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Smt. Alimunnishan & 8 Ors., v. Om Prakash & Anr.
Legal Opinion Summary: First Appeal From Order — Smt. Alimunnishan & 8 Ors. v. Om Prakash & Anr. (Claim Petition No. 23 of 2002)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal arises from Claim Petition No. 23 of 2002 filed by Smt. Alimunnishan & 8 others under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation for the death of Kasim Ali in an accident on 17 November 2001 involving Truck No. U.P.44-A/2098 owned by Om Prakash Singh. The claimants alleged that Kasim Ali, the family's sole breadwinner, was hit by the negligently driven truck while on business in Sultanpur; the accident resulted in deaths and injuries and delay in lodging the FIR due to urgent medical treatment.
Opposite parties filed replies. The truck owner denied negligence, stated the vehicle was insured, and attributed the overturning to mechanical failure ('Kamani' breakage). The insurer pleaded that the driver lacked a valid licence at the time, that policy terms were violated (passengers carried without premium), and that the owner failed to notify the insurer. The Tribunal framed four issues, heard evidence (postmortem, eyewitnesses, documents, and oral testimony), and issued a decision awarding Rs. 50,000 with 5% simple interest under the 'No Fault Liability' clause (Section 140), while finding no rash or negligent driving and therefore rejecting broader compensation claims. The claimants appealed that rejection.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the death of Kasim Ali occurred on account of rash and negligent driving by the driver of Truck No. U.P.44-A/2098.
- Whether, on the date of the accident, the driver of the truck had a valid and effective driving licence.
- Whether the truck was insured and whether it was being used in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in the insurance policy.
- Whether the claimants were entitled to compensation and if so, from which opposite party and to what extent.
Arguments of the Parties
Claimants / Appellants
- The claim petition alleged Kasim Ali was the sole breadwinner and was fatally struck in an accident caused by negligent driving of the truck on 17.11.2001.
- On appeal, learned counsel for the appellants argued that even if negligent driving were not established, the owner should nonetheless be held liable for damages suffered by persons as a result of such an accident.
Owner (Opposite Party No. 1 — Om Prakash Singh)
- Owner admitted ownership and that the truck was insured until 18.12.2001 and that the driver was Taufeeq Ahmad Khan with a valid licence.
- Owner stated the truck was carrying cement when the 'Kamani' broke, causing the vehicle to overturn; the overturn was due to mechanical failure rather than negligent driving.
- Owner asserted that passengers were not sitting in the truck at the time, that he had instructed the driver not to permit persons to ride in the truck, and that there was no violation of insurance policy terms; hence owner denied liability for compensation.
National Insurance Company (Insurer)
- The insurer contended the driver did not have a valid licence at the time of the accident and therefore the insurer was not liable under the policy.
- The insurer also asserted the owner failed to inform it of the accident, alleged the accident arose from rash and negligent driving (excluding liability), and maintained the vehicle was used contrary to policy terms because passengers were carried without payment of appropriate premium.
- The insurer additionally alleged non-compliance with Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act and questioned the claimants' dependency on the deceased.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| S. Kaushnuma Begum & Ors. v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 485 | Explained that Tribunal's jurisdiction is not limited to negligence; compensation may be recoverable even where negligence is not established; considered interplay between Section 140 (no-fault liability) and common law/strict liability principles (Rylands). | The court relied heavily on this decision to hold that compensation can be claimed apart from Section 140 unless exceptions to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher apply, and concluded the Tribunal erred by awarding only the Section 140 amount while rejecting other compensation. |
| Rylands v. Fletcher (1861-73 All ER 1) | Rule of strict liability: a person who brings onto his land something likely to do mischief if it escapes is prima facie answerable for natural consequences of its escape, subject to specified defences (e.g., act of God, plaintiff's default, act of stranger, consent, common benefit, statutory authority, remoteness). | Used in S. Kaushnuma Begum and cited by the court as a foundation for recognising liability in motor accident cases where the vehicle's use creates a danger—compensation may be awarded unless one of the Rylands exceptions applies. |
| M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1987 (1) SCC 395 (AIR 1987 SC 1086) | Discussed liability of industries engaged in hazardous/dangerous activities and observed that courts need to evolve principles appropriate to an industrialised economy; indicated no necessity to rely solely on the Rule in Rylands. | The court noted M.C. Mehta did not disapprove Rylands; the opinion observed that the Constitution Bench was prepared to receive guidance from such common law principles and that M.C. Mehta's approach did not preclude applying Rylands-derived reasoning to motor accidents. |
| Charan Lal Sahu v. Union Of India, 1990 (1) SCC 613 (AIR 1990 SC 1480) | In the context of Bhopal gas leak cases, a Constitution Bench considered strict liability principles favorably. | The court cited it to show that strict liability principles have been applied in Indian jurisprudence and that later decisions have not uniformly rejected the Rylands concept. |
| Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, 1991 (4) SCC 584 (AIR 1992 SC 248) | Referred to earlier cases (including M.C. Mehta) in the context of industrial disasters and liability; did not detract from the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. | The court cited this to demonstrate continuing judicial recognition of Rylands-related strict liability principles in large-scale industrial accident jurisprudence. |
| Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 (3) SCC 234 | Considered application of the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher to motor accident cases and expressed support for treating motor vehicles as creating hazards akin to those contemplated by Rylands, recommending adoption of the rule in motor accident claims. | The opinion relied on this case to support the proposition that the Rule in Rylands can be applied in motor accident claims and to justify awarding compensation even where negligence is not proved. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first reviewed the Tribunal's factual findings: the Tribunal believed the truck driver's version, found no rash or negligent driving, held that the driver had a valid licence and that the truck was used in conformity with the insurance policy, and concluded the accident resulted from mechanical failure ('Kamani' breakage). On those factual bases the Tribunal awarded Rs. 50,000 under Section 140 (the statutory "No Fault Liability" clause) but rejected additional compensation claims tied to negligence.
The appellate court then examined binding Supreme Court authority, principally S. Kaushnuma Begum (AIR 2001 SC 485), which held that:
- The Tribunal's jurisdiction to award compensation is not restricted solely to negligence-based claims; accidents during the use of a motor vehicle may give rise to compensation claims under other legal principles.
- The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and principles of strict liability have been considered and applied in Indian jurisprudence in appropriate contexts; exceptions to that rule must be examined before denying compensation.
- Section 140's "No Fault Liability" mechanism is distinct from common-law or strict liability claims; an award under Section 140 can be deducted from any final award but cannot be the sole basis to deny other compensatory claims where liability otherwise exists.
Applying these legal principles, the court concluded that the Tribunal erred by limiting relief to the fixed Section 140 award and by rejecting the broader compensation claim solely on the ground that no negligence was established. The appellate court held that, in light of S. Kaushnuma Begum and related authorities, a claimant may be entitled to compensation from a Tribunal even where negligence is not proved unless one of the Rylands exceptions applies. Consequently, the court set aside the Tribunal's judgment insofar as it rejected the claim for compensation beyond the Section 140 payment and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for a fresh award consistent with the legal principles identified.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The First Appeal From Order was allowed to the extent that the Tribunal's judgment rejecting the claim (beyond the Section 140 award) was set aside and the matter was remitted for a fresh award.
DISPOSITION: The Tribunal's judgment insofar as it rejects the broader claim for compensation is set aside; the Tribunal is directed to give a fresh award expeditiously.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Tribunal must reassess and make a fresh determination on the claim for compensation in accordance with the principles articulated in S. Kaushnuma Begum and related authorities; the earlier award of Rs. 50,000 under Section 140 remains a factor to be considered/deducted as appropriate by the Tribunal.
- Broader precedent: The court applied established Supreme Court precedent and did not purport to create a new legal principle. The opinion directs that claimants may seek compensation apart from Section 140 unless exceptions to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher apply; it follows and applies existing authority rather than laying down new law.
Order date: 07.01.2011. Hon'ble Justices Devi Prasad Singh and Virendra Kumar Dixit. Judgment pronounced in open Court pursuant to Chapter VII Rule 1(2) of the High Court Rules.
The First Appeal From Order arises out of Claim Petition No. 23 of 2002 (Smt. Alimunnishan & 8 Ors. v. Om Prakash & Anr.) filed on account of death of Kasim Ali in the accident that had taken place on 17th November, 2001 with Truck No. U.P.44-A/2098 owned by Om Prakash Singh.
The said Claim Petition No. 23 of 2002 was filed by Smt. Alimunnishan & 8 Ors. under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 with the averments that the deceased Kasim Ali was the sole bread earner of the family; on 17th November, 2001 he went to Sultanpur for business purposes but Truck bearing No. U.P.44-A/2098 which was being negligently driven by the driver hit the husband of Smt. Alimunnishan as a result of which he and many others died and many were injured; First Information Report could not be lodged in time since medical treatment was immediately required to be provided to the injured and, therefore, as the bread earner had succumbed to the injuries, the claimants suffered irreparable injury and appropriate compensation should be awarded to them.
A reply was filed to the claim petition. Opposite Party No. 1 Om Prakash Singh stated that he was the owner of the truck bearing No. U.P.44-A/2098; truck was insured with the National Insurance Company Branch Rai Bareilly upto 18th December, 2001; truck was being driven by Taufeeq Ahmad Khan, who had a valid and effective driving license; truck was carrying cement from Tikeriya Industrial Area to Faizabad when the ‘Kamani’ of the truck broke down as a result of which the truck lost balance and over turned killing two persons died and injuring three; the injured were taken to the hospital by the police; passengers were not sitting in the truck at the time of accident and the owner had also given instructions to the driver not to permit any person to sit in the truck and assurance had also taken from the driver to this effect; the driver had informed the owner that Imtiyaz Ahmad was not sitting in the truck at the time of accident; that there was no violation of the terms and conditions contained in the Insurance policy; that the accident was not caused due to rash and negligent driving and that the owner was not responsible for payment of any compensation.
The National Insurance Company also filed a reply to the claim petition. It was stated that the driver did not have a valid and effective license at the time of accident and so the Insurance Company was not liable to pay any compensation; the truck owner did not inform the Insurance Company of the accident; the accident was caused on account of rash and negligent driving by the truck driver and so the Insurance Company was not liable to pay any compensation; the truck was being driven contrary to the terms and conditions of the Motor Vehicles Act since passengers were being carried for which no premium had been paid; the insured had not followed the provisions of Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act and in any case the claimants were not dependent on the deceased.
The following issues were framed:-
(1) Whether the death of Kasim Ali-husband of claimant No. 1 had occurred on account of rash and negligent driving by the driver of the truck No. U.P.44-A/2098.
(2) Whether on the date of accident, the driver of the truck had a valid and effective driving license.
(3) Whether the truck was insured and whether it was being used in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in the insurance policy.
(4) Whether the claimants were entitled to compensation and if so then from which opposite party and to what extent.
In support of the claim petition, documentary evidence in the form of postmortem report was filed and three witnesses P.W.1, Safeeq Ahmad ; P.W 2 Taufeeq Ali gave the evidence. On behalf of the owner of the truck, driving license, payment of deposit of tax, registration papers, insurance cover, copy of judgment dated 18th October, 2004, copy of order dated 8th April, 2005 were filed. D.W 1 Alimunnishan gave oral evidence.
While deciding Issue no. 1, the Tribunal held that the version of the driver of the truck should be believed and the owner of the truck and the Insurance Company could not prove that the death occurred due to rash and negligent driving. The Tribunal also found that the Insurance Company could not establish that the deceased Kasim Ali was travelling in the truck. Issue no. 2 was decided by the Tribunal holding that at the time of accident the driver of the truck had a valid and effective driving license. Issue no. 3 was decided by the Tribunal holding that the truck was being driven in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in the insurance policy. Issue no. 4 was decided holding that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the truck and the accident had occurred on account of the breakage of ‘Kamani’ and that the deceased and his friends were not sitting in the truck at the time of the accident and was walking on the left path side of the road. The death occurred because the truck overturned and so the Insurance Company under the ‘No fault liability’ clause should pay Rs. 50,000/- with simple interest of 5%.
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that even if there was no negligence or rashness on the part of the driver of the truck, then too the owner should be made liable for the damages to the persons who suffers on account of such accident. This has been disputed by learned counsel for the respondents.
This issue was examined by the Supreme Court in S. Kaushnuma Begum & Ors., v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 485. The accident which gave rise to the claim occurred at about 7.00 P.M on 20.3.1986 The vehicle involved in the accident was a jeep. It capsized while it was in motion. The cause of the capsize was attributed to bursting of the front tyre of the jeep. In the process of capsizing the vehicle hit against one Haji Mohammad Hanif who was walking on the road at that ill-fated moment and consequently that pedestrian was crushed and subsequently succumbed to the injuries sustained in that accident. The widow and children filed a Claim Petition before the Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the claim for compensation holding that rash and negligence of the jeep was not established but directed the Insurance Company to pay Rs. 50,000/- to the claimants by way of ‘No fault liability’ under Section 140 of the Motors Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Aggrieved by the said rejection of the claim the claimants moved the High Court. On 28.4.1999, a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal and the order reads thus:
“Heard learned counsel for the appellant.
Finding has been recorded that the tempo overturned and there was no negligence or rashness of the driver. Hence Rs. 50,000/- has been awarded as compensation which is the minimum amount. There is no error in the order. Dismissed.”
The widow and the children thereafter filed an appeal before the Supreme Court which observed as follows:-
“It must be noted that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide claims arising out of negligence in the use of motor vehicles. Negligence is only one of the species of the causes of action for making a claim for compensation in respect of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles. There are other premises for such cause of action.
Even if there is no negligence on the part of the driver or owner of the motor vehicle, but accident happens while the vehicle was in use, should not the owner be made liable for damages to the person who suffered on account of such accident? This question depends upon how far the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1861-73 All ER (Reprint) 1) (supra) can apply in motor accident cases. The said Rule is summarised by Blackburn, J, thus:
“The true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the naturalconsequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.”
The House of Lords considered it and upheld the ratio with the following dictum:
“We think that the true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiffs default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequences of vis major or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort exists, here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.
The above Rule eventually gained approval in a large number of decisions rendered by Courts in England and abroad. Winfield on Tort has brought out even a chapter on the “Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher”. At page 543 of the 15th Edn. of the calibrated work the learned author has pointed out that “over the years Rylands v. Fletcher has been applied to a remarkable variety of things: fire, gas, explosions, electricity, oil, noxious fumes, colliery spoil, rusty wire from a decayed fence, vibrations, poisonous vegetation……” He has elaborated seven defences recognised in common law against action brought on the strength of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. They are: (1) Consent of the plaintiff i.e volenti non fit injuria. (2) Common benefit i.e where the source of the danger is maintained for the common benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant is not liable for its escape. (3) Act of stranger i.e if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply. (4) Exercise of statutory authority i.e the rule will stand excluded either when the act was done under a statutory duty or when a statute provides otherwise. (5) Act of God or vis major i.e circumstances which no human foresight can provide against and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility. (6) Default of the plaintiff i.e if the damage is caused solely by the act or default of the plaintiff himself, the rule will not apply. (7) Remoteness of consequences i.e the rule cannot be applied ad infinitum, because even according to the formulation of the rule made by Blackburn, J., the defendant is answerable only for all the damage “which is the natural consequence of its escape.”
The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher has been referred to by this Court in a number of decisions. While dealing with the liability of industries engaged in hazardous or dangerous activities P.N Bhagwati, CJ, speaking for the Constitution Bench in M.C Mehta v. Union of India and ors. (1987 (1) SCC 395): (AIR 1987 SC 1086), expressed the view that there is no necessity to bank on the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. What the learned Judge observed is this:
“We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialised economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order.”
It is pertinent to point out that the Constitution Bench did not disapprove the Rule. On the contrary, learned judges further said that “we are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes.” It means that the Constitution Bench did not foreclose the application of the Rule as a legal proposition.
In Charan Lal Sahu v. Union Of India. {1990 (1) SCC 613):(AIR 1990 SC 1480) another Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with Bhopal gas leak disaster cases, made a reference to the earlier decisions in M.C Mehta (supra) but did not take the same view. The rule of strict liability was found favour with. Yet another Constitution Bench in Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India {1991 (4) SCC 584 (AIR 1992 SC 248) referred to M.C Mehtas decision but did not detract from the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1861-73 All ER 1).
In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai {1987 (3) SCC 234} the question considered was regarding the application of the Rule in cases arising out of motor accidents. The observation made by E.S Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) can profitably be extracted here: “Today, thanks to the modern civilization, thousands of motor vehicles are put on the road and the largest number of injuries and deaths are taking place on the roads on account of the motor vehicles accidents. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehicles upon the roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher. From the point of view of the pedestrian the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous. ‘Hit and run’ cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have caused the accidents are not known are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives as the case may be should be entitled to recover damages if the principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. In order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents there has been a continuous agitation throughout the world to make the liability for damages arising out of motor vehicles accidents as a liability without fault.” Like any other common law principle, which is acceptable to our jurisprudence, the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher can be followed at least until any other new principle which excels the former can be evolved, or until legislation provides differently. Hence, we are disposed to adopt the Rule in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accidents.
“No Fault Liability” envisaged in Section 140 of the MV Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the Rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under that count. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicles can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute. The provisions of the MV Act permits that compensation paid under ‘no fault liability’ can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from Section 140 of the MV Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while using a motor vehicle, is entitled to get compensation from a Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that even apart from Section 140 of the Act, compensation can be claimed from a Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher applies.
In the present case also, as in S. Kaushnuma Begum (supra), the Tribunal has only awarded Rs. 50,000/- as compensation under the ‘No Fault Liability Clause’ under Section 140 of the Act but has denied compensation as there was no rash or negligent driving by the driver of the truck. The claim of compensation is, therefore, required to be determined in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in S. Kaushnuma Begum (supra). The matter, therefore, needs to go back to the Tribunal for giving fresh award.
The judgment given by the Tribunal in so far as it rejects the claim is, accordingly, set aside. The Tribunal shall give a fresh award as expeditiously as is possible.
The First Appeal From Order is allowed to the extent indicated above.
Date: 07.01.2011
NSC
Hon'ble Devi Prasad Singh, J.
Hon'ble Virendra Kumar Dixit, J.
Judgment pronounced in the open Court in pursuance of powers conferred under Chapter VII Rule 1(2) of the High Court Rules being nominated for the purpose.
Order Date-07:01:2011 [Justice Virendra Kumar Dixit] [Justice Devi Prasad Singh]
Rajneesh)
Asstt. Registrar-Cum-PS-II)
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