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Balachandran v. State Of Kerala

Kerala High Court
Aug 13, 2009
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns two related proceedings: Crl. M.C. 877/2009 (filed under S.482 CrPC by the accused in Crime No. 570/2008 of Varapuzha Police Station) and W.P.(C) 17828/2009 (filed by the de facto complainant under Article 226). Crime No. 570/2008 was registered under sections 294(b) and 323 IPC. During investigation, the de facto complainant filed a petition under S.156(3) CrPC (Annexure A) alleging inadequate investigation and that offences under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and other IPC offences were not being incorporated. The Judicial First Class Magistrate, North Paravur, by Annexure B order under S.156(3) directed the Investigating Officer to incorporate provisions of the SC/ST Act (specifically S.3(1)(iii)) and to investigate that offence, finding the case diary, FIR and medical statement sufficient to attract S.3(1)(iii). The accused challenged Annexure B under S.482 CrPC seeking quashing; the de facto complainant sought a writ directing investigation by an independent agency (e.g., CBI).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Magistrate exercising powers under S.156(3) CrPC can direct the Investigating Officer to incorporate a particular offence (specifically an offence under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act) and investigate that particular offence.
  2. Whether the Annexure B order directing incorporation of S.3(1)(iii) of the Act and directing investigation is legally sustainable.
  3. Whether the investigating officer or agency should be changed and whether direction to entrust the investigation to an independent agency is warranted.

Arguments of the Parties

Counsel for the Petitioner in Crl. M.C. 877/2009 (Accused)

  • The Magistrate has no power under the Code to direct the Investigating Officer to incorporate a particular offence and to investigate it; investigation is exclusively within the police domain.
  • Even if the Magistrate is dissatisfied with a final report, the Magistrate's remedy is to direct further investigation under S.156(3) after receipt of that report; the Magistrate cannot compel the officer in charge to file a report under S.170 for a particular offence.
  • The Annexure B direction to incorporate the offence under the SC/ST Act is illegal and must be quashed.
  • Reliance was placed on Shariff Ahmed v. State (Supreme Court) to support the proposition that a Magistrate cannot direct police to incorporate a particular offence and investigate it.
  • Reliance was also placed on E.K. Nayanar v. M.A. Kuttappan to contend that S.3(1)(iii) of the Act is not attracted where the alleged offence was committed inside a police station and not in public view; hence Annexure B's finding on that point is unsustainable.

Counsel for the Writ Petitioner / First Respondent

  • Relied on paragraphs of Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. to argue that the Magistrate's power under S.156(3) is wide enough to give necessary directions for proper investigation and to monitor the investigation, including the power to direct investigation of offences.
  • Contended that where the materials disclose additional offences, the Magistrate may give sufficient directions to ensure those offences are investigated; the Magistrate could have indicated that offences other than those initially investigated should also be looked into.
  • Accepted that while the writ petitioner cannot demand a particular investigating agency, he is entitled to proper investigation and that a senior police officer could be directed to investigate.

Public Prosecutor / State

  • Explained that the case was investigated by the Dy. Superintendent of Police (Rural), Aluva, and later, at the request of a committee concerned with SC/ST offences, the Dy. SP requested to be relieved; the Superintendent of Police subsequently directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Detachment, Ernakulam (Rural), Aluva to investigate.
  • Submitted that given the assignment to the Dy. SP (Crime Detachment) there was no necessity to change the Investigating Officer or agency as sought in the writ petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008 (1) KLT 724) Held that under S.156(3) CrPC the Magistrate has jurisdiction to give necessary directions for investigation and to monitor the investigation, but the decision does not widen the Magistrate's powers under the Code. The court relied on Sakiri Vasu to explain the correct scope of S.156(3): Magistrates can supervise and monitor investigation and give directions for proper investigation, but cannot compel the police to file a final report under S.170 showing commission of a particular offence.
Shariff Ahmed v. State (2009 (3) KLT SN 9 (C. No. 11) SC : 2009 (2) KLD 207) Affirmed that a Magistrate has no power to direct the police to incorporate a particular offence and to investigate the case and file a report; underscored the exclusive field of investigation reserved to the executive/police. The court treated Shariff Ahmed as a controlling Supreme Court authority establishing that a Magistrate cannot direct the Investigating Officer to add a specific offence and investigate it; this supported quashing Annexure B which had done exactly that.
King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (1944 LR IA 203) Expressed the principle that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary but distinct; investigation lies within the exclusive province of the police. The court cited this authority to reinforce the demarcation between judicial supervision and executive investigation, supporting the conclusion that magistrates cannot assume investigative functions beyond monitoring/supervision.
E.K. Nayanar v. M.A. Kuttappan (1997 (1) KLT 512) Used by counsel to argue that S.3(1)(iii) of the SC/ST Act is not attracted where the alleged offence occurred inside a police station and not in public view. The court recorded counsel's reliance on this decision to contest applicability of S.3(1)(iii) to the facts; the opinion notes the argument though the court's primary conclusion on magistrate's powers rested on other precedents.
J.A.C. Saldanha (referenced in the Shariff Ahmed excerpt) Stated the clear demarcation that investigation of an offence is exclusively reserved to the executive/police and that the magistrate's role commences after the investigative agency submits its report. The opinion reproduces the excerpt used in Shariff Ahmed to demonstrate the established principle that a court or magistrate cannot direct the investigating agency to submit a report conforming to the court's view; this supported the court's conclusion to quash Annexure B.
M.C. Abraham (referenced in the Shariff Ahmed excerpt) Referenced in the quoted reasoning as authority for setting aside a High Court order that improperly directed investigation outcomes. The opinion refers to M.C. Abraham to show that orders directing an investigating agency to submit a particular kind of report are unsustainable; the court invoked this to reinforce the conclusion that Annexure B was legally flawed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from established authorities and a close reading of the scope of S.156(3) CrPC:

  1. Recognizing the antecedent facts, the Magistrate had directed incorporation of S.3(1)(iii) of the SC/ST Act based on the case diary, FIR and medical evidence. The court examined whether such a direction was within the Magistrate's statutory power under S.156(3).
  2. Relying on Sakiri Vasu, the court accepted that S.156(3) empowers a Magistrate to give directions for proper investigation and to monitor or supervise ongoing investigations; however, Sakiri Vasu does not enlarge the Magistrate's powers beyond what the Code permits.
  3. The court explained the settled position: even after investigation and a final report under S.173(2), the Magistrate, when considering cognizance under S.190, may direct further investigation under S.156(3) but cannot compel the officer in charge to file a report under S.170 for a particular offence.
  4. From this statutory and precedential matrix the court derived the principle that if a Magistrate lacks competence to direct submission of a final report under S.170 for a particular offence at the post-investigation stage, the Magistrate similarly lacks competence to direct, during investigation, that the Investigating Officer incorporate a particular offence and investigate it as a matter of obligation.
  5. The court emphasized the institutional division between judiciary and police (citing King Emperor), noting that investigation is an executive function and magistrates can only exercise supervisory/monitoring functions within limits declared by precedent.
  6. The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Shariff Ahmed was treated as dispositive: magistrates cannot direct police to add and investigate a specific offence. The opinion quoted and relied on the reasoning in Shariff Ahmed (including the J.A.C. Saldanha principles) to support this limitation on magistrate powers.
  7. Applying these principles, the court held that Annexure B—which directed incorporation of S.3(1)(iii) and investigation of that offence—was beyond the Magistrate's power and therefore unsustainable.
  8. The court then considered the separate question of change of Investigating Officer. The case diary and orders showed that investigation had been entrusted to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Detachment, Ernakulam (Rural) by the Superintendent of Police. Given this entrustment, the court found no necessity to change the Investigating Officer or agency and declined to direct further change as sought in the writ petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Annexure B order is quashed. Crl. M.C. 877/2009 is allowed. W.P.(C) 17828/2009 is disposed of by holding that because the investigation has been entrusted to the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Crime Detachment), Ernakulam (Rural), no further direction (such as change of investigating agency) is warranted.

Implications:

  • The court reaffirmed the settled legal position that a Magistrate under S.156(3) CrPC may supervise or monitor an investigation and may direct that aspects be investigated, but the Magistrate does not have the power to direct an Investigating Officer to incorporate a particular offence and to investigate that offence as a compulsory act. This limitation aligns with the Supreme Court's decisions cited in the opinion.
  • Practically, the direct effect on the parties is that the Annexure B direction to incorporate S.3(1)(iii) is set aside, while the investigation continues under the assigned Dy. SP (Crime Detachment). The court did not order an independent agency or change of investigating officer.
  • The opinion applies existing precedent to clarify the boundary between judicial supervision and executive investigation; it does not purport to create a new precedent beyond applying settled principles.

Note: This summary is confined to and derived exclusively from the reasoning and materials contained in the provided opinion. No information not present in the opinion has been added.

Show all summary ...

1. Can a Magistrate under S. 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure direct the Investigating Officer to incorporate a particular offence and investigate? This is the question to be settled. Petitioner in Crl. M.C 877/2009 is the accused in Crime No. 570/2008 of Varapuzha Police Station. Petitioner in W.P(C) 17828/2009 is the de facto complainant therein. Crl. M.C 8777/2009 is filed under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash Annexure B order passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, North Paravur under S. 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in a petition filed by the writ petitioner. The learned Magistrate directed the Investigating Officer to incorporate the provisions of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act,) and investigate the case finding that the allegations in the First Information Statement, the wound certificate as well as the statement of the doctor are sufficient to attract commission of an offence under S. 3(1)(iii) of the Act. Writ Petition is filed by the defacto complainant under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ of mandamus to entrust the investigation of the case to an independent investigating agency like the Central Bureau of Investigation.

2. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in Crl. M.C 877/2009, learned counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor were heard.

3. Crime 570/2008 of Varapuzha Police Station was registered for the offence under S. 294(b) and 323 of Indian Penal Code against the petitioner by a Sub Inspector of Police alleging that while the Writ Petitioner was in custody the said offences were committed. When the case is under investigation, the defacto complainant filed Annexure Apetition under S. 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure contending that proper investigation is not being carried out and eventhough offences under the Act are involved they are not incorporated and investigated. It is also contended that even the proper offences under the Indian Penal Code were not incorporated and investigated. Armed with the decision of the Apex Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P (2008 (1) KLT 724) the de facto complainant approached the learned Magistrate. Under Annexure B order learned Magistrate found that on perusing the case diary it is seen that the de facto complainant has stated that he has been abused by calling his caste name in the presence of others and as petitioner was taken into custody, there is possibility of knowing his caste and Case Diary reveals that accused was a suspected accused in another theft case and he was questioned therein and therefore accused has knowledge about the caste of the complainant and in such circumstance commission of an offence under S. 3(1)(iii) of Act is attracted and directed the Investigating Officer to incorporate the said offence and investigate the case and file a report within fifteen days.

4. Learned senior counsel argued that Magistrate has no power to direct the Investigating Officer to incorporate a particular offence and to investigate and submit afinal report as investigation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the police and Magistratehas no right to interfere with the investigation. It is argued that even if Magistrate is notsatisfied with the findings in the final report, the Magistrate can only direct further investigation when the final report is submitted, under S. 156(3) and cannot direct theofficer in charge of the Police Station to file a report under S. 170 of the Code for aparticular offence. It is argued that when a Magistrate cannot direct the Police Officerto file a final report on a particular offence, the direction in Annexure B order toincorporate the offence under the Act is illegal and is to be quashed. Learned seniorcounsel also pointed out that the decision of the Apex Court in Sakiri Vasu's case (supra) cannot be interpreted in such a manner to widen the powers of the Magistrate, thanwhat is available under the Code and the said decision only enables the Magistrate togive directions for proper investigation of the case or to monitor the investigation and itdoes not empower the Magistrate to direct incorporation of a particular offence or toinvestigate that offence and therefore the order is bad. Reliance was placed on the decisionof the Apex Court in Shariff Ahmed v. State (2009 (3) KLT SN 9 (C. No. 11) SC : 2009 (2) KLD 207) where their Lordships declared that Magistrate has no power to direct the police to incorporate a particular offence and to investigate the case and file a report. Learned senior counsel relying on the decision of this court in E.K Nayanar v. M.A Kuttappan (1997 (1) KLT 512) submitted that when the alleged offence was allegedly committed inside the police station and not in public view, an offence under S. 3(1)(iii) of the Act is not attracted and the finding to thecontrary in Annexure B order is unsustainable.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent relying on paragraphs 11, 15, 17, 18 and 24 of the decision in Sakiri Vasu's case (supra) argued that power of the Magistrate under S. 156(3) is wide enough to give any direction for proper investigation or monitoring of the case being investigated by the Police and it includes the power to direct investigation of all the offences. Relying on the decision it was argued that when any power is expressly granted by the statute to an authority, it includes in the grant, by implication, every power and every control the denial of which would render the grant ineffective and therefore the Magistrate has jurisdiction to grant sufficient directions in the course of investigation. Learned counsel also argued that eventhough learned Magistrate should have found that offences other than the one being investigated, under the Indian Penal Code are also attracted and should be investigated, it was not stated in Annexure B order and to that extent the order is not correct. It was also submitted that on the complaint the offences attracted is not only S. 3(1)(iii) alone but other offences also and in such circumstance sufficient directions may be issued. Learned counsel also submitted that the case is not being properly investigated and it is for that reason the Writ Petition is filed and though petitioner is not entitled to request to appoint a particular agency for investigation, he is entitled to get the case investigated properly and therefore a senior police officer may be directed to investigate the case.

6. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the case was being investigated by the Dy. Superintendent of Police (Rural), Aluva and subsequently as apprehension was expressed by the members of a Committee constituted for the investigation of SC/ST offences, Deputy Superintendent of Police (Rural), Aluva has requested to relieve him from investigating the case and thereafter Superintendent of Police has directed Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Detachment, Ernakulam (Rural), Aluva to investigate the case and therefore there is no necessity to change the Investigating Officer as sought for.

7. The Apex Court in Sakiri Vasu's case (supra) declared that under S. 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the concerned Magistrate has jurisdiction to give necessary direction for investigation as well as to monitor the investigation. By the said decision powers of the Magistrate available under the Code is not widened. Even after investigation and submission of a final report under S. 173(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, while considering the question whether cognizance under S. 190 of Code of Criminal Procedure is to be taken or not, Magistrate can only direct a further investigation under S. 156(3) and cannot compel the officer in charge of the police to submit a report, under S. 170 for a particular offence. If at that stage Magistrate is not competent to direct the investigating officer to incorporate any particular offence and submit a final report, Magistrate cannot give such a direction even at the investigation stage. If the Magistrate is of the view that the investigation is not proper, on consideration of the final report, he can only direct a further investigation under S. 156(3). If on such further investigation and submission of a final report under S. 173(2), Magistrate is not satisfied with the finding with regard to the commission of the offence in the final report and the materials available in the final report disclose commission of an offence or an additional offence or offence than what is stated in the final report, Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of the offence or other offences on the said final report. But Magistrate cannot direct the Investigating Officer to file a further final report under S. 170, showing commission of a particular offence. This is the settled legal position.

8. If that be the case even by exercising the power of monitoring or supervising theinvestigation as declared by the Apex Court in Sakiri Vasu's case, a Magistrate cannotexercise apower, which is not otherwise available to him under the Code. If the Magistratecannot direct the Investigating Officer to submit a final report on a particular offence, Magistrate cannot direct the Investigating Officer to incorporate a particular offenceand investigate that offence. But upon a petition filed under S. 156(3), while monitoringor supervising the investigation, a Magistrate finds that a particular aspect is not beinginvestigated, definitely the Magistrate can give a direction to investigate that aspect also. But that power will not extend to empowering the Magistrate to direct the investigating officer to incorporate a particular offence and to investigate it. It is to be borne in mindthat as observed in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (1944 LR IA 203) thefunction of the judiciary and the police though complementary are not overlapping andinvestigation is within the exclusive province of the police. Under the Code Magistratecannot exercise his jurisdiction with regard to the investigation at that stage, except tothe limited extent of supervising or monitoring the investigation as declared in Sakiri Vasu's case.

9. The position is now settled by the Supreme Court in Shariff Ahamed case (supra). It was a case where the Metropolitan Magistrate directed the Investigating Officer to add the offence under S. 307 of Indian Penal Code and investigate the matterproperly. It was held:—

“This Court held in the case of J.A.C Saldanha (supra) that there is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. It has been held as follows:

“Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved by the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. It is the bounden duty of the executive to investigate, if an offence is alleged, and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed, it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under S. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, its duty comes to an end. On a cognizance of the offence being taken by the Court, the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in S. 173(8), then commences the adjudicatory unction of the judiciary to determine whether an offence has been committed and if so, whether by the person or persons charged with the crime. In the circumstances, the judgment and order of the High Court was set aside by this Court.

In the instant case the investigation is in progress. It is not necessary for us to comment on the tentative view of the investigating agency. It is the statutory duty of the investigating agency to fully investigate the matter and then submit a report to the concerned Magistrate. The Magistrate will thereafter proceed to pass appropriate order in accordance with law. It was not appropriate for the High Court in these circumstances to issue a direction that the case should not only be investigated, but a charge sheet must be submitted. In our view the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in making this direction which deserves to be set aside. While it is open to the High Court, in appropriate cases, to give directions for prompt investigation etc. the High Court cannot direct the investigating agency to submit a report that is in accord with its views as that would amount to unwarranted interference with the investigation of the case by inhibiting the exercise of statutory power by the investigating agency.”

10. In view of what is stated in M.C Abraham's case (supra) the order of High Court is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. It is brought to our notice by learned counsel for the State-respondent that the charge sheet has already been filed under S. 307 I.P.C But that was in compliance with this Court's order. It is open to the Investigating Officer to file the charge sheet afresh on the basis of the material collected during investigation.”

11. Learned Magistrate is therefore not justified in directing the Magistrate to incorporate an offence under the Act and investigate that offence, as directed in Annexure B order. So also it is not for the Magistrate at this stage to decide what all offences are made out. Annexure B order can only be quashed. But that does not mean that the Magistrate is not entitled to monitor or supervise the investigation. Then the question is whether the investigating officer orthe investigating agency is to be changed as sought for in W.P(C) 17828/2009. Learned Public Prosecutor made available the Case Diary which reveals that as per order D1(a)676/09 ER dated 16.1.2009, the case records were transmitted by the Dy. S.P Sri. Unnirajan, Aluva (Rural) to Dy. S.P Crime Detachment, Ernakulam (Rural), Aluva pursuant to the direction of the Superintendent of Police to investigate the case by the Dy. SP, Crime Detachment, Ernakulam (Rural), Aluva. In such circumstance, I find no necessity to change the investigating Officer or investigating agency as sought for in W.P(C)17828/2069.

12. Crl. M.C 877/2009 is allowed. Annexure B order is quashed. It is made clear that learned Magistrate can supervise or monitor the investigation as declared by the Apex Court in Sakiri Vasu's case. W.P(C) 17828/2009 is disposed holding that in view of the entrustment of the investigation with the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Crime Detachment) Ernakulam (Rural), no other direction is warranted.