and can be considered on merits if an appeal is preferred before the Appellate Tribunal.
Eshwar Purushothaman Gardens v. Indian Bank, I (2013) BC 216 (DB) Decision of this Court (Division Bench) raised by petitioner to support exclusion of SARFAESI in relation to agricultural land. The Court noted the decision but held it would not assist the petitioner at this juncture; it reserved consideration of such authorities for appellate proceedings if an appeal is filed.
Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar & Others, (1974) 2 SCC 393 Authority relied upon by the bank to support the proposition that findings can be the subject of appeals/cross-objections; relates to principles under the Civil Procedure Code. The Court accepted that principles of res judicata and related procedural principles can apply to proceedings under the SARFAESI Act and that this authority is relevant to the question of appealability of findings.
Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, 2010 (5) LW 193 (SC) Authority for the proposition that tribunals constituted under the SARFAESI Act are competent to decide questions of law and fact. The High Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to conclude that the DRT is competent to decide questions of law and fact and that the availability of an effective appellate remedy militates against entertaining a writ petition on disputed factual findings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a textual and purposive interpretation of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Section 18 permits "any person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17" to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days. The Court rejected the petitioner's narrow construction that only a final order adverse to a party would render that party "any person aggrieved" and that an isolated adverse finding could not be appealed.

Key steps in the Court's analysis:

  • Statutory Text: The Court emphasized the plain language of Section 18β€”"any order"β€”and concluded that a person aggrieved by a finding that forms part of an order is within the expression "any person aggrieved".
  • Impact of Findings: The Court recognized that if an adverse finding recorded by the DRT would have an impact on subsequent proceedings between the same parties (including giving rise to res judicata effects), then such a finding is appealable under Section 18.
  • Alternate Remedy Principle: The Court noted that the DRT (and the Appellate Tribunal) is competent to decide questions of law and fact (relying on Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon). Because an effective alternate remedy exists (appeal under Section 18), the Court found it inappropriate to entertain a writ petition that challenges disputed factual findings.
  • Nature of the DRT Order: The Court observed that while the DRT allowed S.A. No.116 of 2015 on procedural grounds (holding the bank had not followed possession notice procedure), it simultaneously recorded a finding that the land was put to industrial use. The High Court treated that recorded finding as an adverse finding that can be the subject of appeal rather than a matter for writ adjudication.
  • Procedure vs. Substance: The Court acknowledged that the 14.12.2013 letter was not strictly a possession notice under Section 13(4) but was a demand under Section 13(12); nevertheless, this procedural point did not justify entertaining a writ petition on disputed facts.
  • Precedential Authorities: The Court accepted that principles such as res judicata (and supporting authorities, including Smt. Ganga Bai) are applicable to SARFAESI proceedings, and that other reported decisions invoked by the petitioner (Neel Madhav; Eshwar Purushothaman Gardens) would have to be examined on merits in the appellate forum rather than in the writ court.

On balance, the Court concluded that the dispute as to the factual characterisation of the land (agricultural or industrial) constitutes a contested question of fact that should be resolved through the statutory appellate process rather than by a writ petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Writ petition is dismissed.

Implications and immediate effects of the decision as stated in the opinion:

  • The petitioner is not permitted to challenge the DRT's contested factual finding by way of a writ petition in the High Court where an effective and alternate remedy of appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act exists; the petitioner is directed to pursue the appellate remedy before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal.
  • The Court excluded the time consumed in the High Court for the purpose of any appeal that the petitioner may file.
  • The writ petition was dismissed with no costs; the connected writ miscellaneous petition was closed.
  • The Court observed that decisions relied upon by the petitioner (Neel Madhav; Eshwar Purushothaman Gardens) would not assist at this stage and can be evaluated on merits in any appellate proceeding filed by the petitioner.

The opinion does not purport to set out any new legal precedent beyond its interpretation of Section 18 in the facts of this case; it confines relief to directing the petitioner to the statutory appellate forum.


Decision authored by S. Manikumar, J., with R. Suresh Kumar, J. concurring. (Order dated 03.10.2017 β€” W.P. No.4867 of 2017 and WMP No.5084 of 2017.)

Show all summary ...

(Order of the Court was made by S.MANIKUMAR, J) Erstwhile Director of M/s.D.G.Power and Electrical Projects Private Limited, who had offered his property viz., land at R.S.No.128/5/1,12811 & 129/4 pt (area approx.1,56,060 sq ft) at Vazhudhavur Road, Thuthipet Village, Villanur SRD & Pondicherry RD, as security, by depositing the title deeds of the property, as Guarantor, has filed the instant writ petition, challenging the finding recorded in S.A.No.116 of 2015 dated 03.01.2017, on the file of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chennai, by which, the tribunal held that lands mortgaged with Bank of India, Thane Main Branch, Thane, the 1st respondent herein, has been put up for industrial use.

2. By inviting the attention of this Court to the finding recorded by the tribunal and Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, Mr.K.V.Subramanian, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said section contemplates that any person aggrieved by a final order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act, to file an appeal under Section 18 of the Act and not the mere finding, recorded against such person. In the instant case, the final order, is in favour of the petitioner, and therefore, he cannot invoke Section 18 of the Act, on other issues

3. Taking this Court to the extracts of the Settlement Registers, permission granted by Pondicherry Ground Water Authority, for digging up of bore-well, and inviting the attention of this Court to Section 31(1) of the Act and also to the contents of the learned Advocate Commissioner's report, Mr.K.V.Subramanian, learned senior counsel further submitted that provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, shall not be made applicable to any security interest created in agricultural land. He also drew the attention of this Court to few paragraphs in Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India reported in AIR 2004 SC 2371 : 2004(4) SCC 311, to contend that when there is an infringement of Article 300-A of Constitution of India, writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is maintainable.

4. In support of his contention that provisions of the SARFAESI Act, cannot be invoked on security interest in agricultural land, Mr.K.V.Subramanian, learned senior counsel also invited the attention of this Court to the decisions of Hon'ble Division Benches of High Court of Andhra Pradesh and this Court, in Neel Madhav Mining P. Ltd. & Ors Vs. Union Bank of India & Ors, reported in III (2006) BC 311 (DB) and in Eshwar Purushothaman Gardens Vs. Indian Bank, reported in I (2013) BC 216 (DB), respectively.

5. Making a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition, Mr.F.B.Benjamin George, learned counsel for the 1st respondent bank submitted that though the final order, made in S.A.No.116 of 2015, on the file of Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chennai is in favour of the writ petitioner in setting aside a notice dated 20.12.2013, which according to him was only an intimation to handover possession and not possession notice, issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, yet, in any subsequent proceedings, if the finding recorded in any proceedings, attract the principles of res judicata, then such a finding rendered, is certainly appealable. He therefore, submitted that the writ petition filed against the finding recorded by the tribunal is appealable. Supporting the said contention, he also relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. Ganga Bai Vs. Vijay Kumar and others, reported in (1974) 2 SCC 393.

6. By way of reply, Mr.K.V.Subramanian, learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that the said decision rendered, as per the Code of Civil Procedure, cannot be made applicable to the instant case, which is covered by statutory provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002. In this context, he also referred to Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which states as follows O.41 R.22. Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred a separate appeal (1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree 1[but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour ; and may also take any cross-objection] to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal Provided he has filed such objection in the Appellant Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. 2[Explanation.--A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent.] (2) Form of objection and provisions applicable thereto.--Such cross-objection shall be in the form of a memorandum, and the provisions of rule 1, so far as they relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal, shall apply thereto. 3[***] (4) Where, in any case in which any respondent has under this rule filed a memorandum of objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit. (5) The provisions relating to appeals by indigent persons shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to an objection under this rule.

7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.

8. Admittedly, loan has been availed by M/s.D.G. Power and Electrical Projects Pvt. Ltd., and writ petitioner was one of the Directors/Guarantor. As there was default, loan account has been classified, as Non Performing Asset and a notice dated 30.09.2013 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, has been issued. According to the petitioner, he has resigned from the Directorship of M/s.D.G. Power and Electrical Projects Private Limited, on 05.01.2010. When bank issued a letter dated 14.12.2013, intimating the petitioner for taking possession, the same has been challenged in S.A.No.116 of 2015 on the file of the Debts Recovery Tribunal - III, Chennai. For brevity, intimation dated 14.12.2013, is reproduced. INTIMATION FOR TAKING POSSESSION Date: 14-12-2013 Mr.P.S.Pushparaj Residence Address, 1307, 13th Main Road, Anna Nagar West, Chennai - 600 040. Dear Sir, Possession of the Securities charged to the Bank under Section 13(4) of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

1. Please refer to our notice dated 30.09.2013 demanding from you within 60 days as sum of Rs.4,45,57,000.00 (Rupees Four Crores Fourteen Lacs Fifty Seven Thousand only) plus interest in respect of various credit facilities allowed to you as specified in the said letter and intimating you that in case of default of payment, Bank shall enforce the securities without intervention of court by taking recourse to one or more of the measures under chapter III of the above Act, 2002, including taking over the possession of the assets charged to the bank to realize the Bank's dues.

2. You have failed to repay the amount mentioned in the said notice.

3. The undersigned being the Authorised Officer of Bank of India, under the said Act in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 13(12) of the said Act hereby demand from you to handover the possession of the secured assets, i.e. Land at R.S.No.128/5/1, 128/11 & 129/4 pt (area approx.1,56,060 sq.ft) at Vazhudavoor Road, Thuthipet Village, Villanur SRD & Pondicherry RD in the name of Mr.P.S.Pushparaj, to the undersigned on the following date & time. Date: 20-12-2013 Time : 10.00 am to 4.00pm Place: Pondicherry Yours faithfully, Sd/- (S.V.Phadate) Assistant General Manager & Authorized Officer, Bank of India

9. As rightly contended by Mr.F.B.Benjamin George, learned counsel for the 1st respondent bank, letter dated 14.12.2013, in strict sense is not a possession notice, issued under Section 13(4) of the Act. But the bank in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 13(12) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, has demanded the petitioner to hand over possession of the secured assets.

10. Nevertheless, the tribunal has entertained the challenge in S.A.No.116 of 2015, and for not following the procedure, as contemplated, allowed the application. On the issue as to whether action can be taken as against the subject property, claimed to be an agricultural property, bank has filed the extract of the characterization of the land, wherein, as against the particular survey number, it has been described, as industrial area.

11. When the writ petitioner had produced documents contending that the subject property is an agricultural land, perusal of the order made in S.A.No.116 of 2015, shows that during the course of hearing of the SARFAESI Application, both parties have admitted that there was no agricultural operation. Both parties have also consented for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner, who submitted his report. Upon considering the rival contentions and the report of the learned Advocate Commissioner, the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chennai, while allowing S.A.No.116 of 2015, on other grounds, has recorded a finding, as hereunder. "To set at rest the controversial claims, Tribunal has taken a stand to appoint an Advocate Commissioner with the consent of both parties who has visited the premises furnished report and whereunder for the schedule of the property, it is described that the boundaries to the property in the respective survey numbers are bounded by either the main road or godowns or engineering companies and it is also described by the Advocate Commissioner that there were only casuarina plants which are of six months old and some dhal plants which ware centimeters tall in length, which concludes that they are laid consequent to the issuance of possession notice to establish certain agricultural operations therein and that there are no agricultural activities and therefore the actions of the respondent bank and the contentions of the respondent bank are fortified by the existence of adjacent industries and consequently the question of land as being put up for industrial use has been upheld. Further, Ld. counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the possession notice has not been served on the appellant and that the respondent bank could not furnish any evidence establishing service of possession notice on the appellant. Although actions of the respondent bank under SARFAESI are valid, the respondent bank did not follow the procedure as warranted under law by serving the subject impugned possession notice and hence this appeal is liable to be allowed. Accordingly, this SA stands allowed, however without costs. Interim stay if any granted and subsisting till this day stands vacated."

12. As per Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal: PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: PROVIDED FURTHER that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: PROVIDED ALSO that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent. of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder.

13. Bare reading of Section 18 of SARFAESI Act, 2002, makes it clear that any person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 may prefer an appeal alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. Though, on other grounds, DRT, Chennai has allowed S.A.No.116 of 2015, filed by the petitioner, indisputably, he is aggrieved over the finding recorded by the tribunal and that is why, he has filed the instant writ petition. If he is aggrieved over the finding recorded by the Tribunal, certainly, he is aggrieved by the order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that if only there is a final order, adverse to the interest of a party, he would be termed as 'any person aggrieved' and if there is a finding against such person, on any of the issues adjudged, no appeal is maintainable, cannot be accepted.

14. As rightly contended by Mr.F.B.Benjamin George, learned counsel for the bank, any person aggrieved over a finding recorded by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, may also file an appeal against such finding, if such adverse finding would have an impact, on any of the subsequent proceedings, between the same parties. Needless to state that even interim orders, inter-se is binding on the parties, if ultimately, the final decision, on the main petition, confirms the interim decision.

15. Though, Mr.K.V.Subramanian, learned senior counsel submitted that the decision rendered in Smt. Ganga Bai Vs. Vijay Kumar and others, reported in (1974) 2 SCC 393, has been considered in the light of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, we are of the view that principles of res judicata, equally apply to proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

16. Reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Division Benches of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Neel Madhav Mining P. Ltd. & Ors Vs. Union Bank of India & Ors, reported in III (2006) BC 311 (DB) and this Court in Eshwar Purushothaman Gardens Vs. Indian Bank, reported in I (2013) BC 216 (DB), at this juncture, would not lend any support, to the case of the petitioner, and the same can be considered, on the merits of the case, if any appeal is preferred before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal.

17. In the light of our interpretation, to Section 18 of the Act, we are of the considered view that if the tribunal has recorded a finding against a person, in a proceeding under Section 17 of the Act, such person would fall within the expression "any person aggrieved". On facts and circumstances of the instant case, it is also seen that finding recorded by the tribunal, is on disputed facts, challenge to which, cannot be entertained in a writ petition, where there is an effective and alternate remedy of an appeal, before the appellate forum, which the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, reported in 2010 (5) LW 193 (SC), has held that the tribunals constituted under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, is competent to decide all questions of law and fact.

18. In the light of the above discussion and decision, writ petition against the impugned proceedings, by which the tribunal has recorded a finding against the interest of the writ petitioner, is not maintainable. Hence, it is open to the petitioner to move the appellate forum. Time consumed in this Court, be excluded, if any appeal is filed. Writ petition is dismissed. No Costs. Consequently, the connected Writ Miscellaneous Petition is closed. (S.M.K., J.) (R.S.K., J.) 03.10.2017 Index: Yes Internet: Yes S.MANIKUMAR, J. R.SURESH KUMAR, J. W.P.No.4867 of 2017 and WMP No.5084 of 2017 03.10.2017