- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
State Of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Mohan Singh & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Opinion by B.J. Shethna, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitions arise from challenges by the State of Rajasthan to a common judgment and order dated 12.6.98 passed by the Board of Revenue, which had dismissed the State's revision petitions and thereby left in place orders of the Revenue Appellate Authority that had conferred khatedari rights on several cultivators.
Background chronology (as stated in the opinion):
- The Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 received Presidential assent on 14.3.1956. Section 15-A was added on 24.3.1960 with retrospective effect, and its validity was challenged in the High Court and in special appeals (the Division Bench decision is referenced as Jugal Kishore v. State of Rajasthan).
- During proceedings in the Supreme Court on related special leave petitions (S.L.Ps), Section 15-AAA was added to the Tenancy Act on 29.12.1979; the Supreme Court disposed of the S.L.Ps on 31.7.1986 directing that cultivators may apply to competent authorities for khatedari rights for lands they possessed prior to 1955.
- On applications under Sec. 15-AAA, the applicants before the present petitions fell into three groups: (1) those whose applications were dismissed by the Assistant Collector and whose revision petitions were dismissed by the Board of Revenue on 29.10.1990 and became final; (2) those whose applications were dismissed by the competent authority on 5.12.1987 and whose revision petitions were dismissed on 31.7.1996 (one of them, Basant Kumar, obtained interim relief from the High Court in Writ Petition No. 3525/96); and (3) those whose applications were dismissed by the Assistant Collector on 14.12.1987 but whose appeals to the Revenue Appellate Authority were allowed on 15.10.1990, and against which the State's revision petitions were dismissed by the Board of Revenue on 12.6.1998.
- The State filed these petitions challenging the Board of Revenue's common judgment and order dated 12.6.1998 on grounds including that the Board failed to follow a coordinate bench decision and misconstrued the Division Bench judgment in Jugal Kishore.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with the Board of Revenue's common judgment and order dated 12.6.1998 that confirmed the Revenue Appellate Authority's grant of khatedari rights to the cultivators.
- Whether the Board of Revenue erred by taking a view contrary to an earlier judgment of a coordinate bench of the Board of Revenue and, if so, whether such impropriety requires interference by this Court.
- Whether the Board of Revenue misconstrued the Division Bench judgment in Jugal Kishore v. State of Rajasthan, and whether any such misconstruction warrants judicial interference.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State of Rajasthan) — Principal contentions by learned Counsel Mr. Prakash (L.R./Prakash) Tatia
- The Board of Revenue improperly took a contrary view in these matters when a coordinate bench of the Board had earlier dismissed similar revision petitions (i.e., failure to follow coordinate bench precedent).
- The Board of Revenue misread and misconstrued the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Jugal Kishore v. State of Rajasthan.
- On these grounds the State submitted that this Court should exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to quash and set aside the impugned orders of the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue.
Respondents (Cultivators / Applicants)
- The respondents are cultivators who have been cultivating their lands prior to 1955 and applied under Section 15-AAA (as introduced) for declaration of khatedari rights; some were recorded in registers, some not.
- It is recorded in the opinion that many of these applicants are poor cultivators who could not pursue appeals or S.L.Ps due to paucity of funds, and one applicant (Basant Kumar) could alone obtain interim relief from the High Court in Writ Petition No. 3525/96.
- The court's factual account emphasizes their long possession and cultivation as central to resisting dispossession; however, the opinion does not set out detailed adversarial legal arguments advanced by the respondents beyond these factual circumstances.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jugal Kishore v. State of Rajasthan (Division Bench decision referenced) | The Division Bench's findings (noted in para. 21 of that judgment) that the cultivators could not be said to be trespassers and were erstwhile tenants. | The Court observed that even if the Board of Revenue misread that Division Bench judgment, the Division Bench itself had made findings protecting the cultivators (they were not trespassers). Hence, even an error by the Board would not lead the Court to interfere when substantial justice has been done to poor cultivators. |
| Brij Lal v. Board of Revenue (Hon'ble Supreme Court) | The Supreme Court's observation that it would be a "travesty of justice" to dispossess a person who has been in cultivating possession of land for over two decades (quoted from para 5 of that judgment). | The Court relied on this principle to refuse to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in these cases, noting that the respondents have long possession (since prior to 1955 and certainly for decades) and that dispossession now would be unjust. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner to evaluate the State's challenge:
- Statutory and factual context: The Court reproduced and considered Section 15-AAA (introduced on 29.12.1979) and the subsequently introduced sub-section (2-A) (11.11.1992), which govern accrual of khatedari rights in the Indira Gandhi Canal area and provide procedural windows and conditions for claiming such rights. The respondents are cultivators who assert possession and cultivation prior to 1955.
- Classification and procedural posture: The Court summarized the three classes of applicants and the procedural history of their respective applications, appeals and revision petitions, noting that many poor cultivators were unable to further litigate and so earlier adverse orders became final for them.
- On the question of the Board of Revenue's approach to precedent: The Court acknowledged that a subsequent bench of the Board of Revenue should respect earlier coordinate bench decisions, or refer the matter to a larger bench if it disagrees. The Court found an "impropriety" in the Board of Revenue having dismissed earlier revision petitions in some instances but later taking a contrary view. The Court stated that, ordinarily, such impropriety would attract interference under Article 227.
- Balancing supervisory jurisdiction against equitable considerations: Despite recognizing the procedural impropriety, the Court declined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in these particular cases because of the respondents' long-standing cultivation and the injustice that would result from dispossessing them. The Court relied materially on the Supreme Court's statement in Brij Lal that dispossessing a cultivator who has nourished land for decades would be a travesty of justice.
- Even assuming an error in the Board's appreciation of the Division Bench judgment in Jugal Kishore, the Court reasoned that the Division Bench itself had found the cultivators were not trespassers and were erstwhile tenants; therefore, correcting a possible error would not be appropriate where substantial justice has already been done to poor cultivators.
- Outcome of the discretionary decision: Having weighed these considerations, the Court decided that the equities and precedent protecting long possession outweighed the procedural impropriety and declined to interfere.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
All the petitions are dismissed. The Court dismissed the petitions with no orders as to costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The Board of Revenue's common judgment and order dated 12.6.1998 (and the underlying orders of the Revenue Appellate Authority allowing the cultivators' appeals) stand; the State's challenge is unsuccessful and the cultivators retain the benefit conferred by those orders.
- Reason for restraint: The Court explicitly declined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the respondents' long possession and the authority of the Supreme Court in Brij Lal, and because the Division Bench in Jugal Kishore had treated such persons as not being trespassers.
- Broader precedent: The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle; it resolves these petitions on the particular facts and equity of prolonged possession and reliance on the cited authorities. The Court emphasized substantial justice to poor cultivators as the controlling consideration in declining to interfere.
End of summary. All statements above are drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and do not add or infer information beyond that text.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.J Shethna, J.:— All these petitions are disposed of by this common order as the point involved in all these cases is same.
2. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act’) received the assent of the President on the 14th day of March, 1956. Sec. 15-A was introduced and added on 24.3.60 giving retrospective effect to it. The validity of the same was challenged before this Court in several petitions. However, the challenge failed before the learned Single Judge of this Court on 18.4.72 Against which special appeals were filed which were also dismissed on 20.1.73 The same is Jugal Kishore v. State of Rajasthan (1). The same was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by way of S.L.Ps During the pendency and final disposal of S.L.Ps, Section 15-AAA came to be added in the Act on 29.12.79 In view of the amendment of Sec. 15-AAA of the Act, the S.L.PS were disposed of by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 31.7.86 on the ground that now Sec. 15-AAA of the Act is introduced in the Act, therefore, the cultivators may apply before the competent authority for conferring them Khatedari rights of the land in question which were in their possession prior to 1955. Accordingly, those cultivators applied before the competent authority. The applicants/cultivators are classified in three sets by the learned counsel Mr. Prakash Tatia for the petitioner (1). Those applicants whose applications were dismissed by the Assistant Collector by his order dated 18.1.88 They approached the Board of Revenue by way of revision petitions which were also dismissed on 29.10.90 It is stated at the Bar by the learned counsel Mr. Tatia that the said order passed by the Board of Revenue on 29.10.90 dismissing the revision petitions of those persons became final as the same was not carried by them before this Hon'ble Court or any higher forum; (2) Second set of the applicants consists of the cultivators whose applications were dismissed by the competent authority on 5.12.87 Against which revision petitions were filed and the same were also dismissed on 31.7.96 (Annex. 1). Out of so many applicants, only one applicant/cultivator Basant Kumar challenged the order of the Board of Revenue passed on 31.7.96 before the learned Single Judge of this Court by way of S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 3525/96 - Basant Kumar v. State Of Raj.—(162) It is stated at the bar that the same is admitted by the learned Single Judge of this Court and while granting stay, it was made clear that the order is passed only in favour of the petitioner who has approached the Court. The said matter is pending before this Court for final disposal; (3) The third set of the applicants consists of those applicants whose applications were dismissed by the Assistant Collector cum Executive Magistrate on 14.12.87 They challenged the order in separate appeals before the Revenue Appellate Authority which were allowed on 15.10.90 and it was ordered to confer them khatedari rights. Aggrieved of this order dated 15.10.90 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, the State preferred separate revision petitions before the Board of Revenue which were also dismissed on 12.6.98 The said common judgment and order dated 12.6.98 passed by the Board of Revenue is challenged by the petitioner-State of Rajasthan in all these petitions.
3. Learned Counsel Mr. Tatia appearing for the State of Rajasthan vehemently submitted that it was not proper on the part of the Board of Revenue to take a contrary view in the matter when the coordinate bench of the Board of Revenue had already dismissed similar revision petitions filed by the said applicants-cultivators on 29.10.90 and 31.7.96 He, therefore, submitted that this court should interfere with the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel Mr. Tatia further submitted that the Board of Revenue has completely misread the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Jugal Kishore v. State of Rajasthan (supra). He, therefore, submitted that all these petitions be allowed and the impugned order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority allowing the appeals and the orders passed by the Board of Revenue on 12.6.98 dismissing the revision petitions filed by the State Government, be quashed and set aside.
4. Before dealing with the aforesaid contentions raised by Mr. Tatia, I would first like to reproduce Sec. 15-AAA which was introduced in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for the first time on 29.12.79:—
“15AAA. Accrual of Khatedari rights in the (Indira Gandhi Canal area)-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sec. 15A, any person who, at the commencement of this Act—
(a) was a holder of Khudkasht or an occupancy tenant or a Maurusidar or a khatedar tenant or a tenant with transferable and heritable rights and was recorded as such in the annual registers then current, or
(b) was not so recorded, but was a holder of Khudkasht or an occupancy tenant or a Maurusidar or a khatedar tenant or a tenant with transferable and heritable rights, shall, as from the date of the commencement of this Act, be entitled to all the rights, and subject to all the liabilities, of a khatedar tenant under this Act.
(2) Every person claiming that the rights mentioned in clauses (b) of sub-section (1) accrued to him shall, within one year of the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 and on the payment of court fee of fifty paisa, apply to the Assistant Collector having jurisdiction, or to any other authority as may prescribed by the State Government from time to time, for a declaration that he acquired Khatedari rights under clause (b) of sub-section (1) in the land held by him and the provisions of sub-section (5) shall apply to such application.”
5. At this stage I may also state that sub-section 2-A was introduced in Sec. 15-AAA on 11.11.92 which I would also like to reproduced which is as under;—
“(2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sec. 15-A, any person who was a holder of Khudkasht or a tenant of land otherwise than as a sub-tenant or a tenant of khudkast within the Indira Gandhi Canal area, whether recorded as such at the commencement of this Act or subsequently in the record of rights, prepared during the survey or re-survey and record operations conducted under Sec. 106 and 107 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan Act No. 15 of 1956), shall be entitled to all the rights, and be subject to all the liabilities, of a khatedar tenant under this Act, with respect to the whole or such part of the land held as does not exceed the maximum area of land which he is entitled to hold in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (Rajasthan Act No. 11 of 1973.)”
6. The respondents-applicants are cultivators and cultivating their lands prior to 1955. Initially on the amendment of Sec. 15-A of the Act, they were compelled to file writ petitions before the learned Single Judge of this Court, then before the Division Bench of this Court in special appeals. They failed before the High Court and, therefore, the matters were carried to the Hon'ble Supreme Court by way of S.L.Ps During the pendency of the S.L.Ps Sec. 15-AAA came to be amended in the Act therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court asked those applicants/cultivators to approach the competent authorities for conferring them khatedari rights. It is true that there are three classes of the applicants before the competent authority. Certain poor cultivators lost their cases before the Assistant Collector. Then revision petitions were also dismissed by the Board of Revenue on 29.10.90 It seems that they are poor farmers and are unable to approach the Courts. Therefore, the said judgment of the Board of Revenue became final. There are other applicants whose applications were dismissed by the Revenue Appellate Authority against which revision petitions were filed which were also dismissed on 31.7.96 Out of several applicants, only one applicant Basant Kumar could afford to approach this Court by way of writ petition no. 3525/96, therefore, this Court admitted his petition and granted stay finding strong prima-facie case in his favour. Rest of the applicants accepted the judgment of the Board of Revenue delivered on 31.7.96 because of paucity of funds or whatever may be the other reasons.
7. The present petitions are arising out the orders passed by the Assistant Collector and Executive Magistrate dismissing the applications of the respondent cultivators who approached the Revenue Appellate Authority by way of appeal which were fortunately allowed by the Revenue Appellate Authority. However, the State of Rajasthan has not accepted the same and challenged it unsuccessfully before the Board of Revenue as the Board of Revenue dismissed the same by a common judgment and order dated 28.6.98 Instead of satisfying with the order of the Board of Revenue, the State of Rajasthan took the decision to challenge the said order before this Court by way of these petitions on the technical grounds like (1) that the Board of Revenue did not consider the earlier judgment of the coordinate bench and (2) misconstrued the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court.
8. Out of these ten petitions, learned counsel Mr. L.R Mehta appears on caveat in the writ petition nos. 4087/98, 3916/98, 3917/98 and 4088/98 for the original applicants.
9. It is true that when there was an earlier judgment of the coordinate bench of the Board of Revenue, the subsequent bench of the Board of Revenue should have respected the same. If it was not agreeing with the same, then it could have referred it to the larger Bench. Instead of that, the Board of Revenue dismissed the revision petitions and confirmed the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority in appeals. At the most we can say that there was impropriety on the part of the Board of Revenue in doing so.
10. In ordinary circumstances, this Court would have definatly interfered with such orders in its supervisory jurisdiction. However, on peculiar facts of these cases, I am not inclined to exercise my supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for the simply reason that the poor respondents-farmers who have cultivated their land since years together cannot be now deprived of their khatedari rights in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Brij Lal v. Board of Revenue (2). In para 5 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:—
“5. It is not disputed before us that the appellant is in cultivating possession of the land since 1970. It would be travesty of justice to dispossess the appellant from the land which he is nourishing for over a period of two decades.”
11. In this case, the claim of the respondents-cultivators was that they were in actual possession and cultivating the land prior to 1955 which was disputed by the learned counsel Mr. Tatia. However, Mr. Tatia himself could not say that they were atleast in possession of the land since 1970 meaning thereby that they are in possession of their lands since last three decades. When they have developed and nourished the said land and if this Court interferes with the order passed by the Board of Revenue whereby the khatedari rights are conferred upon them, it would be nothing but a travesty of justice.
12. The second submission of Mr. Tatia that the learned member of the Board of Revenue has misinterpreted or misconstrued the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Jugal Kishore's case (supra). Even assuming for the sake of arguments that the Board of Revenue has committed some error or mistake in properly appreciating the judgment of Division Bench in Jugal Kishore's case (supra), then also I would not like to interfere with the impugned common judgment and order passed by the Board of Revenue in these petitions because it is clearly stated by the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench of this Court in para 21 of the Jugal Kishore's case (supra) that they cannot be said to be trespassers. It was clearly found that they were erstwhile tenants. In that view of the matter even if the Board of Revenue has committed some error, this Court is not bound to correct it when substantial justice has been done by the Board of Revenue to the poor cultivators/farmers.
13. In view of the above discussion, all these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with no orders as to costs with the hope that the State of Rajasthan will rest here.
Alert