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Dharm Raj Tiwari v. Badri Prasad Tiwari .
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges the judgment and decree dated 13th July 1999 by the Learned Additional District and Session Judge, Howrah, which declined the grant of letters of administration to the plaintiff, Dharam Raj Tiwari. The plaintiff, also the executor named in the Will, filed for letters of administration on the basis of a certified copy of the original Will, alleging the original was lost. Subsequently, the original Will was produced but was not proved or exhibited. The defendant disputed the validity of the Will, particularly contesting the execution and testamentary capacity of the testatrix, who was 117 years old at the time of execution and allegedly resided in Benaras. The plaintiff/appellant sought to prove the Will by examining attesting witnesses, while the defendant/respondent challenged the proof and raised suspicions about the Will's execution and the plaintiff’s procedural approach.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff/appellant, as executor, could maintain a proceeding for letters of administration instead of applying for probate.
- Whether the Will was duly executed and attested in compliance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and proved in accordance with Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
- Whether the plaintiff/appellant discharged the onus of proving the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the genuineness of the Will, including the Left Thumb Impression (LTI).
- The effect of registration of the Will on dispelling suspicion surrounding its execution.
- The legal distinction and applicability of probate versus letters of administration in the context of an executor applying for letters of administration.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The plaintiff/appellant had duly proved the execution of the registered Will by examining available attesting witnesses.
- There was no allegation that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity.
- The appellant contended that an executor is not precluded from applying for letters of administration and that there is no material distinction between probate and letters of administration proceedings.
- Registration of the Will dispels suspicion surrounding its execution.
- Relied on various precedents to support the validity of the Will and the sufficiency of the evidence adduced.
Respondent's Arguments
- The plaintiff/appellant failed to establish valid execution of the Will, especially proof of the Left Thumb Impression (LTI) of the testatrix.
- The testamentary capacity of the testatrix was disputed given her advanced age and circumstances.
- The procedure adopted by the executor to seek letters of administration instead of probate raised suspicious circumstances.
- Probate and letters of administration are distinct and the legislature does not permit an executor to obtain letters of administration without renouncing executorship.
- Registration of the Will does not automatically dispel suspicion if the manner of registration was perfunctory or the Will was not properly proved.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Charan Singh v. Balwant Singh, AIR 1975 (P & H) 179 | Age alone (80 years) not sufficient to disprove testamentary capacity. | Distinguished on facts; age of testatrix (117 years) raised suspicion but age alone was not determinative. |
| Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529 | Proof of Will requires attestation; onus on propounder to remove suspicious circumstances. | Applied to emphasize the necessity of removing suspicion before Will acceptance. |
| Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage, 2002 (1) SC 85 | Requirement of proof under Sections 63 Indian Succession Act and 68 Evidence Act; suspicion requires closer scrutiny. | Referred to underscore the burden on propounder and the need for convincing proof. |
| S. Sundaresa Pai v. Sumangala T. Pai (Mrs.), (2002) 1 SCC 630 | Disproportionate distribution or disinheritance not necessarily suspicious. | Held inapplicable as refusal was not based on disinheritance but on failure to prove execution. |
| Brij Nath Chaudhury v. Dilip Kumar, (2001) 9 SCC 316 | Registration of Will does not ipso facto dispel suspicion if execution is disputed. | Applied to reject appellant’s contention that registration alone proves Will’s validity. |
| Rani Purnima Debi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb, AIR 1962 SC 567 | Registration may prove genuineness but is insufficient if registration was perfunctory or evidence lacking. | Used to highlight insufficiency of registration without proper proof of execution. |
| Surendra Pal v. Dr. (Mrs.) Saraswati Arora, (1974) 2 SCC 600 | Elements to establish valid Will: sound mind, free will, proper attestation. | Reiterated the onus on propounder to establish these elements clearly. |
| Ajit Chandra Majumdar v. Akhil Chandra Majumdar, AIR 1960 Cal. 551 | Onus probandi on propounder; must satisfy Court's conscience; standard of proof is prudence, not perfection. | Applied to affirm the burden on propounder and the standard of proof required. |
| Laxman Mondal v. Most. Saro Devi, AIR 1985 Pat. 151 | Propounder must remove suspicious circumstances before Will is given effect. | Used to support the proposition that suspicion must be dispelled by the propounder. |
| Pushpavati v. Chandraja Kadamba, (1973) 3 SCC 291 | Suspicious circumstances require explanation; registration alone insufficient to dispel suspicion. | Applied to emphasize the need to explain suspicious circumstances satisfactorily. |
| Pundit Prayrag v. Goukaran Pershad, 6 CWN 787; Ex-parte Vittal, 15 Mad. 300 | Probate can be granted only to executor; probate granted on certified copy if original lost, but original must be proved if produced. | Referenced to explain probate procedure and limitations on letters of administration. |
| Hara Coomar v. Doorgamoni, 21 Cal. 195 | Executor cannot be refused probate on grounds of unfitness, poverty, or insolvency. | Noted to clarify executor’s rights to probate. |
| Pundit Prayrag v. Goukaran Pershad, 6 CWN 787 | Probate and letters of administration are distinct; executor must obtain probate unless renounced. | Applied to conclude executor cannot seek letters of administration without renouncing executorship. |
| Sarat Chandra v. Golap Sundari, 18 CWN 527 | Probate can be granted on lost or mislaid Will; presumption of revocation if destruction unproved. | Discussed in relation to Will production and proof. |
| Anwar Hossein v. Secretary of State, 31 Cal. 885 | Probate granted to executor on lost Will; letters of administration not granted to non-executor on such basis. | Referred to confirm executor’s exclusive right to probate in such circumstances. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court carefully analyzed the procedural and substantive aspects of the case. It noted the peculiar fact that the plaintiff, as executor, applied for letters of administration instead of probate, which raised a fundamental question about the maintainability of the proceeding. The Court examined the statutory framework under the Indian Succession Act, particularly Sections 222, 223, 229, 230, and 231, establishing that probate must be granted to the executor unless he renounces executorship, in which case letters of administration may be granted to others. The statute does not empower an executor to obtain letters of administration without renouncing executorship.
On the proof of the Will, the Court emphasized the special nature of proof required under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act. Despite the Will being registered, the Court held that attesting witnesses must be examined to prove execution, especially since the testatrix was not available to admit execution. The plaintiff/appellant failed to prove the Left Thumb Impression (LTI) of the testatrix, which was a critical defect, especially as the original Will was produced but never proved or exhibited.
The Court found suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will's execution, including the advanced age of the testatrix (117 years), the place of residence discrepancy, and the failure of the propounder to remove these suspicions by proper proof. The plaintiff’s inconsistent deposition regarding presence at registration and the procedural irregularity of applying for letters of administration as executor further compounded suspicion. The Court rejected the appellant’s reliance on registration to dispel suspicion, holding that registration alone cannot cure defects in proof or remove suspicion.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Will was not duly proved and the proceeding for letters of administration by the executor was not maintainable.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the Learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Howrah, dated 13th July 1999, is affirmed.
The direct effect of this decision is the refusal to grant letters of administration to the plaintiff/appellant who was the executor of the Will, on grounds of failure to prove the Will and the procedural impropriety of an executor seeking letters of administration instead of probate. No broader precedent beyond the facts and statutory interpretation in this case is established, as the Court strictly applied existing statutory provisions and evidentiary requirements. The case underscores the necessity for executors to follow proper probate procedures and for propounders of Wills to adequately prove execution and remove suspicious circumstances.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D.K Seth, J.:— Mr. Tapan Kumar Dutta, learned Counsel for the appellant, assailed the judgment and decree dated 13th July, 1999 passed by the Learned Additional District and Session Judge, 2nd Court, Howrah in L.A.O No. 6 of 1995. The prayer for grant of letters of administration to the plaintiff, Dharam Raj Tiwari, was declined by the Learned Judge. Mr. Dutta had contended that the plaintiff/appellant had duly proved the execution of the Will, a registered one, by examining the available attesting witnesses. There being no allegation that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity. According to him, the Will was duly proved through the evidences adduced before the Court.
2. Mr. Banerjee, learned Counsel for the defendant/respondent, on the other hand, pointed out that the learned Court had rightly found that the plaintiff had failed to establish the valid execution of the Will. He had further contended that the absence of the testamentary capacity of the testatrix was very much raised. In case of a Will, it is the propounder who is to prove the Will. In this case the propounder has failed to do so. Both the learned Counsel had taken the Court through the materials on record to substantiate their respective cases. Mr. Dutta had relied upon the decisions in Charan Singh v. Balwant Singh, AIR 1975 (P & H) 179; Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529; Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage., 2002 (1) SC 85 : 2002 (1) Indian Civil Cases (S.C) 573; S. Sundaresa Pai v. Sumangala T. Pai (Mrs.), (2002) 1 SCC 630; Brij Nath Chaudhury v. Dilip Kumar, (2001) 9 SCC 316, E. Madhavi Pallikkaramma v. K.V Prabhakaran Nair, (2001) 9 SCC 726.
3. Whereas Mr. Banerjee had relied on Rani Purnima Debi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb, AIR 1962 SC 567; Surendra Pal v. Dr. (Mrs.) Saraswati Arora, (1974) 2 SCC 600 : AIR 1974 SC 1999; Laxman Mondal v. Most. Saro Devi, AIR 1985 Pat. 151; Ajit Chandra Majumdar v. Akhil Chandra Majumdar, AIR 1960 Cal. 551; Radhika Prasad Saha v. Smt. Kalyani Dasi, 75 CWN 63 and Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529.
The question:
4. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. At the outset, we may refer to a peculiar feature of the present case to which the attention of both the learned Counsel was attracted and the learned Counsel were requested to address the Court on the said point which the learned Counsel for the parties had attempted to do at their best. In this case, in the Will the plaintiff/appellant was appointed as executor. In his deposition, he had admitted that he got the Will in 1967. But in the application, he had stated that the original Will was lost, therefore, he had filed a certified copy of the original Will along with the application. The present proceeding is a proceeding for grant of letters of administration. In course of the proceeding, the original Will was brought on record. But the same has not been proved and exhibited. In these circumstances, both the learned Counsel were confronted with the question by the Court as to how, the plaintiff/appellant being an Executor himself approaching the Court for letters of administration instead of probate, such a proceeding can be maintained.
5. We, however, propose to take up this question at the end in view of the fact that both the learned Counsel had laid great stress on the merit of the case.
The scope:
6. We find from the materials on record that the testatrix was 117 years old at the time of the execution of the Will. She died in Benaras. There is no adequate evidence to prove that the testatrix used to live at Howrah, though asserted by the propounder plaintiff/appellant. It is alleged that the will was registered in the registration office at Howrah, after a draft of the Will was prepared and then finalized by the learned Advocate, who is now dead, on the instruction of the testatrix. There were other properties of the testatrix but only one property was made subject matter of the Will. By reason of the Will the defendant/respondent was deprived of the half share in the said property, which would have devolved upon him in case of intestacy. Both the learned Counsel had taken us through the materials on record in support of their respective cases.
7. The scope of jurisdiction of the Court in such a case is confined only to the finding that the Will was duly executed and attested. Unlike other documents, the testator of the Will being unavailable. The proof of Will is something special. A propounder has to establish that the Will was duly executed and attested. He has to remove all suspicious circumstances that might surround the Will and its execution and attestation. Only when this initial onus is discharged by the propounder, the objector/defendant may be called upon to prove his case.
Section 68 Evidence Act:
8. Section 68 of the Evidence Act 1872, read with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act 1925, requires that where a document, by law, is required to be attested, such document cannot be used in evidence until at least one of the attesting witnesses is called for the purpose of proving its execution provided any attesting witness is alive and subject to process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. It further provides that such document, if registered, unless it is a Will, it would not be necessary to call any attesting witness to prove the execution, in a case where the execution of the document has not been denied specifically by the person purported to have executed the same. Thus, we find that if the per???ed to have executed a document specifically denies the execution, then attesting witness would be necessary to be examined even though the document might be a registered one. In case of a Will, the necessity of calling attesting witness for proving a registered document cannot be dispensed with. The reason is simple. Here the Executor is not available to admit execution of a Will. Examination of one of the attesting witnesses would be sufficient to prove the document.
Section 63 Succession Act:
9. Though the deed was registered, but by reason of Section 68, 1872 Act, the attestation of the Will was required to be proved. Section 63, 1925 Act requires the following test to be satisfied for a valid execution of a Will: (1) it must be in writing; (2) it must be duly signed by the testator; (3) it must be duly attested by at least two witnesses. The signature of the Will may be done in either of the following manners: (a) the testator may put his signature; (b) the testator may put his mark; (c) some other person may write the name of the testator; (d) some other person may put his own name to the Will; (e) some other person may put the mark of the testator. It is not necessary that the testator has to sign even when he is literate. A testator able to sign may also put his mark (Donelly v. Broughton, (1891) AC 455 at p. 437). Mark (+) put by the testator was accepted in Gulab Khan v. Amina Mahomed Sha, AIR 1926 Bom. 355 at p. 355-56. A thumb mark is a sufficient signature by mark (Theresa v. Misquita, AIR 1921 Bom. 156). It is not necessary that it must be a thumb of the testator. A mark is a mere symbol and does not convey and idea of a person who notices it, often even to the person who makes it (Nirmal Chunder v. Saratmoni Debya, ILR 25 CAL. 911 AT P. 916). It may be a sign of the cross (Amulya Kumar Bose, In the goods of, 42 CWN 649 at p. 655). In Rajendra Nath v. Jogendea Natha, 14 MIA 67 at p. 83, the Will was not signed but marked by the testator himself with the Bengali letter “bi” (M) “for munjoor or confirmed”, it was held to be a valid signature by mark. The Testator may be assisted in making the mark. If a testator, in making his mark, is assisted by some other person, who guides his hand and acquiesces and adopts it, it is just the same as if he had made it without any assistance (Amulya Kumar Bose (supra); Muktanath Roy Choudhury…Plaintiff, v. Jitendra Nath Roy Choudhury…Defendant, ., 19 CWN 1295 : 22 CD 262. In Radha Krishnan v. Subraya, ILR 40 Mad. 550 : 31 MLJ 357, the testatrix had taken the pen and gave the pen to Dorai Swami Iyenger, who put a cross (X) mark and signed his own name. This was held to be signature of the testatrix by some other person in her presence and by her direction.
The Will how proved:
10. In the present case, it is not the case of putting of mark or signature by any person other than the testatrix. It is a case where the testatrix herself is alleged to have put her mark by her Left Thumb Impression (LTI). When LTI is put by the testatrix, such LTI requires to be proved. When the defence alleges that the testatrix had never executed any Will and that someone else was produced instead of the testatrix, then it is incumbent on the propounder to prove the LTI. The propounder in this case has not done so. Therefore, in such circumstances, it can very well be said that the execution and attestation of the Will has not been proved. By reason of Section 68 of the Evidence Act, a registered Will is equally required to be proved by examining the attesting witnesses. Here the attesting witness was examined. But the attesting witnesses did not prove the LTI in the original Will. There is nothing on record to show that the original Will was confronted to any of the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff or the defendant/appellant. The production of the certified copy may be admissible under Section 63 of the Evidence Act, but that will not affect the provisions provided in Section 68 of that Act, since the person alleged to have executed the Will is not available at the time when the probate or letters of administration is obtained. Therefore, it requires a special proof with regard to execution. The requirement of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act is to be adequately proved through proper evidence in the manner provided in Section 68 of the Evidence Act. In the absence, it cannot be said that the Will has been duly proved.
11. The propounder examined himself as PW1. At page 27 of the Paper Book, in his deposition, he had said that he was present at the time of execution and registration of the Will. Whereas at page 28, he said “I was not present at that time”. He had also admitted to have filed the original Will, which was marked “Y” for identification. From the order dated 25th April 1996, it appears that the original Will was lying with the record kept in the safe custody. But no attempt was made to prove the same and mark the original Will exhibit. On the ground that the Will was lost, the application was made on the basis of a certified copy of the Will. Despite having produced the original Will, absence of attempt on the part of the appellant to prove the said Will, is fatal.
12. Admittedly, the testatrix was an illiterate lady. Though her mother tongue was Hi???di, but she understood Bengali. The defence was altogether of denial of execution. From the tenor of the cross-examination, it appears that the defence had suggested that someone else had impersonated as Bagaswari Devi, the testatrix, to bring about the Will and that the Left Thumb Impression (LTI) belong to someone else. The Will was prepared in English language. The plaintiff/appellant examined PW2, Santokh Kumar Rudra, who was one of the attesting witnesses.
Suspicious circumstances:
13. The propounder himself was the Executor. He stated to have got the Will in 1967. He alleged that the Will was lost. But he did not mention when it was lost. Then it was brought on record and marked “y” for identification. But ultimately he did not prove the same. Though he was the Executor, he applied for letters of administration instead of probate. He could have asked for probate even on the basis of the certified copy of the registered Will. These factors give rise to a suspicion, which the propounder was required to remove. The other suspicious circumstances that emerges are that the testatrix was 117 years old at the time of execution of the Will and that she used to reside at Benaras. Therefore, the initial onus was on the propounder to prove the Will. In fact, the LTI of the testatrix had not been proved, though the original Will was on record. Neither the propounder nor any of the attesting witness had deposed before the Court that the LTI appearing in the original Will is that of the testatrix. The original Will was not marked exhibit and the LTI was never attempted to be proved as those of the testatrix. Therefore, the defendant had no opportunity to contest the said claim. If it was so attempted, in that event, the defendant/respondent could have got the LTI examined through expert. The propounder had avoided to do the same.
14. In fact, the capacity of the testatrix with regard to her mental alertness or disposition capacity was disputed. The age of the testatrix was 117 years. Now it is no more necessary in law that a doctor is required to be present in order to assert that the testator had testamentary capacity. But still then the question might be relevant when the facts are such that it ipso facto gives rise to a suspicion. As we normally know a centurion is not expected generally to possess testamentary capacity. Here testatrix was admittedly 117 years old and an illiterate lady alleged to be residing in Benaras and could understand Bengali, though Hindu speaking. Whereas the Will was written in English. Then again, though the original Will was produced but no attempt was made to prove the execution and attestation of the Will by proving the LTI of the testatrix appearing in the original Will and the appellant attempted to proceed to obtain letters of administration on the basis of the certified copy of the Will.
15. In Charan Singh v. Balwant Singh, AIR 1975 (P & H) 179, it was held that the age of 80 years is not sufficient for contending that he lacked testamentary capacity when he executed the Will. The intention and mind of a testator can be gathered from a language and the provisions made by him in the Will. Relying on this decision, Mr. Dutta contends that the age of the testator being 117 years itself would not be a ground to hold that she lacked testamentary capacity. There is a gulf of difference between 80 years and 117 years. It is normally not expected that a person of 117 years would be of so sound mental capacity but still then the age itself would not be a ground for disbelieving it, but then in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not necessary to go into this question, since the LTI of the testatrix was not proved.
16. In Surendra Pal v. Dr. (Mrs.) Saraswati Arora, (1974) 2 SCC 600 : AIR 1974 SC 1999, the Apex Court had held that the propounder has to show that the Will was signed by the testator, that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions, that he put his signature on the testament of his own free will and that he has signed it in the presence of two witnesses, who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus, which rests on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Will could be accepted as genuine. If the caveator does not discharge the burden, which rests upon him in establishing the circumstances, which show that the Will had been obtained by fraud or undue influence, a probate of the Will must necessarily be granted if it is established that the testator had full testamentary capacity and had, in fact, executed it validly with a free will and mind.
17. In Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage., 2002 (1) SC 85 : 2002 (1) Indian Civil Cases (S.C) 573, it was held that the requirement of proof of a Will is the same as any other document excepting that the evidence tendered in proof of a Will should additionally satisfy the requirement of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. If after considering the materials available on record, the Court either believes that the Will was duly executed on the basis of existence of such fact so probable that any prudent person ought under the circumstances of a particular case to act upon the supposition that the Will was duly executed, then the factum of the execution of Will shall be deemed to have been proved. The delicate structure of the proof framed by a judicially trained mind cannot stand on weak foundation nor survive any inherent defect therein. But, at the same time, ought not to be permitted to be demolished by wayfarers and waylayers. The conscience of the Court is to be satisfied by the propounder of the Will adducing evidence so as to dispel any suspicious or unnatural circumstances attaching to a Will provided that there is something unnatural or suspicious about the Will. The law of evidence does not permit conjecture or suspicion having the place of legal proof nor permit them to demolish a fact otherwise proved by legal and convincing evidence. Well-founded suspicion may be a ground for closer scrutiny of evidence, but suspicion alone cannot form the foundation of a judicial verdict positive or negative. Relying on this decision, Mr. Dutta attempted to contend that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the suspicion that has been sought to be raised are wayward pelting of stones and supposition of wayfarers and waylayers. Therefore his client has sufficiently dispelled the suspicion alleged in the case.
18. But this contention cannot be accepted having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above. At the same time, in the said decision, it was further held that one who propounds a Will must establish the competence of the testator to make the Will at the time when it was executed. The onus is discharged by the propounder, adducing prima facie evidence, proving the competence of the testator and the execution of the Will in the manner contemplated by law. The contestant opposing the Will may bring material on record meeting such prima facie case in which event the onus would shift back on the propounder to satisfy the Court affirmatively that the testator did know well the contents of the Will and in sound disposing capacity executed the same. The factors such as the Will being a natural one or being registered or executed in such circumstances and ambience as would leave no room for suspicion, assume significance. If there is nothing unnatural about the transaction and ???d satisfies the requirement of proving the Will, the Court would not return a finding of not proved merely on account of certain assumed suspicion or supposition. Who are the persons propounding and supporting the Will as against the person disputing the Will and the pleadings of the parties would be relevant and of significance.
19. Mr. Dutta next relied upon Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529. In the said decision, it was held that proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to this special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a Will by Section 63 Succession Act. The onus of proving the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will proving of testamentary capacity and the Signature of the testator is required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. But whether there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Court accepts the Will as genuine. Where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion, the onus is upon him to prove the same. Even where there are no such plea but the circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the dispositions made in the Will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances or there might be other indications in the Will to show that the testator's mind was not free. In such cases, the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicion should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last Will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes part in the execution of the Will, which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account. If propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances, the Court would grant probate even if the Will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations.
20. In Pushpavati v. Chandraja Kadamba, (1973) 3 SCC 291 : AIR 1972 SC 2492, it was held that in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus placed upon the propounder of the Will. Where there are suspicious circumstances, the propounder of the Will has to explain them away to the satisfaction of the Court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the dispositions made in the Will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances or there might be other indications in the Will to show that the testator's mind was not free. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances, the Court has to give effect to the Will even if the Will might be unnatural in the sense it has cut off wholly or in part near relations. Where the signature of the testator is challenged as forged signature and the Will does not come from the custody of public authority or a family solicitor and the fact that the dispositions made in the Will were unnatural, improbable or unfair would undoubtedly create some doubt about the Will when it comes from custody of the person, who is the major beneficiary under the Will.
21. In Ajit Chandra Majumdar v. Akhil Chandra Majumdar, AIR 1960 Cal. 551, it was held that the onus probandi lies upon the party propounding a Will. He must satisfy the conscience of the Court that the instrument so propounded is the last Will of a free and capable testator in all cases in which circumstances excite suspicion of the Court, it is for those who propound the Will to remove such suspicion and to prove affirmatively that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the document, it is only when that was done that the onus is drawn on those who oppose the Will to prove fraud, undue influence to displace the case for proving the Will. The standard of proof to establish a Will is not an absolute or a perfect one but such as will satisfy a prudent man.
22. In Laxman Mondal v. Most. Saro Devi, 1985 Pat. 151, it was held that the propounder is required to prove not ???apacity and the signature of the testator as required by law but was also required to remove the suspicious circumstances before the Will was given effect to.
23. Mr. Dutta next relied upon S. Sundaresa Pai v. Sumangala T. Pai (Mrs.), (2002) 1 SCC 630 and E. Madhavi Pallikkaramma v. K.V Prabhakaran Nair, (2001) 9 SCC 726. In these decisions, it was held that disproportionate distribution or disinheritance of a close relative itself is not a suspicious circumstance or unnatural circumstance. In the present case, disinheritance of the respondent defendant cannot be said to be suspicious circumstances. But that was not the ground on which the grant was refused in this case. Therefore, these decisions have no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
24. Applying the above test in the present case, it appears that the original Will despite having been produced was never attempted to be proved and that the defendant had made out a case that the LTI affixed on the Will were not those of the testatrix and that someone else other than the testatrix was produced before the registration office. In this case the testatrix was aged about 117 years and that a doubt was raised as to whether she came from Varanasi only to registered the Will at Howrah and that some other lady was produced in the Registration Office. The Will is coming from the sole beneficiary and suspicion about the signature, namely, LTI has been raised. Therefore, it was incumbent on the propounder to prove the LTI of the testatrix affixed on the Will by confronting the original to the attesting witnesses as well as the defendant/objector. Failure to do so is definitely a suspicious circumstance, which has not been removed by the propounder. Therefore, these decisions do not help Mr. Dutta having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
Effect of registration of the Will:
25. Mr. Dutta contended that the registration of the Will cast away the scope of suspicion. Mr. Dutta relied on Baij Nath Chaudhary v. Dilip Kumar, (2001) 9 SCC 316, it was held that where the Will is a registered one in the absence of any evidence to establish that the testator was a lunatic was not a ground for assailing the validity of the Will on the ground of suspicion. But this decision is wholly distinguishable. There the signature or LTI or the mark of the testator was not in dispute and was duly proved. Registration of the Will ipso facto does not dispel the suspicion. If there are materials to cast a shadow of suspicion to shroud a Will, the registration will not help it out unless suspicion is removed.
26. In Radhika Prasad Saha v. Smt. Kalyani Dasi, 75 CWN 63, this Court had held that registration simplicitor cannot be regarded as talisman casting away of suspicion all at once. If the manner of registration shows the testator having admitted execution of the Will and signed in token thereout, it goes a long way to dispel suspicion. If, however, the manner shows skimping, e.g, the Will is not read by nor read over to the testator, the same remains suspicious on its own and then far from removing suspicion, it only adds upon suspicion on suspicion.
27. In Rani Purnima Debi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb, AIR 1962 SC 567, it was held that if the Will is registered, it may prove its genuineness. But mere fact that a Will is registered is not by itself sufficient to dispel all suspicion regarding it where suspicion exists without submitting the evidence of registration to a close examination. If the evidence as to registration on a close examination reveals that the registration was made in such a manner that it was brought home to the testatrix that the document of which he was admitted execution was a Will disposing of his property and thereafter he admitted his execution and signed it in token thereof. The registration will dispel the doubt as to the genuineness of the Will. But if the evidence as to registration shows that it was done in a perfunctory manner that the officer registering the Will did not read it over to the testator or did not bring home to him that he was admitting the execution of a Will or did not satisfy himself that the testator knew that it was a Will the execution of which he has admitted.
Whether executor can apply for letters of administration:
28. Then again the suspicious circumstances that shrouds the present case emanates from application of letters of administration by the appellant/plaintiff, the Executor of the Will. Unless the suspicion is removed, it is not possible for the Court to certify the Will. Before we ultimately come to any conclusion that whether the plaintiff was able to remove the suspicion, we need to examine as to whether the attempt to obtain letters of administration by the executor gives rise to a suspicious circumstances at all. In order to examine this, we are required to examine whether an executor could maintain a prayer for letters of administration or a Court could grant or whether the Court has jurisdiction to proceed to grant letters of administration to an executor.
29. According to Mr. Dutta, application for letters of administration does not give rise to suspicious circumstances'. He contended that there is no basis difference between proceedings for probate and letters of administration. It is the same kind of proceeding which is undertaken by a Court when a letters of administration is granted or a probate is granted in a contentious case, as one at hand. The object and purpose is the same, namely, to administer the estate of the deceased. The plaintiff/appellant has a dual capacity. Apart from being executor, he is also the universal legatee in respect of the property involved in the Will. He himself being an Executor, he was not precluded from applying for letters of administration. Whether a probate is granted or letters of administration is granted, it would not prejudice the defendant/respondent. There is nothing within the four corners of the Indian Succession Act, which precludes an executor from applying for letters of administration or prohibits the Court from granting letters of administration to an executor.
30. Mr. Ashok Banerjee, learned Counsel for the defendant/respondent, on the other hand, contends that probate and letters of administration are two distinct and different things. Though, procedure may be the same but the matters being different, the effect being different, one cannot substitute the other. According to him, if we read the Indian Succession Act properly, in that event, it is clear and unambiguous that the legislature had never intended grant of letters of administration to an executor. It definitely precludes an executor from applying for letters of administration and prohibits the Court to grant letters of administration to an executor. Therefore, the adoption of procedure for letters of administration by the executor gives rise to a suspicious circumstance, which the propounder is bound to remove. In the present case, the propounder has not removed such suspicious circumstances. Thus the procedure adopted definitely is one of the grounds, which raises suspicion. This suspicion having not been removed, the appellant could not succeed for the grant.
31. Admittedly, the plaintiff/appellant is the executor appointed in the Will. The original Will was also produced. The application was made on the basis of a certified copy of the registered Will. A certified copy of the registered Will is admittedly an authenticated copy of the registered Will. In this context, we may now examine the various provisions of the Indian Succession Act to ascertain the situation as emanating in this case.
32. Probate as defined in Section 2(f) of the Succession Act means “the copy of a Will certified under the seal of a Court of competent jurisdiction with a grant of administration to the estate of the testator”. Under Section 222 of the Succession Act, probate can be granted only to an executor appointed by the Will expressly or by necessary implication. But the executor cannot be compelled to take out a probate. The right of an executor to apply for probate of the Will is personal to the executor. He may renounce his right to obtain probate, viz. by renouncing his executorship. But an executor who has intermeddled with the estate ???ed without obtaining probate shall be compelled to take out a probate ???o, he may be summoned to lodge the Will and take out a probate (Dayabhai v. Damodar, 20 Bom. 227). A residuary or universal legatee is not entitled to probate, but to letters of administration with the Will annexed. If by mistake probate is granted, it is void (Pundit Prayrag v. Goukaran Pershad, 6 CWN 787; Ex-perte Vittal, 15 Mad. 300; In the goods of Shoshee Bhusan Banerjee, 19 Cal. 582). The Act nowhere provides for any discretion of the Court. Where an application for probate was made by an executor, it cannot refuse probate on the ground that the applicant is unfit (Hara Coomar v. Doorgamoni, 21 Cal. 195) or on the ground of his poverty or insolvency (Halsbury, Vol. 14, Page 167). The restriction with regard to grant of probate under Section 223 is limited to minors and persons of unsound mind and association of individuals not being a company, satisfying the condition of the rules prescribed by the Government.
33. Therefore, probate can be granted only to an executor who is not hit by the mischief of Section 223. Section 229 prohibits grant of letters of administration to any other person without citation to the executor to accept or renounce his executorship in a case where the executor has not renounced executorship. The form of renunciation of executorship is provided in Section 230. It is to be made either orally in the presence of the Judge or by writing signed by the person renouncing. Once renounced, he would be precluded forever thereafter from applying for probate of the Will appointing him executor. Under Section 231, if executor renounces or fails to accept executorship within the time limited for the acceptance or refusal thereof, the Will may be proved and letters of administration with a copy of the Will annexed, granted to the person who would be entitled to administration in case of intestacy. These three Sections read together indicate that an executor is bound to obtain probate but not letters of administration. Though, however, he cannot be compelled to obtain probate but he can be compelled to renounce executorship. It is only when the executorship is renounced letters of administration can be granted. Unless the executor has renounced his executorship, letters of administration cannot be granted.
34. Section 229 uses the expression “letter of administration shall not be granted to any other person until a citation has been issued, calling upon the executor to accept or renounce his executorship”. Therefore, letter of administration can be granted to other person only after summoning the executor and upon being so summoned, he renounces his executorship. On being so summoned, if he accepts executorship, then he has to apply for the probate and not for letters of administration. It is only when he renounces his executorship, letters of administration can be granted to any person other than the executor. Under Section 224, if there are more than one executor, probate can be granted simultaneously to all of them or at different times. It can also be granted to any one of the executors, who might have applied. Unless renounced any other executor may join in the grant.
35. There are two kinds of letters of administration, one kind of letters of administration governs intestacy and the other governs the testacy, as it appears from Section 217. The present case is not one of intestacy. Therefore, it is a case where either probate or letters of administration is to be granted. It is a case where an executor has been appointed in the Will expressly. Therefore, in this case, probate is to be granted to the executor until he renounces executorship in terms of Section 230. Until he renounces, letters of administration cannot be granted. Such letters of administration can be granted only to a person other than the executor. Therefore, letters of administration cannot be granted if the executor renounces executorship to the executor himself. Under Section 229 after renunciation, an executor is expressly precluded by statute from applying for probate. This express statutory bar cannot be circumvented by allowing him to obtain letters of administration. Then again this section expressly provides for grant of letters of administration in case of renunciation of executorship to person other than the executor renouncing. If he does not renounce, then he has to accept the executorship. Once he accepts executorship, he has to obtain probate. He cannot apply for letters of administration. Letters of administration can be granted under Section 232 only to universal or residuary legatee in a case where deceased has made a Will, but has not appointed an executor or the deceased has appointed an executor but such executor is legally incapable or refuses to act or who is dead before the testator or before the Will is proved or where the executor dies after having proved the Will but before the estate is administered.
36. Within the scheme of the act, there is nothing to indicate which empowers an executor to obtain letters of administration nor there is anything to empower the Court to grant letters of administration to an executor. Under Section 234, if there is no executor and if there is no residuary legatee or representative of a residuary legatee or he declines or is incapable to act or cannot be found, letters of administration can be granted in favour of the persons, who would have been entitled to administration of estate in case of intestacy. By reason of Section 233, representatives of the residuary legatee are also entitled to administration with the Will annexed/Under Section 235, letters of administration with the Will annexed shall not be granted to any legatee other than the universal or residuary legatee until a citation is issued and published, calling upon the next of kin to accept or refuse letters of administration. By reason of Section 236, letters of administration cannot be granted to a minor or person of unsound mind or an association of an individual other than a company satisfying the condition of the rules prescribed by the Government.
37. Probate can be granted even where the Will is lost or mislaid since the testator's death or has been destroyed by wrong or accident and not by any act of the testator, and that too for a limited period until the original or a properly authenticated copy of the Will is produced. Therefore, a probate can be obtained on the basis of an authenticated copy of the Will where the Will is lost. Without the Will or with a copy of draft of the Will, probate can be obtained for a limited period until the original or authenticated copy is produced. Once the original is produced, probate could not be granted on authenticated copy, it has to be granted on the original Will. If the original Will is not proved despite having not been lost or destroyed, no probate can be granted on the basis of the certified copy through an authenticated copy of the Will. The destruction of a Will during the lifetime of the testator may have effect of revocation of the Will. Still probate can be obtained in such a case but that too upon proof of execution and attestation of the instrument and for limited period (In the goods of L.P.D Broughton, 29 Cal. 311). The expression since testator's death, according to the Calcutta view in Sarat Chandra v. Golap Sundari, 18 CWN 527 qualifies the expression “mislaid” not the expression “lost”, but this interpretation seems to be doubtful since the testator's death precede both the clauses “lost” or mislaid”. Inasmuch as, in such event, there may be a presumption that the Will was revoked unless there is evidence to rebut the presumption (Anwar Hossein v. Secretary of State, 31 Cal. 885). When the Will is lost, the probate will be granted to an executor who applied. But if the application is made by any person other than the executor, then letters of administration may not be granted (Anwar Hossein (supra)). Under Section 238, when the Will is lost or destroyed and no copy has been made nor the draft is preserved, still then probate can be obtained if the contents of the Will can be established by evidence.
38. Under Section 239, probate can be granted on the basis of a copy of the Will if transmitted to the executor when the person in possession either resides outside the State or refuses or neglects to deliver it up, that too for a limited period until the Will or an authenticated copy is produced. Similarly, under Section 240, letters of administration can be granted for limited period until the original Will or an authenticated copy is produced where the Will of the deceased is not forthcoming, but there is reason to believe that there is a Will in existence. Under Section 241, letters of administration can be granted to an agent or attorney of the executor when the executor is absent from the state or when there is no executor within the State willing to act but limited till the probate is granted to the Executor or letters of administration to the principal of the agent or attorney. Section 252 provides that if after expiry of 12 months of grant of probate or letters of administration, the executor or the administrator remains absent from the State where the probate or letters of administration has been granted, the Court may grant to any person whom it may think fit, letters of administration limited to the purpose.
39. Thus, we find from the scheme of the Act that the legislature had intended for grant of probate to the executor and letters of administration to persons other than the executor, viz., the universal or residuary legatee or to the representative of the residuary legatee or to person entitled to administer the estate in case of intestacy, where there is a Will. When legislature specifically provides for particular mode and manner, one cannot overlook the same even though the procedure might be same and the effect may be the same, particularly, in a case where the executor himself is coming before the Court for grant of letters of administration to himself without having renounced his executorship. Such a procedure is unknown in this part of the Succession Act. When the legislature provides for express provision, the Court cannot introduce something on the ground of implied intention. The minute details that have been provided for, clearly indicates that the legislature had never intended to allow an executor to obtain letters of administration or permit the Court to grant letters of administration to an executor.
Conclusion:
40. Thus, in the present case, we find that the propounder had failed to establish that the Will was duly executed and attested as is required under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and was so proved within the meaning of Section 68 of the Evidence Act. He being an executor could not maintain the proceedings for letters of administration.
41. When the Will was on record, nothing prevented the applicant or the Court from converting procedure into one for probate. But then no attempt having been made during the proceedings before the Trial Court or during the appeal, there is no alternative for the Court but to dismiss the appeal.
Order:
42. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 13th July, 1999 passed by the Learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Howrah in LAO No. 6 of 1995, appealed against, is hereby affirmed. Let the lower Court records be sent down to the learned Trial Court forthwith.
43. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
44. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given.
Alok Kumar Basu, J.:— I agree.
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