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Padatik Dance Centre & Ors. v. Additional Registrar Of Assurance Ii, Kolkata & Ors.
S.P Talukdar, J.:— Challenging the order dated 4th January, 2005, passed by the Additional Registrar of Assurances II, Kolkata and the letter dated 11 April, 2005 issued by the said authority addressed to the Deputy Inspector General of Registration Range I, Government of West Bengal, the writ petitioners, Padatik Dance Centre & 13 others, approached this court with an application under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The facts are: -
One Gour Charan Mallik was the sole and absolute owner of the premises No. 6/7A, Acharya Jagadish Chandra Bose Road, Kolkata - 700 017. He died on 21st August, 1969 leaving his last Will and testament whereunder Lalit Madhab Mallik and Ashima Mallik were appointed as executrix respectively. They were given life interest in premises No. 6/7A, Acharya Jagadish Chandra Bose Road, Kolkata-700 017, hereinafter referred to as the “said premises”. According to the last Will and testament dated 5 May, 1967 of Gour Charan Mallik, after his death, Manisesh Mallik was to get the said premises absolutely. The said Will was duly probated by the Hon'ble Court on 14 October, 1992 in Probate Case No. 205 of 1997. With the death of Lalit Madhab Mallik on 19 December, 1996, Ashima Mallik remained the sole executrix to the said Will.
On 4 August, 1987, Lalit Madhab Mallik and Ashima Mallik executed an agreement and on the basis of the same, the lessee, Mithua Development Private Limited got a building plan sanctioned for the demised premises for construction of a new building thereon.
By an agreement dated 7 September, 1997 between Mithua Development Private Limited and petitioners No. 1 to 8, the petitioners agreed to obtain leases of the demised premises by separate leases with right to construct specific flats and/or portions and the petitioner No. 9, Mithua Development Private Limited, was entrusted with the task of constructing a building thereon. By the said agreement dated 7 September, 1997, Mithua Development Private Limited nominated petitioners No. 1 to 8 for taking leases from the owners thereof. Subsequent to such nomination, the petitioners No. 1 to 9 took separate leases from Ashima Mallik and Manisesh Mallik of the demarcated portion of the new building to be constructed on the demised premises in accordance with the sanctioned plan for exclusive use, occupation and enjoyment thereof by them respectively together with undivided share in the land of the demised premises. Thus, each of the petitioners No. 1 to 9 was exclusively granted the right to construct or have constructed and enjoy a particular demarcated unit at the new building to be constructed. When the construction of the new building was at last completed by petitioner No. 9, disputes and differences cropped up between petitioners No. 1 to 8 on the one hand and petitioner No. 9 on the other. This was referred to the sole arbitration of Mr. T.S Venkatesan inter alia, for obtaining his confirmation as to on whose account and on whose behalf the separate units at the new building at the demised premises had been constructed. By final award dated 22nd March, 2004, this was confirmed that the units mentioned in the 3rd Schedule to the lease Deeds entered into by and between the petitioners No. 1 to 9 and Ashima Mallik and Manisash Mallik are the units which have been constructed by the petitioners No. 1 to 9. By the award, Mr. T.S Venkatesan also confirmed that common portions of the newly built building on the demised premises belonged to the petitioners No. 1 to 9 jointly.
The learned Arbitrator presented and deposited the award of the Additional Registrar of Assurances II, Calcutta for registration. Since the said authority was not inclined to register the award on the ground that proper Stamp Duty thereon has not been paid and assessment of market value in relation to the flats and land being the subject matter of the award would have to be determined to assess the correct amount of Stamp Duty and registration fee that would be payable, the Advocate of the petitioners wrote a letter dated 8 March, 2005 intimating that for registration of the award, assessment of the market value could not be done. On 28 April, 2005, the Advocate of the petitioners received a communication dated 11 April, 2005 intimating that there is deficit Stamp Duty to the tune of Rs. 20,85,075/- and deficit registration fees to the tune of Rs. 3,79,654/-. By order dated 4 January, 2005 passed by the Additional Registrar of Assurances-II Kolkata, the petitioners have been called upon to pay a further sum of Rs. 20,85,075/- on account of deficit Stamp Duty and a sum of Rs. 3,79,654/- on account of additional registration fees. On receipt of the said communication dated 11 April, 2005, the petitioners through their advocate wrote a letter dated 1 September, 2005 to the Additional Registrar of Assurances II. No reply to the same has seen been received.
The petitioners claimed that Additional Registrar of Assurances cannot determine the market value of the property, which is the subject matter of award and cannot make any reference under Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as amended.
In response to this, the respondents-authority contested the case by filing affidavit-in-opposition. It is claimed that the “award” dated 22 March, 2004 being an instrument of partition becomes chargeable under Section 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. It was alleged that the petitioners by way of an award partitioned the property in question and thereby, the award becomes an instrument of partition where proper Stamp Duty is payable on the basis of market value of the property in terms of the West Bengal Stamp Prevention of Under-valuation of Instruments Rules, 2001. Dismissal of the writ application with costs was so prayed for.
Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Jayanta Mitra, appearing for the writ petitioners referred to the backdrop of the present controversy and submitted that the award being Annexure P-6 does not create any right in any immovable property. It only confirmed that the units mentioned in the 3 Schedule to the lease Deed being Annexure P-4 are the units, which have been constructed for the petitioners No. 1 to 9. He submitted that the said award dated 22 March, 2004 only determines the further construction of the car parking space on the common area over which the petitioners No. 1 to 9 have an undivided interest in terms of the lease deed being Annexure-P-4. It was emphatically submitted that the purported order dated 4 January, 2005 and the purported intimation dated 11 April, 2005 for determination of the market value of the property being the subject matter of the award under Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as amended are de hors the provision of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as amended.
Mr. Mitra in support of his contention referred to the Cooperation Agreement and submitted that following Clause 9 of the same, the dispute between the parties was referred to for arbitration. Inviting attention of the court to lease deed dated 8 September, 1997, being Annexure P-4 at page 52, it was submitted that it was a lease between the owner and the developer. The arbitration award, being Annexure P-6, mentions that various disputes arose between the parties thereby calling for such arbitration. The award refers to the measurement of exclusive areas. The relevant portion of the said award is set out as follows: -
“Measurement of Exclusive Areas: The area of the portions of the Building and the Premises which have been constructed for and on behalf of the parties respectively are as mentioned in Schedule-II hereto and that the common portions which have been constructed and/or installed for and on behalf the parties jointly (Common Portions) are as mentioned in Schedule - III. Those mentioned in Schedule-II are the portions to which the parties respectively are separately and exclusively entitled to.”
The crux of the present controversy is whether the authority-concerned was justified in considering the award as, in effect, a deed of partition. In the impugned order dated 4 January, 2005, the authority-concerned held that “the deed though captioned as a ‘matter of arbitration’ actually contains three types of instruments incorporated in one document as envisaged from the contents of the deed. Those are: - (1) Arbitration, (2) Developer's Agreement and (3) Award effecting partition of defined shares among the Co-Lessees…”
Section 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 defines “instrument of partition” as follows: -
“Instrument of partition means any instrument whereby co-owners of any property divide or agree to divide such property in severalty, and includes also a final order for effecting a partition passed by any revenue authority or any Civil Court and an award by an arbitrator directing a partition”.
It was submitted on behalf of the writ petitioners that an ‘award’ does not come within the scope and ambit of Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act.
Section 47A of the said Act refers to:-
(a) agreement or memorandum of an agreement relating to a sale or lease-cum-sale of immovable property,
(b) conveyance,
(c) exchange of property,
(d) gift,
(e) partition,
(f) power of attorney -
(i) when given for consideration to sell any immovable property, or
(ii) in such other cases referred to in Article 48 of Schedule 1A, where proper stamp duty is payable on the basis of market value,
(g) settlement,
(h) transfer of lease by way of assignment,
It lays down that no Registering Authority while registering any of those instruments has reason to believe that the market value of the property which is the subject matter of any such instrument has not been truly set forth in it, he may, after receiving such instrument, ascertain the market value and compute the proper stamp duty chargeable on the market value and ascertain the same.
On behalf of the respondents-authority it was contended that since there is a statutory provision for appeal, the present writ application does not deserve to be entertained. Section 47B of the Indian Stamp Act relates to appeal. The same is set out as follows: -
47B. Appeal. - (1) Any concerned person aggrieved by an order passed under sub-section (5), or sub-section (8), of Section 47A determining the market value may, in the prescribed manner, prefer an appeal to such appellate authority as may be prescribed within sixty days from the date of receipt of such order or such further period as may be allowed by the said authority for cause shown to his satisfaction.
(2) Subject to such rules or procedure as may be prescribed, the appellate authority shall dispose of any appeal preferred before him under sub-section (1) in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where the appellate authority modifies the amount of stamp duty determined under sub-section (5), or sub-section (8), of Section 47A and the modified amount of such stamp duty is higher than the stamp duty already paid by the concerned person, he shall pay interest at the rate specified in sub-section (6) of section 47A on the modified amount of such stamp duty from the month in which he was liable to pay interest under sub-section (6) up to the month preceding the month of payment of such modified amount of stamp duty.
The question, however, arises as to whether the writ petitioners in the present case could at all take recourse to such appeal since the petitioners cannot be strictly speaking, said to be aggrieved by an order passed under subsection (5), or sub-section (8) of Section 47A determining the market value. In the present case, it is not the quantum of market value, which is strictly under challenge but the order whereby the award in question has been held to be an instrument of partition is, in fact, in dispute.
In course of submission, reference was made to Section 47C of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 which relates to “suo motu revision by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority”.
Learned Counsel for the respondents while seeking dismissal of the writ application invited attention of the court to the Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) DelhiC. Reference No. I-D of 1966, reported in AIR 1968 Delhi 1. The leaned court observed that for finding out the true character of an instrument, one has to read the instrument as a whole, and then find out its dominant purpose. A single instrument may embody several purposes. But what is relevant for the purpose of the Act, is the dominant purpose of the instrument.
Reference was further made to the decision of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Union of India v. S. Sarup Singh, as reported in AIR 1968 Delhi 219. It was in support of the contention that no writ of mandamus could be issued to the Revenue Authority unless the said Revenue Authority had been requested to do something, which it was bound to do, and which it had failed or refused to do in spite of the request. But leaned court in the said case further held that when a mode of approach to the High Court was provided by the statute itself, it is that mode of approach only that has to be made to the High Court and no other mode, including the recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution.
It is, no doubt, true that the nomenclature or label of a document does not necessarily characterize the same. It is the contents of the document that are required to be looked into in order to ascertain its proper identity. There may be instances where a document in the grab of an agreement is in essence a lease deed. Even a letter in certain circumstances can be construed as a lease deed. It is necessary to take the entire document into consideration in order to fix up its identity. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mitra, on behalf of the writ petitioners contended that the grievance relating to the characterization of the award in question as a deed of partition could not have been effectively ventilated by way of filing an appeal. It was further submitted that the Revenue Rule being Rule II of the West Bengal Stamp (Prevention…….of Instrument) Rules, 2001 relates to as “Suo motu Revision by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority”. No doubt, on the presentation of a document for registration the Registering Officer shall first satisfy himself that it is duly stamped or is exempt from, or does not require, Stamp Duty. Rule 21(b) of the West Bengal Registration Rules leaves no scope for doubt in that regard.
After taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, this court finds it difficult to brush aside the grievances ventilated on behalf of the writ petitioners. The writ petitioners having challenged the jurisdiction itself, it cannot be said that this court is to keep its doors shut. As already mentioned, appeal under the circumstances as referred to earlier may not be appropriate remedy. Section 47C only relates to Suo motu revision by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. Sub-section (3) of Section 47C lays down that any order passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Civil Court or before any other authority. But such question does not arise in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
Here, we are concerned as to whether the authority-concerned was justified in holding the award under reference as a deed of partition. Partition essentially means ‘break up’, ‘division’, ‘separation’, ‘splitting up’. It essentially means division of property amongst the co-owners.
The factual backdrop of the present case goes a long way to indicate that the various co-owners approached for settlement of their differences. Separate deed of lease was executed in favour of each of them. The writ petitioners took leases from the owners and the co-owners by 18 separate leases, all dated 8 September, 1997 which are registered with the Registrar of Assurances obtained separate leases of undivided share in the premises with right to construct, own, uses and enjoy specified portion. The nature of the disputes was in relation to the funds to be provided as well as various other aspects relating to the management and maintenance of the building as well as the exclusive and common entitlement of the co-lessees and confirmation and so on and so forth. Mr. Mitra quite rightly submitted that the contents of the award do not by any stretch of imagination gives it the character of a deed or instrument of partition.
There is force in the submission made on behalf of the writ petitioners. Since the statutory remedy as referred to on behalf of the respondents-authority does not appear to be sufficient for redressal of the grievance raised in the writ application, particularly when the order under challenge has been assailed on the ground that the order is without jurisdiction, the present application under Article 226 of the Constitution is very well maintainable.
It however, cannot be denied that the petitioners, as reflected from the letter dated 1 of September, 2005 addressed to the Additional Registrar of Assurance II Kolkata, approached the concerned authority. I think that interest of justice will be best served if such authority is directed to consider the matter in its proper perspective.
Accordingly, the writ application being W.P No. 639 of 2006 succeeds and impugned order and letter be quashed. The petition is disposed of with liberty to the writ petitioners to submit a fresh representation, annexing thereto a copy of the earlier correspondence dated 1 September, 2005 being Annexure P-10, as well as other relevant documents before the Deputy Inspector General of Registration Range I, West Bengal. If such a representation is received by the said Authority within a period of six weeks from this date, the said Authority being Respondent No. 2 herein must consider the matter in its proper perspective and must take appropriate action or pass necessary order in accordance with the rules - of course, after giving the writ petitioners or their representatives, who may be Advocate of their own choice, an opportunity of hearing. Such consideration must be made within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the representation.
Action to be so taken and order to be so passed must be duly communicated to the writ petitioners through their advocate/representative within a further period of three weeks.
There is no order as to costs.
Xerox certified copy be supplied to the parties, if applied for, on urgent basis.
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