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Beji v. State Of Kerala & Ors.

Kerala High Court
Jun 18, 2012
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — K.T. Sankaran, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The detenu, Henry Jose (husband of the petitioner), was detained under the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 ("KAAPA"). The detention order was issued on 17.12.2011 and the detenu was arrested on 21.12.2011. The Government, exercising powers under Section 10(4) of the KAAPA, confirmed the detention, and the Advisory Board opined that there was sufficient cause for detention. It was not disputed that the detenu had previously been detained under the KAAPA by an order dated 5.11.2009. The petitioner filed the present Writ Petition (Criminal) challenging the legality of the detention; the petition raised two principal contentions which the Court considered.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a detention order under the KAAPA is invalid when the detenu is in judicial custody for a crime referred to in the detention order, unless the detaining authority specifically assesses (a) the possibility of the detenu obtaining bail and (b) the likelihood of the detenu, if released, again indulging in similar criminal activities.
  2. Whether sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAAPA — dealing with the definition of "known-rowdy" based on findings "on investigation or enquiry" on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers — can be invoked where the alleged offences are still under investigation and a final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. has not been filed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The detention order is bad in law because in Crime No. 1096/11 (referred to in the detention order) the detenu was in judicial custody when the detention order was issued. The detaining authority, though noting custody, should have specifically satisfied itself whether bail was possible and, if so, whether there was a likelihood of the detenu repeating criminal activity if released.
  • Three of the crimes mentioned in the detention order were still under investigation with no final report filed by the Police. Therefore, the petitioner argued that sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAAPA would not be attracted.

Respondent / State's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 The proposition that even if a person is in custody a valid detention order can be passed where (1) the authority is aware the person is in custody, (2) the authority reasonably believes there is a real possibility of bail and that on being released the person would likely indulge in prejudicial activity, and (3) the authority records satisfaction that detention is essential to prevent such activity; and that a detention order in such circumstances is permissible rather than being required to be opposed only by opposing bail. The Court found that the ingredients set out in paragraph 13 of Kamarunnissa were satisfied in the present case and that the detaining authority had applied its mind to these aspects.
Ramesh Yadav, (1985) 4 SCC 232 : AIR 1986 SC 315 The cautionary principle that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal and can be dealt with under ordinary law. The Court quoted this principle as part of the legal backdrop referenced in Kamarunnissa but accepted that preventive detention may still be available where facts warrant it.
Jameela v. State of Kerala, 2008 (1) KHC 5 (DB) : 2007 ICO 9496 Authority should consider whether the detenu was on bail or in judicial custody; failure to indicate the custody status could vitiate the detention order. The Court distinguished Jameela: in the present case the detaining authority had expressly considered the detenu's judicial custody, bail application and its dismissal, and recorded satisfaction. Hence Jameela did not apply to invalidate the order here.
Poonam Lata v. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 4 SCC 48 : AIR 1987 SC 2098 Supports the proposition that detention can be necessary even when the person is already in custody. The Court referred to Poonam Lata to support the view that being in judicial custody does not, by itself, oust the jurisdiction to make a detention order if detention is nonetheless necessary.
Elizabath George v. State of Kerala, 2008 (4) KLT 425 Held that a final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. is not a precondition to attract the KAAPA provision; preventive detention is anticipatory and the detaining authority may reach subjective satisfaction even while investigations are pending. The Court adopted and followed the reasoning in Elizabath George, holding that pending investigations (without a final report) do not prevent a detaining authority from forming the requisite satisfaction under the KAAPA.
Ranjini v. State Of Kerala, 2009 (3) KLT 500 : 2009 ICO 2608 Considered Elizabath George and the conflict with another Division Bench (Sathi). It noted the disagreement but did not refer the matter to a Full Bench. The Court referred to Ranjini and stated it was inclined to accept the view in Elizabath George and, following the reasoning in Ranjini, chose not to refer the issue to a Full Bench.
Sathi v. State of Kerala, W.P. Crl. 201 of 2009 A Division Bench had disagreed with Elizabath George's view on whether a final report under S.173(2) is required. The Court noted Sathi's disagreement with Elizabath but declined to refer the conflict to a Full Bench and instead accepted Elizabath's reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the two points raised by the petitioner in turn.

Point No. 1 (detenu in custody when detention order issued):

  • The detention order indicated the detenu was involved in six crimes: three pending trial and three pending investigation.
  • The detaining authority recorded that the detenu's bail application had been dismissed by the Sessions Court on 12.12.2011 but nevertheless formed the subjective satisfaction that, if enlarged on bail, the detenu would again indulge in anti-social activities prejudicial to public safety.
  • The Court relied on the three-fold test set out in Kamarunnissa: (1) awareness that the person is in custody; (2) reasonable belief, based on reliable material, of a real possibility of release on bail and likelihood of prejudicial activity upon release; and (3) essentiality of detention to prevent such activity. The Court concluded these ingredients were present and that the detaining authority had applied its mind to the relevant aspects.
  • The Court distinguished Jameela where the detention order failed to mention custody status: in the present case, the order explicitly addressed custody, bail application and the authority's satisfaction, so Jameela did not invalidate the order here. The Court also noted Poonam Lata in support of the proposition that detention can be necessary despite custody.

Point No. 2 (interpretation of sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 — "known-rowdy"):

  • The Court set out the statutory language of clause (p) and specifically sub-clause (iii), which refers to persons "found, on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers" to have committed offences mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2.
  • The Court examined definitions from the Cr.P.C.: "investigation" (Section 2(h)) and "inquiry" (Section 2(g)), and noted that "complaint" as defined in Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. contemplates allegations to a Magistrate and excludes police reports. The KAAPA does not define "complaint."
  • The Court reasoned that sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) does not refer to findings by a Court and the use of the words "investigation" and "enquiry" in ordinary parlance indicates that the Legislature intended that the finding could arise from police investigation or enquiries initiated at the instance of private persons (not suo motu police registration). Thus a private person may initiate the matter leading to investigation/enquiry by police or other authority.
  • The Court held that it is not necessary for a final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. to be filed before sub-clause (iii) can operate. If investigations are pending, the investigating officer may, after making sufficient enquiries, be satisfied that the person committed the offence; such satisfaction can support classification as a "known-rowdy" for detention purposes.
  • The Court relied on and adopted the view in Elizabath George (that a final report under S.173(2) is not a precondition) and, after considering Ranjini and Sathi, chose to accept Elizabath George's approach and not to refer the conflict to a Full Bench.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: For the reasons stated, the Writ Petition (Criminal) is DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The dismissal upholds the detention of the detenu Henry Jose under the KAAPA as valid on the facts presented: the detaining authority had recorded its satisfaction after considering custody, bail proceedings and the likelihood of repetition of anti-social activities.
  • The Court interpreted sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAAPA to allow a finding based on investigation or enquiry even where a final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. has not been filed, provided the investigating officer (or competent authority) after sufficient enquiries is satisfied that the person committed the offences. The Court expressly adopted the reasoning in Elizabath George on this point.
  • The Court distinguished precedents where detention orders were vitiated for failure to state custody-related facts (e.g., Jameela) because here the detaining authority had expressly addressed those facts.
  • The opinion applies existing authorities (Kamarunnissa, Poonam Lata, Elizabath George, Ranjini and others) to the facts; the Court declined to refer the split in authority (as between Elizabath and Sathi) to a Full Bench and chose to follow Elizabath's reasoning. The decision therefore gives effect, in this case, to the view that pending investigations do not preclude preventive detention under the KAAPA.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K.T Sankaran, J.:— Henry Jose, the husband of, the petitioner was detained under the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007, hereinafter referred to as ‘the KAAPA’. The order of detention was issued on 17.12.2011 The detenu was arreted on 21.12.2011 In exercise of the powers under Section 10(4) of the KAAPA, the Government confirmed the order of detention. The Advisory Board opined that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu It is not in dispute thatthe detenu was detained under the KAAPA on an earlier occasion, as per the order of detention dated 5.11.2009

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of detention is bad in law and therefore, the continued detention of the detenu is illegal. The counsel raised two points; (1) In Crime No. 1096/11 referred to in the order of detention, the detenu was injudicial custody at the time when the detention order was issued. Though the detaining authority mentioned in the order of detention that the detenu was injudicial custody on the date of issue of the order, it was further necessary for the detaining authority to satisfy, as to whether there was any possibility for the detenu to get bail and if so, whether there was any likelihood of the detenu indulging in similar criminal activities; and (2) Three of the crimes mentioned in the order of detention were under investigation and no final report was filed by the Police in those cases. If so, Sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of KAAPA would not be attracted. The points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are discussed below.

3. Point No. 1; The order of detention reveals that the detenu was involved in six crimes, of which three cases were pending, trial and the other three cases were pending investigation. The detaining authority was satisfied that the detenu would again indulge in prejudicial activities which may adversely affect the public safety, if he is released from judicial custody. The order of detention further shows that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the bail apphcatioh filed by the detenu was dismissed by the Sessions Court on 12.12.2011 Still, the detaining authority came to the satisfaction that if the detenu were to be enlarged on bail, he would again indulge in similar anti-social activities.

4. The leamed counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1990 ICO 1 and the decision of the Kerala High Court in Jameela v. State of Kerala, 2008 (1) KHC 5 (DB) : 2007 ICO 9496. In Kamarunnisa's case (supra), the Supreme Court held thus:

“13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to belive on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing, if the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a higher Court! What this court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav, (1985) 4 SCC 232 : AIR 1986 SC 315 (Supra) was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which aire essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention.”.

5. The ingredients mentioned in paragraph 13 of the judgment in Karnarunnissa's case have been satisfied in the present case. The detaining authority applied its mind to all the relevantaspects mentioned in Karnarunnissa's case.

6. The counsel also relied on the decision in Jameela v. State of Kerala, 2008 (1) KHC 5 (DB), in support of the contentionthat if tile detaining authority did not consider the fact that the detenu was already in custody, the order of detention would be vitiated. In Jameela's case (supra), the order of detention did not mention whether the detenu was on bail or whether he was under judicial custody. The case in Jameela v. State of Kerala, 2008 (1) KHC 5 (DB) is clearly distinguishable since in the present case all the relevant details regarding the judicial custody of the detenu, his filing of an application for bail, the dismissal of the same, the likelihood of the detenu being granted bail and the satisfaction of the detaining authority that if the detenu is released on bail, he is likely to indulge in similar criminal activities, have been specifically dealt with and considered. That the detenu is injudicial custody, does not by itself take away the jurisdiction of the detaining authority to make an order of detention under the KAAPA. However, it must be established that the detaining authority was aware of the fact thaj the detenu was injudicial custody, but in the facts of the particular case, his detention under the KAAPA became necessary. We are fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in Poonam Lata v. M.L Wadhawan, (1987) 4 SCC 48 : AIR 1987 SC 2098 : 1987 ICO 669, in this context.

7. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to accept the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

8. Point No. 2; To consider this point, it is apposite to extract the relevant part of the definition of “known-rowdy” in clause (p) of Section (2) of the KAAPA.

2. Definitions—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

x x x x x.

x x x x x x x

(p) “known rowdy” meaiis any person, who had been, by reasotf of acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the Order imposing any restriction or detention under this Act,—

(i) made guilty, by a competent Court at least once for an offence of the nature under item (i) of clause (t) of Section 2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause; or

(ii) made guilty, by a competent Court at least twice for any offence of the nature mentioned under item (ii) of clause (t) of Section 2 or amy offence notified as such under the said clause; or

(iii) found, on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2:

Provided that any offence committed by a person,—

xxxxxxxxxxxxx

9. Under sub-clause (in) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAAPA, the person concerned must be found on investigation or enquiry, by a competent police officer or other authority, to have committed any Offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2. The interpretation of the expression “investigation or enquiry” in sub-clause (iii) becomes relevant in this context. “Investigation”, as defined in Section 2(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Cr.P.C’), includes all proceedings under the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate), who is authorised by a Magistrate in that behalf. “Inquiry”, as defined in Section 2(g) of the Cr.P.C means, every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under the Code by a Magistrate or Court. Sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAAPA also stipulates that the finding must be on complaints initiated by persons other than the police officers. The expression “complaint”, is not defined in the KAAPA. “Complaint” is defined in Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C, as follows:

“2.(d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under this Code, thatsome person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report”

10. Sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAAPA nowhere mentions about Court, while in the definition of “known-goonda” in sub-clause (ii) of clause (o) of Section 2, mention is made about investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer, authority or competent Court. Sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 insists that the investigation or enquiry must relate to a complaint initiated by persons other than police officers. A private person cannot make a complaint to a police officer, if we take the expression “complaint” as having the same meaning, as defined in Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C That means, the expression “complaint” is used in Sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAAPA in the ordinary parlance and not for conveying the meaning of “complaint”, as defined in Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C The requirement is that the case is not registered by the Police suo motu, but the case is registered at the instance of an aggrieved person or at the instance of a person who has got relevant information. That is to ensure that cases are not booked without substance in an attempt to see that a person is detained under the KAAPA. At the same time, there cannot be any investigation, if a charge is laid. If the investigation is over, that must result in a final report under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C If the intention of the Legislature was that the offending acts must be found to have been committed, and that it must be revealed in a final report, there was no difficulty for making it clear in sub-clause (ii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAAPA. On the other hand, the specific expression investigation is used in sub-clause lause (iii). The expression “enquiry” is also used, to our mind, as in ordinary parlance. There cannot be any enquiry by a police officer, if it is an “inquiry”, as defined in clause (g) of Section 2 of the Cr.P.C Therefore, we are of the view that the word “enquiry” is used in sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) to mean that after making sufficient enquires the Investing Officer is satisfied that the person concerned has committed the offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2. In other words, to found an order of detention on the ground that the person concerned is a “known-rowdy”, it is not necessary that the final report under Section-173(2) of the Cr.P.C should be filed in the cases concerned. It is sufficient, if investigation is pending and on investigation made by the Investigating Officer, he is satisfied that the person concerned has committed the offence.

11. In Elizabath George v. State of Kerala, 2008 (4) KLT 425, a Division Bench of this Court took the same view. In that decision, the Division Bench held thus:

“We are of the view that a final report as provided under S. 173(2) is not a precondition to attract the said provision. Preventive detention is anticipatory and preventive. Thus it is a case where the detaining authority will have to satisfy itself of the possibilities of the person indulging in acts cotemplated by the respective provisions. Therefore, a final report as envisaged under S. 173(2) of the Cr.P.C as such is not essential for an action under S. 3 of the Act. Even though investigations are pending against the detenus who are accused in various erimes and is yet to be completed for various reasons, it will not prevent the detaining authority from examining the matter to arrive at the subjective satisfaction, even in the absence of a final report.”

12. Another Division Bench in Ranjini v. State Of Kerala, 2009 (3) KLT 500 : 2009 ICO 2608, after referring to Elizabath George's case, held that a Division Bench in Sathi v. State of Kerala, W.P Crl. 201 of 2009 had disagreed with the view expressed in Elizabath George's case. The Division Bench in Ranjini's case did not refer the case to a Full Bench, (even though they thought that it was necessary to refer the same to a Full Bench) as the matter would be unnecessarily protracted. On a consideration of the Division Bench judgment in Elizabath George's case, Sathi's Case as well as Ranjini's case, we are inclined to accept the view taken in Elizabath George's case. We also adopt the same reasoning, as mentioned in Ranjini's case, not to refer the matter to a Full Bench. We are not inclined to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard.

13. For the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petition (Criminal) is dismissed.