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Gopal Chandra Barik (Sri) v. Punjab National Bank & Ors.
Judgment Summary — Satyabrata Sinha, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, an officer who served in various posts (Clerk-cum-Cashier at Dasghara, promoted to Cash-Officer in December 1983, then selected as Officer-in-Charge/Assistant Manager posted to Jhilimili from 14.8.89 to 3.2.1991, to Sarberiahatkhola from 4.2.91 to 5.2.1992, and at Regional Office Burdwan from 6.2.92 to 26.2.1992), was suspended from loaning powers on 10.1.92 and placed under suspension on 26.11.92.
The Bank served a charge-sheet dated 2.11.92 containing eight charges (three relating to Jhilimili posting and five relating to Sarberiahatkhola posting) alleging various acts of omission and commission — including unauthorised overdrafts, failure to obtain/maintain securities and insurance, reckless sanctioning of term loans for pump sets, failure to verify end-use and to submit limit statements, and sanctioning loans when his loaning power was suspended.
The petitioner responded, explaining that in Sarberiahatkhola he was threatened and forced to sanction loans to protect his life and that he had repeatedly informed superiors about threats and gherao incidents. A departmental inquiry was initiated; the Enquiry Officer was appointed on 17.2.1993. During inquiry the presenting officer produced numerous documents and called witnesses; only two departmental witnesses were examined. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report (7.4.94) summarily stating each of the eight charges as "proved" (with one charge noted as not proved in part), and the disciplinary authority passed an order dated 3.9.94 removing the petitioner from service. An appeal against removal was dismissed by the appellate authority by order dated 9.6.95 (served 9.9.95).
The petitioner filed this writ application challenging the disciplinary authority's order of removal and the appellate dismissal. The High Court considered procedural compliance in the inquiry and the sufficiency/reasoning of the inquiry report and disciplinary/appellate decisions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the departmental inquiry complied with the procedural requirements of the Punjab National Bank Officers Employees (D & A) Regulations, 1977 — specifically Regulation 6(17) (duty to question the delinquent if he has not examined himself) and Regulation 21( i )(a)/(ii)/(c)/(d) (requirements for an inquiry report and forwarding records to disciplinary authority)?
- Whether the charge-sheet and the articles of charge were sufficiently clear and not vague so as to afford the petitioner a fair opportunity of defence (i.e., whether any charge was impermissibly vague)?
- Whether documents relied upon at inquiry were admissible and whether failure to have documentary evidence proved by witnesses vitiated the inquiry, particularly when the petitioner had not objected to marking those documents and had relied on them?
- Whether the Enquiry Officer's report constituted a reasoned report (as required by precedent and the Regulations) — that is, whether the enquiry report analyzed evidence, assessed evidence charge-wise, met the defence and assigned reasons for findings?
- Whether the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority applied their minds appropriately (recorded sufficient reasons, checked procedural compliance and considered the defence, including coercion/compulsion pleaded by the petitioner) before imposing and sustaining the penalty of removal?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Dipankar Dutta)
- The charges are vague and therefore do not afford a fair opportunity to defend (particular emphasis on Charge No. V).
- Documents relied upon to prove charges were not proved by any witness; they were not placed on record in a manner admissible to sustain charges (relied upon Swapan Roy and other authorities).
- The Enquiry Officer contravened Regulation 6(17) by failing to question the petitioner after the petitioner did not examine himself, i.e., he did not put the circumstances appearing against the petitioner to him as required (invoking analogy to Section 313 CrPC).
- The Enquiry Officer considered bank guidelines and circulars that were not part of inquiry records.
- The Enquiry Officer wrongly placed the burden of proof on the petitioner in several places.
- The Enquiry Officer was biased; his report relied on ipse dixit and not on legal evidence.
- Regulation 6(21)(i)(a) was not complied with because the gist of the statement of imputations was not recorded; disciplinary authority also failed to consider the statement of imputation as required.
- The Enquiry Officer failed to assess evidence charge-wise and did not assign reasons for his findings as required under Regulation 6(21)(i)(c) and (d).
- The disciplinary authority passed the final order without properly considering the statement of imputations and the procedural compliance issues, and apparently relied on materials not in record or on surmise (for example assessing an "apprehended loss" of Rs. 15 lakhs when charge-sheet mentioned only difficulties in recovering about Rs. 8 lakhs).
- The appellate order failed to assign sufficient or cogent reasons in upholding the disciplinary order.
Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Arunava Ghosh)
- The Enquiry Report disclosed sufficient reasons; although not all charges may have been proved, some charges were admittedly proved and punishment can be imposed on proved charges.
- The petitioner never objected at inquiry to documents being marked and therefore cannot now contend those documents are inadmissible; once marked without objection, an employee cannot later object (relying on P.C. Purushothama Reddiar and R. Padmanabhan).
- In quasi-judicial/adjudicatory proceedings, detailed reasons are not always necessary; only such reasons as show application of mind to relevant facts are required (relied on Peerless Employees' Union and Maharashtra State Board v. K.S. Gandhi).
- Even if the Bank did not suffer monetary loss, acts such as acting beyond authority or violating established rules can constitute misconduct warranting disciplinary action (relying on Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, State Bank of Indore v. Govindrao, and other authorities).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Swapan Roy v. Indian Airlines Limited (1996 (1) CHN 147) — unreported decision | Documents taken on record behind the back of the delinquent officer do not prove themselves; documentary evidence must be properly proved. | The petitioner relied on this to argue documents were not proved. The Court distinguished the present facts because petitioner here allowed marking of documents and himself relied on many exhibits, so Swapan Roy did not invalidate the enquiry on that ground. |
| Durgadas Mukhopadhyay v. State (disposed 6.7.1998) | Natural justice requires documentary reports relied upon for punishment to be placed on record and tested; documents that form basis of serious allegations should be produced. | Cited by petitioner; Court noted factual differences and observed that in this case the petitioner permitted and used exhibits, distinguishing the earlier decision. |
| State of U.P v. Ravinder Nath Chaturvedi (1995 Supp (3) SCC 592 : 1995 (6) SLR 813) | An officer acquainted with records should be examined to prove documentary evidence; respondents should have opportunity to cross-examine such witness — failure may vitiate inquiry. | Cited to support the petitioner's contention about documentary proof. The Court quoted this authority to emphasise that in general documentary evidence should be proved, but observed that the present facts differed because the petitioner had not objected and had relied on documents. |
| Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra ((1984) 4 SCC 116 : AIR 1984 SC 1622) | Illustrates the duty to put incriminating evidence to accused (analogy to Section 313 CrPC) — non-compliance can vitiate proceedings. | The petitioner relied on this for mandatory compliance with questioning obligations. The Court held that the criminal-context decision is not precisely apposite to disciplinary proceedings but that the Regulation 6(17) should be generally complied with; non-compliance in this case vitiated the inquiry because petitioner was not questioned after he did not examine himself. |
| Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer ((1985) 3 SCC 378 : AIR 1985 SC 1121) | Where disciplinary enquiry affects livelihood and casts stigma, the minimum expectation is a reasoned report; absence of correlation between evidence and findings means there is no enquiry worth the name. | The Court found this authority directly applicable and held that the enquiry report here was not a reasoned one; applied the principle to set aside the report and the consequent disciplinary order. |
| P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumalrespondent ((1972) 1 SCC 9 : AIR 1972 SC 608) | If a party does not object to a document being marked at inquiry, that party cannot later object to the other side relying on it. | Respondents relied on it; Court accepted that because the petitioner did not object and used many documents (and got exhibits marked), he could not now contend those exhibits were inadmissible. |
| R. Padmanabhan v. Kerala State Handloom Development Corporation Limited (82 F.J.R 321) | Similar principle: objection cannot be raised to documents which were marked without objection by the opposite party. | Cited in support of respondents' argument; Court relied on it in reasoning that the petitioner cannot now repudiate documents he allowed to be exhibited. |
| Peerless Employees' Union v. The Peerless General Insurance and Investment Co. Ltd. (Cal. L.T 1991 (1) H.C 86) | In quasi-judicial proceedings, reasons need not be exhaustive, but must show application of mind to relevant facts. | Respondents cited it to justify less detailed reasons; Court acknowledged the principle but required cogent reasons when charges are not admitted and the enquiry affects livelihood. |
| Maharashtra State Board of Secondary & Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi (1991 AIR SCW 879) | Reasons are necessary to show conscious application of mind; recorded reasons are important when an order affects rights — reasons prevent arbitrariness. | Although respondents cited it to argue detailed reasons are not always required, the Court quoted the decision to emphasize that reasons are necessary and used it to support the need for a reasoned inquiry and disciplinary order. |
| Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (J.T 1996 (4) SC 457) | Misconduct can be found even if there is no monetary loss; acting beyond authority or disobeying instructions may constitute misconduct. | Cited by respondents; Court accepted the proposition that misconduct may be established even absent actual monetary loss, but still required that findings be based on proper evidence and reasons. |
| State Bank of Indore v. Govindrao ((1997) 2 SCC 617 : 1997 (2) SLR 53) | Acts beyond authority or disobedience of lawful orders may amount to misconduct supporting disciplinary action. | Relied upon by respondents to justify that misconduct can exist without proven loss; Court acknowledged but insisted on compliant procedure and reasoned findings. |
| Calcutta Dock Labour Board v. Sri Ram Ayodhyay Rai (Cal. L.T 1998 (1) HC 332) | Supports that misconduct may be found on acts of omission/commission though not amounting to monetary loss; earlier Division Bench authority cited by respondents. | Used by respondents in support of their contention; Court noted it among authorities on what constitutes misconduct but required the enquiry process to be legally sound. |
| Vitarelli v. Seaton ((1859) 359 U.S. 535) | Administrative agencies must follow the procedures they prescribe; if dismissal is based on a defined procedure, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. | Court quoted this dictum to underline the need for procedural compliance but also observed slight deviations that do not prejudice the accused may not necessarily vitiate proceedings; nevertheless, substantial compliance was required here. |
| Transport Commissioner, Madras-5 v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy ((1995) 1 SCC 332) | Charges that are vague and not specific deprive an accused of a fair opportunity to meet allegations; vague charges can invalidate disciplinary proceedings. | Cited by the petitioner on vagueness; Court accepted the legal principle and examined Charge No. V for vagueness, treating the authority as instructive. |
| I.R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India ((1986) 2 SCC 651) | The appellate authority must "consider" whether procedure was complied with, whether findings are warranted by evidence and whether the penalty is adequate — implying due application of mind. | Cited in assessing the appellate authority's duties; Court held the appellate authority had failed to consider these factors as required and therefore appellate order could not be upheld. |
| Dipankar Sengupta v. United Bank of India (1998 (2) C.L.J 204 : 1998 (5) SLR 553) | For misconduct there may need to be some ill-motive in appropriate circumstances, but ill-motive is not always necessary. | Cited to show that the petitioner’s explanation (coercion/compulsion) ought to have been considered before concluding misconduct; Court held such factors were not considered and must be examined afresh. |
| Ashok Kumar Chopra v. Allahabad Bank (Matter No. 2208 of 1992, disposed 23.9.98) | Illustrative of appellate failure to perform duties under similar regulations and resulting in quashing of disciplinary proceedings where procedural defects existed. | Cited by the Court as a comparable instance where an appellate authority failed to perform obligations; used to support remittance for fresh inquiry in present case. |
| A.I.R. 1991 SC 491 (case name not specified in text) | Used by the Court to support the proposition that an opportunity to make representation with respect to inquiry report should be given. | Cited by the Court to underscore the obligation on disciplinary authority to record reasons and to permit representation before finalizing penalty. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a step-by-step analysis rooted in statutory regulations (Punjab National Bank Officers Employees (D & A) Regulations, 1977) and established authority on disciplinary proceedings:
- The Court examined whether documents were properly proved. It found that, unlike cases where documents were placed on record without the delinquent's awareness, in the present case the petitioner permitted the marking of numerous documents (and himself procured many exhibits) and relied upon them in his defence. Consequently, the Court concluded the petitioner cannot now challenge admissibility of those documents.
- The Court analysed Regulation 6(17) (which obliges the Inquiring Authority, where the officer employee has not examined himself, to generally question him on circumstances appearing against him). The petitioner did not examine himself and the Inquiry Officer did not ask the petitioner such questions; instead, the petitioner was promptly asked to make submissions without being questioned. The Court held that the use of the word "shall" makes this procedural safeguard obligatory in substance and that substantial compliance was required. Non-compliance on this point was held to be a violation of a statutory procedural safeguard.
-
The Court scrutinised the Enquiry Officer's report against the requirements of Regulation 21(i) and (ii), which require the report to contain a gist of articles of charge and statement of imputations and to forward the records of inquiry to the Disciplinary Authority, including documentary and oral evidence and written briefs. The Court found multiple deficiencies:
- The Enquiry Officer produced a tabular, summarised report that merely stated each charge as "proved" without analysing or correlating the evidence to support findings.
- Where the Enquiry Officer noted that certain parts were not proved, he nonetheless concluded the corresponding charge as proved without explanation or analysis.
- The report failed to assess evidence charge-wise or to assign reasons for findings in the manner required by precedent (Anil Kumar) and by the Regulations.
- The Enquiry Officer at places relied upon guidelines and circulars that were not on record and did not engage with the petitioner's defences and documentary/ oral evidence adequately; oral evidence of the two departmental witnesses examined was not analysed or referenced in the report.
- The Court emphasised the settled principle (citing Vitarelli and Anil Kumar) that when an agency prescribes procedures for dismissal or severe disciplinary action, those procedures must be respected; where a disciplinary inquiry may affect an officer's livelihood and cast a stigma, the minimum expectation is a reasoned report demonstrating application of mind to evidence. The Court found the present enquiry deficient on these grounds.
- The Court also reviewed the disciplinary authority's final order and the appellate authority's order. It found that the disciplinary authority in its order largely reproduced the charge-sheet and did not adequately address other contentions raised by the petitioner or verify procedural compliance; it also appears to have relied on or accepted material not on record (e.g., the "apprehended loss" figure). The appellate authority likewise failed to consider relevant factors mandated by rule and precedent (I.R.P. Bhatt), such as whether procedures were complied with, whether findings were warranted by evidence, and whether the penalty was appropriate.
- Considering the totality of procedural deficiencies (failure to question the petitioner under Reg. 6(17), inadequacy of the Enquiry Officer’s reasoned findings and failure by disciplinary and appellate authorities to apply their minds), the Court concluded that the inquiry and consequent orders could not stand and required remittance for a fresh, properly conducted inquiry.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The Court set aside the Enquiry Report and the impugned orders of removal and dismissal of appeal, and directed that the matter be remitted for a fresh inquiry in accordance with law.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The Enquiry Report and the disciplinary order dated 3.9.94 and the appellate order dated 9.6.95 were quashed and set aside.
- The Disciplinary Authority was directed to remit the matter to the original Enquiry Officer (if still in service) or to appoint another Enquiry Officer to conduct a fresh inquiry complying with the Regulations and the directions in this judgment.
- If the parties wish to adduce further evidence, the Enquiry Officer is to permit such evidence; only relevant documents should be produced and irrelevant documents should be excluded.
- The petitioner shall be deemed to be under suspension from the date of removal (effective suspension status retained).
- Proceedings were to be completed expeditiously; there was no order as to costs.
- The Court refused the prayer for stay of its order (i.e., did not stay this judgment).
- The Court expressly ordered that the appeal be allowed (the appellate relief in these proceedings was granted insofar as remittal and quashing of prior orders is concerned).
Note: The summary above is prepared exclusively from the contents of the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, or holdings beyond those expressly contained in the opinion text have been added or inferred.
Satyabrata Sinha, J.:— The petitioner who was an Officer-in-Charge at B.O Sarberiahatkhola has filed this writ application questioning the order dated 3.9.94 passed by the disciplinary authority as contained in annexure ‘L’ to the writ application whereby and whereunder he was directed to be removed from service as also the order dated 9.6.95 passed by the respondent No. 2 acting as an appellate authority as contained in annexure ‘M’ thereto whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by him against the order dated 3.9.94 was dismissed.
2. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The petitioner was appointed as Clerk-cum-Cashier in-Charge and he joined at Branch Office, Dasghara in the District of Hooghly. He was promoted to the post of Cash-Officer in Junior management Grade Scale-I in December, 1983. He, in the year 1989, was selected as Officer-in-Charge/Asstt. Manager and posted at the Branch Office, Jhilimili, Bankura and served therefrom 14.8.89 to 3.2.1991 The petitioner was posted at the Branch Office, Sarberiakatkhola, 24-Parganas (North) from 4.2.91 to 5.2.1992 He served as Assistant Manager at Regional Officer Burdwan from 6.2.92 to 26.2.1992 However keeping in view the irregularities committed by the petitioner, the respondent Bank, suspended his loaning power by order dated 10.1.92 According to the petitioner while he was working in the aforementioned Branch Office he was threatened for sanctioning of the loan for pump set. On 20.1.92 the petitioner informed the respondent No. 4 that despite the fact that his loaning power has been suspended, Savapati and other persons of the concerned Gram Panchayat had been creating pressure and threatening him for grant of loan for purchase of pump sets. The petitioner informed the respondent No. 4 that his life was in great danger and he received a threatening letter from Panchayat Prodhan of Agarhati G.P, a xerox copy whereof had been despatched to the respondent No. 4 on 7.1.1992 The petitioner stated that it was felt by the employees of the Bank that they had been serving at the said Branch on the mercy of the public and local leaders and thus Ye sought for protection of his life. The respondent No. 4 on 24.1.1994 lodged a written complaint to the Officer-in-Charge requesting him to take necessary step for protection of the lives of his officials working at the Branch Office, Sarberiahatkhola or smooth functioning of the nationalised institution.
3. The petitioner stated that in fact the matter had been discussed by him with the respondent No. 4 on 21.1.92 The petitioner states that he was gheraoed by the local public for non-sanctioning of the alleged loan for pump set and thereafter the petitioner was compelled to release such loans. On 26.1.92 he has also issued a letter to the respondent No. 4 regarding gherao by the local people. On 28.1.92 he again wrote a letter to the respondent No. 4 that he had been working in the said Branch Office with a great risk of his life. The petitioner further wrote a letter to the supplier Ahamed Machineries not to supply 17 pump sets as his sanctioning power had been suspended. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 26.11.92 Thereafter a charge sheet was served on him on 2.11.92 The said charge sheet contains eight charges. Three article of charges are in respect of the petitioner's acts of omission and commission while he was posted at Jhilimili and 5 article of charges are in respect of his acts while he was posted at Sarberiahatkhola. The said article of charges read thus:
At PO Jhilimil:
Shri Barik unauthorisedly allowed clean overdraft in C/A No. 15 and he exceeded the powers vested to him. He did not report the matter to the Regional Manager and concealed the facts.
ARTICLE II
Shri Barik cailed to take any action where securities were not available/sold/missing, thereby jeopardising the interest of the bank.
ARTICLE III
Shri Barik unauthorisedly sanctioned loan to Govt servant under Retail Trade Scheme and violated the rules of financing under the scheme and thus jeopardised bank's interest.
ARTICLE IV
Shri Barik failed to take insurance coverage in 74 a/cs. He also failed to renew the insurance and, therefore, jeopardised the interest of the bank.
AT PO SARBERIAHATKHOLA
Shri Barik sanctioned recklessely 133 term loan for purchase of pump sets without pre-sanction appraisal and put the interest of the bank in jeopardy.
ARTICLE VI
Shri Barik failed to verify the end-use of funds while financing pump sets. In as much as 26 a/cs. pump/engine number differs with the record of the bank, 20 borrowers were not traceable, in 34 a/cs the securities were missing and in 10 cases pump sets have not been delivered involving substantial amount in jeopardy.
ARTICLE VII
Shri Barik failed to submit limits sanction statement for the months of August, 1991 to December, 1991 and during this period, fair number of limits were sanctioned. He failed to reply the letters/telegrams emanating from the Regional Office in respect of limits sanctioned by him. Thus he concealed the facts to the higher authorities and acted against the interest of the bank.
ARTICLE VIII
When his loaning power was suspended, he sanctioned 7 term loans. He disobeyed the instruction of the Regional Manager and put the bank's interest in jeopardy
Thus, Shri Barik did not discharge his duties with utmost honesty/integrity, devotion and diligence and has committed misconduct in terms of Regulation 3(i) read with 24 of PNB Officer Employees' (Coduct) Regulations, 1977.
4. Along with the said chargesheet a statement of imputation of charges had also been annexed which was marked as annexure “II” thereto.
5. The petitioner filed a reply, inter alia, reiterating the aforementioned statements as contained in his letter addressed to the respondent No. 4 and other authorities.
6. He however sought to explain his acts. The petitioner categorically stated that he has sanctioned loan for pump sets on 24.1.92 for the sake of his life. He, however, made the following statements:—
“The situation prevailing of Sarbaria could better be realised from the fact that or rowdy incident, the branch was closed from 26th to 29th February, 1992 demanding grant of loans. Shri Samir Banerjee, Officer-in-Charge of Purfura branch came to this branch on 30th December, 1991 and saw for himself the, pressure of the public supported by political leaders.
It may also be appreciated that the Branch Offices at Jhilimili and Sarberia hatkhola being situate in the interior villages far from the town I had no scope to get immediate help from and therefore I was a victim of circumstances as narrated to earlier were noticed and witnessed by two Managers of other branches and by the president of the Panchayat”.
7. Being not satisfied with the said written statement the disciplinary authority initiated a departmental proceeding against the petitioner and appointed the respondent No. 5 as Enquiry Officer on 17.2.1993
8. The respondents have annexed the copy of the enquiry proceeding with their affidavit-in-opposition. It appears that the presenting officer on the second day of enquiry filed 155 documents which were marked as Exbts. The presenting officer also named 4 witnesses who were to be examined on behalf of the department for proving the charges. The petitioner however was given inspection of the said documents but it appears that several other documents had also been produced on subsequent stages. The matter relating to holding of departmental enquiry admittedly is covered by the provision of Punjab National Bank Officers Employees (D & A) Regulations, 1977. Regulation 6 provides for the procedure for imposing major penalties. The relevant provision of the said Regulation indicates that where an enquiry officer is appointed, the disciplinary authority is required to forward the documents as specified in clause (5) of the Regulation 6.
9. In the event the officer employee does not plead guilty to the charges levelled against him, the Inquiry Authority shall adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding 30 days during which time the discovery or production of documents should to be completed. Upon receipt of notice for discovery of production of the documents, the Inquiring Authority shall forward the same or copies thereof to the authority in whose custody or possession the documents are kept with a requisition for the production of the documents on such date as may be specified. On the date fixied for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved are required to be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority and the witnesses produced by the Presenting Officer are to be examined by the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the officer employee. However in the instant case it appears that before the witnesses were examined the Presenting Officer in the guise of placing his case made elaborate submissions which continued for a number of days. Only thereafter, out of 4 witnesses 2 witnesses were examined, namely, G. Nandy and R.N Mukherjee. Both the aforementioned witnesses have been examined in relation to the charge Nos. 5 and 6. No witness had been examined in respect of other charges. Immediately after the aforementioned witnesses were examined, the petitioner was directed to make his submissions as regard his defence.
10. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report. A novel procedure appears, to have been adopted by the Enquiry Officer. He compartmentalised in a tabular form the charge, the presenting officer's submission and the charged officer's submission and thereafter made his own observations. Thereafter making such observations as against each of the charges, without any further discussion on the evidence as adduced and without analysing oral evidences purported to have submitted his findings which is to be following effect:—
“I submit the findings on a summarise way as under:
Article I, Charge I The charge is proved Article II, Charge II The charge is proved Article III, Charge III The charge is proved Article IV, Charge IV The charge is proved Article V, Charge V The charge is proved Article VI, Charge VI The charge is proved Article VII, Charge VII The charge is proved Article VIII, Charge VIII The charge is proved”
11. A copy of the said report was forwarded to the said petitioner. The petitioner on 17.6.94 i.e prior to filing of the report by the Enquiry Officer which took place on 7.4.94 alleged that the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority failed to consider the pleadings of the petitioner in proper perspective and came to an erroneous conclusion. Upon receipt a copy of the second show cause the petitioner submitted a written statement on 8.8.94 whereafter the disciplinary authority passed the impugned order of removal which was served on 7.9.94 On 11.10.94 the petitioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed by Appellate Authority by an order dated 9.6.95 which was served upon the petitioner on 9.9.95
12. Mr. Dipankar Dutta appearing on behalf of the petitioner, inter alia submitted:
(I) that the charges framed as against the petitioner are vague;
(II) the documents on the basis whereof the charges are sought to be proved had not been brought on records by any witness proving the contents thereof and in support of the aforementioned contentions reliance has been placed in Swapan Roy v. Indian Airlines Limited, reported in 1996 (1) CHN 147, as unreported decision of this Court, in CO. 4346(W) of 1995 (Durgadas Mukhopadhyay v. State) disposed of on 6.7.1998 as also a decision of the Apex Court in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 592 : [1995 (6) SLR 813 (SC)] (State of U.P v. Ravinder Nath Chaturbedi; (3) the Enquiry Officer while conducting the enquiry proceeding acted illegally in so far as he failed to comply with Regulation 6(17) of the said Regulations. According to the learned counsel, the said provision is in pari materia with the provision of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Dutta would urge that non-compliance of the said provision has vitiated the entire proceeding and in support of his aforementioned contention reliance has been placed on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 : AIR 1984 SC 1622. The learned counsel pointed out that as in the instant case, the petitioner did not examine himself, it was obligatory on the part of the Enquiry Officer to put questions to him explaining the circumstances which had been brought on record by the department and failure to do so has resulted in violation of the procedural provision which is of a mandatory character. (IV) The Enquiry Officer while holding the petitioner guilty of charges took into consideration guidelines and the circulars of the Bank which did not form part of the records of enquiry. (V) The Enquiry Officer had also put the burden of proof wrongly upon the petitioner. (VI) The Enquiry Officer was biased and his report is based on ipse dixit and not founded on legal evidence. (VII) Regulation 6(21)(i)(a) had not been complied with insofar as the Enquiry Officer failed to record the gist of the stratement of imputation of misconduct which resulted in grave failure of justice inasmuch as it was for the disciplinary authority to consider the same in terms of Regulation 6(21)(ii). (VIII) As in the instant case, the disciplinary authority had passed a final order only on the basis of the Enquiry Report and without taking into consideration the statement of imputation, the same has resulted in failure of justice. (IX) The Enquiry Officer has also failed to observe the provision of Regulation 6(21)(i)(c) to make an assessment of evidence in respect of each article of charge. In none of the charges, Mr. Dutta would urge, the Enquiry Officer had discussed and or assessed the evidence and had thereafter analysed the same. The Enquiry Officer has also not assigned any reason in support of his findings as is required under Regulation 6(21)(i)(d). The learned counsel contends that the defective enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer has vitiated the entire departmental proceeding and in support of his aforementioned contention reliance has been placed on Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer reported in (1985) 3 SCC 378 : AIR 1985 SC 1121 : [1985 (3) SLR 26 (SC)]. (X) The order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority is also bad in law as the statements of imputation of misconduct on the part of the petitioner had not been gone into and thus he could not have objectedly considered the defence of the petitioner. Mr. Dutta would urge that a bare perusal of the said Rules would clearly domonstrate that the disciplinary authority was enjoined with a duty to ascertain as to whether the procedure required to be followed under the regulations had been complied with or not and as to whether charges have really been proved or not which according to the learned Counsel, having not been complied with the petitioner has suffered great prejudice. It has been pointed out that without there being imputation of misconduct, the disciplinary authority had allegedly held the apprehended losses to the Bank was to the tune of Rs. 15 lacs whereas in the charge-sheet it had only been mentioned that recovery to the tune of Rs. 8 lacs had become difficulty. The learned counsel contends that such conclusion had been arrived at either on the basis of certain materials which had been taken into consideration behind the back of the petitioner or on surmises which were not based on records. (XII). The appellate order is also vitiated as no sufficient or cogent reason has been assigned in support thereof.
13. Mr. Arunava Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that the Enquiry Report discloses sufficient reason. The learned counsel contends that although all the charges might not have been proved, admittedly, some were proved and thus punishment could be imposed on proved fact. The learned counsel submits that at no point of time the petitioner had objected to the documents being taken in evidence and in that view of the matter, it does not lie in his mouth to contend that the said document are not admissible in evidence. Reliance in this connection has been placed on P.C Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumalrespondent reported in (1972) 1 SCC 9 : AIR 1972 SC 608 and R. Padmanabhan v. Kerala State Handloom Development Corporation Limited reported in 82 F.J.R 321. It has further been submitted that it is not necessary that in quasi judicial adjudication a detailed reasons have to be indicated, but only such reasons which would domonstrate application of mind to the relevant fact would serve the purpose. Reliance in this connection, has been made to Peerless Employees' Union v. The Pearless General Insurance and Investment Co. Ltd. reported in Cal. L.T 1991 (1) H.C 86. Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel, would urge that as most of the charges have been admitted, no illegality, has been committed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority in not assigning detailed reasons. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Maharashtra State Board of Secondry and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S Gandhi reported in 1991 AIR SCW 879 : [1991 (2) SLR 682 (SC)]. It was further submitted that it cannot be said that only because the respondent Bank has not suffered any loss, the same by itself would not consitute any misconduct. According to the learned counsel, failure on the part of an officer to adhere to act within his own authority and acting beyond the same as also violation of a general regulation and/or transgression of some established and definite rule of action would constitute misconduct. Reliance in this connection has been placed on The Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik reported in J.T 196(4) S.C 457, State Bank Of Indore v. Govindrao reported in (1997) 2 SCC 617 : [1997 (2) SLR 53 (SC)] and Calcutta Dock Labour Board v. Sri Ram Ayodhyay Rai reported in Cal. L.T 1998 (1) HC 332.
14. The submissions of Mr. Datta, learned counsel to the effect that all the charges are vague cannot be accepted. At no point of time the petitioner contended that he had failed to understand the implication of the charges and/or he was in any manner prejudiced by reason of non-disclosure of the materials against him. Such a stand has been taken by the petitioner only in respect of charge No. V. In fact, apart from charge No. V, the petitioner had answered all the charges and from a perusal of the argument advanced on his behalf before the Presenting Officer, it appears that he had explained each and every contention raised on behalf of the department. However, while discussing the question as regards the validity of the enquiry proceeding as also the order passed by the disciplinary authority, the implication of vagueness of the charge in respect of Charge No. V shall be considered. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Datta, the learned Counsel, on Surath Chandra Chakravarty v. The State of West Bengal reported in (1970) 3 SCC 548 : A.I.R 1971 SC 752 : [1972 (2) SLR 103 (SC)], wherein the Apex Court held:—
“…………The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This Rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending onself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him.”
15. In Transport Commissioner, Madras-5 v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy. reported in (1995) 1 SCC 332 : [1995 (1) SLR 239 (SC)], the Apex Court held:—
“Insofar as the vagueness of the charges is concerned we find that it deserves acceptance. It is asserted by Shri Vaidyanathan, learned counsel for the respondent that except the memo of charges dated 4.6.1989 no other particulars of charges or supporting particulars were supplied. This assertion could not be deneid by the learned counsel for the appellant. A reading of charges would show that they are not specific and clear. They do not point out clearly the precise charge against the respondent, which he was expected to meet. One can understand the charges being accompanied by a statement of particulars or other statement furnishing the particulars of the aforesaid charges but that was not done. The charges are general in nature to the effect that the respondent along with eight other officials indulged in misappropriation by falsification of accounts. What part did the respondent play, which account did he falsify or held falsify which amount did he individually or together with other named persons misappropriate, are not particularised. The charge is a general one. It is significant to notice that the respondent has been objecting to the charges on the ground of vagueness from the earliest stage and yet he was not furnished with the particulars. It is brought to our notice that respondent's name was not included in the schedule appended to GOMs 928 dated 25.4.88 mentioning the names of officials responsible for falsification of accounts and misappropriation and that he is also not made an accused in the criminal proceeding initiated in that behalf.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment of the tribunal is right in so far as it holds that the charges communicated to the respondents are vague. In the ordinary course we would have directed the disciplinary authority or the authority which framed the charges to particularise the charges and then to proceed with the enquiry but it appears that the respondent has hardly about seven or eight months to go for retirement. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the matter should end here.”
16. It is true as has been submitted by Mr. Datta that no document had been proved by any witness. But the question which has to be posed and answered is as to whether the petitioner has been prejudiced thereby. The proceedings before the Enquiry Officer reveal that all the documents were permitted to be marked as exhibits without any demur whatsoever. In fact, the petitioner himself has taken advantage of the said procedure and got as many as 225 documents exhibited on his behalf. A bare perusal of the submission made on behalf of the petitioner would clearly show that he has himself relied upon the said documents and extensively argued on the basis thereof. In Swapan Roy's case documents were taken on record behind the back of the delinquent officer. It was, in the fact of that case, held that documents do not prove themselves. In Durgadas Mukhopadhyay v. State of West Bengal, this court was considering a matter falling within the purview of Rule 28(8) of the Management of Recognised Non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided) Rules. Keeping in view the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, interpreting the provision of the said Rule, it had been held that the principle of natural justice had to be complied with. In that case, a report by a Special Audit Team was taken into consideration, although the same had not been brought on records although the petitioner denied the correctness thereof. Keeping in view the serious allegations made as against the petitioner, it was observed that rules of natural justice required that the said documents ought to have been brought on record particularly when the punishment was inflicted upon the delinquent employee by the administrator of the school relying on or on the basis of the said report. In State of U.P v. Ravinder Nath Chaturvedi reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 592 : [1995 (6) SLR 813 (SC)] the Apex Court observed:—
“The High Court has set aside the imposition of the penalty on the respondents on the ground that no reasonable opportunity was given to the respondents during the inquiry by the Inquiry Officer. It is also found that no one was examined to prove the case of the State. It would be desirable that an officer who is acquainted with the records may also be examined to prove the documentary evidence and opportunity may be given to the respondents to cross-examine the witness or produce any evidence in rebuttal. Thereafter inquiry will be conducted the report will be given and copy thereof will be supplied to the respondents.”
17. As indicated hereinbefore, the fact situation in the instant case is absolutely different. Apart from the fact that the petitioner had allowed the Inquiry Officer to mark the said documents, he has taken advantage of the said procedure. Furthermore, he has himself relied upon some of the documents to prove his innocence. In this situation, Mr. Ghosh, learned Counsel, has rightly pointed out that the documents having marked as exhibits without objection, the petitioner now cannot turn around and contend that the same are not admissible in law. In R. Padmanabhan v. Kerala State Handloom Development Corporation Limited reported in 82 FJR 321, R. Jagannath Rao, C.J (as His Lordship then was) speaking for Division Bench held that objection cannot be raised by the appellant-employee to the opposite party relying on a document that has been marked without any Objection by him. It is not necessary to consider the submission of Mr. Ghosh to the effect that the charges against the petitioner constitute misconduct despite the fact that the Bank might not have suffered any monetary terms as the law appears to be well settled in view of the decision of the Apex Court in The Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik reported in J.T 1996 (4) SC 457, State Bank Of Indore v. Govindrao reported in (1997) 2 SCC 617 and a Division Bench of this Court in Calcutta Dock Labour Board v. Sri Ram Ayodhyay Rai reported in Cal. LT 1998 (1) HC 332.
18. The question, however, which arises for consideration is as to whether the enquiry proceedings have been conducted fairly and in accordance with law, Before dealing with the said question, it is fruitful to note the dicta of Frankfurtar, J. in Vitarelli v. Seaton reported in (1859) 359 U.S 535 which is in the following terms:—
“An executive agency must be regorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed…………. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, it I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword.”
19. However, that does not mean that even a slight deviation on the part of the Inquiry Officer in scrupulously following any provision of the rules as also if delinquent officer had not been prejudiced, in the opinion of this court, shall not vitiated the inquiry proceeding in its entirety. Keeping in view the aforementioned legal principle, the questions raised by Mr. Dutta may be considered. The Presenting Officer was required to examine the witnesses in terms of clause 13 of the Regulation 6 and after cross-examination he was also entitled to re-examine them. The Inquiry Officer was also entitled to allow the Presenting Officer to adduce additional evidence. Thereafter officer employee was required to produce his evidence. Clause 17 of Regulation and reads thus:—
“6(17) The Inquiring Authority may, after the officer employee closes his evidence, and shall, if the officer employee has not got himself examined generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.”
20. In the instant case, as indicated hereinbefore, immediately after the two witnesses were examined by the Presenting Officer the petitioner was asked to make his-submission. The Inquiry Officer, therefore, had not generally questioned the petitioner on the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. Admittedly in this case, the petitioner did not examine himself and thus it was obligatory on the part of the Inquiry Officer to comply with the said provision. The aforementioned provision although is procedural one, keeping in view the fact that the word, “shall” has been used therein and further in view of the object and purport which is sought to be achieved thereby this Court is of the opinion that the non-grant of such an opportunity to a delinquent employee would result in violation of a procedural safeguard afforded to him by statutory regulations framed under section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1970. The aforementioned provision cannot be followed as scrupulously as is required under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the said provision ought to have been substantially complied with. The decision of the Apex Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 : A.I.R 1984 SC 1622 having been rendered in connection with a criminal case cannot be apposite in disciplinary proceeding but in the opinion of this court, it was obligatory on the part of the Inquiry Officer to comply with the said provision generally. Furthermore, a bare perusal of the Inquiry report clearly shows that the Inquiry Officer has failed to comply with the provision of Regulation 21(i)(a) and 21(i)(ii) whichread thus:—
“21(i) On the conclusion of the inquiry the inquiring authority shall prepare a report which shall contain the following:—
(a) a gist of the articles of charges and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour;
(21(ii) The Inquiring Authority where it is not itself the Disciplinary Authority, shall forward to the Disciplinary Authority the records of inquiry which shall include:—
(a) the report of the inquiry prepared by it under clause (i)
(b) the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the officer employee referred to in sub-regulation (15)
(c) the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry;
(d) Written briefs referred to in sub-regulation (18) if any; and
(e) the orders, if any, made by the disciplinary authority and the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry.”
21. The report of an Inquiry Officer is vital for the purpose of ultimate order that may be passed by the Disciplinary Authority. A report of the Inquiry Officer is although not final, the same has a persuasive value. A finding arrived at by the Inquiry Officer is normally accepted by the Inquiry Authority and in the event of his dis-agreement with any finding of the Inquiry Officer, sufficient and cogent reasons are required to be assigned therefor. In this situation, it was obligatory on the part of the Inquiry Officer to consider the materials on record analyse the same briefly and meet the defence of the delinquent officer in the event he arrives at such a conclusion that he is guilty of the charges levelled against him. Even while holding a delinquent officer not guilty of any charges, he is required to assign reasons so as to enable the Disciplinary Authority to meet the same. In the instant case, in respect of charge No. III the Inquiry Officer has merely observed that charge is not proved by evidence without assigning any reason. However, he has held the petitioner guilty of the other charges. So far as the second part of the charge No. 1 is concerned, the Inquiry Officer appears to have made out a third case by holding that although the incumbent has full power to purchase government cheque but he does not have any power to advance thereagainst. He referred to current account No. 15 and stated that the same which did not indicate that clean OD has been allowed against a Government cheque except that proceeds of the cheque has been deposited in the account and interest charged thereupon. He has not taken into consideration the defence of the petitioner at all. In respect of Charge No. II, his observations are:—
“No documentary evidence has been produced by PO in support of the charge that Sri Barik did not report the fact of allowing clean overdraft in the weekly statement of affairs dated 16.11.89 This charge is not proved. As regards, no reporting through clear overdraft statement of the relevant period, Sri Barik has admitted the same. Hence this charge is proved.”
22. Thus although on his own finding that a part fact of the said charge had not been proved, in his finding he has stated that the entire charge No. 1 has been proved. So far as Charge No. II is concerned, it appears that he relied upon some guidelines which according to the petitioner had not been placed on records. Thus he has taken into consideration a materials which did not form part of the records. Similarly, as regards the charge No. IV, he has not assigned any reason whatsoever, particularly, in view of the fact that the petitioner had advanced submission to the effect that 34 out of 74 accounts in question had been closed and moreover, 69 out of 74 accounts related to advance not made during the petitioner's incumbency. So far as the charges No. V and VI are concerned, as indicated hereinbefore, two witnesses had been examined. The Inquiry Officer had not referred to the statements made by the said witnesses at all nor analysed the evidence on record. He without referring to relevant documents came to the conclusion that the documentary evidence submitted by CO of refuting the charges is not appearing. He merely placed reliance upon Annexures “B” “C” “D” and “E”, of the chargesheet although from a perusal thereof it would appear that no particulars thereabout have been furnished. Annexures “B” “C”, “D” and “E” taken together which were marked as PD 99, PD 104, PD 106 and P 136 respectively related to only 80 cases. Furthermore, they are merely certain sheets which were submitted as documents, but the basic materials on the basis whereof such sheets had been prepared had not been brought on record. The petitioner had taken various defences and raised various contention in relation to the aforementioned charges, but no cognizance thereto had been taken at all, as for example, according to the petitioner, it has not been mentioned as to in respect of which borrower approval of Ground Water Survey Board was required to be taken nor any circular or instruction had been brought on records by the presenting officer to show that approval of such Board was mandatory or a precondition for grant of sanction. As regards non-entrying of the loan documents in the prescribed register is concerned, the contention of the petitioner to the effect is that such register was not available and thus he recorded the same on plain paper in the interest of the Bank had not been considered at all. The petitioner had further contended that the details as regards posting of a second man and his opinion had not been proved. Similarly, so far as the alleged failure on the part of the petitioner to obtain no objection certificate from the other banks are concerned the same are absolutely vague as no details as regards borrower in respect of whom such circulations were required to be taken had not been proved. Furthermore, the petitioner in his evidence has referred to the statements made by the witnesses No. 1 and 2 in their cross-examination to prove his innocence but as noticed hereinbefore the oral evidence of witnesses had not been considered at all. As regards charge No. 6 also submission made by the petitioner had not been taken into consideration. This assumes significance in view of the fact that the Disciplinary Authority while passing the impugned order, inter alia, observed:—
“While posted at PO Sarberiahatkhola, Shri Barik sanctioned recklessly 133 Term Loans for purchase of pumpsets without pre-sanction, failed to verify the end-use of Bank's fund while financing pump sets. He also failed to submit Limit Sanctioned Statement for the relevant periods and did not care to reply to the letters emanated from Regional Office, thus concealed the facts. Further, despite the fact that the loaning power of Shri Barik has suspended, he sanctioned 17 Term Loans and disobeyed the instruction of the Regional Manager.”
“The charges proved against Shri Barik are of very serious nature. Leaving aside all other charges, even if we take 133 pump set accounts at PO, Sarberiahatkhola which have been financed by Shri Bark recklessly, there is no recovery in 124 accounts while in remaining 9 accounts nominal recovery has been made. Due to lapses, negligence and reckless financing by Shri Barik, the apprehended loss to the Bank is about Rs. 15.00 lacs.”
23. Thus even the Disciplinary Authority had laid great emphasis thereupon and appeal to have made his mind for the purpose of imposition of penalty of removal from service of the petitioner primarly on the aforesaid charges. It further appears that the Enquiry Officer in respect of charge No. V had at various places put the burden of proof upon the petitioner. It further appears that in respect of Charge No. V, the Enquiry Officer has arrived at a finding, “this has resulted double financing.” No such allegation has been made as against the petitioner nor any material appears to have been brought on records to prove the same. It has been pointed out that in various paragraphs findings have been arrived at by the Enquiry Officer without there being any evidence at all. Reference in this connection has been made to pages 72, 75, 85, 90 and 92 of the writ application. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S Gandhi reported in 1991 AIR SCW 879, upon which Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel himself relied upon, the Apex Court held that although strict rules of Evidence Act do not apply and the standard of proof is mere preponderance of probabilities reasons are required to be assigned unless the charges are admitted it has been held:—
“Thus it is settled law that the reasons are harbinger between the mind of the maker of the order to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. It also excludes the chances to reach arbitrary whimsical or capricious decision or conclusion. The reasons assure an inbuilt support to the conclusion/decision reached. The order when it affects the right of a citizen or a person, irrespective of the fact, whether it is quasi-judicial or administrative fair play requires recording of germane and relevant precise reasons. The recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned consciously applied its mind to the facts on record. It also aids the appellate or revisional authority or the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or the Appellate Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 to see whether the authority concerned acted fairly and justly to meet out justice to the aggrieved person.”
24. Sub-regulation 21(i)(c) of the Regulation 6 casts a statutory obligation upon Enquiry Officer to prepare a report inter alia on the basis of an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge. It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the Enquiry Officer to consider the materials on record and assess the requirement thereof. In Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer reported in (1985) 3 SCC 378 : A.I.R 1985 SC 1121, a Three Judges Bench of the Apex Court held:—
“Where a disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likely to cast a stigma and it had to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice the minimum expectation is that the report must be a reasoned one. The Court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order-sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe that it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, there was no enquiry in this case worth the name and the order of termination based on such proceeding disclosing non-application of mind would be unsustainable.”
25. The said decision applies in all fours in the instant case. The Disciplinary Authority in his impugned order dated 3.9.94 has merely reproduced charge-sheet and assigned some reasons only. In respect of other contentions raised by the petitioner as regards irregularities committed by the Inquiry Officer he had assigned no reason. The Disciplinary Authority is required to pass an order imposing penalty having regard to the findings of the Inquiry Officer on all or any of the articles of charges. The very fact that Regulation 21(ii) provides that Inquiry authority is required to forward the reports of the inquiry and further in view of the fact that in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in A.I.R 1991 SC 491 as also subsequent decisions an opportunity to make representation has got to be given as regards inquiry report, it is necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to record his reasons. The Disciplinary Authority further has failed to ascertain as to whether the procedure which was required to be followed under regulation had been followed. He had also taken into consideration additional material which he could have done. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Matter No. 2208 of 1992 (Ashok Kumar Chopra v. Allahabad Bank disposed of on 23.9.98 wherein this Court upon taking into consideration similar regulation, inter alia, noted—
“The petitioner has alleged that the entire enquiry proceeding was a “drama”. His explanation that most of the loans were advanced in loan mela organised by She Bank itself had also not been taken into consideration. In this view of the matter I am of the ??? that the appellate authority had also failed a perform its duties as contained in Clause (ii) of Regulation 17 of the said Regulation. It is therefore, a case where there has been a flagrant violation of principles of natural justice.”
26. The Court in that case had quashed the disciplinary proceeding. The Enquiry Officer as also the Disciplinary authority were further required to consider the fact that according to the petitioner, loans had been distributed at the command of the higher authorities. Similarly, the order passed by the appellate authority also suffers from non-consideration of the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties. In terms of regulation 17 of the said Regulations, the appellate authority is required to consider whether findings of the disciplinary authority are justified or whether penalty is excessive or inadequate and then pass an appropriate order. The word, “consider” assumes great significance. I.R.P Bhatt v. Union of India reported in (1986) 2 SCC 651, the Apex Court while considering the requirements to assign reason by the appellate authority held—
“The word ‘consider’ in Rule 27(2) implies ‘due application of mind’. It is clear upon the terms of Rule 27(2) that the appellate authority is required to consider (I) whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with and if not whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justicel; (2) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and therefore pass orders confining, enhancing etc. the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same, Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the appellate authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in clause (a), (b) and (c) thereof.” The Apex Court held that although it is not the requirement of Article 311(2) that in every case the appellate authority should state its own reasons except where the appellate authority disagrees with the finding, but still held that the aforementioned factors must be considered. The appellate authority did not consider the said factor. The appellate authority further failed to consider that every act of omission and commission may not constitute a misconduct. In this view of the matter, the impugned orders cannot be upheld. The petitioner has although admitted that he had sanctioned loan in respect of 17 pump sets and although his power had been suspended had explained as to under what circumstances he had to do so. The said factors had not been considered by the concerned authorities at all. If a person is forced to do something against his Will, the same may not amount to misconduct. In Dipankar Sengupta v. United Bank of India reported in 1998 (2) C.L.J 204 : [1998 (5) SLR 553 (SC)], this Court held that for consideration of misconduct there should be some ill-motive although in all circumstances the same may not be required. However in The Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik reported in J.T 1996 (4) S.C 457, the Apex Court has observed:—
“…………It is not suggested that the respondent being a Class-I Officer was not aware of the limits of his authority or of his powers. Indeed, Charge No. 9 which has been held established in full is to the effect that in spite of instlructions by the Regional Office to stop such practice, the respondent continued to indulge in such acts. The Enquiry Officer has recorded a clear finding that the respondent did flout the said instructions and has thereby committed an act of disobedience of lawful orders.”
27. In the instant case, the petitioner has pleaded ignorance about the procedure on the ground that he had been posted as Officer-in-Charge without any proper training. He was, therefore, not aware of all the procedure. This aspect of the matter also ought to have been taken into consideration by the concerned authorities.
28. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned orders cannot be upheld. The impugned orders as also the Enquiry Report are set aside and the Enquiry Officer is directed to consider the matter afresh. The Disciplinary authority is directed to remit the matter to the Enquiry Officer in the event he is still in service and if not, another Enquiry Officer, so that the matter may be considered afresh in the light of the observations made hereinbefore as also in accordance with law. If the parties intend to adduce further evidence, such an opportunity should be granted to them by the Enquiry Officer.
29. Before parting with this case, this Court may note that from page 110 of the writ application it appears that several documents had been produced by the Presenting Officer although the same were not required.
30. This aspect of the matter shall also be considered by the Enquiry Officer so that only relevant documents are produced by the parties. The petitioner shall, however, be deemed to be placed under suspension from the date of removal. It is expected that the proceeding shall be completed as expeditiously as possible.
31. This application is allowed to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. There will be no order as to costs.
32. Prayer for stay of operation of this order is considered and refused.
33. Appeal allowed.
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