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Sreekant Bangur v. State Of West Bengal & Anr. Opposite Parties.

Calcutta High Court
Jun 12, 2000
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Judgment delivered by Malay Kumar Basu, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter is a Revisional Application filed under section 482 Cr.P.C. by Sreekant Bangur (the applicant), who is one of the accused in Criminal Case T.R. No. 30/97 (arising out of C 446/97) pending before the Court of the 8th Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. The underlying complaint was lodged on 14.2.97 by Kunal Kumar Chatterjee on behalf of Peerless Abasan Finance Ltd. The complaint alleged that the accused company (M/s. Bangur Foundation Ltd.) received an intercorporate deposit of Rs. 100 lakh on 25.3.96 and to repay that liability issued five cheques (four for Rs. 25 lakhs each and a fifth for about Rs. 5 lakhs). Those cheques were presented on 19.12.96 and were returned dishonoured with the remark "Insufficient Funds". A statutory notice dated 30.12.96 demanding payment was allegedly ignored, and the complaint was filed under sections 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The applicant's case in the revisional application is that he was not a director of the accused company at the material time and had no connection with the company's business; therefore, the prosecution as to him is without basis, illegal and mala fide and should be quashed. The learned Magistrate, after taking sworn statements of the complainant and perusing documents, issued process (summons) against the accused, finding a prima facie case under sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings against the applicant when the Magistrate has already issued process under section 204 Cr.P.C. after being satisfied of a prima facie case.
  2. Whether the allegation that the applicant was a Director (and therefore liable under section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act) — an allegation disputed by the applicant — can be treated as absurd or inherently improbable so as to justify quashment at this stage.
  3. Whether the applicant's claim of non-directorship is a matter to be decided at the stage of a quashing petition before the High Court, or whether it is a factual question to be determined by the trial Court during trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Applicant's) Arguments

  • The applicant (through Mr. Bagchi) contended that he was not a Director of M/s. Bangur Foundation Ltd. at the relevant time and therefore cannot be prosecuted under section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • He asserted that the allegations in the complaint are "patently absurd and inherently improbable" and thus justify quashment under the High Court's powers in exceptional cases.
  • He relied on several precedents (cited in the judgment) which, he submitted, support quashment where complaints do not make out a case at the threshold or where the averments are incredible.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Learned counsel for O.P. No. 2 (Mr. Basu) maintained that the complaint contains specific allegations disclosing the ingredients of offences under sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and that the Magistrate, after taking sworn statements and perusing documents, was satisfied that a prima facie case existed and therefore issued summons.
  • The respondent relied on settled law that at the initial stage the High Court should not reappraise evidence or test the truth of allegations, but must accept the complaint's allegations at face value to see if they constitute cognizable offences.
  • The respondent disputed that mere denial of directorship by the accused could render the complaint inherently improbable so as to warrant quashment without trial or without the accused first appearing and raising the issue before the trial Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dhana Lakshmi v. Prasanna Kumar (1990 Cr LJ 320; 1990 Supp SCC 686; AIR 1990 SC 494) Where specific allegations in a complaint disclose ingredients of an offence and the Magistrate has issued process under section 204 Cr.P.C., the High Court should not quash proceedings at the initial stage; allegations are to be taken at face value. The court applied this principle to hold that it should not quash the complaint where the Magistrate, on sworn statements and documents, found sufficient ground to proceed.
(1986) 3 SCC 67 : AIR 1986 SC 833 At the initial stage, taking all allegations in the complaint as true, the limited question is whether on those allegations a cognizable offence is disclosed; truth of allegations to be tested at trial. The court relied on this as the limit of the High Court's power under section 482 — it cannot reappraise truth of allegations where prima facie ingredients exist.
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998 Cr LJ 1 (SC) : 1997 (4) All India Criminal Law Reporter 541 (SC)) If a complaint makes out no case at all against the accused, subjecting the accused to trial is unnecessary; High Court may quash even at initial stage. The court considered this decision but distinguished it on facts, holding it inapplicable because here the complaint did disclose the ingredients of offences and initial sworn statements corroborated the complaint.
Ashok Chaturvedi v. S.H. Chanchani (JT (1998) 5 SC 452) Where allegations (even taken at face value) do not make out the ingredients of the offence, the complaint may be quashed. The court found this precedent inapplicable because, unlike that case, the present complaint prima facie disclosed offences under sections 138/141 N.I. Act.
Madhab Rao Scindia (1998 SCC (Cri) 234) High Court should consider any special features and may quash prosecution where chances of conviction are bleak and prosecution would serve no useful purpose. The court held the ruling not applicable because any such exercise must be based on the allegations in the complaint and not on pleas raised before the High Court without appearance before the trial Court.
Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration (JT (1996) 7 SC 6 : 1996 (3) All India Criminal Law Reporter 286 (SC)) Courts under section 226 or magistrates under section 239 may consider materials produced at the stage contemplated if such material fatally affects the case's substantiality. The court observed this precedent was inapplicable because the accused had not appeared before the trial Court and produced such materials at the appropriate stage.
State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604) — Head Note-E Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and in rare cases; if allegations are so absurd or inherently improbable that no prudent person could find sufficient ground for proceeding, the prosecution may be quashed. The court applied the Bhajanlal criteria and found they were not met: the complaint's allegations were neither absurd nor inherently improbable; therefore quashment was not justified.
H.S. Jalan v. Food Inspector Chernkob (1997 SCC (Cri) 968) — Prevention of Food Adulteration Act case Plea that company nominated another person under statutory provision to be liable is a question of fact for trial and not for quashment at threshold. The court used this analogy to reinforce that factual defenses (such as non-directorship or nomination of another person) are matters for trial, not for immediate quashment under section 482.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. P.D. Jhunjhunwala (1983 1 SCC 9 : AIR 1983 SC 158) For quashing, only the allegations in the complaint are to be seen at the initial stage; evidence and its weight are matters for trial. The court found this decision closely analogous and supportive of the position that the complaint's allegations must be taken at face value and tested at trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by restating the established principle — consistently laid down by the Supreme Court — that when a complaint contains specific allegations disclosing the ingredients of an offence and the Magistrate has issued process under section 204 Cr.P.C., the High Court should not ordinarily quash proceedings at the threshold. The proper inquiry at this stage is limited to whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclose the ingredients of a cognizable offence; the truth or otherwise of those allegations is to be investigated during the trial.

Applying these principles, the court observed that the complaint alleged dishonour of cheques due to "Insufficient Funds," which, if accepted on their face, constitute the ingredients of an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with section 141 (for company directors). The Magistrate had before him the sworn statements of the complainant and documents, and on that basis was satisfied that a prima facie case existed and issued summons.

The court considered the applicant's central contention — that he was not a Director at the relevant time and therefore could not be prosecuted under section 141 — but found that this contention raised a factual issue which must be decided at trial. The court distinguished the authorities relied upon by the applicant where complaints were quashed because the allegations did not, even on their face, disclose an offence or were inherently improbable. Here, the court held, the complaint did allege the essential facts (dishonour of cheques, demand notice, failure to pay) and the allegation of directorship was a factual matter subject to proof or disproof in the trial Court.

The court emphasized that the attributes "absurdity" and "inherent improbability" must characterise the complaint's allegations themselves; they cannot be inferred merely from defense pleas advanced before the High Court without first raising them before the Magistrate or producing supporting evidence at the appropriate stage. Because the Magistrate had followed the procedure under section 200 Cr.P.C. and taken sworn statements, and because there was no shown illegality in issuing process, the High Court ought not to usurp the trial Court's function by quashing the proceedings at this stage.

Consequently, the court concluded that none of the exceptional circumstances required for exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under section 482 were present in this case.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Revisional Application under section 482 Cr.P.C. is DISMISSED. (The judgment concludes: "Application dismissed.")

Immediate Consequences for the Parties

  • The applicant (Sreekant Bangur) is directed to appear before the trial Court without further delay.
  • The Trial Magistrate is directed to proceed with the case in accordance with law.

Broader Legal Implications

The court applied established Supreme Court jurisprudence emphasizing that section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and that factual disputes (such as whether an accused was a director at the material time) must generally be resolved at trial rather than by quashment at the High Court stage. The opinion does not purport to lay down any new precedent; it applies and distinguishes existing authorities to the facts before it.

This summary is strictly confined to the facts, arguments, authorities and reasoning contained in the provided judgment text. No extraneous facts, interpretations or inferences beyond the opinion have been introduced.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Malay Kumar Basu, J.:— This is a Revisional Application under section 482, Cr. P.C filed by Sreekant Bangur (hereinafter refered to as the applicant) who is one of the accused persons in the Criminal Case pending before the Court of the 8th Matropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta T.R No. 30/97 arising out of C 446/97 under section 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (as amended upto date) for an order quashing the said proceeding and all orders passed therein so far as it relates to this applicant.

2. The Case of the applicant is that the O.P No. 2, Kunal Kumar Chatterjee on behalf of the Peerless Abasan Finance Ltd. lodged a complaint dated 14.2.97 before the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, against the applicant along with others levelling therein allegations which according to the applicant are petently absurd and inherently improbable. In that complaint the complaint (O.P No. 2 of this revisional application) has alleged that the applicant along with three others (arraigned as accused Nos. 2 to 5 in that Petition of complaint) are Directors of the accused company, viz. M/s. Bangur Foundation Ltd. and are in Charge of and responsible to the said company for the conduct of its day-to-day business and that as per the request of the said company intercorporate deposite of Rs. 100 lakh was made by the Peerless Co. to them on 25.3.96 with interst accrued thereon for a period of 97 days. The further allegation in that complaint is that to liquidate the said liability the said company issued four cheques for 25 lakhs each and fifth cheque for Rs. 5 lakhs and odd for repayment of the entire amount of intercorporate loan with the amount of interest thereon. The cheques being drawn on the Bank of Rajasthan Ltd., Chowringee Branch were presented through the Banker of the Peerless Co., the Vaisya Bank, on 19.12.96, but they were returned with the remark, “Insufficient Funds”. The Peerless Company then issued notice dated 30.12.96 demanding the total sum covered by the said dishonoured cheques, but the accused company made no payment in spite of having received that notice and then this complaint was filed against the accused persons including the applicant on the plea that he is one of the Directors of the accused company. But according to the applicant this averment in the complaint is totally wrong, since this applicant was not a Director at the material point of time, nor was he in any way connected with the business of the company and this fact would be shown by the public documents or records lying with the Registrar of Companies. Therefore, according to the revisional application, the impugned prosecution as against him as without any basis, illegal and mala fide and hence, liable to be quashed. The principles governing the quashing of a criminal proceeding based upon complaint before a Court at an initial stage are now well-established. The apex Court in the case of Dhana Lakshmi v. Prasanna Kumar reported in 1990 Cr LJ 320 : (1990 Supp SCC 686 : AIR 1990 SC 494) has held that where there are specific allegations in the complaint disclosing ingredients of any offence, High Court should not quash proceedings for the purpose of putting an end to a criminal proceeding at the initial stage when the Magistrate has issued process under section 204, Cr. P.C holding that there has been sufficient ground for proceeding. All that is to be looked into is whether the allegations levelled in the petition of complaint taken at their face value constitute the ingredients of any offence of which cognizance has been taken. In the aforementioned decision, it has been further held that the High Court was clearly in error in analysing the case of the complainant in the light of all the probabilities and assessing the materials before it and concluding that the complaint could not be proceeded with and since ther were specific allegations in the complaint disclosing the ingredients of the offence in question being supported by the sworn statement of the complaint, it sufficed for the purpose of taking cognizance or issuing process against the accused persons and the allegations were to be substantiated by the complainant at a later stage.

3. This view has been confirmed and followed in a host of subsequent decisions, Mr. Basu, learned Counsel for the O.P No. 2 has referred to another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1986) 3 SCC 67 : AIR 1986 SC 833 wherein it has been held by its Division Bench that taking all the allegations in the complaint to be true, without adding or substracting anything, at this stage, it cannot be said that no prima facie case for trial had been made out and the question at this stage was not whether there was any truth in the allegations made but the question is whether on the basis of the allegations a cognizable offence could be said to have been committed and the truth or otherwise of the allegations is to be investigated at the time of trial. According to their Lordships, this is the limit of the power to be exercised under section 482 of file Code of Criminal Procedure.

4. In the present case, it is very clear, that the allegations made in the complaint cited above, viz., dishonour of cheque due to insufficiency of fund, constitute the ingredients of an offence under Section 138 of the N.I Act. The learned Magistrate in view of the sworn statements of the complainant and some documents produced by him having been satisfied as to the making out of a prima facie case in support of the allegations under sections 138 and 141 of the N.I Act issued summons upon the accused persons Mr. Bagchi, learned Advocate for the revisional applicant accused also does not appear to have seriously disputed this position. But, the entire focus of his argument is on the point that under section 141 of the Act only a Director of the company of the accused company can be liable for prosecution and his client was not a Director at the material time and therefore, on the score alone the proceeding as against this applicant is liable to be quashed.

5. In support of his contention, he has referred to a number of reported judgments. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, reported in 1998 Cr LJ 1 (SC) : [1997 (4) All India Criminal Law Reporter 541 (SC)] cited by him it has been held by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the apex Court that when the complaint does not make out any case against the accused, there is no necessity that he must undergo the agony of the criminal trial simply because it is at the initial stage and in such circumstances the order of the High Court refusing to quash the complaint on the ground that there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and that alternative remedy was available under the Code would not be proper. But, the facts and circumstances of out instant case are far from identical. In the case under reference what happened, the complaint being under section 7/16 of the P.F.A Act did not show what role the appellants played in the manufacture of the beverage which was said to be adulterated nor there was any averment as to how the complainant could say so and also if the appellants manufactured the alleged bottle or its contents and the preliminary evidence on which the complainant relied upon also did not show these facts and thus the complaint and the preliminary evidence recorded in that case made out no case at all against the accused appellant and hence the abovementioned verdict was passed. But here, as we have seen, the allegations made in the complaint vide para-2 clearly implicate the accused-applicant in his capacity as a Director of the company apart from the fact that the complaint vide Para-5 contains specific allegation to the effect that 5 cheques sent by the accused company towards repayment of the loan was reutrned unpaid being dishonoured by the Bank of the accused with the remarks. “Insufficient funds” thereby constituting the ingredients of the offence under section 138 of the N.I Act read with section 141 thereof. The copy of the order of the learned Magistrate shows that he was satisfied on a perusal of the sworn statements of the complainant as well as the documents filed by him that a prima facie case under section 138/141 N.I Act had been made out against all the accused and accordingly, he issued summons upon them. It is not a case of the applicant that the initial deposition of the complainant was not in corroboration of those allegations of the complaint. Therefore, the abovementioned ruling of the Supreme Court will not be applicable to this Case.

6. Then, the decision relied upon Mr. Bagchi, viz., JT (1998) 5 SC 452 : [1998 (4) All India Criminal Law Reporter 316 (SC)] (Ashok Chaturvedi v. S.H Chanchani) also has no application. Here the allegations in the complaint even being taken on their face value did not make out the ingredients of the offences of which cognizance had been taken by the Magistrate and that is why the complaint was found liable to be quahsed. But, obviously that is not the situation in the case at hand.

7. The case of Madhab Rao Scindia, 1998 SCC (Cri) 234 has also been cited where the apex Court has given the verdict, viz., that for the purpose of quashing a complaint the High Court should consider the existence of any special feature in any particular ??? and that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where chances ???atc conviction are bleak and it seems no useful propose is likely to be served ???lowing a criminal prosecution to continue the Court may quash the proceeding.

8. But this Ruling will not be applicable here for the obvious reason that such an exercise was to be made on the basis of the allegations of the complaint and not in view of any plea taken by the defence before the High Court without entering his appearance before the Court of the Magistrate.

9. Another decision referred to by Mr. Bagchi in JT (1996) 7 SC 6 : [1996 (3) All India Criminal Law Reporter 286 (SC)] (Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration). Here the apex Court ordered quashment of the criminal proceeding in question holding that the accusations were of incredulous nature and there was no sufficient ground for trial and further held that the Sessions Judge in view of section 226, or the Magistrate under section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be within their powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated under section 226 or 239, as the case may be and if the accused succeeds in producing any reliable material at that stage which might fatally effect even the very substantiality of the case, it is unjust to suggest that no such material shall be looked into by the Court at that stage.

10. It is needless to point out that while coming to such a finding what played in their Lordships' minds was the question of justifiability of the accused filing some vital document substantially affecting the fate of the case at the sage of framing of charge and nor earlier in view of the mandatory provision of the law requiring the Court to give the accused an opportunity of being heard. But that finding has nothing to do with a situation like the present one where the accused without even entering his appearance before the trial Court in response to the summons by it has straightway come to the High Court with a prayer to quash the proceeding. It is not a case where it can be said that the accused has not been given the right of audience by the trial Court or that the trial Court has not considered his submission at the stage of framing of charge. Obviously; the above decision of the apex Court is not meant to be attracted here, the circumstances being altogether different.

11. The next case law which Mr. Bagchi seeks to rely on is another decision of the apex Court reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604 : [1991 (1) All India Criminal Law Reporter 68 (SC)] (State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal) at Head Note-E where the principles for exercise of powers by the High Court for quashing any criminal proceeding under section 482 Cr. P.C have been discussed Here Their Lordships started with the sermon that such a power should be exercisd sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. Mr. Bagchi draws my attention particularly to the paragraph (5) of Head Note-E wherein it is observed by the Hon'ble Division Bench that if the allegations made in the complaint are so absurd and inherently inprobable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, then the criminal prosecution in question will be liable to be quashed. But, I fail to understand how this clause will be applicable to the facts of the present case. Here, as it has been pointed out above, no part of the allegations constituting the ingredients of the offence under section 138, N.I Act suffers from any improbability or absurdity. All that is intended to be brought home by the Revisional Applicant is that he was not a Director at the material time when the alleged occurrence took place and hence he cannot be proceeded against in view of the provisions of section 141 of the said Act. Mr. Bagchi's contention that the allegation of the complainant that the applicant was a Director at the relevant time should be taken as an absurd or inherently improbable proposition cannot be accepted. The question whether he was a Director of the accused company at that time is a factual question and must be determined by the Court at the time of trial by taking evidence and without appearing before the trial Court at all and without raising such an issue before it at the appropriate stage he cannot expect a decision in his favour from this High Court straightway ordering quashment of the proceeding, particularly when the Magistrate before issue of process against the accused derived prima facie his satisfaction about the alleged directorship of the applicant-accused from the sworn statements of the complainant and certain documents filed. The Magistrate had nothing more at that stage to do. Under the provisions of section 200, Cr. P.C the procedure to be adopted when a complaint is lodged is spelt out. It is incumbent upon the Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint to examine upon oath the complainant and his witness present, if any, to satisfy himself as to the making out of any prima facie case to enable him to issue process. Here, there has been no lacuna on the part of the Magistrate in that respect. Had it been a case where the learned Magistrate had before him primia facie reason to distrust the averments in the complaint or the sworn statements of the complainant, then, of course, the order issuing process could be put into question. By any means, the allegations in the complaint, as they stand, cannot be said to be absurd or inherently improbable in any way. The attributes, ‘absurdity’, ‘inherent, improbability’ etc. are to characterise the allegations as they have been averred in the complaint and they are not to be inferred from the allegations that may be levelled by the defence in response. The case of the applicant that he was not a Director at the relevant period and, therefore, not liable to any such prosecution on that score along is to be ajudged from the evidence to be adduced before the trial Court. When that Court issued the process after observing all the prescribed modes or procedure and there has been no illegality anywhere the accused cannot supersede or circumvent the procedural law and get the proceeding quashed without entering his appearance before the Court of first instance. He could jave invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for quashment of the entire proceeding only if the allegations in the complaint did not prima facie constitute or disclose the offence alleged or the allegations in the complaint were so marked with absurdity or inherent improbability that there could not be any justification for proceeding with such a complaint and allow the process of the Court to be issued. As Their Lordships of the apex Court in (1986) 3 SCC 67 : AIR 1986 SC 833 (discussed above) have held, the question at this stage is not whether ther was any truth in the allegations made, but the questions is whether on the basis of the allegations a cognizable offence or offences had been alleged to have been committed. The facts subsequently found out to prove the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint would be investigated at the time of trial. In the case at hand the plea taken by the accused petitioner that he was not a Director of the company at the relevant time and hence was not at all liable is to be adjudicated upon by the trial Court at the appropriate stage. In a similar situation in another case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (H.S Jalan v. Food Inspector Chernkob) reported in 1997 SCC (Cri) 968 (already discussed) a Division Bench of the apex Court held that the plea of the accused-appellant that his company had nominated a person under section 17(2) of the Act who would only be liable for any breach of the provisions of the Act and not this accused was a question of fact which could be gone into and decided at the stage of trial and hence the petition under section 482, Cr. P.C for quashing the prosecution had no merit at all.

12. Mr Bose has referred to another Division Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. P.D Jhunjhunwala, reported in (1983) 1 SCC 9 : AIR 1983 SC 158. The facts of this case are almost identical with our instant case. Here the criminal prosecution against the accused appellant was under sections 16, 17 & 20 of the P.F.A Act. In the complaint complete details of the note the Directors and the extent of their liability were given but the Delhi High Court was of the view that the description was vague and the complaint did not disclose any offence against the respondent Nos. 1 to 11 and hence it quashed this proceeding. The Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside that finding holding that for the purpose of quashing any proceeding only the allegations set forth in the complaint were to be seen and nothing further and what would be the evidence of the respondents was not a matter to be considered at this initial stage and that would have to be proved during the trial.

13. This must be so. Otherwise in every criminal prosecution the whole scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure Would have been given a total burial and in almost all the cases the accused would have approached the High Court straightway under its extra ordinary jurisdiction under section 482 with a prayer for quashing of the proceeding raising one plea or other thereby reducing it into a forum of enquiry and appreciation of evidence which are exclusive tasks of the trial Court. In view of the entire discussion made above, I am to hold that this is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretion under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and quash the proceedings against the accused-appellant and therefore the application under section 482 is dismissed. He shall now appear before the trial Court without any further delay and the learned Trial Magistrate shall proceed with the case in accordance with the law.

14. Application dismissed.