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Heiza Boilers (I) Pvt. Ltd. And Another v. Union Of India And Others
Summary of the Opinion (Jayanta Kumar Biswas, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners (Heiza and a director) filed a writ petition dated April 9, 2007 seeking a mandamus quashing arbitral proceedings pending before an Arbitral Tribunal appointed by the Director General of Supplies and Disposals (DGSSD) by a letter dated September 22, 2006 (Annexure P-9). The dispute arises from a tender floated by the Director of Supplies and Disposals, Mumbai, for supply, installation and commissioning of two boilers. Heiza's quotation was accepted by letter dated January 17, 1991 (Annexures P-3 and P-31), and the parties entered into a contract which contained (a) an ouster clause confining jurisdiction to the courts at the place from where the acceptance of tender was issued, and (b) an arbitration clause vesting sole arbitration in an officer appointed by the DGSSD.
Disputes were referred to arbitration and successive arbitrators were appointed. One arbitrator, Dr. Gita Rawat, was appointed by letter dated December 8, 2003, but by order dated February 4, 2004 (Annexure P-8) she terminated the proceedings under section 32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 because notices sent to Heiza at 28 Burdwan Road, Alipore, Kolkata-700027 were returned by post marked "LEFT" and the Union of India failed to take steps for substituted service.
By letter dated September 22, 2006 the DGSSD appointed Suresh Chandra as sole arbitrator (copy sent to Heiza at the Kolkata address). Subsequent orders and notices (including an order dated December 20, 2006 fixing hearing for January 17, 2007, and an order dated January 17, 2007 adjourning hearing until April 16, 2007) were communicated to Heiza, sometimes at alternate Kolkata addresses. Heiza sent correspondence questioning validity of the reference and asserting entitlement to records; it sent a legal notice dated March 20, 2007 challenging the arbitral proceedings. Feeling aggrieved, Heiza and one director filed the writ petition in this Court.
Procedurally, the Court initially granted an interim injunction on April 16, 2007 restraining the respondents from holding arbitration meetings on 16.4.2004 and/or subsequent dates until disposal of the application (the interim order lapsed on December 18, 2007; a fresh interim order was made on February 28, 2008 and remained in force until further order). Respondents were given opportunities to file opposition; an application by respondents to vacate the interim order was later treated as opposition. The matter ultimately came up for final hearing on the limited question of territorial jurisdiction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this High Court has territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain the writ petition, having regard to the fact that the respondents' offices are outside the Court's territorial limits and certain letters were received by the petitioners in Kolkata.
- Whether the service or receipt in Kolkata of the DGSSD's letter dated September 22, 2006 (appointing the arbitrator) and other letters (dated January 6, 2007, February 26, 2007 and March 30, 2007) constitute a part of the cause of action sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction on this Court.
- Whether the Director General of Supplies and Disposals possessed the power to appoint an arbitrator after the previous arbitrator terminated the proceedings under section 32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
- Whether the arbitrator appointed by the letter dated September 22, 2006 acquired jurisdiction to proceed with the arbitral proceedings.
- Whether the writ court should examine the validity of the reference in view of section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (as argued by respondents).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Service/receipt of the DGSSD's appointment letter (22.9.2006) and the Director of Supplies and Disposals' letters (including 30.3.2007) at Heiza's Kolkata office establishes that part of the cause of action arose within this Court's territorial jurisdiction.
- The ouster clause in the contract is irrelevant for determining territorial jurisdiction because the contract "no longer exists" (as argued) and the present letters served in Kolkata are sufficient to create a part of the cause of action in Kolkata.
- Relied upon a line of authorities and authorities on "cause of action" (including Kusum Ingots, Om Prakash Srivastava, Ashok Kumar Sahoo) to support that even a fraction of the cause of action arising within the Court's limits suffices to confer jurisdiction.
Respondents' Arguments
- Counsel for respondents (second to fourth) contended this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction because the respondents have offices outside the territorial limits and no part of the cause of action arose within the area in relation to which the Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 226; reliance was placed on Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu.
- Counsel for the first respondent submitted that in view of section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the writ court should not examine the validity of the reference (i.e., jurisdictional objections to the arbitral reference should not be entertained by the writ court under that provision).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu | Used to support contention that where respondents' offices are outside the territorial limits and no part of cause of action arose there, the High Court has no jurisdiction. | The Court considered the precedent relied upon by respondents in arguing lack of jurisdiction and analysed whether the present facts matched that principle; ultimately the Court held there was no territorial jurisdiction here. |
| State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties | Held that mere service of a notice at a firm's registered office does not give rise to part of the cause of action unless such service is an integral part of the cause of action; the test is whether service must be pleaded and proved for questioning the impugned order. | The Court adopted this principle as the general rule for assessing whether service/receipt of letters in Kolkata could constitute part of the cause of action; applying it, the Court held service/receipt in Kolkata was not an integral part and therefore did not confer jurisdiction. |
| Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India | Affirmed that if even a small fraction of the cause of action arises within a High Court's limits, that High Court will have jurisdiction; also that facts unrelated to the relief sought cannot be treated as giving rise to a cause of action. | The Court considered this authority to frame the correct test (substance over form) and to note that only material facts integral to the lis can give rise to jurisdiction; it nonetheless concluded the present Kolkata facts were not material to the lis. |
| Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India | Clarified "cause of action" as the bundle of material and essential facts without which the plaintiff must fail; when jurisdiction is in issue, ask whether cause of action or part of it arose within the High Court limits. | The Court relied on the definition and approach in this case to evaluate whether service/receipt in Kolkata formed part of the cause of action — concluding it did not because it was not an essential fact. |
| Tara Chand Boid v. Shikam Chand Bhora; Ashok Kumar Sahoo (H.U.F.) v. Hindusthan Paper Corporation Ltd. | Referred to by petitioners on issues related to ouster clauses and territorial jurisdiction. | The Court held that the arguments based on these decisions and the ouster clause were irrelevant to the specific jurisdictional question under examination in this case. |
| Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. | Noted as factually resembling the present case (contextually used to show absence of a local office/address). | The Court observed the facts resembled that case and used the analogy to support the conclusion that there was no reason to assume the first respondent had a Kolkata office or took action there. |
| Sarkar's Code of Civil Procedure (text reference) | Part of a textual reference (passage on p.211) concerning jurisdictional principles and service. | Referenced by petitioners' counsel for support on the territorial jurisdiction analysis; the Court relied on established case-law principles rather than novel textual propositions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court framed the issue narrowly because the respondents challenged territorial jurisdiction. It declined to express any opinion on the merits of the arbitrability or the propriety of the DGSSD's appointment (including the interplay with section 16 of the Arbitration Act) unless jurisdiction was first established.
The Court set out the legal test drawn from precedent: to determine whether a fact (for example, service or receipt of a letter) gives rise to part of the cause of action, one must examine whether that fact is material, integral or essential to the lis between the parties — i.e., whether pleading and proving that fact is necessary for the success of the writ petition. This approach follows the authorities (notably State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, Om Prakash Srivastava and Kusum Ingots).
Applying that test, the Court analysed where the decisive acts giving rise to the causes of action occurred:
- The decision to appoint the arbitrator was taken by the DGSSD in New Delhi.
- The arbitrator's orders (dated December 20, 2006 and January 17, 2007) were made in Mumbai where the arbitral proceedings were pending.
The Court concluded that the service or receipt in Kolkata of the letters (including the DGSSD's appointment letter and various communications) did not constitute a material, integral or essential part of the controversies. The receipt of those letters only gave the petitioners a right to take action on causes of action that had already accrued (and enabled them to meet any plea of laches or limitation). Because it was not necessary for the petitioners to plead and prove service/receipt in Kolkata in order to obtain the relief sought (quashing the appointment and the arbitral proceedings), those facts could not be said to create a part of the cause of action within this Court's territorial limits.
The Court also observed that arguments about the ouster clause and certain authorities relied upon by petitioners were irrelevant to the jurisdictional question. It further noted that no clear basis existed for treating the first respondent as having an office in Kolkata as shown in the cause title.
For these reasons, the Court held it lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and therefore did not proceed to decide the substantive merits relating to the DGSSD's power to appoint an arbitrator after termination under section 32 or the consequences of section 16 of the Arbitration Act.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The writ petition is DISMISSED for want of territorial jurisdiction.
Direct consequences and practical implications:
- The dismissal disposes of the petitioners' request to quash the appointment letter dated September 22, 2006 and the arbitral proceedings in this Court.
- There shall be no order as to costs.
- The Court declined to make any interim order restraining the respondents from pursuing the pending arbitral proceedings after dismissing the writ petition; the Court found nothing in its judgment that required staying.
- The Court expressly refrained from expressing any view on the merits of the controversies (including whether the DGSSD had power to appoint a replacement arbitrator after termination under section 32, or whether the arbitrator had acquired jurisdiction), since those issues were not reached after the jurisdictional conclusion.
There is no indication in the opinion that the Court intended to lay down a new precedent beyond the application of established territorial-jurisdiction principles: the decision is a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds and does not resolve the substantive arbitral questions.
Source: Opinion by Jayanta Kumar Biswas, J., as provided. All contents of this summary are derived exclusively from that opinion.
Jayanta Kumar Biswas, J.:— The petitioners in this writ petition dated April 9, 2007 are seeking a mandamus quashing the arbitral proceedings pending before the Arbitral Tribunal appointed by the Director General of Supplies and Disposals, Government of India, Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals (Litigation Branch), New Delhi, by a letter dated September 22, 2006, Annexures P-9 at P-63, and the letter itself.
2. The Director of Supplies and Disposals, Mumbai floated a tender inviting quotation for supply, installation and commissioning of two Boilers Stream Vertical Oil Fired. By a letter dated January 17, 1991, Annexure P-3 and P-31, his office informed Heiza that its quotation dated July 10, 1989 read with its letter dated January 16, 1991 was accepted. Then the parties entered into an agreement that contained an ouster clause reading: “The Courts of the place from where the acceptance of tender has been issued shall alone have jurisdiction to decide any dispute arising out of or in respect of the contract.”; and an arbitration clause providing: “In the event of any question, dispute or difference arising under these conditions or any special conditions of contract, or in connection with this contract (except as to any matters the decision of which is specifically provided for by these or the special conditions) the same shall be referred to the sole arbitration of an officer in the Ministry of Law, appointed to be the arbitrator by the Director General of Supplies and Disposals.”, and “in the event of the Arbitrator dying, neglecting or refusing to act or resigning or being unable to act for any reason, or his award being set aside by the Court for any reason, shall be lawful for the Director General of Supplies and Disposals to appoint arbitrator in place of the outgoing arbitrator in the manner aforesaid.” Disputes and differences arose between the parties, and they were referred to arbitration by the Director General of Supplies and Disposals who appointed successive arbitrators including one Dr. Gita Rawat, Additional Legal Adviser to the Government of India in the Ministry of Law, who Was appointed by a letter dated December 8, 2003. Noticing that all notices of the proceedings, pending from February 2, 1999, sent to Heiza at 28 Burdwan Road, Alipore, Kolkata-700 027 had been returned urn???rved by the post Office with the remark “LEFT”, and that, in spite of orders, the Union of India failed to take necessary step for substituted service, the arbitrator terminated the proceedings by an order dated February 4, 2004, Annexure-P-8 at p. 61, saying:— “In view of the observations made above, I have no option hut to pass order under section 32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for the termination of the proceedings in this case as due to the non-availability of the correct address and non-co-operation of the claimant, the continuation of the proceedings of the case is not possible.”
3. Thereafter by the letter dated September 22, 2006 the Director General of Supplies and Disposals appointed one Suresh Chandra, Additional Government Counsel to the Ministry of Law and Justice, New Delhi as the sole arbitrator. It was mentioned in the letter that since the previous arbitrator terminated the arbitral proceedings on February 4, 2004 under section 32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, her mandate stood terminated under section 32(3). A copy of the letter dated September 22, 2006 was sent to Heiza at 28, Burdwan Road, Alipore, Kolkata-700 027. In the arbitral proceedings the arbitrator made an order dated December 20, 2006, Annexure-P-10 at p. 64, fixing hearing for January 17, 2007. With a letter dated January 6, 2007, Annexure P-11 at p. 65, the Director of Supplies and Disposals, Mumbai forwarded a copy of the order of the arbitrator dated December 20, 2006 to Heiza at Budge Tank Road! Chandan Nagar, 24 Pgs. (s), Kolkata.
4. By a letter, Annexure P-12 at p. 66, marked “without prejudice”, Heiza, while questioning the validity of the reference, asked the arbitrator to supply it copy of the records. It sent an identical letter dated January 15, 2007, Annexure P-13 at p. 67, to the Director of Supplies and Disposals. The arbitrator made an order dated January 17, 2007, Annexure P-14 at p. 68, adjourning the hearing until April 16, 2007 so that Heiza, seeking time, might get a fair opportunity of hearing. By a letter dated February 26, 2007, Annexure P-15 at p. 69, the Director of Supplies and Disposals communicated the order of the arbitrator dated January 171, 2007 to Heiza that sent a legal notice dated March 20, 2007, Annexure P-16 at p. 70, questioning the validity of the arbitral proceedings. In a reply letter dated March 30, 2007, Annexure P-17 at p. 73, the Director of Supplies and Disposals said that Heiza would get full opportunity to raise all objections before the arbitrator. Feeling aggrieved, Heiza and one of its directors took out this writ petition.
5. The respondents in the writ petition are: 1. “Union of India; Ministry of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, Secretary represented by Senior Central Government Advocate Ministry of Law and Justice having office of 11, Strand Road, Calcutta-700 001”; 2. “The Director of Supplies and Disposals, having office at Jeevan Tara Building, 5, Sansad Marg, New Delhi-110 001”; 3. “Assistant Director of Supplies for D.S and G.D having office at New G.G.O Building, 5th/6th floor, S.W Wing, New Marine Line, Mumbai-400 020”; and 4. “Shri Suresh Chandra Additional Government Counsel Advisor/Justice and sole arbitrator having office at Jeevan Tara Building, Room No. 4, 1st floor, 5, Sansad Marg, New Delhi-110 001”. It has been stated that while the second, third and fourth respondents have their respective offices outside the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 226, the first respondent has its office within such territories.
6. In para 25 of the writ petition the petitioners have stated as follows: “25. The part of the cause of action has arisen at Calcutta inasmuch as letter dated 22.9.2006 making appointment of arbitrator is received at Calcutta and letter dated 30.3.2007 to continue with the arbitration proceedings and diverse correspondence has been received at Calcutta. The purported acceptance tender dated 1.2.1991 was received at Calcutta as it appears claim statement. The part of cause of action arose at Delhi as the respondent No. 2 by letter dated 30.3.2007 has threatened to continue with the arbitration proceeding and part of cause of action arose at Mumbai as diverse correspondence has been exchanged by the Mumbai office of the respondents.”
7. By an order dated April 16, 2007 the writ petition has entertained and an interim order in terms of prayer (i) was made. Prayer (i) is: “(i) An order of injunction be made restraining the respondents from holding any arbitration meeting on 16.4.2004 and/or any subsequent date, until disposal of the instant application”. At the time of hearing on April 16, 2007 none appeared for the respondents. By an order dated June 6, 2007 directions were given for filing opposition by the respondents. On June 6, 2007 also none appeared for the respondents. Counsel for the second-fourth respondents appeared on September 22, 2007 when he prayed for extension of time to file opposition. The interim order expired on December 18, 2007. The petitioners applied for a fresh interim order, and by an order dated February 28, 2008 a fresh interim order in terms of prayer (i) was made. It was ordered that the interim order would remain in force until further order. The interim order is still in force. The second-fourth respondents, instead of filing opposition, filed CA.N No. 2739 of 2008 for vacation of the interim order. By an order dated December 19, 2008 the application was treated as opposition and time to file reply by the petitioners was extended. Reply has been filed, and the writ petition has come up for final hearing.
8. Counsel for the second-fourth respondents has raised the question of territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition. Relying on Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu,1 he has contended that since all the respondents have their respective offices outside the territorial limits of this Court and no part of the cause of action arose within the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 226, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Counsel for the first respondent has said that in view of the provisions of section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 validity of the reference should not be examined by the Writ Court.
9. Relying on a portion of a passage on p. 211 of Sarkar's the Code of Civil Procedure, (2006 Ed.) and the decisions in Tara Chand Boid v. Shikam Chand Bhora; Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India;2 Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India;3 and Ashok Kumar Sahoo (H.U.F) v. Hindusthan Paper Corporation Ltd.,4 Counsel for the petitioners has argued that since today there is no existence of the contract, the ouster clause incorporated therein; that is otherwise also totally irrelevant for determining the territorial jurisdiction of the Writ Court, is of no consequence; and that, since I the letters of the Director General of Supplies and Disposals dated September 22, 2006 appointing the arbitrator and of the Director of Supplies! and Disposals dated March 30, 2007 threatening to pursue the arbitral proceedings were served on Heiza at its Kolkata office, a part of the cause of action arose within the territories in relation to which this Court Exercises jurisdiction under Article 226. I have drawn her attention to State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties.5
10. In State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties,6 it was held (para 8) that the mere service of a notice at Swaika's registered office in Kolkata did not give rise to a part of the cause of action within the territorial limits of this Court empowering it to entertain the writ petition. The general rule applying which the decisions was given in (para 8): the mere service of a notice at the registered office of a firm or company does not give rise to a part of the cause of action at such place, unless the service of the notice is an integral part of the cause of action; and the answer to the question whether the service of the notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) must depend upon the nature of the impugned order or action giving rise to the cause of action, and the test to ascertain this is whether for questioning the order or action it is necessary to plead the service of the notice in the writ petition.
11. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu,7 O.N.G.C through its consultants, issued an advertisement dated June 27, 1991 inviting tenders, and N.I.C.C.O, filing the writ petition in this Court, stated that it read the advertisement in Kolkata, submitted bid from its Kolkata office, by letters demanded justice from Kolkata, and received a fax message dated January 15, 1993 in Kolkata. Final decision was taken by the steering committee in New Delhi on January 27, 1993 and the contract was given to one C.I.M.M.C.O.N.I.C.C.O, contending that a part of the cause of action arose in Kolkata, sought orders restraining O.N.G.C from awarding the contract to any other party and cancelling the contract, if awarded. It was held (para. 8) that none of the above-noted facts was an integral part of the cause of action.
12. In Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India,8 it was held (para 10) that in view of the expressions used in Article 226(2), even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the territorial limits of a High Court, then such High Court will have jurisdiction over the matter, and (para 18)) that facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made in the writ petition cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court.
13. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India, while ascertaining (paras 9-17) the meaning of the expression “cause of action” their Lordships reiterated (para 13) that the expression “cause of action” denotes the whole bundle of the material and essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit, and held (para 18) that when the question of jurisdiction arises, the correct way to deal with a writ petition is to say whether the cause of action or a part thereof arose within the territorial limits of the High Court, and not to decline to exercise jurisdiction saying that it may have jurisdiction, but another High Court can deal with the matter more effectively.
14. The principles are these; Facts which have no bearing on the lis or the dispute involved in the case do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on a Court. What is to be seen is whether a particular fact is of substance and can be said to be material, integral or essential part of the list between the parties. If it is, it forms a part of the cause of action. If it is not, it does not form a part of the cause of action. In determining the question the substance of the mater, and not the form thereof, is to be considered. The answer to the question whether the service of a notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) must depend upon the nature of the impugned order or action giving rise to the cause of action, and the test to ascertain this is whether for questioning the order or action it is necessary to plead the fact of service of the notice in the writ petition and prove it. Only those facts without the proof of which the action must fail are material and essential facts in the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. Hence a fact without the proof of which a writ petition will not fail is not an integral part of the cause of action, and, accordingly, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action has arisen at the place where the event concerning the fact has happened.
15. Here the question is whether the service of a copy of the letter of the Director General of Supplies and Disposals dated September 22, 2006 appointing the arbitrator, and the letters of the Director of Supplies and Disposals including the one dated March 30, 2007 saying that Heiza would get full opportunity to raise all objections before the arbitrator, on Heiza in Kolkata gave rise to any part of the cause of action. The controversies involved in the writ petition are whether the Director General of Supplies and Disposals possessed the power to appoint the arbitrator after the arbitrator appointed by him previously by his letter dated December 8, 2003 had terminated the arbitral proceedings by her order dated February 4, 2004, made under section 32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and whether the arbitrator appointed by the letter dated September 22, 2006 acquired any jurisdiction to proceed with the arbitral proceedings.
16. Since the question of very jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition has been raised, I do not think it is necessary for me to express any opinion on the merits of the controversies involved in the writ petition. In my opinion, appropriate opinions on them are to be expressed only if it is found that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition and then it is held that even in the face of the provisions of section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the merits of the controversies can be examined, and the questions arising therefrom can be answered by the Writ Court. At present I am required only to answer the question of jurisdiction.
17. There is no dispute that the letters dated September 22, 2006, January 6, 2007, February 26, 2007 and March 30, 2007 were received by Heiza in Kolkata. Hence if it is held that the fact of their service or receipt is a material, integral or essential part of the cause of actin, then it can be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial limits of this Court, and in that case this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition.
18. The decisions to appoint the arbitrator was taken by the Director General of Supplies and Disposals in New Delhi. The arbitrator made the orders dated December 20, 2006 and January 17, 2007 in Mumbai where the arbitral proceedings are pending decision. I am unable to see how far an order quashing the decision to appoint the arbitrator, the orders of the arbitrator and the arbitral proceedings, it is necessary for the petitioners to plead in the writ petition and prove the fact of the service or receipt of the letters dated September 22, 2006, January 6, 2007, February 26, 2007 and March 30, 2007. The causes of action arose when the Director General of Supplies and Disposals appointed the arbitrator in New Delhi, and when the arbitrator made the orders dated December 20, 2006 and January 17, 2007 in the arbitral proceedings pending decision in Mumbai.
19. The service and receipt of the letters gave the petitioners only a right to action on the already accrued causes of action, and they enabled them to meet the plea of laches or limitation, if raised by the respondents. There is no reason to say that the fact of service or receipt of any of the letters is! a material, integral or essential part of the controversies between the parties. The fact of service or receipt of the letters has absolutely no bearing on any lis involved in the case. For an order, if otherwise available from the Writ Court, quashing the letter of the Director General of Supplies and Disposals dated September 22, 2006 and the arbitral proceedings pending before the arbitrator appointed thereby, it is not necessary for the petitioners to plead in the writ petition the fact of service or receipt of the letters and the orders in question, and prove it. I am, therefore unable to accept the contention that since the petitioners received the letters in Kolkata, a part of the cause of action arose within the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
20. There is no merit in the case of the petitioners that the letter concerning acceptance of Heiza's tender was received by Heiza in Kolkata. As will appear from the letter dated January 17, 1991, Heiza's offer was accepted by the Director of Supplies and Disposals in Mumbai. The arguments concerning the ouster clause incorporated in the contract concerned and the decisions in Tara Chand Boid v. Shikam Chand Bhora, and Ashok kumar Saboo [H.U.F) v. Hindusthan Paper Corporation Ltd. relied on by Counsel for the petitioners are totally irrelevant to the question under examination. The facts of this case resemble the ones in Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd.. The first respondent's whereabouts, [evident from the cause title, reveals the petitioners' stunning ingenuity. There is no reason to say that the first respondent took any action or decision, or that it has a Kolkata office at the address given in the cause title. In my opinion, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition.
21. For these reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order for costs.
22. Counsel for the petitioners prays for stay of operation of my judgment. I am unable to see what is to be stayed. I have dismissed the writ petition. I have not given any direction to any of the parties to the case. Hence there is nothing to stay. What Counsel seeks in an interim order from me. In my opinion, after dismissing the writ petition for lack of jurisdiction, I should not make an interim order restraining the respondents from pursuing the pending arbitral proceedings. Urgent certified xerox of this order, if applied for, shall be supplied to the parties within three days from the date of receipt of the file by the section concerned.
23. Petition Dismissed.
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