1. This special appeal has been preferred by the officials of the Life Insurance Corporation of India against the judgment dated 08.09.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 6026/1997 by which the writ petition was allowed with the directions to the appellants to grant the retiral benefits to the petitioner-respondent, as per the pension scheme framed by the appellant-Corporation.

2. The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner-respondent herein filed a writ petition stating therein that on completion of more than 20 years of service with the appellant-Corporation, the petitioner-respondent submitted a letter on 15.06.1990 which has been filed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition, the same reads as follows:-

“S.L MeenaAnuraj Resort

Ranthambhor Road,

Sawai Madhopur

Dated 15-6-1990

Respected Sir,

Re: Leave

With the reference to your two letters dated 9.6.90, I would like to submit as under:

1. When I joined after sick leave I have submitted all the sickness and fitness certificate and copies of all certificates, which are in my file at Dholpur when I will resume my duties I will submit all my copies again.

Due to the marriage of my niece I had to remain on leave from 29th Jan., 1990 to 4 Feb., 1990 if it is more than 6 days kindly treat it P.L and sanction as P.L

When I went to Jaipur for budget discussion on 7 March, 1990, I found that my wife was admitted in Zanana Hospital, Chandpole Gate, Jaipur for major operation and it become very necessary for me to take the leave from 9 March to 26 March, 90 as P.L

The C.L was taken from 5 to 6 April, 90 to shift my wife from Jaipur to Sawai Madhopur as per the advice of the surgeon of my wife.

I had to take again her for check up to Jaipur on 7 and 8 May, 1990 and accordingly applied for C.L from 7 to 9 May, 1990. As I returned from Jaipur I fell sick due to stomach pain (recurrent acute pain abdomen and dermatitits) and applied for medical leave from 10 May 1990 onwards by telegrahpically. The necessary medical certificate are enclosed for needful.

As all the circumstances stated above make clear that my absence from duty is either because of my illness or on my wife's illness (certificate enclosed) if health of myself and my wife does not allow as the only cause remain with me is to take voluntary retirement.

With kind regards,

Yours faithfully,

(S.L MEENA)

Sh. Kumar S.De,

Manager (Marketing)

L.I.C of India,

JAIPUR”

(Emphasis supplied.)

3. As would be evident from the aforesaid letter on account of the circumstances mentioned therein, the petitioner submitted that he may be permitted to take voluntary retirement. This letter of 15.06.1990 was followed by another letter sent by the petitioner on 18.06.1990 to the Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Jaipur which has been filed as Annexure-4 in which also the petitioner made the same request that he may be permitted to seek voluntary retirement. The said letter reads as follows:-

“S.L Meena

Anuraj Resort

Ranthambhor Road,

Sawai Madhopur

Dated 15-6-1990

The Sr. Divl. Manager,

L.I.C of India,

Jaipur.

Respected Sir,

Re: Leave

With reference to your letter dated 13.6.90 I submit my reply as under:-

At the time of releaving of my wife from hospital on 27 March, 1990, the date of re-check up was fixed on 8 May 1990 (certificate enclosed) by the operating Surgeon. As per the advice of the Surgeon I have taken my wife from Sawai Madhopur to Jaipur for re-check up on 7 and 8 May 1990, and accordingly I applied C.L from 7 to 9 May 1990.

When I returned at Sawai Madhopur from Jaipur I fell sick due to stomach pain (Recursent acute pain abdomen and dermatitis) and applied for medical leave from 10 May 1990 onwards by telegraphically.

The necessary medical certificate are enclosed for needful. The above circumstances make clear that my absence from duty is either because of my illness or on my wife's illness ailment. If health of myself and my wife does not allow me, the only cause remain with me to seek voluntary retirement.

With kind regards,

Yours faithfully,

(S.L MEENA)

Sr. Branch Manager,

L.I.C of India,

Dholpur”

(Emphasis supplied.)

4. It appears that the appellant did not take any action on the aforesaid two letters sent by the petitioner and he thereafter sent a letter on 14.07.1990 which has been filed as Annexure-1. The said letter reads as follows:-

“The Managing Director,

LIC of India,

Central Office,

BOMBAY.

Through proper channel

Dear Sir,

Reg: My resignation from the services of the LIC as Sr. Branch Manager, Dholpur.

I beg to submit that I am not keeping good health for the post for months, suffering from skin diseases and SUBACUTE INTESTENTINAL OBSTRUCTION with RECEIPANT APPENDICITIS and my wife is also not keeping good health since she was operated in the month of March, 1990. In this situation, my living alone at Dholpur away from my family has proved adverse towards my health and disturbed my family circumstances.

I, therefore, resign from the services of the Corporation with immediate effect. Kindly accept the same.

I shall request you to kindly waive the period of notice in my case as a special case.

Thanking you.

Yours faithfully,

14-7-1990Sd/-

(S.L Meena)

Sr. Branch Manager,

Dholpur SR No. 141414

Advance copy to:

Zonal Manager,

LIC of India,

Zonal Office,

New Delhi.”

5. The aforesaid request made vide Annexure-1 dated 14.07.1990 seeking permission to resign and also requesting for waiver of the notice period was ultimately accepted by the appellant-Corporation and conveyed to the petitioner vide Annexure-2 dated 11.01.1991 The said letter of the appellant-Corporation dated 11.01.1991 reads as follows:-

“LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA

Divisional Office,

“Jeewan Prakash”

Bhawani Singh Road,

Post Box No. 65,

Jaipur 302005

per/BDate 11-1-1991

Shri S.L Meena

Sr. Branch Manager,

L.I.C of India,

BO DHOLPUR

Dear Sir,

Re: Your Resignation

This refer to your letter dated 14-7-90 tendering resignation from the service of the Corporation.

In this connection, we have to inform you that Competent Authority has waived the notice period and accepted your resignation with immediate effect i.e 14.7.90, the date of your resignation letter, subject to recovery of outstanding dues if any including salary period to you after 14-7-90.

Yours faithfully,

Manager (P&IR)”

6. In the year 1995, the appellant-Corporation brought into force the Pension Rules with retrospective effect i.e with effect from 01.11.1993 The said Pension Rules of 1995, known as Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 provided in so far as the application and eligibility under Chapter-II is concerned as follows:-

“3. Application.- These rules shall apply to employees who, (1)(a) were in the service of the Corporation on or after the 1st day of January, 1986 but had retired before the 1 day of November, 1993; ….”

7. Based upon the above, the petitioner contended and submitted a representation for the grant of pension under the aforesaid Pension Rules of 1995 stating therein that the said Rules were applicable in terms of the Rule 3 to the petitioner because he was in service of the Corporation on the first day of January, 1986 and he had retired having sought voluntary retirement before 1 of November, 1993.

8. The appellant-Corporation sent a reply to the petitioner vide their letter dated 06.04.1996 (Annexure-5) stating therein that since the petitioner had in fact resigned from service of the Corporation, he was not entitled to the grant of pension as per the Rules of 1995. The petitioner sent a notice of demand of justice vide Annexure-6 through his counsel on 28.08.1997 calling upon the appellant-Corporation to grant the pension stating therein that the appellant had sought voluntary retirement after having completed more than 20 years of qualifying service and, therefore, the Rules being applicable, he should be sanctioned pension in terms of the said Rules. Since the appellants did not accede to the aforesaid request nor sanctioned the pension in favour of the petitioner, the petitioner filed the writ petition.

9. The writ petition of the petitioner came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment dated 08.09.2006 allowed the writ petition. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge, the appellant-Corporation has come up in appeal.

10. The submission of Mr. Agarwal appearing on behalf of the appellant-Corporation is that the petitioner had not sought voluntary retirement but instead had submitted his resignation and, therefore, the Rules of 1995 were not applicable to the petitioner and he was not entitled for receiving any pension in accordance with the Rules of 1995. It was further submitted that under the Service Rules of the Life Insurance Corporation of India prior to the amendment introduced in 1996 there was no provision for seeking voluntary retirement and it was only resignation which an employee was entitled to seek in case the employee wanted to leave the service of the appellant-Corporation prematurely i.e prior to attaining the age of superannuation. It was contended that since petitioner had tendered his resignation in accordance with the Rules, as they existed prior to 1996 in the year 1990, the question of grant of pension on the basis of having sought voluntary retirement does not arise. In support of the aforesaid, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the provisions contained in the Pension Rules of 1995 and the original Staff Regulations of 1963 and more particularly regulation 19 thereof. On the basis of the above, it was contended that in the absence of there being any provision in the staff regulation, for seeking voluntary retirement, the petitioner had in fact submitted his resignation which was accepted and the question of grant of pension treating the case of the petitioner as one of voluntary retirement did not arise.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon reported in (2004) 9 SCC 461 and submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had drawn a clear distinction between voluntary retirement and resignation and since the petitioner had in fact tendered his resignation, the scheme of 1993 did not apply in the case of the petitioner and he was not entitled to the grant of pension.

12. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon a Division Bench decision dated 08.01.2010 of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of J.M Singh v. Life Insurance Corporation of India [CWP No. 10157/1996] based upon the interpretation of the Pension Rules of 1995 in somewhat similar circumstances wherein after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances and relying upon the decision in Cecil Dennis's case (supra) as well as other decisions, the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the writ petition.

13. Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand supported the decision given by the learned Single Judge and submitted that the petitioner in fact had clearly stated in his correspondence dated 15.06.1990 and 18.06.1990 that he wanted to seek voluntary retirement on account of health grounds though the fact remains that under the letter dated 14.07.1990 the petitioner had tendered his resignation in absence of any specific provision for seeking voluntary retirement under the Staff Regulations of 1963, as they existed in the year 1990. However, learned counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge had taken into account the case law which was cited at Bar more particularly the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.K Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur v. State of U.P reported in (1990) 4 SCC 27 : AIR 1990 SC 1808 wherein their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held after taking into consideration the dictionary meaning in para 8 of the report that tendering of voluntary resignation amounts to voluntarily giving up the job and, therefore, the resignation in such circumstances would amount to voluntary retirement. It was contended that the mere use of the word ‘resignation’ in the regulations prior to 1995 did not mean that the act resignation would not amount to seeking voluntary retirement when all ingredients of voluntary retirement are fulfilled as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court more particularly when it has been held that in a given case the word ‘resign’ may also amount to voluntary retirement.

14. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaipal Singh v. Sumitra Mahajan (Smt) reported in (2004) 4 SCC 522 with special reference to para 10 of the report, that the Hon'ble Supreme court had clearly spelt out the points of distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement and if those are to be taken into account and applied to the facts and circumstances of the case of the petitioner-respondent, the case of the respondent would fall within the category of voluntary retirement as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaipal Singh's case (supra). Learned counsel further pointed out in this behalf that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had further occasion to deal with the aforesaid question in the case of Padubidri Damodar Shenoy v. Indian Airlines Limited reported in (2009) 10 SCC 514 and in para 26 of the report after taking into consideration the judgments in Jaipal Singh's case and Cecil Dennis's case the Hon'ble Supreme Court has again reiterated the same position as held earlier in Cecil Dennis's case decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, submitted that applying those tests laid down in Jaipal Singh's case, the case of the petitioner clearly falls within the purview of voluntary retirement, distinct from resigning notwithstanding the fact that Staff Regulations of 1963 did not specifically provide for the grant of voluntary retirement of the employee and the resignation so submitted in fact amounts to seeking voluntary retirement.

15. We have considered the aforesaid submissions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.K Cotton's case (supra) while dealing with the case of an employee who had tendered his resignation from service and thereafter raised an Industrial Dispute on account of not having been paid retrenchment compensation, as required by Section 6N of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, held that as per Section 2(s) of the said Act, retrenchment covers termination by the employer of the service of workman for any reason whatsoever. There being the only exceptions where the termination is by way of punishment inflicted as a result of disciplinary action or voluntary retirement of the workman or retirement of the workman on attaining the age of superannuation. It was contended in the said case that since the workman having tendered his resignation, the case of the workman does not fall within the two exceptions to Section 2(s) and, therefore, the workman was entitled to the retrenchment compensation which was not paid and accordingly the order of termination was bad. The aforesaid question was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 4 onwards of the report and the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set side the judgment of the High Court which was held in favour of the workman that resignation amounted to retrenchment and was not covered by the exception under Section 2(s) of the voluntary retirement or retirement on attaining the age of superannuation. After considering the various dictionary meanings of the words ‘resign’ and ‘retire’, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 8 of the report held as follows:-

“8. In the present case the employee's request contained in the letter of resignation was accepted by the employer and that brought an end to the contract of service. The meaning of term ‘resign’ as found in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary includes ‘retirement’. Therefore, when an employee voluntarily tenders his resignation it is an act by which he voluntarily gives up his job. We are, therefore, of the opinion that such a situation would be covered by the expression ‘voluntarily retirement’ within the meaning of clause (i) of Section 2(s) of the State Act….”

16. On the basis of the above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the voluntary resignation given by the workman amounted to voluntary retirement, as referred to in the explanation in Section 2(s) of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Otherwise, if resignation submitted in the circumstances was not held to be seeking voluntary retirement it would have amounted retrenchment enabling the workman to seek retrenchment compensation and consequences flowing from Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act on failure to comply.

17. If we look at the facts of the present case, the Staff Regulations framed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India did not contain at the relevant time in the year 1990 any provision for seeking voluntary retirement. Under Regulation 19 an employee could only submit his resignation.

18. In the instant case, as has been quoted hereinabove, in the first letter written by the petitioner on 15.06.1990 (Annexure-3), the petitioner specifically made the prayer that the only option left for him was to seek “voluntary retirement” on account of the circumstances as mentioned in the said letter. The same request was reiterated in the letter dated 18.06.1990 (Annexure-4) pointing out that the only recourse which he had was to seek “voluntary retirement”. Thereafter, realizing that the regulations do not contain any provision for seeking voluntary retirement, the petitioner sought voluntarily to resign from service and also prayed that the notice period which is required, as per the Staff Regulations, may be waived. This request was made vide Annexure-1 on 14.07.1990 The request made by the petitioner was accepted vide letter dated 11.01.1991 and the request for accepting the resignation was accepted with retrospective effect i.e on 14.07.1990 and it was further granted with the condition that “recovery of outstanding dues, if any, including salary paid to you after 14.07.1990”. In the light of these facts, if the principles which were enumerated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court drawing distinction between tendering of resignation and seeking voluntary retirement are to be taken into account, as laid down in para 10 of Jaipal Singh's case (supra), we would find that the case of the petitioner-respondent would fall within the scope of having sought voluntary retirement. Para 10 in Jaipal Singh's case (supra) reads as follows:-

“We also do not find any merit in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the acceptance by the appointing authority of the application seeking permission to retire was not required as there was no difference between “voluntary retirement” and “resignation”. In the case of Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon, reported in (2004) 100 FLR 441, this Court has laid down that in service jurisprudence there is a difference between “voluntary retirement” and “resignation” as they convey different connotations. It has been held that voluntary retirement and resignation involve voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave service and though both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of the basic distinctions between the two is that in the case of resignation, it can be tendered at any time but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be sought for after rendering prescribed period of qualifying service. In the case of resignation, a prior permission is not mandatory while in the case of voluntary retirement, permission of concerned employer is requisite condition. Under rule 16 of the 1958 Rules, an employee who seeks voluntary retirement has to give three months notice to enable the employer to complete the designated mode of acceptance [See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4 Edition Vol. 9 Page 133]. Lastly, in a given case, the appointing authority may refuse to waive the said notice period which shows that resignation may be unilateral whereas voluntary retirement is bilateral. A similar question came before this Court in the case of UCO Bank v. Sanwar Mal decided on 11.3.2004 vide Civil Appeal No. 3192 of 1999 unreported, in which this Court has inter alia held that in the case of ‘resignation’, the relationship of employer and employee terminates on acceptance of resignation whereas in the case of ‘retirement’, voluntary or on superannuation, the relationship continues for the purposes of payment of retiral benefits. In the case of retirement, there is a nexus between such retirement and retiral benefits. For the aforestated reasons, we do not find any merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant.”

19. As would be seen hereinabove, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaipal Singh's case (supra) relied upon the earlier decisions in Cecil Dennis's case (supra) as well as the UCO Bank v. Sanwar Mal reported in (2004) 4 SCC 412. Test which was laid down in the above quoted paragraph after laying down that voluntary retirement and resignation both involve voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave the service but they operate differently. The differences which have been pointed out are (1) the resignation can be tendered at any point of time whereas voluntary retirement can be sought after rendering specified period of qualifying services; (2) in the case of resignation prior permission is not mandatory whereas in the case of voluntary retirement permission of the employer is a pre-requisite condition. In the case at hand before the Hon'ble Supreme Court Rule 16 of the Rules required that a person seeking voluntary retirement has to give three months notice and it is open in a given case for the appointing authority to refuse or grant the waiver of the notice period; (3) resignation is an unilateral act whereas the voluntary retirement is a bilateral act. In the case of resignation, the relationship between the employer and the employee terminates on the acceptance of the resignation whereas in the case of voluntary retirement, the relationship continues for the purpose of supplying retiral benefits.

20. If we apply the above test to the facts of the present case, we find that the petitioner has sought on 15.06.1990 voluntary retirement having admittedly put in 20 years or more of service which as per the Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of 1995 entitles an employee to seek voluntary retirement. Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of 1995 reads as follows:-

“31. Pension on voluntary retirement - (1) At any time after an employee has completed twenty years of qualifying service he may, by giving notice of not less than ninety days in writing, to the appointing authority, retire from service.”

21. Thus, the Pension Rules permit voluntary retirement and entitlement to pension on completion of 20 years of qualifying service. Under Rule 19 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India of Regulations, 1960 speaks of resignation prior to the amendment in the year 1996 and even in the case of resignation the employee concerned is supposed to give a notice of three months to the employer-Corporation and it was only on the acceptance of the resignation that the employee on the expiry of the three months notice period could be allowed to leave on acceptance of resignation. The aforesaid provisions which only spoke of resignation prior to 1996 on the touchstone of Jaipal Singh's case (supra) the so-called resignation submitted by the petitioner-respondent notwithstanding the fact that the regulations do not speak of voluntary retirement, the petitioner sought permission of the employer and requested for waiving three months notice period. The conditions which have been enumerated hereinabove when applied to the facts of the present case clearly show that notwithstanding the fact that the term “voluntary retirement” in the Staff Regulations of LIC of 1960 prior to the amendment of 1996 had not been used, the use of word “resignation” in the Regulation 19 would on the touchstone of the judgment of Jaipal Singh's case (supra) amount to nothing but seeking voluntary retirement in the facts of the present case.

22. We have considered the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of J.M Singh (supra) and we find that we are unable to agree with the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The learned Judges while having noted the decision in UCO Bank's case (supra) and Cecil Dennis's case (supra) have not taken into account the law laid down in Jaipal Singh's case (supra) as discussed hereinabove.

23. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment had relied upon the judgment in J.K Cotton's case (supra), and held in favour of the petitioner-respondent. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with both the terms “retire” and “resign” in the said case and held that in fact ‘resign’ amounted to seeking voluntary retirement. Till such time as the Regulations of 1995 were not brought into force which dealt with the two aspects of resignation and seeking voluntary retirement separately by providing separate definitions and procedure for each of them, the term used in the original Staff Regulations in the facts and circumstances where the petitioner had put in the requisite number of years of service so as to qualify for pension, the resignation of the respondent would amount to seeking voluntary retirement and since the petitioner has put in the requisite number of more than 20 years of qualifying service, it would entitle the petitioner to grant of pensionary benefits under the Pension Rules frame by the appellant-Corporation.

24. In the light of the above discussion, we would dismiss the appeal filed by the appellant-Corporation affirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge and on the basis of the additional reasons given herein.

25. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.