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Kithania Textiles v. East India Transport Agency
Judgment Summary — Harinath Tilhari, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
These revision petitions arise from several suits brought by an insurance company (plaintiff No.2) in which the trial Court decided most substantive issues in favour of the Insurance Company but dismissed the suits on the basis of issue No. 6. Issue No. 6 asked whether the suit filed by the Regional Manager of the second plaintiff was under the valid authority of the plaintiff company (i.e., whether the Regional Manager was properly authorised to sign and verify the plaint). The dismissal turned on the trial Court's finding that the Regional Manager had not proved execution of a power of attorney by the company authorising him to sign and verify the plaint.
Representative particulars recorded in the opinion include S.C. No. 15/1988 (value of consignment Rs. 5,941) which gave rise to C.R.P. No. 1451/94; other suits included S.C. No. 191/1988 (value Rs. 5,187.15) and S.C. No. 16/1988 (value Rs. 6,015.20) giving rise to C.R.P. No. 1449/94. The Insurance Company filed revisions under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act challenging the dismissal of the suits on the said technical ground.
The Court heard learned counsel for the revision petitioners (Sri S.P. Shankar) and for the respondents (Sri U. Ashok) and framed its decision by interpreting the provisions of Order XXIX CPC and related authorities, considering whether the Regional Manager qualifies as an "other principal officer" who may sign and verify pleadings on behalf of a corporation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial Court was correct in holding that the Regional Manager had not proved authority (by production of a power of attorney) to sign and verify the plaint for the plaintiff-company, thereby rendering the suits not maintainable.
- Whether, for the purposes of Order XXIX Rules 1–3 CPC, a Regional Manager of a corporation can be treated as an "other principal officer" capable of signing and verifying pleadings on behalf of the corporation (and/or whether a board resolution or other evidence can suffice instead of a power of attorney).
Arguments of the Parties
Revision Petitioners' Arguments (Sri S.P. Shankar)
- The trial Court misinterpreted the provisions of Order XXIX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and misappreciated the material on record.
- The finding on issue No. 6 — that the Regional Manager had not proved execution of a power of attorney by the company and therefore the suit was not maintainable — was erroneous and resulted in an illegal refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Court below.
Respondents' Arguments (Sri U. Ashok)
- The respondents contested the revision petitioners' submissions (described in the opinion as hotly contested).
- Specifically, respondents' counsel contended that the original resolution of the company authorising the Regional Manager had not been produced; the Court below considered that a bare resolution was not sufficient and that there must have been a power of attorney.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kisloskar Brothers v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, AIR 1996 SC 3261 | The test of "control by the principal employer" to determine applicability of statutory provisions to regional offices; focus on control as the relevant test rather than predominant business activity. | The Court applied the "control" test by analogy to corporate regional offices: holding that a Regional Manager who controls regional business and employees may qualify as a "principal officer" for the purposes of Order XXIX because control within the regional unit makes the Regional Manager the relevant officer able to depose to material facts. |
| United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar | Recognition that procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not defeat substantive rights; Order 6 Rule 14 and Order 29 Rule 1 read together permit officers to sign pleadings by virtue of office and permit ratification of such acts by the corporation. | The Court relied on the quoted paragraphs to hold that (a) courts have power to prevent injustice caused by curable procedural irregularities, and (b) an officer referred to in Order 29 Rule 1 may sign and verify pleadings by virtue of his office even in absence of formal authority, and the corporation can ratify such signing expressly or impliedly. This supported the view that dismissal on a mere technicality was improper and that the corporation's conduct (including filing revision) evidenced ratification. |
| L.M.P. Precision Engineering Company v. Ram Narain, AIR 1998 Rajasthan 179 | Support for the proposition that "other principal officer" under Order 29 Rule 1 need not have specific written authorisation to sign pleadings; status as joint director/secretary/principal officer suffices unless other authorisation is required for different officers. | The Court cited this decision as supportive authority for construing "other principal officer" to include officers like a Regional Manager who hold status and responsibility within a regional unit and who therefore may sign pleadings on the corporation's behalf without separate written authorization in every case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a textual and functional reading of Order XXIX Rules 1–3 CPC. It noted that Order XXIX Rule 1 permits the Secretary, any director, or "other principal officer" of a corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case to sign and verify pleadings on the corporation's behalf. Rule 2 prescribes modes of service on a corporation and similarly refers to the secretary, any director, or "other principal officer".
The key interpretive question was the meaning and test for an "other principal officer." The Court observed that the Code does not define "principal officer" and therefore analyzed the composite meaning of the words "principal" and "officer" (citing dictionary definitions from Black's Law Dictionary as recorded in the opinion). The Court then adopted an operational test drawn from analogous authority (Kisloskar Brothers) emphasising control: the relevant test is whether the officer has control over the operations/employees in the relevant unit such that he is able to depose to the facts of a case.
Applying that test, the Court found that a Regional Manager who operates and controls the corporation's affairs in the regional area, supervises employees and business operations of that unit, and holds an office of trust, falls within the phrase "other principal officer" for the purposes of Order XXIX Rules 1–3 when the litigation concerns the regional unit's business. The Court noted administrative delegation (a 1991 financial standing order) indicating that a regional office may be treated as an independent unit and that the officer-in-charge of a regional office is empowered in relevant respects; while the standing order post-dated the 1988 suits, the Court considered it illuminating for interpretation.
The Court further considered the evidential record. A certified copy of a Board resolution authorising the Regional Manager to institute and defend suits was produced and admitted; the Administrative Officer (PW1) testified about production of that certified copy and stated the original was at head office. The trial Court had not rejected the certified copy but considered a power of attorney necessary. The revising Court held that such a resolution or other written authorisation can suffice and that a power of attorney is not invariably required. The Court emphasized that procedural rules are intended to sub-serve justice and should not be interpreted to create technical obstacles defeating substantive rights.
The Court relied on United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar to underline that procedural defects not going to the root of the matter should not defeat a just cause, that officers referred to in Order 29 Rule 1 may sign by virtue of their office, and that the corporation can ratify such acts expressly or impliedly. The fact that the corporation filed revision proceedings was treated as indicative of implied ratification.
In view of these considerations, the Court concluded that the trial Court erred in dismissing the suits on the narrow technical ground recorded in issue No. 6, and that the Regional Manager could properly be treated as an "other principal officer" for the purposes of signing and verifying the plaints in the regional matters before the Court; additionally, the certified board resolution and the corporation's conduct supported the validity of the institution of the suits.
Holding and Implications
Holding: All revisions are allowed; the trial Court's dismissal on issue No. 6 is set aside and all the suits are decreed in favour of the plaintiffs (the Insurance Company) for the claims as adjudicated on merits.
Consequences spelled out by the Court (direct effect on the parties):
- The finding recorded by the trial Court on issue No. 6 (that the Regional Manager lacked authority to sign and verify the plaint) was set aside.
- All suits giving rise to these revision petitions were decreed with interest at the rate of 10% from the date of entrustment of the consignments until realisation.
- The plaintiffs recover full costs of the trial Court and 50% of the costs of this Court in revision in each case.
Broader legal implication (as stated in the opinion): The Court construed "other principal officer" in Order XXIX to include a Regional Manager who has control and responsibility over a regional unit and who is capable of deposing to material facts; it also affirmed that procedural formalities should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights where the defect is curable and the corporation's conduct and evidence show authorisation or ratification.
This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what appears in that opinion.
Harinath Tilhari, J.:—
These revision petitions raise a common question of law relating to the jurisdictional competence of the Court below to decree the suits and the question to the effect, whether the Court below, by taking the view that the Regional Manager of the Insurance Company, on the basis of a Special power of Attorney executed in his favour by the Insurance Company itself was competent enough to sign and verify the plaint filed in suits giving rise these revision petitions?
It may be mentioned here that in all these cases giving raise to the revisions findings on the merits of the cases, otherwise have been answered by the court below in favour of the Insurance company, but the suit of the Insurance Company has been dismissed in all these cases on the basis of the finding recorded on issue No. 6. Therefore, all these revision petitions are disposed of by this common order and will govern all the revision petitions.
In S.C No. 15/1988 the trial court held that for non-compliance of Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act did not turn fatal of the suit. 1st plaintiff was the owner of the goods under consignment in respect of the suit claim and the value of the consignment has been assessed at Rs. 5,941/-. It further held that the first plaintiff has executed a power of attorney and subrogation of his rights in favour of the second respondent, i.e, the present revision petitioner. The trial Court further found that the plaintiffs have complied with the requirements of Section 10 of the Carriers Act. As regards issue No. 6 - “Whether the suit filed by the Regional Manager of the 2nd plaintiff is under the valid authority of the second plaintiff, i.e, the plaintiff-Company and on the basis of this finding the trial Court held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to get the decree in their favour. S.C No. 15/88 has given raise to CRP. No. 1451/94. With reference to other suits also, it may be mentioned that the trial Court has given the same answer as it has been given in SC. 15/88, but the value of the consignment has been different, namely, in the case of SC. No. 191/1988, it was assessed at Rs. 5,187.15 ps. and with reference to S.C No. 16/88 giving rise to C.R.P No. 1449/94, the value of the consignment was assessed at Rs. 6,015-20 ps. The trial Court (Concerned) in all these suits on the basis of finding recorded by it on issues referred to above held that Regional Manager having failed to prove the execution of Power of Attorney by plaintiff No. 2 to sign and verify the plaint, is not entitled to decree for the sums involved and dismissed the suit. No doubt, it has found that it has been proved that plaintiff No. 1 has executed power of Attorney in favour of plaintiff No. 2.
Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, Insurance Company has come up in revision under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act.
I have heard Sri S.P Shankar, learned Counsel for revision petitioners and Sri U. Ashok for respondents at good length.
Sri S.P Shankar submitted the finding of Court below is based on misinterpretation of the provisions of Order XXIX Rule 1 of Code and misappreciation of material on record. Sri S.P Shankar further contended that all the revision petitions arising out of these suits, the finding given on issue No. 6 holding that the Regional Manager has not proved the execution of the Power of Attorney by Company, Plaintiff No. 2 in his favour to verify and sign the plaint and as such, suit was not maintainable is erroneous and did result in illegal refusal to exercise the jurisdiction vested by dismissal of suit on that ground as such, is not in accordance with law.
Sri U. Ashok hotly contested the submissions made by Sri S.P Shankar.
I have applied my mind to contentions made by learned Counsel for the parties
The provisions of Order XXIX of C.P.C provides for institution of the suit by or against Corporations Rule (1) of Order XXIX CPC reads as under:
“(1): Subscription and verification of pleading:— In suits by or against a Corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the Corporation by the Secretary or by any director or other principal officer of the corporation, who is able to depose to the facts of the case.”
Rule (2) of Order XXIX reads thus:
“(2): Service on Corporation:— Subject to any statutory provision regulating service of process, where the suit is against a corporation, the summons may be served,-
(a) on the secretary, or on any director, or other principal officer of the corporation, or
(b) by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office, then at the place where the corporation carries on business.”
That a reading of these rules (1) and (2) of Order XXIX of CPC per se clearly reveals that in suits filed by or against the Corporation, any pleadings may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary, or by any director or other principal officer of the corporation, who is capable to depose to the facts of the case and the service of process where the suit is against a corporation, it may be served on the secretary, or on any director, or other principal officer of the corporation and it may by leading it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered officer, or if there is no registered office, then at the place where the corporation carries on business. The expression ‘principal officer’ is material. If a person holding an office of Secretary or Director or other Principal officer, who is able to depose to the facts of the case, notice shall be served on them or such other persons who are competent to depose to the facts of the case.
Rule (2) does not require anything beyond that. It does not impose any other condition. No doubt, the person to whom the notice is served is to be either the Secretary or the Director or other principal officer of the company, should be able to depose the facts of the case. There is no dispute that the person who signed the plaint was the Regional Manager. The plaint, per se, on its face reveals that the plaint has been verified by the Regional manager of the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. The office seal also indicates that he is the Regional Manager. The expression ‘other principal officer’ is also important. It has not been disputed before me that the Regional Manager is one of the principal officers, for the purpose of administering matters relating the Corporation of in the Karnataka region. Regional Manager is the Principal Officer of the Company in the concerned region. The expression “principal officer” which has been used in Order 29 Rule 1 or Rule 2 has not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. Before the expression “principal officer” word “other” is used. Rule says “other principal officer of the Corporation” then puts a further condition “who is capable to depose about the facts of the case, Rule 3 of Order 29 also uses the expression when it empowers the Court to require personal attendance of the officer of the Corporation. No doubt, it refers to Secretary or any Director and thereafter uses the expression “or other principal officer of the Corporation who may be able to answer material questions relating to the suit”, the principal officer is also shown by whom the plaint can be signed, who can appear before the Court and who is capable to answer the material questions. The use of expression, “who is capable to depose the facts of the case or who may be able to answer material questions of the suit” clearly reveals that who is in touch and in control of the business of the Corporation especially within the area of jurisdiction of the Court. It means it may also refer to the regional area. It may refer to the Regional Manager, with respect to officer controlling the business of the Corporation, who may be holding the office of the Trust. It may include the General Manager and the like. The expression “principal officer” consists of two expressions i.e, “principal” and “officer”. The expression “principal” as defined in Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edition, at page 1192 means it is an adjective and it means, “Chief; leading; most important or considerable; primary; original, highest in rank, authority, character, importance, or degree”. The expression “officer” has been defined in the same Black's Law Dictionary-Sixth Edition, at page 1083, column 2 as under:—
“Officer. Person holding office of trust, command or authority in Corporation, government, armed services, or other institution or organization.”
The question is what is the test to be applied in relation to determine if an officer is a principal or other principal officer. In the case of Kisloskar Brothers v. Employees State Insurance Corporation . AIR 1996 SC 3261 their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to consider another expression “principal employer”, no doubt, with reference to Section 2(9), 215, 217 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. In that case, the factory though was situated in Maharastra State, but it had established its regional offices at several places. In that case, the Government of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka had applied the provisions of Section 2(9) of the Act to the aforesaid regional offices situated at Secunderabad and Bangalore and the respondent had issued notice under Section 39 of the Act calling upon them to contribute their share to the Health Insurance of the workers working in the respective regional offices. The Insurance Court in that case held that the regional offices were covered by the Act and it directed them to pay their contribution. Appeals were filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka and both the High Courts upheld the orders of the Insurance Court. Therefrom, the employers had filed an appeal before their Lordships of the Supreme Court and in that context, the question raised before the Court was to the effect, whether the registered office of the Kirloskar Brothers Limited, which was situated at Maharastra and which had the regional offices at Secunderabad and Bangalore, could they be directed to make the contribution or the Insurance Court should have issued the notice to the principal office at Maharastra. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered that matter, affirmed the view expressed by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka and laid down the test in paragraph 11 of the judgment. Their Lordships laid down that,
“An employee need not necessarily be the one integrally or predominantly connected with the entire business or trading activities. The true test is control by the principal employer over the employee. That test alone will be the relevant test. The connection between the factory and its predominant products sold or purchased in the establishment or regional offices are irrelevant and always leads to denial of welfare benefits to the employees under the Act. When there is connection between the factory and the finished products which are sold or distributed in the regional offices or establishment and principal employer has control over employee, the Act becomes applicable. The test laid down by the Orissa High Court namely, predominant business activity, i.e, sale or distribution of the goods manufactured in the factory at Deewas, is not a correct test.”
If this principle is applied with reference to regional business carried on and controlled under the regional offices of the Corporation, the Regional Manager has got the power to control the business activities as well as control over the employees of the region. He holds an office of trust on behalf of the Corporation for the purpose of maintenance and administration of the office as well as for the business activities carried by the Corporation in the regional area. Applying this test, it appears to me that taken in the context of the business operation area, control of the activities including the institution of the suits by or against as well as taking into view that who is able or who may be capable to depose to the facts of the case, the Regional Manager of the Corporation can also be held to be covered by the expression “other principal officer”. There may be “principal officer” at the principal places of business no doubt, but, where the regional office is carrying on the business, the immediate connection and link between the business and the institution running at the regional place is that of Regional Manager. Office of the Regional Manager, no doubt, is an office of trust and along with the trust, power no doubt is vested and conferred on the Regional Manager to deal with it. In this connection, reference may be given to the financial standing order which confers delegation of financial powers. This standing order is of 1991. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that all the suits have been of 1988. So this may not control, as it has come from 1.8.1991 This may be taken into consideration only for the purpose of defining the expression as it may give enlightenment how to interpret the expression. In this case expression used is “officer incharge” “Officer incharge” has been defined to mean an officer incharge of a Branch Office-divisional office, regional office or department of the Head Office or any other office set up as an independent unit. “Officer incharge” is in respect of regional or head office may nominate any officer subordinate to him to act as “officer incharge” so far as any or all other reliefs covered by these delegations. This perse reveals that regional office is to be taken as an independent unit and the officer incharge of the regional office has been given the power to nominate any officer subordinate to him. This has been the position which has a statutory recognition by order, no doubt it is held that regional office has been considered to be an independent unit of the Corporation and the incharge of the regional office is the Regional Manager. In charge of the Head Office may be General Manager or Director or anybody. But, regional unit is an independent unit. So, when it is taken to be an independent unit of the Corporation where litigation arises or has arisen by way of either filing of a suit by the Corporation against the person like the defendant or if any suit is filed by an individual person against the Corporation's regional office, then, no doubt, the Regional Manager can be said to be the “principal officer” of the unit. The Regional Manager holds the office of trust and has a control over the employees working in the regional office under him and the pusiness carried on by the Corporation and the local offices running in the region. The expression “principal officer” refers to the officer holding the highest post of control in the Corporation or in regional unit of the Corporation and may even include the officer incharge of the local offices in case of local units. But, to determine that further it has to be taken note of that if the matter relates to the business it-self of the regional area, then among the principal officers at the Head Office, Regional Office, and local office, who are the persons who can be expected to answer the material questions relating to the facts of the case or who may be capable to depose about the facts of the case. So it has to be examined in the context of the units of a Corporation and in the context of this particular question as well as to which officer will be able to depose about the facts of the case. But, no doubt, he must be an officer, not a simple officer, but an officer of the highest rank, holding the office of trust. When I consider from this yardstick, in my opinion, the Regional Manager with respect to business carried on in the region and he is the one who has got control over the regional office, being well conversant with respect to the material facts of the case than the person as General Manager or Director, may be taken to be covered by the expression “other principal officer” for the purpose of Order 29 Rule 1, 2 and 3. When I so opine, I find support for my view from the decision of the Rajastan High Court in the case of L.M.P Precision Engineering Company v. Ram Narain . AIR 1998 Rajasthan 179.. Order 29 Rule 1 with respect to other joint Director or Secretary or any other principal officer does not use any further condition that he must have been authorised specifically to sing the pleadings or verify the pleadings. So with respect to three types of persons, there may not be any need of any specific authorisation. But, it must be taken that these persons with status of responsibility with of trust are able to sing the pleadings. But, it does not mean that the pleadings cannot be signed by other officers. It may be signed by other officers provided there is specific authorisation in respect thereof from the Corporation or the principal officer or director. Apart from that, in the present case, a copy has been filed of the resolution of the Board of Directors which in its meeting had autorised the Regional Manager to institute suits on behalf of the Corporation and to defend the suits filed against the Corporation. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the original resolution of the Corporation has not been produced. The copy of the resolution had been admitted on record. The Court below has only said that bare resolution is not sufficient, there must have been a power of attorney. In my opinion, the Court below was wrong. Authorisation may be made by a resolution passed by the Board of Directors. Authorisation may be made by other means of written order or it may be made by a power of attorney. It is not necessary that both things should be done. If one is there, that may be sufficient in case of other officers. So far as copy is concerned, no objection appears to have been taken at the stage of trial of the suit nor the Court required the summoning of original records of the meeting of the Board of Directors. It has been stated that the copy was certified by the notary which is the copy of the original copy of the resolution and the notary has stated that original was shown and compared and the copy of the resolution as verified and certified by the notary has been filed. The said copy has been produced which is taken on record. The Administrative Officer who appeared as P.W 1 had stated that the copy attested by the notary has been supplied to the office i.e, copy of the resolution which he had produced. Original was in the Head Office at Delhi. That document having been admitted in evidence and person having deposed about that, no doubt, document could have been marked as an exhibit and if the defendant had any objection to that, he should have raised it and he could have summoned it or asked the Court to call for it. No objection was raised to the certified copy which is certified as correct and true copy of original by the notary in evidence. The Court below has not rejected that document. The Court below-has only taken into consideration the question that apart from resolution, there should have been power of attorney executed in favour of the Regional Officer and it has not been so done. The Court below opined that the Regional Officer could have signed and verified the plaint. The rules and procedures are meant to sub-serve the cause of justice and not meant to create obstructions in the flow of justice. If this technical objection has to be taken, the respondent should have taken this objection at the earlier and asked the Court to get it summoned. He did not do so. Now, the document is on record. Regional Manager of the Corporation has been authorised to sign and verify the pleadings. When I observe that rules of procedures are meant to aid and sub-serve the cause of justice and they have not to be interpreted in a manner that these may result in defeating the cause of justice, I find support from the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar. It will be appropriate to quote the following observations from paragraphs 9 and 10 of the above decision. The observations read as under:—
“9. In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable.
10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the Corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed, a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and dehors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the Company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, a corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.”
Keeping these basic principles of law and particularly the latest circumstance namely that when the suit has been dismissed on a technical ground, the Corporation has now come up in revision and is challenging the order of the Trial Court, is indicative of the fact that Corporation has impliedly ratified the signing and verification of the pleadings by the officer concerned namely the Regional Manager. So apart from the resolution passed, of which copy has been produced by the Administrative Officer stating on oath, these circumstances and the act of revision being filed by the Corporation clearly reveals that really the suit has been filed by the person authorised by the Corporation, if there would have been any need of either authorisation or ratifications. Otherwise, as I have held earlier, Regional Manager in such cases can be taken to be coming within the framework of “other principal officer” who can sign the pleadings on behalf of the Corporation even in absence of a letter of authority or power of attorney by virtue of holding that office of responsibility and trust on behalf of the Corporation.
Thus considered, in my opinion, the Court below acted illegally and did not act according to law in dismissing the suits giving raise to these revisions petitions. Findings on merits on all other issues i.e, issues except issue No. 6 and 7 having been recorded in favour of the plaintiffs-revision petitioners and suit only having been dismissed on the finding on issue No. 6 i.e, whether the suit filed by the Regional Manager of the second plaintiff is under the valid authority of the second plaintiff company limited having been recorded in negative only dismissed the suit. In such circumstances, it appears just and proper to allow the revision petitions and set aside that finding on issue No. 6. The judgment of the dismissal of the suits have to be are set aside and modified. All the suits giving raise to these revision petitions have to be and are hereby decreed with the cost of the Trial Court in full and 50% of the cost of this Court in revision in all these cases.
All the revisions are allowed. All the suits are decreed for the claim along with the interest at the rate of 10% from the date of entrustment of consignment till the date of realisation and with full costs of the suit of trial Court and 50% costs of proceedings in revisions in each case.
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