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Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur And Another v. Phool Chand .

Rajasthan High Court
Sep 24, 2002
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns two appeals arising out of common orders of the courts below and therefore heard together. The key factual and procedural events recorded in the opinion are as follows:

  • Services of the concerned workman (plaintiff-respondent) were terminated by an order dated 23.1.1983.
  • The concerned workman alleged that he filed a departmental appeal which was dismissed by the appellate authority on 15.1.1986.
  • The workman filed a suit for declaration before the trial court; the opinion contains two different dates for the filing: 12.12.1988 in one passage and 12.1.1988 in another. The opinion also contains a reference to wages being allowed from the date of filing of suit "i.e 12.12.1998" in the operative portion of the trial court's decree. These differing dates appear in the text of the opinion and are reproduced here as presented.
  • The trial court decreed the suit on 6.7.1991, setting aside the termination as illegal and in violation of principles of natural justice, and ordered reinstatement; wages were allowed only from the date of filing of the suit as stated in the trial court's operative portion.
  • Separate appeals were filed against the trial court's judgment — by the appellant corporation and by the concerned workman. The first appellate court dismissed both appeals by a common order dated 1.7.1996.
  • The appellant corporation brought the present appeal challenging the orders passed by the courts below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit filed by the concerned workman was barred by limitation and therefore not maintainable.
  2. Whether there is any evidence on record that a departmental appeal was filed by the concerned workman and an appellate order was passed (as alleged by the workman), and what effect the absence of such proof has on the question of limitation and maintainability.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant Corporation's Arguments

  • The written statement specifically denied that any departmental appeal was filed by the concerned workman and denied that any order was passed by any appellate authority as alleged by the workman.
  • Given the specific denial and absence of any appellate order on record, the trial court and the first appellate court erred in failing to decide the issue of limitation; both impugned orders should be set aside on the ground that the suit was time-barred.

Concerned Workman's Allegations

  • The workman alleged that a departmental appeal had been filed and that the appellate authority dismissed that appeal on 15.1.1986.
  • The workman sought a declaration challenging the termination and, as recorded in the trial court's decree, was held entitled to reinstatement (with wages granted from the date of filing of the suit, as stated by the trial court).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the record and the orders of the courts below and articulated the following analysis (as stated in the opinion):

  1. The termination order date is recorded as 23.1.1983. The opinion records the date of filing of the suit in different passages (12.12.1988 and 12.1.1988), and also reproduces the trial court's operative allowance of wages "from the date of filling of suit i.e 12.12.1998" — the opinion treats these dates as they appear in the record.
  2. There was nothing on the record presented to the court to prove that any departmental appeal had been filed against the order of termination or that any appellate order was passed. The court noted the trial court had, in the operative portion, set aside any appellate order "if any" in a mechanical manner.
  3. On the basis of the absence of proof of a departmental appeal or appellate order and on consideration of the dates, the court concluded that the suit was filed after a considerable delay and was beyond the period of limitation; on this ground the suit should have been dismissed.
  4. Accordingly, the court found that the orders passed by the courts below could not be sustained in law because the underlying suit was time-barred.
  5. However, the court took account of the subsequent fact that the concerned workman had already been reinstated in service on 14.11.1996 after the judgment and decree of the first appellate court and had been continuing in employment since that date (the opinion records he had been in service for six years at the time of this decision).
  6. Balancing the legal infirmity (time-bar) with the factual reality of the workman's continued service, the court exercised its discretion to direct that the appellant corporation continue to employ the concerned workman, but only treating his service as commencing w.e.f. 14.11.1996, and expressly denying any entitlement to back wages or benefit of past services prior to that date. The appellant corporation was left free to terminate the services in accordance with law if they were not required.

Holding and Implications

The court reached the following conclusions and directions, stated in the opinion:

Core Ruling: The court held that the suit was filed beyond limitation and the orders passed by the courts below could not be sustained in law. The opinion concludes with the procedural statements: "The appeals are disposed of accordingly." followed by the line "Appeal dismissed." These lines appear in the decision as provided.

Practical Implications for the Parties:

  • The concerned workman's suit was treated as time-barred and thus not maintainable in law (the courts below erred in not deciding or giving effect to the limitation point).
  • Notwithstanding the legal infirmity, because the workman had already been reinstated on 14.11.1996 and had been in continuous employment since then, the court directed the appellant corporation to continue the concerned workman in service.
  • The concerned workman is to be treated as in service only with effect from 14.11.1996; he is not entitled to any back wages or benefits for any period prior to that date.
  • The appellant corporation retains the liberty to terminate the services of the concerned workman in accordance with law if his services are not required.
  • No new legal precedent is recorded or cited in the opinion; the decision resolves the parties' dispute by applying the limitation analysis to the facts before the court and by issuing directions based on the factual circumstance of the workman's reinstatement.

Note: The opinion as provided contains multiple date references for key events (dates of suit filing and the trial court's operative date for wages) that are internally inconsistent within the text. This summary reproduces those dates as they appear in the opinion without attempting to reconcile them.

Show all summary ...

Ashok Parihar, J.:— Since both the appeals are arising out of common orders passed by the courts below, on the request of counsel for the parties, both the appeals have been heard together and are being decided by this common order.

2. Services of the plaintiff respondent (the concerned workman) were terminated vide order dated 23.1.1983 Though it has alleged by the concerned workman that a departmental appeal has been filed by him and the same was dismissed by the appellate authority on 15.1.1986, a suit for declaration was filed by the concerned workman before the trial court only on 12.12.1988 Considering the evidence and material on record, the suit was decreed by the trial court vide order dated 6.7.1991 While setting aside the order of termination been illegal, null & void and in violation of the principles of natural justice, the concerned workman was held entitled for reinstatement. However, wages were allowed only from the date of filling of suit i.e 12.12.1998

3. Aggrieved by the above judgment and decree dated 6.7.1991 passed by the trial court, separate appeals were filed by the appellant corporation as well as the concerned workman: The first appellate court dismissed both the appeals by the common order dated 1.7.1996, hence the present appeal filed by the appellant corporation challenging the orders passed by the courts below.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there has been a specific denial in the written statement as filed on behalf of the appellant corporation that neither any departmental appeal was filed by the concerned workman nor any order as such was passed by the appellate authority as alleged by the concerned workman.

5. In spite of specific denial by the appellant corporation in this regard and no appellate order been filed by the concerned workman, the trial court as well as the first appellate court seriously erred in not deciding the issue of limitation in accordance with law and both the orders passed by the courts below are liable to be set aside only on this ground.

6. After hearing counsel for the parties, I have carefully gone through the material on record and also the orders passed by the courts below.

7. The termination order was passed on 23.1.1983 The suit was filed on 12.1.1988 There is nothing on record to prove that any departmental appeal was filed against the order of termination and further any order was passed by the appellate authority thereon. Even the trial court, in a mechanical manner, in the operative portion, held that the appellate order if any is also set aside. In my opinion, the suit itself was filed after a considerable long delay, moreso, beyond limitation and the suit itself should have been dismissed only on the ground of limitation. Both the appeals filed by the appellant corporation are liable to be allowed on this ground.

8. After passing of the judgment and decree by the first appellate court, the concerned workman had already been reinstated in service on 14.11.1996 and is continuing in employment of the appellant corporation since then. After having given my anxious consideration to the entire facts and circumstances of the present case, since the suit itself was filed beyond limitation and was not maintainable, the orders passed by the courts below cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. However, since the concerned workman was already been reinstated in service on 14.11.1996 and continuing as such since then for last six years. I deem it proper to direct the appellant corporation to continue the concerned workman in service. The concerned workman, however, shall be treated as in service w.e.f 14.11.1996 only. The concerned workman shall not be entitled for any back wages or benefit of past services prior to the above date. The appellant corporation shall further be at liberty to terminate the services of the concerned workman in accordance with law, if the same are not required.

9. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

10. Appeal dismissed.