Vijay Mahobiya v. State Of M.P

He is heard on admission.

In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the FIR, Annexure P/1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegations mentioned in the FIR are factually incorrect and legally improper. Learned counsel in his elaborate arguments submits that the incorrect and false allegations are mentioned in the FIR which is bad in law. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on (1998) 5 SCC 749 (Pepsi Foods v. Special Judicial Magistrate); (2009) 4 SCC 439 (Mahesh Choudhary v. State Of Rajasthan); (2008) 14 SCC 1 (Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar), and lastly, (2011) 1 MPJR 44 (Dev Vrat Mishra v. State of MP).

I have heard the learned counsel at length.

This is settled in law that FIR can be called in question on limited grounds. The correctness of allegations of FIR is not a ground for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. In State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, the Apex Court has laid down the law that if all the allegations are accepted on its face value and even then no offence is made out, interference can be made. However, petitioner's case is that he is falsely implicated and allegations mentioned against him are factually incorrect. I am afraid that this is not the scope of judicial review in a writ jurisdiction. This Court is under no obligation to conduct a roving enquiry or act as a trial court. So far the judgment delivered in Pepsi Foods (supra) is concerned, the Apex Court held that where there is an abuse of process of law, the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction. This legal principle is settled. However, the abuse cannot be gathered on the basis of facts which are not admitted. In other words, since FIR cannot be called in question on correctness of allegations, abuse cannot be established on the basis of those factual averments of the FIR. In Mahesh Choudhary (supra) the Apex Court held that the powers by the writ court should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose the commission of offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused. This principle is in furtherance to the law laid down in Bhajanlal (supra). This judgment is of no assistance to the petitioner, rather it is against his case. In Rukmini Narvekar (supra) the Apex Court opined that at the time of framing of the charges the material produced by the defence can be looked into by the competent court. It is further held that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into while framing the charge by the competent court. In my considered opinion, this defence may be available to the petitioner before the trial court at the time of framing of the charge but this cannot be examined at this stage in a writ petition. In Dev Vrat Mishra (supra) this Court followed the ratio of Bhajanlal (supra). This judgment is also of no assistance to the petitioner. The petitioner has a remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure to redress the aforesaid grievance. No other point is pressed before me.

Accordingly, I find no reason to interfere in the FIR on the allegation that it is factually incorrect. Resultantly, interference is declined. Petition is dismissed.

So far other relief para 7(2) is concerned, the writ is not tenable against the respondent No. 2 - ICICI Bank. This relief is also declined. However, liberty is reserved to the petitioner to avail the other remedy available to him under the law.