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Yadhava Community Trust v. Jawahar Nisha
Judgment Summary — A.S.No.357 of 2007 (05.12.2016)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs in O.S.No.23 of 2004 (on the file of the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No. I, Cuddalore at Chidambaram) are the appellants in this appeal. The plaintiffs filed the suit seeking (i) declaration of title to the suit property, (ii) delivery of vacant possession, (iii) a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove any superstructure, and (iv) a permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their agents from raising constructions on the suit property.
The plaintiffs relied on a trust deed dated 14.04.1920 (Ex.A1) asserting the property belonged to their Trust. The factual narrative in the pleadings includes: a settlement deed dated 24.11.1925 executed by Rajamanickathachi in favour of Rajambal (Ex.B1/Ex.A4 references); a purported cancellation (deed of revocation) by Rajamanickathachi dated 03.07.1929 (Ex.A5); and a lease deed dated 10.07.1929 executed by Rajamanickathachi in favour of the plaintiffs' Trust (Ex.A6). The plaint also records subsequent transactions by persons who derived title from the settlee and a sale to the defendants (sale deed dated 23.08.1994 appears in the pleadings; the record also refers to a 1942 sale deed produced by the defendants, Ex.B2).
The defendants denied the validity of the trust deed and contended that Rajamanickathachi lacked the authority to cancel the 1925 settlement and that any later admission by her could not confer title on the plaintiffs. The trial court framed multiple issues (including title, validity of settlement/revocation/lease, adverse possession and ancillary procedural issues) and heard oral and documentary evidence: plaintiffs' P.Ws.1–2 and Exs.A1–A9; defendants' D.Ws.1–2 and Exs.B1–B19.
The trial court dismissed the suit (decree dated 29.11.2005), concluding that the trust deed Ex.A1 did not confer title to the plaintiffs and that the revocation/lease executed by Rajamanickathachi could not affect the settlee's rights. The plaintiffs appealed. This judgment is the appellate court's decision on that appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the deed of declaration dated 14.04.1920 would amount to dedication of the suit property in favour of the first plaintiff trust?
- Whether the deed of cancellation dated 03.07.1929 (referred to in the record as 30.07.1929 in one place) is valid in law?
- Whether the execution of the lease deed dated 10.07.1929 by Rajamanickathachi would estop the settlee under the settlement deed dated 24.11.1925 from denying the title of the plaintiff?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments
- The trust deed Ex.A1 dated 14.04.1920 is a valid deed of declaration creating a religious endowment in favour of the plaintiffs' Trust; Ex.A1 together with Exs.A5 (revocation) and A6 (lease) establish plaintiffs' title.
- Reliance on THE IDOL OF RENGANATHASWAMY Vs. M. PANDIAN (2015 (1) CTC 429) to show Ex.A1 is a trust deed creating Religious Endowment; the legal proposition is accepted by counsel.
- Reliance on the Full Bench decision in M/s. LATIF ESTATE LINE INDIA LTD Vs. MRS. HADEEJA AMMAL AND OTHERS (2011(2) CTC 1) for the proposition that unilateral cancellation is invalid; thereby contending that revocation and admissions by Rajamanickathachi cannot be valid if she lacked title.
- Produced Exs.A2 and A3 (registered lease deeds dated 10.03.1926) and argued these documents support plaintiffs' ownership and possession.
- Argued Section 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act removes limitation for suits by a trust and defendants cannot plead adverse possession (relying on NARAYANAN Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU, 2012(1)CTC 474 and ARULMIGU KOLAVIZHI AMMAN TEMPLE v R. SHANMUGAM (2008) 3 MLJ 732).
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- Denied the validity and truth of the trust deed dated 14.04.1920 (Ex.A1) and contended that the property was not dedicated to the plaintiffs' Trust under Ex.A1.
- Contended that the revocation (Ex.A5 dated 03.07.1929) is invalid because Rajamanickathachi had no right to cancel the earlier settlement deed dated 24.11.1925.
- Argued that any post-1925 admission by Rajamanickathachi (including Ex.A6 lease) cannot confer a valid title on the plaintiffs since she herself had no title after the 1925 settlement in favour of Rajambal.
- Sought dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit on these grounds; produced Ex.B2 (a 1942 sale deed) and other documents (Exs.B1–B19) to support the defence position.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| THE IDOL OF RENGANATHASWAMY Vs. M. PANDIAN, 2015 (1) CTC 429 | To support the proposition that Ex.A1 is a trust deed creating a Religious Endowment. | The court recorded that "there is no quarrel about the proposition of law" invoked from this case, but emphasized that the critical question remained whether Ex.A1 in fact relates to the suit property; the legal proposition did not decide identity or title on the facts. |
| M/s. LATIF ESTATE LINE INDIA LTD Vs. MRS. HADEEJA AMMAL AND OTHERS, 2011 (2) CTC 1 (Full Bench) | The principle that unilateral cancellation of a settlement is invalid. | The principle was noted (unilateral cancellation is invalid). Despite this legal principle, the court concluded on the evidence before it that the plaintiffs had not established title to the suit property, so the principle did not secure a favorable result for the plaintiffs in this case. |
| NARAYANAN Vs. STATE OF TAMILNADU, REP. BY ITS SECRETARY, 2012 (1) CTC 474 | To support the proposition that Section 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act prevents defendants from raising adverse-possession pleas against a trust. | The court acknowledged the authority upholding Section 109, but observed that because the plaintiffs had failed to establish title, it was unnecessary to decide the plea of adverse possession in the appeal. |
| ARULMIGU KOLAVIZHI AMMAN TEMPLE v R. SHANMUGAM, (2008) 3 MLJ 732 | To support the proposition that there is no limitation for recovery of possession of trust property under Section 109. | The court agreed with the legal proposition (no limitation bar in such suits) but held that the point was moot here because the plaintiffs failed to establish title to the property. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The appellate court reviewed the trial proceedings, the pleadings and the evidence (oral and documentary). The core of the court's analysis focused on identity of the suit property and the probative value of the documents relied upon by the plaintiffs:
- Document comparison and boundaries: The court observed that the boundary descriptions in Exs.A1 and A3 do not tally with the boundary descriptions in Ex.B1, Ex.A6 and Ex.A7. Ex.A1 (the trust deed) did not contain full boundaries and only recorded a "door number" as 81, whereas subsequent documents showed a different door number (121). This mismatch created reasonable doubt as to whether the property described in Ex.A1 was the same as the suit property.
- On the evidence of possession and oral testimony: The court found oral evidence unhelpful because of the long passage of time between the events and the proceedings; therefore oral testimony did not dispel the documentary inconsistencies.
- Existence of intermediate transactions: The court noted Ex.B2 (a sale deed of 1942 produced by the defendants) under which the settlee Rajambal Ammal had sold a portion of the property to third parties, and that this sale had not been questioned by the plaintiffs. The court also observed that boundary descriptions in Exs.A5, A6 and Ex.B2 were almost the same, reinforcing doubt about which portions related to the plaintiffs' claimed property.
- Treatment of revocation and lease documents: The trial court had held that the trust deed Ex.A1 could not confer title, and that the revocation (Ex.A5) could not bind the settlee under the earlier settlement; likewise the lease (Ex.A6) executed soon after the revocation could not affect the settlee's rights. The appellate court reviewed these findings and found no reason to interfere, noting legal principles cited by counsel (including the invalidity of unilateral cancellations) but emphasizing that factual identity and proof of title were lacking.
- Adverse possession and statutory argument: Although the appellants invoked Section 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act and supporting authorities to argue that adverse possession could not be pleaded against the Trust, the court stated there was no need to examine the adverse-possession plea because plaintiffs had not proved title in the first instance.
On this basis, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs had not established their title to the suit property by cogent and convincing evidence and that there was no ground to interfere with the trial court's findings.
Holding and Implications
CORE RULING: APPEAL DISMISSED — the appellate court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2005 in O.S.No.23 of 2004 made by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court No. 1), Cuddalore at Chidambaram.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The plaintiffs' suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction was dismissed — the plaintiffs did not establish title to the suit property.
- The trial court's decree stands confirmed. The appellate court made no order as to costs, noting that the appellant is a trust. The connected miscellaneous petition was closed.
Broader implications:
The opinion applies established legal principles cited by the parties (including principles on trust declarations, unilateral cancellation and the effect of Section 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act) to the facts, but it did not create or announce any new legal precedent. The court's decision turned on factual findings—principally documentary inconsistencies and failure to prove identity of the property—rather than on novel legal doctrine.
The plaintiffs in O.S.No.23 of 2004 on the file of the learned Additional District Judge, (Fast Track Court No.I), Cuddalore at Chidambaram are the appellants. The said suit was filed by the plaintiffs seeking declaration of the title of the plaintiffs; directing the defendants to deliver vacant possession, for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove the superstructure if any, raised by them, and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men or agents or persons claiming under them, from in any way raising construction in the suit property.
2. According to the plaintiffs, the suit property belongs to the plaintiff's Trust, which had been declared under a Deed dated 14.04.1920 styled as a deed of declaration of the trust. According to the plaintiffs, one Rajamanickathachi, wife of Ambalavana Pillai, had executed a settlement deed on 24.11.1925 settling the property in favour of one Rajambal, wife of Azhagu Pillai. Realising that the property settled by her is trust property, she had executed a document termed as deed of cancellation on 03.07.1929, thereby cancelling the settlement deed dated 24.11.1925. After the said cancellation, on 10.07.1929, the said Rajamanickathachi had executed a lease deed in favour of the plaintiff's trust with reference to the portion of the property. According to the plaintiffs, the execution of the lease deed would amount to acknowledgment of title of the plaintiffs by Rajamanicakathachi. The plaintiffs also claimed that the settlee under Ex.B1, namely, the settlement deed dated 24.11.1925 had executed as settlement deed in favour of her son one Balasundaram on 05.08.1979. Pursuant to the said settlement deed, the said Balasundaram had sold the property to the defendants under Sale Deed dated 23.08.1994. There upon, the plaintiffs chose to issue legal notice on 08.09.1994, which was replied on 17.10.1994. According to the plaintiffs, the said settlor under Ex.B1 dated 24.11.1925, she had acknowledged the fact that she had no right over the property under Ex.A6 dated 10.07.1929. On the above pleadings, the plaintiffs sought for the reliefs stated above.
3. The defendants resisted the suit and contended that the claim of the plaintiffs that the property was dedicated to the trust under Ex.A1 is not correct. They would deny the truth and validity of the said document dated 14.04.1920. The defendants would claim that the alleged cancellation of the settlement deed dated 24.11.1925 by Rajamanickathachi under Ex.A5 dated 03.07.1929 is invalid inasmuch as the said Rajamanickathachi had no right to cancel the settlement deed executed by her. It is further contended that any document executed by Rajamanickathachi after 24.11.1925, admitting the title of the plaintiffs cannot confer any valid title of the plaintiffs inasmuch as the said Rajamanickathachi herself had no right over the suit property. On the above pleadings, the defendant sought for dismissal of the suit.
4. The learned Additional District Judge,(Fast Track Court No.I), Chidambaram, had framed the following issues in the suit.
1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of declaration, injunction and recovery of possession as prayed for?
2. Whether the settlement deed dated 24.11.1925 is valid and acted upon? 3.Whether the sale deed dated 26.09.1990 which was executed by the plaintiffs trust is valid? 4.Whether the revocation deed dated 03.07.1929 is true and valid? 5.Whether the defendants can claim title by adverse possession? 6.To what other relief is plaintiffs are entitled to? ADDITIONAL ISSUES:
1. Whether the plaintiffs have paid proper court fee? 2.Whether the suit as framed is not maintainable?
5. Before the trial Court, on the side of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A1 to A9 were marked and on the side of the defendants, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B1 to B19 were marked. On a consideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence, the learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that the trust deed dated 14.04.1920 cannot confer any title on the plaintiff to the suit property. The learned Additional District Judge further held that the recitals in Ex.A5, namely, the deed of cancellation executed by Rajamanickathachi on 03.04.1929 cannot bind the settlee under Ex.A4 settlement deed. The learned Additional District Judge has also held that there cannot be a unilateral cancellation of the document. Therefore, the learned Additional District Judge also came to the conclusion that the registered lease deed Ex.A6 dated 10.07.1929, which was executed closely on the heel of Ex.A5 deed of revocation can also affect the rights of the settlee under Ex.B1 dated 24.11.1925. Though the plaintiff would rely upon two other documents, namely, Exs.A2 and A3 dated 10.03.1926 to prove that the plaintiffs have been exercising the right of ownership over the suit property, the learned Additional District Judge concluded that those documents are of no avail to the plaintiffs to establish their title to the suit property. On the above conclusion, the learned Additional District Judge found that the plaintiffs has not established their title to the suit property and therefore they are not entitled to any relief prayed for in the suit. On the above findings, the suit was dismissed in entirety. Aggrieved over the said judgment, the plaintiffs have filed the above appeal.
6. The following points arise for determination in this appeal.
1. Whether the deed of declaration dated 14.04.1920 would amount to dedication of the suit property in favour of the first plaintiff trust?
2. Whether the deed of cancellation dated 30.07.1929 is valid in law?
3. Whether the execution of the lease deed dated 10.07.1929 by Rajamanikathachi would estop the settlee under the settlement deed dated 24.11.1925 from denying the title of the plaintiff?
7. I have heard Mrs.Hema Sampath, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mrs.A.Nilaphar for the appellant and Mr.A.Muthukumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
8. Mrs.Hema Sampath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that Ex.A1 trust deed dated 14.04.1920 coupled with Exs.A5 and A6 would establish the title of the plaintiffs to the suit property. She would further submit that the deed of declaration trust is valid. Relying upon the judgment in THE IDOL OF RENGANATHASWAMY Vs. M.PANDIAN, reported in 2015 (1) CTC 429, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that Ex.A1 is in fact a trust deed which created Religious Endowment. There is no quarrel about the proposition of law. But, what has to be seen is that whether the property shown in Ex.A1 is in fact the suit property and whether the plaintiffs have established the title to the suit property. Exs.A5 and A6, namely, deed of revocation dated 03.04.1929 and lease deed dated 01.07.1929 cannot be of any probative value, inasmuch as the executent of the document, namely, Rajamanickathachi had lost her title by executing the settlement deed dated 24.11.1925. In view of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in M/s.LATIF ESTATE LINE INDIA LTD Vs. MRS.HADEEJA AMMAL AND OTHERS reported in 2011(2) CTC 1, unilateral cancellation is invalid. Therefore, the said Rajamanickathachi having settled the property in favour of Rajambal Ammal as early as on 24.11.1925, had no right to execute the revocation deed and any admission of the title by her in the lease deed dated 10.07.1929 cannot provide the basis for the plaintiffs to claim title over the suit property. The plaintiffs have also produced Exs.A2 and A3 which are registered lease deeds dated 10.03.1926 executed by third parties in favour of the plaintiffs. According to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants/plaintiffs, those two documents would clinchingly prove the title of the plaintiffs to the suit property.
9. I have gone through said documents, I find that both the documents contain same description of property and portions of the property have been leased deed two different persons under the said documents.
10. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the boundary description in Exs.A1 and A3 do not tally with the boundary description in Ex.B1, Ex.A6 and A7. Apart from the above, Ex.A1 trust deed does not contain the boundaries of the property and only the Door number is given as 81 and in the subsequent documents, the Door number is shown as 121. Therefore, it creates doubt as to whether the suit property was subject matter of Ex.A1. The oral evidence is not very helpful, because of the passage of time in between the documents and the present proceedings. Ex.B2, which has been produced by the defendant is a sale deed in the year 1942 under which the settlee Rajambal Ammal had sold the portion of the property to the third parties. The said sale has not been questioned by the plaintiffs. Moreover, the boundary description in Exs.A5 and A6 and Ex.B2 is almost the same. Therefore, the very identity of the property is in doubt. The plaintiffs have not established their claim to the suit property by cogent and convincing evidence. The learned Additional District Judge has gone into the evidence found that the plaintiffs have not established by tangible evidence that Ex.A1 in fact relates to the suit property. I am unable to see any ground for interfering with the well considered findings of the trial Court.
11. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants would further submit that the defendants have raised a plea of adverse possession and in view of Section 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, the defendants cannot raise the plea of adverse possession and the validity of Section 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, has been upheld by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in NARAYANAN Vs. STATE OF TAMILNADU, REP. BY ITS SECRETARY, reported in 2012(1)CTC 474. Inasmuch as, it has been found that the plaintiffs have not established their title and are not entitled to seek declaration of title and further relief of recovery of possession, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction, there is no need to go into the plea of adverse possession raised by the defendants in this appeal.
12. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant would rely upon the Judgment in ARULMIGU KOLAVIZHI AMMAN TEMPLE, REP. BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MADRAS Vs. R.SHANMUGAM (DIED) AND OTHERS reported in (2008) 3 MLJ 732, and contend that there is no limitation for recovery of possession of the trust property. Here again there is no quarrel with the legal proposition that Section 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, literally removes any restriction by way of limitation, for a suit to be filed by a trust for recovery of property. In this case, the plaintiffs have to fail, because they have not established their title to the suit property. Therefore, the question as to whether the plaintiff suit is barred by limitation or does not really arise.
13. As regards the contention that Ex.A6 namely, the lease deed executed by Rajamanickathachi in favour of the plaintiffs would in fact buttress the claim of the plaintiffs over the suit property, I am unable to accept the such contention. As already stated Rajamanickathachi had parted with her title to the suit property under the settlement deed dated 24.11.1925. Thereafter, she chose to cancel the said document on 03.07.1929 under Ex.A5 and Ex.A6 lease deed is dated 10.07.1929. A reading of Exs.A5 and A6 would show that they came in existence, when the relationship between the settlor Rajamanickathachi and Settlee Rajambal Ammal was strained. Even other wise, legally Rajamanickathachi had no right to admit the title of the plaintiffs and thereby defeat the right that had accrued to the settlee Rajambal Ammal under Ex.B1. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the plaintiffs/appellants have not made out a case for interference with the Judgment and decree of the trial Court.
14. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed, confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 29.11.2005 made in O.S.No.23 of 2004 on the file of the learned Additional District Judge(Fast Track Court No.1), Cuddalore at Chidambaram. I make no order as to costs considering the fact that the appellant is a trust. Consequently, connected M.P. is closed. rrg 05.12.2016 The Additional Judge, Fast Track Court No.I, Chidambaram. R.SUBRAMANIAN,J. Pre-Delivery Judgment A.S.No.357 of 2007 05.12.2016 http://www.judis.nic.in
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