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H.C Misra And Others v. State Of U.P And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion addresses a cluster of writ petitions challenging the validity of the U.P Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997, specifically the levy of additional tax under the Act by operators of public service vehicles used for carriage of passengers for hire or reward. The petitioners contest the legislative competence of the State legislature to impose such tax, allege invidious discrimination violating Article 14 of the Constitution, claim infringement of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse under Article 301 due to non-compliance with Article 304(b), and assert that the additional tax is unreasonable, excessive, confiscatory, and violates Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The court heard arguments from both petitioners and State authorities and examined the legislative history and provisions of the Act in detail before delivering its judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the levy of additional tax under the U.P Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997, is within the legislative competence of the State legislature under the Constitution.
- Whether the levy of additional tax violates the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed by Article 301 of the Constitution, particularly due to non-compliance with the proviso to clause (b) of Article 304.
- Whether the additional tax imposed is unreasonable, excessive, confiscatory, and thus violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
- Whether the Act suffers from invidious discrimination in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
- Whether the circular dated January 25, 1999, issued by the Transport Commissioner, imposing the highest rate of additional tax on vehicles operated without permits, is valid.
- Whether the provision for refunding one-third of the quarterly tax payable in respect of vehicles used for a continuous period of one month or more is arbitrary.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The legislation imposing additional tax is beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature.
- The levy of additional tax violates Article 14 due to invidious discrimination among different classes of vehicles and operators.
- The additional tax infringes the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed under Article 301, particularly due to non-compliance with Article 304(b) requiring Presidential sanction.
- The additional tax is unreasonable, excessive, and confiscatory, violating Article 19(1)(g).
- The circular dated January 25, 1999, imposing the highest rate of additional tax on vehicles without permits, is without jurisdiction and ultra vires the Act.
- The refund provision under Section 12 of the Act is arbitrary as it does not refund tax for the entire period the vehicle was not used.
State Authorities' Arguments
- The levy of additional tax under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act falls within the legislative competence under Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
- The additional tax is a regulatory and compensatory tax for use of motor vehicles on public roads, not a tax on income or passengers, and thus does not violate Article 301.
- The tax is reasonable and not confiscatory, supported by comparative data showing reduced tax burden under the new Act compared to repealed Acts.
- The classification of vehicles and rates under the Act is based on reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved and does not amount to invidious discrimination.
- The circular imposing the highest rate on vehicles without permits is justified by the Explanation to the Fourth Schedule.
- The refund provision is consistent with the tax payment structure and not arbitrary.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1480 | Interpretation of taxing provisions under Entry 56 of List II; tax correlated with fares and freights on passengers and goods. | Distinguished from the U.P Act; held that additional tax under U.P Act is on vehicle use, not on passengers or income, thus falling under Entry 57. |
| A.S Karthikeyan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1974 SC 436 | Tax as regulatory and compensatory measure under Entry 56; importance of clear provisions for collection of tax. | Held that Kerala Act’s tax on passengers and goods was under Entry 56; distinguished from U.P Act’s additional tax provisions. |
| Maharaja Tourist Service v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 1650 | Taxation jurisprudence principle that State may choose kind of tax to levy; regulatory and compensatory nature of tax. | Found not helpful for legislative competence issue in this case; confirmed U.P Act’s tax as on vehicle use under Entry 57. |
| State of Assam v. Labanya Prabha, AIR 1967 SC 1575 | Taxes on vehicles as regulatory and compensatory taxes under Entry 57; taxes must have nexus with vehicle use on roads. | Supported view that additional tax under U.P Act is a valid regulatory and compensatory tax under Entry 57. |
| Atiabari Tea Company Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 232 | Nature of freedom under Article 301; taxes that directly and immediately restrict trade violate Article 301 unless compensatory/regulatory. | Applied to hold that U.P Act’s additional tax is compensatory and regulatory, not an impermissible restriction on trade. |
| Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 SC 1406 | Clarified compensatory/regulatory nature of taxes under Entry 57; taxes for use of roads do not violate Article 301. | Relied upon to uphold validity of additional tax as compensatory and regulatory, not infringing freedom of trade. |
| Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 17 | Tax under Entry 57 must be regulatory and compensatory with nexus to roads used by vehicles. | Confirmed that U.P Act’s additional tax meets these criteria and is valid. |
| International Tourist Corporation v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 774 | Taxes under Entries 56 and 57 are regulatory and compensatory; need not be proportionate to expenditure incurred. | Supported the principle that additional tax under U.P Act is valid if it has identifiable object and nexus. |
| Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1637 | Wide latitude to legislature in classification for taxation; reasonable classification upheld under Article 14. | Applied to reject claim of invidious discrimination in tax rates and classification under the U.P Act. |
| Jaipur Hosiery Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1971 SC 1330 | Judicial restraint in economic and taxation regulation; legislature’s wide discretion in classification. | Supported court’s approach to uphold classification and tax scheme under the U.P Act. |
| G.K Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1975 SC 583 | State’s discretion in method, measurement, and amount of tax once proper purpose is established. | Applied to hold additional tax under U.P Act is not confiscatory and within State’s discretion. |
| S. Ahmad v. State of Mysore, AIR 1975 SC 1443 | Violation of Article 304 can also imply violation of Article 19(1)(g); both rights considered together. | Since Act does not violate Article 301 or confiscate tax, no violation of Article 19(1)(g) arises. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by tracing the legislative history of the U.P Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997, noting it consolidates earlier enactments dealing with road tax, passenger tax, and goods tax. The court examined the constitutional entries under which the State legislature claims competence to levy the tax, particularly Entries 56 and 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. It distinguished between taxes on passengers and goods (Entry 56) and taxes on vehicles suitable for use on roads (Entry 57), concluding that the additional tax under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act is a tax on the use of vehicles, falling under Entry 57 and within the State's legislative competence.
The court rejected petitioners’ arguments that the tax is on income or passengers and that it violates Article 301. It relied on precedents holding that regulatory and compensatory taxes on vehicles for use of roads do not infringe the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed by Article 301, provided they meet the requirements of Article 304(b). The court held the additional tax is compensatory and regulatory, not confiscatory or unreasonable, supported by evidence showing the tax burden under the new Act is less than under repealed laws.
Regarding Article 14 challenges, the court applied established principles allowing wide latitude to the legislature in classification for taxation. It found the differential treatment in tax rates and formulas between various vehicle classes and ownerships to be reasonable and based on relevant economic and operational distinctions, thus not amounting to invidious discrimination.
The court invalidated the circular dated January 25, 1999, issued by the Transport Commissioner, holding that it exceeded statutory authority by prescribing the highest tax rate for vehicles operated without permits, a matter requiring legislative specification.
Finally, the court dismissed the claim that the refund provision under Section 12 is arbitrary, finding it consistent with the tax payment structure and the legislative scheme.
Holding and Implications
The writ petitions challenging the validity of the U.P Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997, and the levy of additional tax thereunder are dismissed.
The court holds that the levy of additional tax under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act is within the legislative competence of the State under Entry 57 of List II, is compensatory and regulatory in nature, and does not violate Articles 14, 19(1)(g), or 301 of the Constitution. The classification and rates prescribed are reasonable and not discriminatory. The impugned circular dated January 25, 1999, is quashed as ultra vires and without jurisdiction. The refund provision under Section 12 is upheld. The parties shall bear their own costs. No new precedent beyond the application of established constitutional principles is created by this decision.
S.R Singh, J.:— In this cluster of writ petitions, the operators of public service vehicles used or adopted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, have challenged the validity of the U.P Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997 (in short the ‘Act) and to be precise, levy thereunder of the additional tax. The challenge basically is rooted in the grounds, inter-alia, that the legislation in question is beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature; that it suffers from the vice of invidious discrimination and violates Art. 14 of the Constitution; that the levy of tax additional tax under the Act interdicts freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed by Art. 310 of the Constitution and is invalid and void owing to non-compliance with the requirement of the proviso to clause (b) of Art. 304 of the Constitution and that levy of additional tax under the Act is unreasonable, excessive confiscatory and violative of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
2. We have heard Sri L.P Naithani, Senior Advocate and Sri Ravi Kant for the petitioners and S/Sri Ashok Mehta, Chief Standing Counsel and M.S Persania, Standing Counsel for the State authorities.
3. Before coming to grips with the points raised at the bar, we may briefly trace out the legislative history of the Act. From the statement of objects and reasons of the Act, it would appear that the Act is an amalgam of three enactments viz., the United Province Motor Vehicles Act, 1935; the U.P Motor Gari (Yatrikar) Adhiniyam, 1962; and the U.P Motor Gari (Mai Kar) Adhiniyam, 1964 which provided for the levy of road tax, passenger tax, and goods tax respectively. It appears that the question regarding enactment of a composite law for levy and collection of all taxes on motor vehicles was considered by the U.P Taxation Enquiry Committee constituted under the Chairmanship of Chelaiya and the U.P Review Committee headed by Dr. Papola. The U.P Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997, a composite law for levy and collection of all the taxes on motor vehicles, has been enacted with a view to rationalise taxes on motor vehicles and to streamline the administration thereof and to establish the “U.P Road Transport Accident Relief Funds so as to provide relief to the passengers or other persons suffering from casualty in the accidents in which public service vehicles are involved.” The charging provisions in the United Provinces Motor Vehicles Taxation Act 1935 were Sections 4, 5A and 11 which read as under:
“4. Imposition of tax—(1) Save as otherwise provided by this Act or by any rule made thereunder or by any other law for the time being in force, no motor vehicle shall be used in any public place in (Uttar Pradesh) unless the owner thereof has paid in respect of it a tax at the appropriate rate specified in the First Schedule to this Act (within the time allowed by S. 5), and save as hereinafter specified, such tax shall thereafter be payable annually notwithstanding that the motor vehicle may from time to time cease to be used: (2) For the purpose of determining the amount of the tax payable in respect of (transport vehicles) under Art. IV to VII or IX) of the first schedule to this Act, all routes in (Uttar Pradesh) shall be classified by the prescribed authority as special routes or ordinary routes, and every ordinary route shall be further classified as an A class route, or a B class route, or a C class Route.
Explanation—In this section and in S. 5A ‘the First Schedule’ means (a) for the purposes of determination of the tax payable in respect of any period prior to the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam 1962, hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1962 the First Schedule as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Act of 1962;
(b) For the purposes of determination of the tax payable in respect of any period from and after the commencement of the Act of 1962, but prior to the commencement of Chapter V of the Uttar Pradesh Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1969, the First Schedule as substituted by the Act of 1962; and
(c) for the purposes of determination of the tax payable in respect of any period from arid after the commencement of Chapter V of, Uttar Pradesh Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969, but prior to the first day of January, 1972, the First Schedule as substituted by the said Act of 1969;
(d) for the purposes of determination of the tax payable in respect of any period from and after the first day of January, 1972, but prior to the commencement of Chapter V of the Uttar Pradesh Taxation and Land Revenue Laws Act, 1975, the First Schedule as Amended by Chapter IV of the Uttar Pradesh Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972;
(e) for the purposes of determination of the tax payable in respect of any period from and after the commencement of Chapter V of the Uttar Pradesh Taxation and Land Revenue Laws Act, 1975, the First Schedule as substituted by the said Act.) (* * *) sub-section (3) omitted. (5-A)—Vehicles not to be used in Uttar Pradesh without payment of tax—(1) No transport vehicle plying under a permit granted by an authority having jurisdiction outside Uttar Pradesh under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 shall be used in Uttar Pradesh, unless there has been paid in respect thereof a tax calculated at the appropriate rate specified in the First Schedule and in the manner provided under sub-section (2) for the number of weeks of its use or stay in Uttar Pradesh; anything contained in S. 5 to the contrary notwithstanding.
(2) For the purposes of levy and payment of tax under sub-section (1) the tax payable for (every two-weeks or part thereof) shall be (one twenty-sixth) of the appropriate rate specified in the First Schedule).
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11. Payment of additional tax where any motor vehicle in respect of which the tax has been paid is altered in such as manner as to cause the vehicle to become a vehicle in respect of which a higher rate of tax is payable, the owner thereof shall be liable to pay an additional tax of a sum which is equal to the difference between the tax already paid in respect of such vehicle and the tax which is payable in respect of such vehicle after its being so altered (***).
4. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Gadi (Yatri-kar) Adhiniyam, 1962 was enacted “to provide for the levy of a tax on passengers carried in certain classes of public service vehicles in the State of Uttar Pradesh. S. 3, which was the charging provision in the said Act, in so far as it is relevant, reads as under:
“3. Levy of tax on passangers carried by stage carriages—(1) From and after the coming into force of this section there shall be levied and paid to the State Government a tax on every passenger carried by a stage carriage at a rate equivalent to five per cent, of fare payable by such passenger to the operator of the stage carriage in respect of his journey in the State:
(Provided that the amount of tax shall, whenever necessary)
(a) in the case of a stage carriage plying exclusively within the limits of a city or Municipality, be rounded off to the nearest paise, that is to say, fractions of half a paisa and over shall be counted as one and less than half a paisa shall be disregarded; and
(b) in the case of other stage carriage be rounded off to the nearest multiple of five paise, that is to say, fractions of two and a half paise and over shall be counted as five paise and of less than two and half paise shall be disregarded.) Explanation I when a passenger is carried by stage carriage at a concessional rate or without being charged any fare, the fare normally payable for the journey shall for the purposes of this section be deemed to be the fare payable by such passenger.
(Explanation II—In the case of a contract carriage the fare payable for the carriage divided by the number of passengers therein shall be deemed to be the fare payable by each such passenger, provided that when the fare payable for the carriage is less than seventy five per cent, of that worked out at the maximum rates, if any, fixed for contract carriages in pursuance of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, such seventy five per cent shall be deemed to be the fare payable for the carriage.)
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(3) From and after the commencement of this section, there shall further be levied and paid to the State Government an additional tax on every passenger carried by a stage carriage, not being a stage carriage plying exclusively within the limits of city or municipality, at the rate of ten paise on the fare for each journey (where the ordinary fare for such journey is not less than one rupee), payable by such passenger to the operator of the stage carriage in respect of every journey in the State.
Explanation. The additional tax under this sub-sec. shall in the case of a contract carriage, be levied in respect of the number of passengers for whom accommodation is provided in it, irrespective of the actual number of passengers carried.
(3-A) From and after the commencement of this sub-section there shall further be levied and paid to the State Government a surcharge for the purposes of insurance of passengers, on the tax and additional tax payable by every passenger carried by a stage carriage for each journey, at a rate not exceeding 5 per cent of the aggregate of such tax and additional tax as the State Government may be notification direct)
Section 5 of the aforesaid act provided the method of collection of tax. It reads as under:
“5. Method of collection of tax-(1) The tax shall be collected by the operator of the stage carriage and paid to the State Government in the prescribed manner.
Provided that the State Government may accept, or agree to accept, a lump sum in lieu of the amount of tax that may be payable by the operator to the State Government.
(Provided further that any change in the rate of tax which comes into force after the date of agreement shall have the effect of making a corresponding (proportionate) change in the lump sum agreed upon in relation to that part of the period of the agreement during which the changed rate remains in force.)
(2) The State Government may by rule require the operator to purchase the stamps and use the same for the collection of the tax.
The Uttar Pradesh Motor Gadi (Mal-Kar) Adhiniyan, 1964 was enacted to provide for the levy of tax on goods carried by certain classes of motor vehicles in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The charging Ss. 3 and 4 of the said Act read as under:
“3. Levy of tax on goods carried by public goods vehicles—(1) subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall, from and after the coming into force of this section, be levied and paid to the State Government a tax on all goods carried by road in a public goods vehicle at a rate equivalent to five per cent of the freight payable for such carriage of goods in the State.
(Explanation-I. Where goods are carried by a public goods vehicle (a) from any place outside the State, to any place within the State, or
(b) from any place within the State, to any place outside the State; or
(c) From any place outside the State to any place within the State, an amount bearing the same proportion to the total freight payable as the distance within the State bears to the total distance to which goods are carried by such vehicle shall be deemed to be the freight payable for the carriage of goods in the State).
Explanation II.—Where no freight is payable or the freight payable is less than the amount calculated at such rates as may be fixed by the State Government from time to time, which shall not be more than eighty per cent of the maximum rates of freight fixed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, or under any other law for the time being in force, the amount so calculated shall be deemed to be the freight payable.
(2) Except in the case of agricultural produce, minerals, mineral ores and petroleum goods, the State Government may, by notification in the Gazette, increase the rate of tax leviable under sub-section (1), but not so as to exceed fifteen per cent of the freight referred to in that sub-section.
4. Levy of tax on goods carried by private goods vehicles. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall, from and after the coming into force of this section be levied and paid to the State Government tax on all goods vehicle in the State at rate equivalent to five per cent of the amount of freight calculated at such rates as may be fixed by the State Government from time to time, which shall not be more than seventy five per cent of the maximum rate of freights fixed for public carriers under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or under any other law for the time being in force.
(2) Except in the case of agricultural produce, minerals, mineral ores and petroleum goods, the State Government may, by notification in the Gazette, increase the rate of tax leviable under sub-section (1), but no so as to exceed fifteen per cent of the amount calculated at seventy five per cent of maximum rate of freights referred to in that subsection.”
5. The charging provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Taxation Act 1997 are Obstracted.
“4. Imposition of tax—(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act or the rules made thereunder, no motor vehicle other than a transport vehicle, shall be used in any public place in Uttar Pradesh unless a one-time tax at the rate applicable in respect of such motor vehicle, as specified in part ‘B’ of the First Schedule has been paid in respect thereof.
Provided that in respect of an old motor vehicle, instead of a one-time tax, annual tax at the rate applicable to such motor vehicle as specified in part ‘C’ of the First Schedule may be paid.
(2) Save as otherwise provided by or under this Act no transport vehicle shall be used in any public place in Uttar Pradesh unless a tax at the rate applicable to such motor vehicle, as specified in part ‘D’ of the First Schedule has been paid in respect thereof.
(3) Where any motor vehicle other than a transport vehicle, in respect whereof one time tax has been paid is operated as a transport vehicle the tax payable under this Act on such transport vehicle shall be payable.
5. Additional tax on goods carriages. (1) Save as otherwise provided by or under this Act no goods carriage shall be operated in any public place in Uttar Pradesh, unless there has been paid in respect thereof, in addition to the tax payable under S. 4, an additional tax at the rate applicable to such goods carriage specified, as the case may be in
(a) Third Schedule in the case of the goods carriage plying under permits granted by authorities having jurisdiction outside Uttar Pradesh for Inter State route partly lying in Uttar Pradesh.
(b) part ‘B’ of the Third Schedule, in the case of goods carriage operating under national permit granted under sub-section (12) of S. 88 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988;
(c) Sixth Schedule, in the case of the goods carriage plying under permits granted by authorities having jurisdiction outside Uttar Pradesh for Inter State route partly lying in Uttar Pradesh:
Provided that the State Government may, by notification, increase by not more than fifty per cent, the rates of additional tax specified in the said schedules.
(2) where any reciprocal agreement relating to taxation of goods carried by road is entered into between the Government of Uttar Pradesh and any other State Government or a Union Territory, the levy of additional tax under sub-section (1) shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said sub-section, be in accordance with the terms and conditions of such agreement.
Provided that the additional tax so levied shall not exceed the additional tax which could have otherwise been levied under this Act.
6. Additional tax on public service vehicle.— (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act or the rules made thereunder, no public service vehicle, other than those owned or controlled by the State Transport Untertaking shall be operated in any public place in Uttar Pradesh unless there has been paid in respect thereof, in addition to the tax payale under S. 4, an aditional tax at the rate applicable to such public service vehicle specified in the Fourth Schedule:
Provided that the State Government may by notification increase by not more than fifty per cent, the rates of additional tax specified in the said Schedule.
(2) The additional tax in respect of a public service vehicle owned or controlled by a State Transport undertaking shall be levied and paid in accordance with the formula specified in the Fifth Schedule.
(3) Where a public service vehicle is wholly or partially exempted from the payment of additional tax by or under this Act a surcharge for the purpose of the fund established under S. 8 shall be levied on its operator at the rate of five per cent of the additional tax that would have been payable on such vehicle had it not been so exempted and such amount shall be credited to the said Fund.”
6. Other provisions germane to the questions involved herein would be referred to as and when it is so felt necessary in the perspective of the questions raised at the bar. So far as S. 4 of the Act is concerned, it prohibits use of all ‘motor vehicles’, including a ‘transport vehicles’, “in any public place” except on payment of one time tax at the rate specified in the appropriate part of the 1st schedule. In addition to the tax payable under S. 4 an additional tax is payable under the Act in respect of ‘transport vehicle’ viz. ‘goods carriages’ and ‘public service vehicles’ under Ss. 5 and 6 respectively at the rates specified in appropriate schedule applicable to ‘goods carriage’ and ‘public service vehicle, as the case may be. “Transport Vehicle”, as the term is defined in S. 2(n) of the Act, means a goods carriage or a public service vehicle. “Goods carriage” means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted wholly or partly for use for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adopted when used for the carriage of goods either solely or in addition to passengers, and includes a trailer but does not include motor cab, or a maxi cap or a contract carriage or stage carriage where such contract or stage carriage is authorised to carry a limited quantity of load and “public service vehicle” as the term is defined in S. 2(35) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 means any motor vehicle used or adopted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a max-cab, a motor cab, contract carriage and stage carriage.
7. In Re-Legislative Competence:
8. The power of the State Legislature to levy taxes on goods and passengers carried by road and on motor vehicles is traceable to Entry 56 and Entry 57 of List II of the 7th Schedule read with Art. 246 of the Constitution while Entry 56 provides for taxation on goods and passengers carried by road or inland waterways. Entry 57 provides for legislation in respect of “taxes on vehicles whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use on roads including the tram-cars subject to the provisions of Entry 35 of List III”, Entry 35 of List III empowers the Parliament and State Legislature to make law in respect of mechanically propelled vehicles Including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied. So far as the repealed Acts are concerned, it has not been disputed and it is clear from the preambles, and the language used in, the repealed Acts, that the 1935 Act was covered by Entry 57 while 1962 and 1964 Acts were covered by Entry 58 of List II.
9. Learned counsel for the parties have been inconsistent in their submissions on the question of legislative competence to levy additional taxes under the Act. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that while levy of tax under S. 4 of the Act is covered by Entry 57, the levy of additional taxes under the Act is a levy on income and is not at all covered by Entry 56 which empowers the State legislature to make law in respect of tax on goods and passengers carried by road or inland waterways. Sri L.P Naithani, learned Senior Counsel has however, submitted that the levy of additional taxes in relation to ‘public service vehicles’ owned or controlled by State Transport Corporation, being co-related with fare as per Schedule V, is covered by Entry 56, in the counter-affidavit, the levy of additional tax is sought to be justified under (sic) Entry 56 of List II and the Chief Standing Counsel too initially tried to support the levy of additional tax under S. 6 of the Act with the help of Entry 56 and adopted the same line of reasoning as taken in the counter-affidavit on the Issue of legislative competence but subsequently during the course of his arguments, he switched over, in our opinion, rightly, to Entry 57. It has been submitted by the learned Chief Standing counsel that the levy of additional tax under S. 6 of the Act on public service vehicles with which we are concerned herein, is a levy of tax on passengers carried by road in that, proceeds the submission the additional tax levied under S. 6 has replaced the taxes levied under the Uttar Pradesh Motor Gadi (Yatri-Kar) Adhiniyam, 1962. To enforce his contention, the learned Chief Standing Counsel has placed reliance on Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1480.
10. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions advanced at the bar. We are the view that if the language used in the Act is anything to go by the levy of taxes thereunder is covered by Entry 57 of List II. The decision in M/s Sainik Motors is not very helpful in the construction of the Act. In that case, the provision made in S. 3 of the Rajasthan Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1959 was that “there shall be levied, charged and paid to the State Government, a tax on all fares and freights in respect of all passengers carried and goods transported by motor vehicles.” To reproduce it, the tax in that case was levied “in respect of all passengers carried and goods transported by motor vehicles”, and unlike the levy of tax under the U.P Act, it was co-related with fares and freights and on the language of the charging provision in that case the Supreme Court held that the charging section did not go outside Entry 56 and the measure of tax was although furnished by the amount of fare and freight charged, it did not cease to be a tax on passenger and goods. S. 4 of the said Act, it may be pointed out, clearly provided for collection of tax by the owner of the motor vehicle. The word “collected” used in S. 4 of the said Act would, in the context, mean “collected from the passengers or consignors, as the case may be. ‘This is further clear from S. 5, which enjoined the issuance of ticket showing the tax paid or receipt showing the freight charged and the tax paid. Thus the language used in the related provisions of the Rajasthan Act made it clear beyond doubt that the levy of tax thereunder was in respect of passengers carried or goods transported as was the position under the Uttar Pradesh Motor Gadi (Yatri-Kar) Adhiniyam, 1962 and the Uttar Pradesh Motor Gadi (Mal-Kar) Adhiniyam, 1964. In other words, the levy of tax in M/s. Sainik Motors was co-related with the carriage of passengers and transportation of goods by road and was chargeable by the operator/owner on fares and frieghts whereas in the present case, the language used in the charging provision namely, Ss. 5 and 6 of the Act makes it clear that they do not fall with the amount of Entry No. 56. Rather, the language in which the charging sections are couched clearly suggests that the levy of additional tax is on the operator of the goods vehicle or the public service vehicle. Section 3 of the U.P Motor Gadi (Yatri-Kar) Adhiniyam, 1962 was covered by Entry 56 because it provided for levy of tax “on every passenger carried by a stage carriage at a rate equivalent to the per cent of fare payable by such passenger to the operator of the stage carriage in respect of his journey in the State”. The fact that the rates of additional tax on stage carriage, as laid down in 5th Schedule, is co-related with the seating capacity of the stage carriage and authorised distance run in a quarter would not make it a tax on passenger. There is no provision in the U.P Act enabling the operator to charge and collect the additional tax from passengers. True, the burden of additional tax may be passed on to passengers by enhancing the freight and fare under the provisions of S. 57 of the Motor Vehicles, Act, 1988, but that by itself would not bring the levy of additional tax under Entry 56.
11. In the case of A.S Karthikeyan v. State of Kerala, (1974) 1 SCC 258 : AIR 1974 SC 436 reliance on which was placed by the Chief Standing counsel, Section 3 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles (Taxation of passengers and goods) Act, 1963 provided that there would be “levied and paid to the Government, a tax on all passengers, luggage and goods carried by stage carriages and on all goods transported by public carrier vehicles “at the specified rates such rates being co-related with fares and freights. The Kerala High Court, although held that the tax was a tax on passengers and goods but expressed the view that there was no satisfactory provision for the collection of the tax. Amendments were then made in the Act to clarify the position with regard to levy and collection of taxes from passengers and consignors of goods. Thus the income of the operators though the measure of the tax was furnished by the amount of fare and freight charged. Such a provision would no doubt be covered by Entry 56 of List II. Section 3 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles (Taxation of passengers and goods) Act, 1963 cannot be said to be in pari materia with Ss. 5 and 6 of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997. In support of his connection that the levy of additional taxes under S.5 and S.6 of the Act fall within the ambit of Entry 56, the Chief Standing counsel then placed reliance on Maharaja Tourist Service v. State of Gujarat, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 489 : AIR 1991 SC 1650. The said decision too is not of any avail in the context of the question as to legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact provisions like Ss. 5 and 6 of the Act. It is axiomatic in taxation jurisprudence that the State may choose the kind of taxes, which it will levy e.g a tax may be levied on the sale rather than on the use or upon the use rather than upon the ownership. What is the kind of the taxes levied under the Act? The language used in the taxing provisions of the Act is eloguent of the fact that the levy of tax under S. 4 and additional taxes under Ss. 5 and 6 are indubitably levies on use of ‘motor vehicles’. The incidence of additional taxes levied under the Act is not upon the vehicle or its ownership, nor on the income derived from the vehicle nor upon the passengers carried and goods transported by ‘transport vehicles’ namely, ‘public service vehicles’ and ‘goods carriages’ as the case may be, put on the use thereof’ in any public place in Uttar Pradesh” and the liability to pay the taxes imposed under the Act is on the owner/operator of the motor vehicle.
12. We are of the considered view that imposition of additional taxes on goods carriages and public service vehicles under Ss. 5 and 6 of the Act is, in substance and reality, a tax on ‘vehicles suitable for use on reads’ within the meaning of the term used in Entry 57 of State List and are taxes payable by the operators for operating ‘transport vehicles’ in any public place in Uttar Pradesh with no express or implied right under the Act to collect the same from passengers and consignors of goods, being carried or transported in ‘public service vehicles’ and ‘goods carriages’ as the case may be. In other words, additional tax under S. 5 of the Act is on motor vehicles used or adapted to be used for the carriage of goods and additional tax under S. 6 is leviable on motor vehicles used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward and the tax is leviable irrespective of any income or profit. Therefore, the levy of additional tax on ‘goods carriages’ and public service vehicles’ under Ss. 5 and 6 of the Act is covered by Entry 57 of List II and hence it is within the competence of the State Legislature. The contrary submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be countenanced.
13. The Assam Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, like the Act in question herein may be cited as an example of a law made under Entry 57 of List II. The charging provision therein visualised that no motor vehicles could be used in the province of Assam unless the owner thereof had paid in respect of it a tax at the rate specified in the schedule to the Act. The Assam Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, was up for consideration in State of Assam v. Labanya Prabha, AIR 1967 SC 1575. It has been held therein that, Taxes on vehicles in their ordinary meaning connote the liability to pay taxes at the rates at which the taxes are to be levied.” We are of the view that the additional tax under the Act is, in content and nature, no different from the tax imposed under S. 4 of the Act. The Legislature was competent to put an additional burden upon a class of vehicles in view of the object and purpose sought to be achieved through the levy of additional taxes and the compensatory service rendered in lieu thereof.
14. In Re. Art. 301 of the Constitution
15. The next question that begs determination is whether the Act infringes the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed by Art. 301 due to non compliance with the requirement of Art. 304(b) of the Constitution.
16. Art. 301 reads as under:
“301. Subject to the other provisions of this part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free.”
17. It is clear from the plain language of Art 301 that the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India admits of no restrictions subject, of course, to Part XIII of the Constitution (Arts. 302 to 307). Article 304(b), which alone is relevant in the context of the question, involved herein are quoted below for ready reference.
304. Restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse among states.
Notwithstanding anything in Art. 301 or Art. 303, the Legislature of a State may by law.
(a)…………………
(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest.
Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President.”
18. In Atiabari Tea Company Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 232, the nature and content of freedom guaranteed by Art. 301 vis-a-vis Taxation Laws came up for consideration before a Five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the context of the Assam Taxation (on goods carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act, 1954. In that case, three views were articulated, Sinha, C.J repelled the contention that freedom envisaged by Art. 301 means absolute freedom from taxation and upon consideration of related constitutional provisions and authorities on the point, his Lordship inter-alia, held that the freedom declared by Art. 301 did not mean freedom from taxation simpliciter but did mean freedom from taxation, which has the efffect of directly impeding the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse and further that ‘all taxation is not necessarily impediment or restraint in the matter of trade, commerce and intercourse, ‘In other words, it was held, the freedom envisaged by Art. 301 is not absolute freedom from the incidence of taxation in respect of trade, commerce and intercourse. Gajendragadkar, J. (as his lordship then was), speaking for himself and on behalf of Wanchoo and Das Gupta, JJ. maintained that the freedom guaranteed under Art. 301 was not intended to be an absolute freedom and held that though the power of levying tax was essential for the very existence of governance, its exercise must inevitably be controlled by the Constitutional provisions made in that behalf and further that “the taxing laws are not excluded from the operation of Art. 301” but added a clarificatory rider that “restriction freedom from which is guaranteed by Art. 301 would be such restriction as directly and immediately restrict or impede the free flow of movement of trade.” And further; “Taxes may or do amount to restrictions but it is only such taxes as directly and immediately restrict trade that would fall within the purview of Art. 301. The argument that all taxes should be governed by Art. 301 whether or not their impact is immediate or mediate, direct or remote adopts in our opinion, an extreme approach which cannot be upheld” and further more:
“At this stage we think it is necessary to repeat that when it is said that the freedom of the movement of trade cannot be subject to any restrictions in the form of taxes imposed on the carriage of goods or their movement all that is meant is that the said restrictions can be imposed by the State Legislatures only after satisfying the requirements of Art. 304 (b). It is not as if no restrictions at all can be imposed on the free movement of trade.”
19. The third view held by Shah, J. was that the freedom comprehended by Art. 301 was freedom of trade, commerce and intrecourse in all their varied aspects. It was held:
“The power on tax is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of the State and is not exercised in consideration of the protection it affords or the benefit that it confers upon the citizens and aliens. Its content is not measured by the apparent need of the amount sought to be collected and its incidence does not depend upon the ability of the citizens to meet the demand. But it Is still not an unrestricted power.”
20. The Assam Taxation on goods carried by Road or Inland Waterways Act, 1954, S. 3 of which provided inter-alia that the “manufactured tea in chest carried by motor vehicles, Cart, Trolley, Boat, Animal and human agency or any other means, except Railways and Air ways shall be liable to a tax of one Anna per pound of such tea and this tax shall be realised from the producer” was regard infringing guarantee of freedom of trade and commerce under Art. 302, because the Bill moved in the Assembly did not receive the assent of the President as required by proviso to Art. 304(b) nor was the infirmity cured by recourse to Art. 255 of the Constitution.
21. The next case of seminal importance is the Seven Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 SC 1406. In that case the validity of Rajasthan Motor Vehicle Taxation Act, 1951 was under challenge, S. 4 of the said Act which was more or less similar to the taxing provisions contained in the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997 visualised that—
“Save, as otherwise provided in this Act or by Rules made thereunder or by any other law for the time being in force, no motor vehicle shall be used in any public place or kept for use in Rajasthan unless the owner thereof has paid in respect of it a tax at the appropriate rate specified in the schedule to this Act within the time allowed by S. 5 and save as hereinafter specified such tax shall be payable annuity notwithstanding that the motor vehicle may, from time to time, cease to be used.”
22. The majority speaking through S.K Das, J., disapproved the extreme view taken by Shah J. in Atiabari's case (supra) and approved by majority view expressed therein by Gajendragadkar, J. subject to following clarifications (at page 248):
“We have therefore, come to the conclusion that neither the widest interpretation nor the narrow interpretation canvassed before us are acceptable. The interpretation which was accepted by the majority in Atiabari Tea Company, (1961) 1 SCR 809 : AIR 1961 SC 233 is correct but subject to this classification Regulatory measures or measures imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities do not come within the purview of the restrictions contemplated by Art. 301 and such measures need not comply with the requirements of the proviso to Art. 304 (b) of the Constitution.”
23. On the question whether a tax is compensatory or not, it has been held as under:
“It seems to us that a working test for deciding whether a tax is compensatory or not is to enquire whether the trades people are having the use of certain facilities for the better conduct of their business and paying not patently much more than what is required for providing the facilities. It would be impossible to judge the compensatory nature of a tax by meticulous test and in nature of things that cannot be done.”
24. And further—
“Nor do we think that it will make any difference that the money collected from the tax is not put into a separate fund so long as the facilities for the trades people who pay the taxes, are provided and the expenses incurred in providing them, are borne by the State out of whatever sources it may be. In the cases under our consideration the tax is based on passenger capacity of commercial buses and lodging capacity of goods vehicles both have some relation to wear and tear caused to the roads used by the buses. In basing the taxes on passenger capacity or lodging capacity, the Legislature has merely evolved a method and measure of compensation demanded by the State but the taxes are still comprregulation.”
(Emphasis is ours).
25. Subba Rao. J. as his Lordship then was, while agreeing with the conclusion arrived at by S.K Das, J. adopted the doctrine of “direct and immediate effect” on the freedom as a reasonable solvent to the difficult situation that may arise in the construction of a taxation law vis-a-vis the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed by Art. 301. His Lordship observed as under;
“Taking the illustration from taxation law, a law may impose a tax on the movement of goods or persons by a motor vehicle, it directly operates as restriction on the free movement of trade except when it is compensatory or regulatory on the other hand, a law may tax a vehicle, as property, or the garrage wherein the vehicle used for conveyance is kept. A law may have indirect repercussions on the movement but the said law is not one directly imposing restrictions on the free movement. In this context, two difficulties may have to be faced; firstly that though a law purporting to impose a tax on a property or motor vehicle as the case may be, may in fact and in reality impose a tax on the movement itself, secondly a law may not be on the movement of trade, but on the property itself but the burden may be so high that it may indirectly affect the free flow of trade. In the former case, the Court may have to scrutinise the provisions of a particular statute to ascertain whether the taxi is on the movement. If the provisions disclosed a tax on the movement, it will be a restriction within the meaning of Art. 302. In the latter case, if the provisions show that the taxes on property, the reasonableness of the tax may have to be tested against the provisions of Art. 19 of the Constitution the question whether a law imposes a restriction or not, depends upon the question whether the said law imposes directly and immediately a limitation on the freedom of movement of trade. If it does, the extent of the impediment relates to the question of degree rather than to the nature of it. If it is a restriction it must satisfy the condition laid down in Art. 302 of the Constitution.
26. The provisions of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act were held to be compensatory in character not infringing freedom enshrined in Art. 301 of the Constitution as per majority in the Automobile case. Hidayat Ullah, Ayyangar and Mohalkar, JJ. took a contrary view and held that taxes imposed under the Act in question therein operated on trade and commerce directly and were not justifiable as a regulatory or compensatory measure since the Act, plainly levied a tax upon the possession or use of motor vehicles and contained no provision therein which could be regarded as regulating the trade ordinarily rather it imposed a charge on the trade and thereby burdened the trade and impaired the free flow of trade and commerce resulting in violation of Art. 301, the tax levied under the said Act was, according to the minority view, a tax on the movement of trade and created a barrier between one State and another except on payment of tax which according to the minority view, was not a fair recompense for wear and tear of roads and it was in this view of the matter that the taxing provision was found violative of Art. 301 according to the minority view. But the majority view being the law of the land is binding on us under Art. 141.
27. In Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State Of Orissa , (1974) 2 SCC 777 : AIR 1975 SC 17, the nature of taxation under Entry 57 of List II of the Constitution was taken into reckoning. The Supreme Court held as under (at page 22):
“The power exerciseable under Entry 57 is the power to impose taxes which are in the nature of regulatory and compensatory measures. The regulatory and compensatory nature of the tax is that the taxing power should be exercised to impose taxes on motor vehicles which use the roads in the State or are kept for use thereunder either throughout the whole area or parts thereof and are sufficient to make and maintain such roads.”
28. Explaining further, the Apex Court observed as under:
The validity of the taxing power under Entry 57, List II of the 7th schedule read with Art. 301 of the Constitution, depends upon the regulatory and compensatory nature of the taxes. But entry 57 of List II is subject to the limitation referred to above namely, that the power of taxation thereunder cannot exceed the compensatory nature which must have some nexus with the vehicles using roads viz. public roads. If the vehicles do not use the roads notwithstanding that they are registered under the Act they cannot be taxed.”
29. In the Automobile's case (supra), it was held as under:
“We must consider the substance of the matter and so considered, there can be no doubt that the taxes imposed are not hindrance to the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse, if a statute fixes a charge for a convenience or service provided by the State or an agency of the State, and imposes it upon those who choose to avail themselves of the service or convenience, the freedom of trade and commerce may well be considered unimpaired. In such a case, the imposition assumes the character of remuneration or consideration charged in respect of advantage sought and received. In Arm Strong v. State of Victoria, (1957) 99 CLR 28, Dixon, C.J said:
The reason, as I venture to suggest, simply is that when the bridge, the aerodromes and Airways, the wharves and the shades, the respective inter-State operations could not be carried out and that the charges serve no purpose save to maintain these necessary things at a standard by which they may continue. However it may be stated, the ultimate ground for exaction of the payments for using the instruments (sic) commerce, that have been of mentioned is no vidation of the freedom of inter-State trade lies in the relation to inter-State trade which their nature and purpose give them. The reason why the public authority must maintain them is in order that the commerce may use them and so for the commerce to bear or contribute to the cost of their upkeep can involve no detraction from the freedom of commercial intercourse between States.”
30. The learned Chief Justice reiterated the same view in Common-Wealth Freghters Proprietory Ltd. v. Sneddons, (1959) 102 CLR 280 at P. 291.
31. In International Tourist Corporation v. State of Haryana, (1981) 2 SCC 318 : AIR 1981 SC 774, the Supreme Court boiled down to the view that Haryana Passengers and Goods Taxation Act was a law made pursuant to the power given to the State Legislature by Entry 56 of List II and that the power exercisable under Entries 56 and 57 of List II is the power to impose taxes which are in the nature of regulatory and compensatory measures. Such taxes it has been held therein, need not “be proportionate to the expenditure incurred on the regulation provided and the services rendered.” Reiterating the principle laid down in the Automobile's case (supra). it has been observed that.
“What is necessary to uphold the regulatory and compensatory taxes is the existence of a specific identifiable object behind the levy and the nexus between the subject and the object of the levy.”
32. Same principle has been reiterated in the Malwa Bus Service v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 237 : AIR 1983 SC 634, and several other cases cited at the bar.
IN RE-REASONABLENESS AND CONFISCATORY NATURE OF THE ADDITIONAL TAXES.
33. Impost of additional taxes under the Act per se does not restrict freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. Rather it facilitates trade, commerce and intercourse. These would of course be interdicted, if it is found that the additional taxes levied under the Act are confiscatory and unreasonable for in that event the levy loses its regulatory and compensatory character. Will is on Constitutional Law has answered the question in these words:
“May taxes be so high as to amount to confiscation? It Is believed that the proper answer to this question is that so long as taxes are levied for the public purpose when the State is in the need of revenue, there is no limitation to the amount of burden which may be imposed upon persons and objects on taxation so long as the so-called tax is really a tax even though the tax may have the effect of destroying the business but if what is called a tax is not really a tax, but confiscation in the guise of taxation, the Supreme Court might declare the law unconstitutional.”
34. The onus proband that additional tax on use of transport vehicles in any public place in Uttar Pradesh is excessive and tantamount to confiscation in the guise of taxation, is on the petitioners which they have miserably filed to discharge and on the facts brought on record, it cannot be said that the additional taxes levied under Sees. 5 and 6 on use of transport vehicles in any public place in Uttar Pradesh in addition to the one time tax payable under Sec. 4 of the Act is really a confiscation in the guise of taxation. The legislation in question does not suffer from the vice of colourable exercise of power. Nor is it hit by doctrine of ‘fraud on Constitution’. In G.K Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 375 : AIR 1975 SC 583, it has been maintained that ‘once a proper purpose is established, the State has considerable discretion in the method, measurement and amount of the tax’. Considering the question as to the tax being of a compensatory nature, the Apex Court held:
“17. Strictly speaking, a compensatory taxis based on the nature and the extent of the use made of the roads, as, for, example, a mileage or ton mileage charge or the like, and if the proceeds are devoted to the repair, upkeep, maintenance and depreciation of relevant roads and the collection of the exaction involves no substantial interference with the movement. The expression’ reasonable compensation is convenient but vague. The standard of reasonableness can only be in the severity with which it bears on traffic and such evidence of extravangance in its assessment as come from general considerations. What is essential for the purpose of securing freedom of movement by road is that no pecuniary burden should be placed upon it whcih goes beyond a proper recompense to the state for the actual use made ofi the physical facilities provided in the sliape of the road. The difficulties are very great in defining this conception. But the conception appears to be based on a real distinction between remuneration for the provision of a specific physical service of which particular use is made and a burden placed upon transportation in aid of the general expenditure of the state. It Is clear that the motor vehicles require, for their safe, efficient and economical use, roads of considerable width, hardness and durability, the maintenance of such roads will cost the government money. But, because the users of vehicles generally, and of public motor vehicles in particular, stand in a special and direct relation to such roads and may be said to derive a special and direct benefit from them, it seems not unreasonable that they should be called upon to make a special contribution to their maintenance over and above their general contribution as taxpayers of the State. If however, a charge is imposed, not for the purpose of obtaining a proper contribution to the maintenance and upkeep of the road, but for the purpose of adversely affecting trade or commerce, then it would be a restriction on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse, see Freightlines, and Construction Holding Ltd. v. State of New South Wales, (1968) AC 625.”
35. Figures given in the counter affidavit sworn by Shiv Puja Tripathi, Asstt. Transport Commissioner U.P Lucknow demonstrate that the tax burden under the present Act is less than that under the repealed Acts. The rates of fares of the Stage carriage and Contract Carriage as fixed by the State Government in exercise of power under Sec. 67(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 vide notification No. 3259/30-4-346-95 dated 11-2-1998 would show that the quantum of the tax has been reduced by average of 25% in comparison to the tax liability under the repealed Acts. Additional Tax on stage carriage for an authorised distance run of 4500 Kms in three has been reduced from Rs. 155/- to Rs. 140/- per seat in respect of K-Class routes with effect from 20-1-1999. This means that for 50 Kms of distance run in a day, the additional tax would come to Rs. 1.55 per seat whereas for 50 Kms of distance run in a day, the fare shall be Rs. 13.60 calculated at the prescribed rate of 27.2 paise per seat per Km. Under the old rate of passenger tax levied under the U.P Motor Gari (MalKar) Adhiniyam, 1962 the passenger tax at the rate of 16% of the fare would be 2.18; additional passenger tax 10 paise per seat and insurance/surcharge (at the rate of 5% of the passenger tax and additional passenger tax) Rs. 00.11 Paise. The total tax liability at the old rate would be Rs. 2.40 Paise as compared to Rs. 1.55 per seat admissible under the new Act. Mere fact that on every 4500 Kms or part thereof, there will be addition of Rs. 104/- in the tax liability for each fraction of 4500 Kms as stated in the writ petition No. 169 of 99 Pradunna Singh v. State of U.P is no ground to hold the tax to be confiscatory and unreasonably excessive, As a matter of fact even if it be assumed that the tax liability under new Act has increased that by itself would be no ground to hold that the legislation has lost its regulatory and compensatory character. The petitioners have failed to prove that the tax liability under the new Act is unreasonably high so as to be tantamount to confiscation in the garb of legislation. In such view of the matter, we find no substance in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the legislation in question is confiscatory in character.
36. IN REVIOLATION OF ART. 19(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND VACATION OF ART. 14
37. In S. Ahmad v. State of Mysore, ((1975) 2 SCC 131 : AIR 1975 SC 1443), it has been held that the individuals affected by the violation of guarantees under Art. 304 of the Constitution can also complain, at the same time, of infringement of their rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution provided a breach of the former involves violation of the latter also, as it would ordinarily do. Since we have taken the view that the impugned legislation does not result in breach of the freedom guaranteed under Art. 301 of the Constitution and further that the levy of additional taxes under the Act is not confiscatory or unreasonable, the question of violation of the individual citizens right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution does not arise. We are of the considered, view that the legislation in question has withstood the tests of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘public interest’. Therefore, the same cannot be held to be violative of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Submission made on behalf of the petitioners to the contrary does not commend itself to be countenanced.
IN REINVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION.
38. It has been submitted for the petitioners that Sec. 6 of the Act makes individious discrimination between private vehicles and those owned and controlled by U.P.S.R.T.C, between vehicles being operated on permits granted under Sec. 88(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and Tourist vehicles; between vehicles in respect of which permits have been granted outside the State and those in respect of which, the permits have been granted in the State and between stage Carriages and contract carriages. The discrimination is also alleged in respect of grant of premission in that, it has been submitted, the stage carriages are granted permission for the period they are plied outside the State whereas similar permission in respect of other vehicles has not been allowed under the Act. Zonal discrimination has also been pleaded as based on no rationale.
39. In order to appreciate the question in re-violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, we may have a glance over the tax structure as indicated in the relevant schedules. The additional taxes are specified in Schedules III, VI, V and VI. The third schedule provides the rates of additional tax on goods carriages. The rate of additional tax on goods carriages operating on hill routes is Rs. 210,00 per metric ton of the grogs vehicle weight’ of the vehicle or part thereof and additional tax on goods vehicles operating on plain routes is Rs. 85.00 per metric ton of the gross vehicle weight’ of the vehicle or part thereof if the area of operation is one region and in case the area of operation is more than one region, the additional tax would be payable at the rate of Rs. 110,00 per metric ton of the ‘gross vehicle weight’ of the vehicle or part thereof. The words “gross vehicle weight”were substituted fbr the words Registered laden weight” by U.P Act No. 5 of 1999, which has been enforced w.e.f Nov. 9, 1998. The rates of.additional tax, payable in respect of ‘public service vehicles’ viz. Stage caitiages and contract carriages are prescribed in the Fourth Schedule, which contains Articles, I to V. Art. is in respect of vehicles, other than Omni Bus when used as contract carriage, operating in plain excluding Meerut and Jhansi regions. Art. II provides the rates bf additional tax payable in respect of vehicles other than Omni bus when used as contract carriage, operating in hills. Articles III and IV prescribed rates of additional tax payable in respect of vehicles, other than Omni bus when operating (sic) as contract carriages, in Meerut and Jhansi regions respectively. Art. V is in respect of contract carriages. Clause (a) in each of the Articles I to IV provides the rate of additional tax on each seat for specified distance run in a quarter provided that a fixed amount depending on seating capacity is payable per quarter in respect of stage carriages operating within the limits of a corporation or municipality. The Fifth Schedule provides a formula for working out the additional tax payable by U.P State Road Transport Undertaking. The formula is GX 21/121 where “G” stands for gross receipts of the undertaking on account of passenger traffic during any calender month. The sixth Schedule provides the rates of additional tax payable under Sec. 10 of the Act by goods carriages and public service vehicles plying under permits granted by authorities having jurisdiction outside Uttar Pradesh for an inter-state route lying in Uttar Pradesh.
40. It is no longer resintegra that taxing laws are subject to the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. However, “having regard to the wide variety of diverse economic criteria that go into the formation of a fiscal policy, legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons, Subject ‘matter, events, etc. for taxation”. Legislature does not, as an old saying goes, have to tax everything in order to be abel to tax something. If there is equality and unanimity within each group the law would not be discriminatory Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Association of India v. Union’ of India, (1989) 3 SCC 634 : AIR 1990 SC 1637. The samp view had been echoed in Jaipur Hosiery Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1970) 2 SCC 26 : AIR 1971 SC 1330 and Hiralal Ratan Lal v. State of U.P, (1973) 1 SCC 216 : (AIR 1973 SC 1034) and State of hujarat v. Sri Ambika Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656 : (AIR 1974 SC 1300). In State of Gujarat (supra), the Supreme Court has cautioned for a judicial restraint in such matters in these words; “In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self restraint if not Judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulations, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewicdering conflict of the experts, and the number of times, the Judges have been overruled by events-self limitation can be seen to be the parth of Judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability.” The principles that reasonable classification is one, which includes all whom are similarly situated and none who are not and that the differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the law are by now well settled principles of law. “If there is equality and unanimity within each group, the law will not be condemned as discrimination though due to some fortuitous circumstances arising out of a peculiar situtation, some included in a class get an advantage over others, so long as they are not singled out for special treatment” Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agriculture I.T Officer, AIR 1963 SC 591. Taxation law is not an exception to these principles of equality enshrined in Art. 14 vide Purshottara Govind Ji V.B.M Desai. 1955 2 SCR 887 : AIR 1956 SC 20; and KT Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala, 1961 3 SCR 77 : AIR 1961 SC 552.” But in the application of the principles, the courts in view of inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse element, permit a larger discretion to the legislature in the matter of classification so long it adheres to the fundamental principles underlying the said doctrine. The power of legislature to classify is of “wide range and complexity” so that it can adjust its system of taxation in the proper and reasonable ways” Khandige Sham Bhat (supra).
41. The plea that Sec. 6 of the Act read with the Fourth Schedule, wears the vice of invidious discrimination may now be traversed upon in the backdrop of the principles aforestated. The passenger tax under the repealed Act was levied on every passenger carried by stage carriages or contract carriages, Initially, the rate of passenger tax was pegged iat 5% of the fare under U.P Motor Gari (Yatri-Kar) Adhiniyam. 1965 but with effect from Dec. 1, 1962, it was raised to 10% and subsequently with effect from Jan 1, 1966, it rose up to 15%. Upper limit fixed at 15% by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the said Act, was subsequently enhanced to 20% and consequently, the passenger tax was also increased to 16% of the fare with effect from May 1, 1976 and besides, from Nov, 15, 1971 an additional tax on passengers at the rate of 10% was also levied on every passenger carried by stage carriage, plying beyond the limits of city or municipality, provided that the ordinary fare for such journey was not less than 1%. A surcharge was also levied for insurance of passengers and every passenger for each journey at the rate of 5% as aggregate of tax and additional tax. The passenger tax was subject to compounding and the system of compensation was predicated upon the formula F.T.R (F. = fare for total number of seats in bus for a single one-way trip in the route, T = number of oneway trips, R = equal to rate of tax with the proviso that the actual compensation amount would not be leiss than 75% of the maximum amount of tax estimated on the basis of the above formula). The U.P Taxation Enquiry Committee Report 1980 submitted by R.J Chelaiya, would evince that the system aforestated led to leakage of passenger tax revenue from private operators and also amounted to certain harassment because of the regulatory provision presecribed the permit. As regards the U.P.S.R.T.C, it was summed up that the corporation had to maintain a large fleet of vehicles and it had to replace the vehicles suffering from break-down or to shift vehicles from one route to another route for maintaining the frequency of service on the Nationalised routes. Under the repealed Act, the lump sum amount payable by S.R.T.C as passenger tax was calculated at 4/29 of its earning from passenger fair and passenger tax. The fraction 4/29 of the fare inclusive of passenger tax represented exactly 16% of the fare component. The Review committee headed by Dr. T.S Papole in its report submitted in the year 1985 suggested that the additional motor vehicles tax payable by S.R.T.C should be fixed at 21/121 of the gross earning of the undertaking on account of passenger traffic during any calender month and that is how, the formula Gx 21/121 has been evolved to be imputed additional tax payable by the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Undertaking under Sec. 6 of the Act. The private operators of stage carriages used to manipulate their way bills and thereby evade the tax liability under the 1962 Act. So far as vehicles owned and controlled by the U.P.S.R.T.C are concerned, present formula is more or less similar to the formula evolved in Rule 5-B of the Motor Gari (Yatri-Kar) Niyamwali 1962 which envisaged the lump sum amount payable by the corporation as passenger tax calculated at 4/29 of its earning from passenger fares and passenger tax. The transport vehicles owned and controlled by the undertaking forms a class in itself. In the totality of the circumstances, we veer round to the view that the legislation in question does not suffer from the taint of any hostile discrimination merely because a different formula has been brought to bear for computing the additional tax payable by the Vehicle owned and controlled by the U.P.S.R.T.C The arrangement that the private vehicles being used by the corporation under a contract should not have been meted out the same treatment too does not appeal to us.
42. We also do not find any substance in the submission that there was no justification for giving different treatment to the vehicles being operated on permits granted under Sec. 88(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 and the Tourist vehicles nor do we find any justification to hold that the classification between vehicle in respect of which permits have been granted outside the state and those in respect of which the permits have been granted in the State wears the taint of any invidious discrimination. The discrimination between stage carriages and contract carriages for the purpose of computation of tax liability too does not infact Art. 14 of the Constitution. A perusal of Fourth Schedule would be eloquent of the fact that the additional tax payable on stage carriages, covered by temporary permits issued for the purpose of conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings and for marriage parties, tourist parties or such other reserved part is a fixed amount (Rs. 135/- with seating capacity of not more than 42 excluding Driver and conductor and Rs. 226/- with seating capacity of more 42 per-. sons exclusive of Driver and conductor) in addition to the tax payable under clause (a) of Articles I, II, III and IV, as the case may be. Contract carriages being plied on temporary permits cannot be treated in party with stage carriages being operated on permanent permits. The grant of remission to stage carriages for a period they are plied outside the State too does not infringe upon equality clause of Constitution and is rather based on reasonable nexus with the user of the vehicle in any public place in Uttar Pradesh. Fixation of different rates of additional tax for different zones cannot be dressed up as arbitrary. This has in fact been done after reckoning into consideration the condition of roads of respective zones of Divisions. In such view of the matter we find no substance in the submission that the Act suffers from inviduous discrimination and/or is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
43. The only question that now remains for consideration is in the validity of the circular dates Jan 25, 1999 issued by the Transport Commissioner, U.P providing thereby that the additional tax payable in respect of vehicles being operated without, permits would be computed at the highest rate specified in the Fourth Schedule and further provides that in case, a vehicle is operated without payment of additional tax and penalty under Sec. 22 of the Act and the operator moves an application for payment of additional tax in respect of such vehicle, the computation of additional tax shall be at the highest rate specified in the Fpurth Schedule. The circular purports to have been issued on the strength of Explanation (8) to Fourth Schedule, which provides that, “where any motor vehicle is taxable under more than one of the Articles of this Schedule, the additional tax payable shall be at the highest appropriate rate”. The challenge to the circular is grounded on the fact that the Fourth Schedule does not provide the rate at which additional tax may be levied in respect of vehicles being plied without permit. In our opinion, the circular dated Jan 25, 1999 is without jurisdiction. The liability to pay additional tax under Sec. 6 is in respect of ‘public service vehicles’ hot exempted wholly or partially under the Act. Public Service Vehicle as the term is defined in Sec. 2(35) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, “means any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a maxi-cab, a motor-cab, contract carriage and stage carriage.” The liability to pay additional tax under Sec. 6 is in respect of a ‘public service vehicle’, i.e a motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for carriage of passenger for hire or reward irrespective of whether a permit has been obtained or not in respect of such vehicle for carriage of passengers for hire or reward. Fourth Schedule provides rate of additional tax in respect of stage carriages including stage carriages covered by temporary permits and contract carriages as well as vehicles covered by permit under sub-sec. (9) of Sec. 88 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 read with Motor Vehicles (All India Permit for tourtist Transport Operators) Rules, 1993, issued by the authority having seisin outside the State of Uttar Pradesh but it does not provide the yard-stick and measure of taxation of motor vehicles being operateed without permits. Fixation of rate or measure of tax being an essential legislative function could not be performed by the Transport Commissioner. The operators of such vehicles, in our opinion, may be subjected to such penal liabilities as may be permissible in law for violating Sec. 16 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 but they cannot be held liable to pay additional tax at the highest rate specified in Fourth Schedule in the absence of any specific stipulation or provision in the statute in that respect. The impugned circular, therefore, cannot be sustained being ultra vires and sans any authority of law.
44. Before parting with the case, we fell called to deal with yet another submission made on behalf of the petitioners that Sec. 12 of the Act in so far as it provides for refund of an amount equal to one-third of the quarterly tax payable in respect of vehicles which have been used for a continuous period of one month or more, since the tax was last paid, is arbitrary. To rephrase it, the submission is that the tax should be refundable in respect of the total period duririg which the vehicle has not been used. We find no substance in the submission made by the learned counsel. Clause (iv)(a) of sub-sec. (i) of Sec. 9 provides that additional tax shall be payable in advance on or before 15th day of calender month at the rate of one-third of the rates specified in the Fourth Schedule and the additional tax payable under Sec. 6 in respect of vehicles covered by temporary permits issued for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gathering or to carry marriage party, tourist party or such other reserved parties, shall be paid at the time of issuance of such temporary permits. In such view of the matter, the provisions for refund of an amount equal to one-third of the rate in respect of vehicles which have been used for a continous period of one month or more, since the tax was last paid cannot be anathematised as arbitrary. In the result, the challange to the validity of the Act fails and the writ petitions in that respect are dismissed. Interim orders are discharged. The impugned circular dated 25-1-1999 issued by the Transport Commissioner is, however quashed being ultra vires the statute and sans jurisdiction. The parties shall bear their respective costs.
45. Petition dismissed.
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