Mahesh Narain Shukla And Another v. Vith A.D.J, Allahabad And Others

S.U Khan, J.:— Heard learned Counsel for the parties.

2. This is landlords' writ petition arising out of eviction/release proceedings initiated by them for eviction of their tenants-respondents 2 to 6 Shrimati Prabha Devi and others, on the ground of bonafide need under section 21 of U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.

3. Property in dispute is a shop, rent of which is Rs. 75/- per month. The release application was registered as P.A Case No. 217 of 1984 on the file of Prescribed Authority, Allahabad. The original tenant-Babulal had died much before filing of the release application and the tenancy had been inherited by his widow, sons and daughters, who were made opposite parties in the release application and who are contesting respondents in this writ petition.

4. Release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority, Allahabad on 6.6.1985 Against the said judgment and order tenants-contesting respondents filed Rent Control Appeal No. 323 of 1985. VI A.D.J Allahabad allowed the appeal on 29.5.1985 and set aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. This writ petition has been filed by the landlords against the said judgment of the Appellate Court.

5. The need set up in the release application was for setting up Sri Arvind Shukla, one of the sons of landlord-petitioner No. 1 Sri Mahesh Narain Shukla in business. Tenants are carrying on laundry business from the shop in dispute.

6. Appellate Court observed that during pendency of appeal some important developments took place — one of which was that the business of Sri Arvind Shukla at Teliarganj, Allahabad came to an abrupt end and was closed. In the initial release application need set up was for establishing office for the business of fabrication, which was being carried out from Teliarganj by Sri Arvind Shukla. During the pendency of appeal, release application was got amended and it was stated that Sri Arvind Shukla had started the business of construction and Thekedari for which he required the shop in dispute and as a temporary measure he was carrying out the said business from a very small portion of 10 feet × 10 feet, which was near the shop in dispute. The tenants pleaded that landlords had several other shops available with them to satisfy the need of Arvind Shukla, if any. It was further submitted that during pendency of appeal Sri Arvind Shukla had got the job of teacher in Boys High School, Allahabad. The landlords pleaded that for want of proper accommodation Sri Arvind Shukla was unable to carry out any proper business, hence as a temporary arrangement in mid nineties he had joined the job of teacher.

7. The Appellate Court held that apart from a flat on the first floor situate over the shop in dispute and the adjoining, no other shop was available to the landlords. In respect of the flat Appellate Court held that its earlier tenant had vacated the same. Landlord asserted that the tenant of the flat had not actually vacated the said flat but she has temporarily gone to Kolkata and the flat in dispute had been left in the care of Syed Israr Hussain, owner of Kidwai Commercial Institute. Tenants-respondents had pleaded that the landlords had given on higher rent the said flat to Syed Israr Hussain. Even according to the tenants-respondents the said flat was residential and after its vacation by the previous tenant Syed Israr Hussain was residing in the said flat. A residential building belong to the landlord cannot be taken in consideration while considering his need for commercial purpose. Accordingly whether landlord let out the flat to Israr Hussain or is Hussain was merely a care-taker of the said flat on behalf of its tenant, did not make any difference. Appellate Court held that the said flat was re-let by the landlords to Israr Hussain after it was vacated by previous tenant MacLoD and in case the alleged need was bonafide then Sri Arvind Shukla would have started the business from the aforesaid flat instead of letting it out to Israr Hussain. Appellate Court also held that since about 1994 Sri Arvind Shukla was teaching in Boys High School, hence he had no need.

8. The finding of the Appellate Court that the need of the landlord was not bonafide is quite erroneous in law. The facts found by the Appellate Court did not demolish the need of the landlords. Sri Arvind Shukla, son of one of the landlords, had failed in two or three businesses. He joined the service in 1994. No landlord or his family member is supposed to remain idle until possession of the shop sought to be released is delivered to him. Stop gap arrangement does not mean that need stands satisfied. Residential building can not be taken in to consideration while deciding bonafide need for commercial building. Appellate Court clearly found that no commercial accommodation was available to the landlord to settle his son Arvind Shukla. In view of these findings and legal position need was fully proved. The Supreme Court in the case of Siddalingama v. M. Shenoy,1 has held that the Rent Control Acts are basically meant for the benefit of the tenant and the provision of release on the ground of bonafide need provided therein is the only provision which treats the landlord with some sympathy.

9. So far as the comparative hardship is concerned, tenants did not show that they made any effort to search alternative accommodation. This is sufficient to decide the question of comparative hardship against them as held by the Supreme Court in B.C Bhutada v. G.R Mundada.2

10. The shop in dispute is situate in civil lines market which is a prominent market of Allahabad. Rent of Rs. 75/- per month is actually as well as virtually no rent. It is rather ridiculous. By paying such a highly in adequate rent, which is virtually negligible, the tenants must have saved a lot of money. Money saved is money earned. Tenants did not show that they made any efforts either to purchase or to take on rent another shop.

11. Accordingly, I find that the landlords fully proved their need and balance of hardship also lay in their favour. The judgment of the Appellate Court is manifestly erroneous in law and is based upon wrong interpretation and conception of bonafide need. The Supreme Court in G.C Kapoor v. N.K Bhasin,3 ought rightly allowed the appeal of the landlord whose release application had been rejected by the Prescribed Authority, appeal was dismissed by A.D.J and writ petition was also dismissed by this High Court.

12. Accordingly writ petition is allowed. Judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court is set aside. Judgment and order passed by Prescribed Authority is restored. Release application filed by the landlords is allowed.

13. Tenants-respondents are granted six months time to vacate provided that:

1. Within one month from today they file an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority to the effect that on or before the expiry of aforesaid period of six months they will willingly vacate and handover possession of the property in dispute to the landlords-petitioners.

2. For this period of six months, which has been granted to the tenants-respondents to vacate, they are required to pay Rs. 24,000/- (at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per month) as damages for use and occupation. This amount shall also be deposited within one month before the Prescribed Authority and shall immediately be paid to the landlord-petitioners.

14. In case of default in compliance of any of these conditions tenants-respondents shall be evicted through process of Court after one month.

15. It is further directed that in case undertaking is not filed or Rs. 24,000/- are not deposited within one month then tenant-respondents shall be liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 8,000/- per month since after one month till the date of actual vacation.

16. Similarly, if after filing the aforesaid undertaking and depositing Rs. 24,000/- the accommodation in dispute is not vacated on the expiry of six months then damages for use and occupation shall be payable at the rate of Rs. 8,000/- per month since after six months till actual vacation.

Petition Allowed.