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T.K Sumathi & Ors. v. Kundantavida Rabiya & Ors.

Kerala High Court
Dec 13, 2011
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Legal Opinion Summary — K. Harilal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision arises from an unsuccessful tenancy petition before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge, Thalassery), recorded as RCA No. 6/2003, which the tenants challenged in revision. The original petition by the landlord was filed under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide need to occupy the building to run a stationery business.

During pendency before the Rent Controller the original landlord died. His legal representatives were impleaded as supplemental petitioners and the petition was supplemented and amended to reflect the change. The supplemental petition asserted that the need to occupy the premises for conducting a stationery business continued after the landlord's death and that a family member (Latheef, the husband of the 3rd supplemental petitioner) would manage the business.

The tenant (revision petitioner) contested the claim, filing counter and additional counter affidavits. The tenant alleged the need was a pretext to evict, that the tenant primarily relied on the business for livelihood, and that no alternate premises were available; the tenant further argued that the bona fide need ceased upon the landlord's death and that the legal representatives could not continue the petition on the same ground without filing a fresh petition.

On evidence, PWs 1 and 2 (for the landlord/legal representatives) and RW 1 (the tenant) were examined, and exhibits A1–A11 and B1–B3 were marked. The Rent Control Appellate Authority ruled in favour of the landlord/legal representatives. The tenants challenged that judgment in revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a bona fide need asserted under Section 11(3) survives the death of the original landlord if he died before securing an order of eviction.
  2. Whether the legal representatives of a deceased landlord have the right to proceed with the same petition under Section 11(3) after the landlord's death.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner (Tenant) — Arguments

  • The judgment below was vitiated by illegality, irregularity and impropriety in finding that the landlord's need was genuine and bona fide.
  • The court erred in finding that alternate buildings were available in the locality to shift the business.
  • The claimed need was actually for occupation by the son-in-law (Latheef) and there was no evidence that he was a dependent of the original landlord or the supplemental landlords.
  • By the death of the original landlord, the bona fide need ceased to exist; the legal representatives could not prosecute the petition on the same ground and the correct remedy for them was to file a fresh petition advancing their own bona fide need.

Respondent / Legal Representatives of the Deceased Landlord — Arguments

  • After the landlord's death, legal representatives were impleaded and sufficient amendments were made to show that the bona fide need for the stationery business continued for the livelihood of the family.
  • The family (through Latheef) was prepared and willing to manage the business; therefore the need survived and the petition should continue despite the landlord's death.
  • Evidence (PWs 1 and 2) was adduced to prove continuance of the bona fide requirement after death.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Santhilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Tehvala, (1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358 Held that after the death of the original landlord (who sought eviction under Section 11(3)), the senior member of his family takes his place and can continue the suit for occupation; overruled Phoolran's case which held the right to sue does not survive. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a bona fide requirement can be prosecuted by legal representatives and that survival of the claim is recognized by higher precedent.
Phoolran's case, (1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110 Two-Judge Bench view that the right to sue on the ground of bona fide need does not survive the death of the landlord. Noted as having been overruled by Santhilal; the court treated Santhilal as authoritative over Phoolran's case when considering survival of claim after death.
Kamaleswar Prasad v. Pradymanju Agarwal, 1997 (2) KLT SN 11 Principle that the crucial date for deciding bona fide requirement is the date of the application for eviction. Cited with other Kerala decisions to frame the principle that timing of the need is relevant; court considered that need must continue as of the relevant date and factual inquiry is required.
Gayprasad v. Pradeep Srivasthava, 2001 (1) KLT 753 Same line of authority: the crucial date for deciding bona fide requirement is the date of application for eviction. Used alongside other Kerala decisions to support how courts determine the relevant date for assessing bona fide necessity.
Narayanan v. Tahiba, 2009 (3) KLT 749 Held that if a decree for eviction is passed and the landlord dies during the pendency of appeal, the need claimed by legal representatives will survive and they have the right to proceed with the appeal. Cited to demonstrate prior application of survival principle where death occurred after decree; the court distinguished the present case because the landlord died before securing an order of eviction.
Prathapan v. P.R. Rama Warrier, 2004 (2) KLT 559 Observed that persons such as sisters, brothers, in-laws or even long-serving domestic servants may be treated as family members depending on family relations and bonds; membership is fact-specific. Invoked to support a pragmatic, fact-specific approach to who counts as a "member of the family" for Section 11(3) purposes.
Thalayodi Raghavan v. Kooraritavitta Kelappan & Others, 2006 (1) KLT 1 (Full Bench) Held that "dependent" in the BRC Act context is generally considered as dependent on the landlord for the building; no precise definition possible — depends on facts and circumstances. Relied upon for the proposition that dependency and family membership must be determined pragmatically on facts, reinforcing that factual inquiry is determinative.
K.P. Komalan v. Muhammed, ILR 2001 (3) Kerala 390 Held that the benefit of the second proviso to sub‑section (3) of Section 11 cannot be claimed merely because alternative accommodation requires high pagidi and rent. Cited to reject the tenant's contention that difficulties such as heavy deposit/payments for alternate premises suffice to invoke the second proviso; supported the concurrent finding that the tenant failed to discharge the burden under that proviso.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Pleadings and amendments: The court examined the amended pleadings filed after the death of the landlord and observed that the legal representatives had been impleaded and the petition supplemented to allege continuance of the bona fide need for occupation for conducting the stationery business.
  2. Identification of core questions: The court framed two central questions: (a) does bona fide need survive if the landlord dies before securing an order of eviction; and (b) can legal representatives proceed with the same petition.
  3. Precedential analysis: The court reviewed earlier authorities, notably Santhilal Thakordas (holding survival of claim in certain circumstances and overruling Phoolran) and Kerala decisions establishing that the crucial date for assessing bona fide need is the date of application; it treated these authorities as guiding principles for the survival question. It distinguished cases where death occurred after decree/eviction order from the present factual matrix where death occurred before securing the order.
  4. Statutory interpretation: A plain reading of Section 11(3) was applied. The court noted that Section 11(3) permits a landlord to seek eviction for the landlord's own occupation or for occupation by any member of the family dependent on him, thereby bringing family members' occupation within the statutory ambit. On this basis and with reasoning from precedents, the court held that bona fide need can survive the landlord's death provided the need continues for occupation by a dependent family member at the time of death.
  5. Factual determination: The court reviewed evidence: PW 1 (wife of the original landlord) and PW 2 (husband of supplemental petitioner No.3 / Latheef) testified that the bona fide requirement continued and that Latheef was willing to manage the business. The courts below had concurrently found the need genuine and bona fide; the revisional court found no valid contrary evidence to upset those concurrent findings.
  6. Application of provisos to Section 11(3):
    • First proviso: The court found no evidence that the landlord possessed other vacant rooms suitable for the business, so the first proviso did not defeat the claim.
    • Second proviso: The tenant (RW 1) was a pensioner and admitted certain incomes and that his son had been running the business for several years; he also admitted he had not conducted sincere inquiries regarding alternative accommodation and that net income from business (after expenses) was low. Relying on K.P. Komalan, the court rejected the tenant's contention that high deposits/rents for alternate premises justify benefit under the second proviso. The court held that the tenant failed to discharge the burden under the second proviso.
  7. Standard of review: Considering the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1968, the court assessed whether there was any illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the concurrent findings. It found none and expressed satisfaction with the concurrent factual findings of the courts below.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE REVISION FAILS AND STANDS DISMISSED.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The courts below correctly found that the bona fide need projected by the landlord/legal representatives was genuine and continued after the death of the original landlord, based on the pleadings and evidence of PWs 1 and 2.
  • The tenant's contentions under the provisos to Section 11(3) were rejected: there was no evidence of other vacant rooms in landlord's possession (first proviso), and the tenant failed to discharge the burden under the second proviso (including failure to make sincere inquiries and inability to rely on high deposits/rent as a defence, in the light of K.P. Komalan).

Broader legal implications (as articulated by the court):

  • The court held that a bona fide need asserted under Section 11(3) will survive even if the landlord dies before securing an order of eviction, provided the need alleged by the landlord continues after death for occupation by any family member who was dependent on the landlord at the time of death.
  • Legal representatives are entitled to proceed with the same petition, but it is incumbent on them to make necessary amendments to the petition to demonstrate the continuance of the need; whether need continues is a factual question depending on circumstances of each case.
  • The decision applies established precedents (including Santhilal Thakordas and subsequent Kerala decisions) and does not purport to create a novel principle beyond those authorities; instead it applies them to the fact that death occurred before securing the eviction order and upholds concurrent findings below.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the materials and statements contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the opinion's text.

Show all summary ...

K. Harilal, J.:— The unsuccessful tenants before the courts below have come up in revision challenging the judgment in RCA No. 6/2003 passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority (the Additional District Judge, Thalassery). The petition was filed under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The landlord died during the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of the Rent Controller. The legal representatives got impleaded in the petition and supplemental amendments were made in the petition.

2. The respondent/original landlord who had been working in Saudi Arabia and was constrained to give up his job due to health problem is now living without any kind of job or income to meet livelihood for himself and his family. The need alleged in the petition was for conducting a stationery business in the petition schedule building to eke out livelihood for himself and his family. In the petition, it is alleged that the income derived from the business carrying on in the petition schedule shop room is not the only source of income of the tenants/revision petitioners for their livelihood and suitable buildings are available in the locality to shift the business. After the death of the original landlord supplemental petitioners have been impleaded and sufficient amendments were made in the rent control petition. They contended that by the death of the original landlord, they are put to impecuniousness and hence the members of the family decided to start the business which their deceased father has already desired to start in the management of Latheef, the husband of the 3rd suppl. petitioner. The said Latheef is ready and willing to manage the stationery business for and on behalf of the other legal representatives of the original deceased landlord. Thus, after the death of the landlord sufficient pleadings were incorporated in the petition to show that the need already alleged in the petition is continuing. The revision petitioner/tenant entered appearance and filed a counter contending that the need projected in the petition is only a ruse to evict him and no other buildings are available in the locality to shift the business. Further contended that he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income from the business carried on in the petition schedule building. In the additional counter, the revision petitioner/tenant further contended that by the death of the original landlord bona fide need stated in the petition ceased to exist and legal representatives of the deceased cannot prosecute the petition on the same ground. According to the tenant, the remedy available to the petitioner is to file a fresh petition advancing the bona fide need of the legal representatives, any.

3. On the basis of the rival contentions PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Ext. A1 to A11 were marked for the petitioner and RW 1 was examined and Exts. B1 to 3 were marked for the tenant.

4. Sri. K.V Sohan, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner contended that the impugned judgment is vitiated by illegality, irregularity and impropriety. The court below committed illegality in finding that the need raised by the landlord is genuine and bona fide. The learned counsel further contended that the court below committed illegality in finding that alternate buildings are available in the locality to shift the business of the tenant. The present need is for the occupation of the son in law of the landlord to conduct the business and there is no evidence to show that the son-in-law is a dependent of the original landlord or supplemental landlords. It is further contended that by the death of the original landlord bona fide need ends there and the petition was liable to be dismissed.

5. We have given our anxious considerations to the argument advanced by Sri. K.V Sohan. On an analysis of the pleadings, it could be seen that after the death of the original landlord, the legal heirs were impleaded and sufficient amendments were made in the petition so as to project the continuance of the need already alleged in the petition. Therefore, from the additional pleadings it could be seen that after the death of the original landlord, the additional landlords claim that the need survives.

6. In view of the rival contentions, the questions which emerge for consideration are (1) whether bonafide need survives after the death of the landlord, if he died before securing the order of eviction. (2) Whether legal representatives of the deceased landlord have the right to proceed with the same petition in such cases. Almost similar questions were considered in Santhilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Tehvala, (1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358. In that case the landlord, who sought for eviction under Section 11(3), died after securing order of eviction, during the pendency of the appeal. The Apex Court held that” after the death of the original landlord, the senior member of his family takes his place and he is well competent to continue the suit for his occupation and occupation of the other members of the family”. Besides, the Apex Court overruled the decision in Phoolran's case, (1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110 wherein the Bench consisting of two learned Judges took the view that right to sue does not survive after the death of the landlord in a petition on the ground of bonafide need. The decisions in Kamaleswar Prasad v. Pradymanju Agarwal, 1997 (2) KLT SN 11, Gayprasad v. Pradeep Srivasthava, 2001 (1) KLT 753 are also in the same line holding that crucial date for deciding as to bonafide requirement of the landlord is the date of application for eviction. Relying on the above decisions, in Narayanan v. Tahiba, 2009 (3) KLT 749, this Court held that “if a decree for eviction is passed, the death of the landlord during the pendency of the appeal does not make any difference and the need claimed by the legal representatives will survive and the legal representatives have the right to proceed with the appeal. The only difference with the case on hand is that, here the landlord died before securing the order of eviction.

7. On the above context, we may have to look at Section 11(3), which reads as follows:

“A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bonafide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any members of his family dependent on him”.

8. When we focus at the Section, on a plain reading itself, it could be seen that the landlord has the right to apply for eviction under Section 11(3), either for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. Obviously, the occupation of any member of the family was also taken into consideration by the legislature, equally as that of the occupation of the landlord himself. Thus the need for the entire family comes within the ambit of Section 11(3). On an analysis of Section 11(3), in the light of the above decisions, we hold that the bonafide need will survive, even if the landlord died before securing order of eviction and the legal representatives have the right to proceed with the petition, provided that the need projected by the landlord for his occupation must continue after the death of the landlord for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him at the time of death. The death of the original landlord who filed a petition under Section 11(3) before securing eviction, shall not cause the bonafide need to be abated automatically. It is also ir rambent on the legal representatives to make necessary amendments in the petition to the effect that the need is continuing. Whether the need continues or not is a factual issue depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

9. Another contention raised by the tenant is that PW 2 is not dependent on the landlord. In Prathapan v. P.R Rama Warrier, 2004 (2) KLT 559, this Court observed that “there may also be cases where sisters, brothers, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law be treated as members of the family. It all depends upon the family relations and family bonds. A domestic servant who served the family through out his life also in a given situation be treated as member of the family. Further in Thalayodi Raghavan v. Kooraritavitta Kelappan & Others, 2006 (1) KLT 1, a Full Bench of this Court held that “the word ‘dependent’ in the context of BRC Act is generally considered as dependent on the landlord for the building. In short it would not be possible to give a clear definition as to who all will fell within the expression “member of the family dependent on the landlord, which depends upon variety of factors including relationship the landlord has with his members of the family. Courts dealing with rent control matters have to make a pragmatic approach on the issue depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it would not be possible to give a precise and definite meaning to that expression in the context of Section 11(3) of the Act”

10. PW 1, the wife of the original landlord has stated that her husband genuinely required the petition schedule building for starting the stationery business for the income of the family and with the death of the husband his legal representatives are put to a pathetic situation and they wanted to start the proposed business for the livelihood of the entire family. PW 2, the husband of the supplemental petitioner No. 3, was also examined and proved that bona fide requirement continues even after the death of the original landlord. He expressed his willingness to manage the proposed stationery business for the livelihood of the entire family. In view of the evidence of PWs 1 and PW 2 the courts below concurrently and rightly found that the need projected by the landlord is bona fide and we are also satisfied with the above findings in the absence of any valid contra evidence.

11. Coming to the first proviso to sub section (3) Section 11, there is no evidence to show that the landlord is in possession of other vacant rooms of his own to conduct the business. Therefore, the need projected by the landlord is not hit by the first proviso to sub section (3) of Section 11. Coming to the second proviso, admittedly the tenant is a pensioner earning a sum of Rs. 5,900/- per month. While examined as RW 1, the tenant stated that he had been getting a sum of Rs. 8,000/- per month from the business in the petition schedule building. But he further stated in the cross examination that after deducing the expenditure, the monthly income from the business is only Rs. 1200/- per month. Besides, he admitted that for the last 4 to 5 years, his elder son is running the business. He further stated that his son is maintaining the accounts of income and expenditure in respect of the business and he is not aware of such things. Coming to the second limb of the second proviso, RW 1 has admitted that he has not made any sincere enquiry regarding the availability of alternative building in the locality. His another contention is that for the purpose of acquiring another building, he has to pay heavy sums as deposits. We also find no merit in the above contention of the tenant in the light of the decision reported in K.P Komalan v. Muhammed, ILR 2001 (3) Kerala 390. In this decision, this court held that “the benefit of the 2nd proviso to sub section (3) of Section 11 cannot be availed of on the contention that for the alternate accommodation high pagidi and rent are required”. Thus, the court below concurrently and rightly for id that the tenant is not entitled to get the benefitunderthe 2nd proviso to Section 11(3) and the tenant miserably failed to discharge the burden under the 2nd proviso to sub section (3) of Section 11.

12. Considering the limited jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1968, the question is whether there is any illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the findings of the court below. We are of the view that there is no irregularity, or illegality or impropriety in the findings of the court below and we are satisfied with the concurrent findings of the courts below. In the result, this revision fails and stands dismissed.