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Jose v. State

Kerala High Court
Sep 18, 2012
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, accused in C.C No. 347/1998 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Adimali, was prosecuted under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code for rash and negligent driving causing injury to CW1 on 27.4.1998. The Magistrate found the petitioner guilty under Sections 279 and 338 IPC, sentencing him to simple imprisonment and fines, with sentences to run concurrently, while acquitting him under Section 337 IPC. The petitioner appealed in Crl. A. No. 101/2003 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Thodupuzha, who confirmed the conviction and sentence. The petitioner challenged these judgments in the present Criminal Revision Petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appreciation of evidence by the courts below was perverse, particularly regarding the place of occurrence and identity of the accused as the driver.
  2. Whether two conflicting sets of evidence presented by the prosecution regarding the place of occurrence should result in acquittal of the accused.
  3. Whether the prosecution proved rash and negligent driving amounting to criminal culpability beyond mere civil negligence.
  4. Whether the courts below erred in considering only the prosecution evidence while ignoring defense evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The prosecution presented two conflicting versions about the place of occurrence—scene mahazar indicating the tar end of the road, supported by PW6, versus witnesses stating it was beyond the tar end—thus both should be rejected as per Vijayakumar v. State.
  • PW1’s First Information Statement did not name the accused or vehicle number, only mentioning a jeep named ‘Kannai’, which was absent from the prosecution case and evidence, indicating a material contradiction.
  • PW1 admitted giving evidence based on photocopies of prosecution documents, suggesting he was a tutored witness.
  • The courts below failed to consider defense evidence, violating the principle established in George v. State of Kerala.
  • To prove rash and negligent driving, prosecution must establish a high degree of negligence amounting to recklessness, which was not done, relying on Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Discrepancies in evidence about the vehicle name are immaterial and no effective cross-examination disproved the identity of the accused or vehicle.
  • All witnesses consistently stated the injured was standing by the side of the road and was hit beyond the tarred road, supporting the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
  • There was no suggestion of any motive for witnesses to falsely implicate the accused.
  • Two eyewitnesses, including the injured, were young boys, whose evidence should be given due weight considering their age and lack of motive.
  • Evidence that the injured was taken to the hospital in the same jeep that caused the accident supports the identity of the vehicle and driver.
  • The accused was known locally as a jeep driver carrying milk, confirming identification by witnesses.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vijayakumar v. State, 1994 (2) KLJ 903 When prosecution adduces two conflicting sets of evidence, courts should reject both and acquit the accused. The court found no two conflicting sets of evidence and thus did not apply this principle.
George v. State of Kerala, 1959 KLT 1101 Court must consider both prosecution and defense evidence in appreciation of evidence. The court held that the courts below did consider defense evidence and found no error.
Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 Standard of proof required for rash and negligent driving involves proving a high degree of negligence amounting to recklessness. The court applied this standard and found culpable negligence established by the facts of the case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully examined the discrepancies alleged by the petitioner, particularly concerning the place of occurrence and identity of the accused. It concluded that the alleged discrepancy about the jeep's name in the First Information Statement was not material enough to discredit the prosecution evidence. The court accepted the testimony of eyewitnesses PW1 and PW2, who stated they were standing by the side of the road when the petitioner’s vehicle hit PW1. The court rejected the contention that two conflicting versions of the place of occurrence existed, interpreting the term "tar end" in the scene mahazar as not conclusively defining the accident location.

The court also found the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable, as the accident occurred in circumstances where the petitioner’s rash and negligent driving was the only plausible cause. The suggestion by the accused that the accident happened due to avoiding an oncoming jeep further supported the finding of reckless driving. The court disagreed with the petitioner’s claim that the courts below ignored defense evidence, affirming that both sides' evidence was considered in the overall appraisal.

Ultimately, the court found the prosecution had proved the petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but exercised discretion to modify the sentence to one of fine only, reflecting the facts and circumstances.

Holding and Implications

The court confirmed the conviction of the petitioner under Sections 279 and 338 IPC but modified the sentence by setting aside imprisonment and imposing only fines: Rs. 500/- under Section 279 and Rs. 1000/- under Section 338, with a default imprisonment of one month for non-payment.

The direct effect is that the petitioner remains convicted but receives a lighter sentence. No new precedent was established by this decision.

Show all summary ...

ORDER

The accused in C.C No. 347/1998 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Adimali is the petitioner herein. He was prosecuted for offences under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution case was that on 27.4.1998, the accused drove the jeep bearing Reg. No. KL 6/4388 through Anachal-Munnar road rashly and negligently and when it reached Pallivasal village, Chithirapuram Kara, it hit CW1, thereby causing fracture on the leg of CW1. The Magistrate found the petitioner guilty under Sections 279 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 279 and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 338 Indian Penal Code and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In default of payment of fine, the accused was to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days more. The sentence was directed to run concurrently. The petitioner was acquitted of the offence under Section 337 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner filed Crl. A. No. 101/2003 before the Addl. Sessions Judge (Adhoc-I), Thodupuzha, who confirmed the conviction and sentence. The judgments of the courts below are under challenge in this Criminal R.P

2. The petitioner contends that the appreciation of evidence by the courts below is perverse. According to him, the prosecution themselves have set up two sets of evidence in the matter of the place of occurrence. According to him, the scene mahazar itself would point out the scene of occurrence as the tar end of the road, which is supported by PW6, who proved the scene mahazar. The witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution would state that the place of occurrence is beyond the tar end by the side of the road. Therefore, according to the petitioner, in view of the decision of this Court in Vijayakumar v. State, 1994 (2) KLJ 903, when two sets of evidence are let in by the prosecution, the courts should reject both and acquit the accused. It is further submitted that there is deviation of the stand of PW1 from the First Information Statement given by him, in the evidence adduced by him. It is pointed out that in the First Information Statement he did not specifically name the accused as the driver of the offending vehicle or the number of the vehicle. His statement is to the effect that a jeep with the name ‘Kannai’, hit him. The learned counsel for the petitioner points out that such a case was conspicuously absent in the whole of the prosecution case. According to him, even the evidence of PW1 does not support such a case. On the other hand, PW1 would categorically deny having mentioned the name of the jeep to the police, which, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, is a very material contradiction, which would go to the root of the prosecution case. It is further submitted that while giving evidence, PW1 himself admitted that he was given the evidence on the basis of the photo copies of the documents of the prosecution supplied to him, which would go to show that PW1 was a tutored witness. Lastly, it is contended that both the courts below discussed only the evidence in support of the prosecution and did not even refer to the evidence in support of the defence. He would submit that this is clearly against the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in George v. State of Kerala, 1959 KLT 1101. The petitioner also points out that for proving an offence of rash and negligent driving, it is not sufficient to prove simple lack of care which may constitute civil liability. But the prosecution should prove a very high degree of negligence which would answer the epithet “reckless” which has not been done in this case. In support of that contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner would rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848.

3. In answer to the contentions of the petitioner, the learned Public Prosecutor would submit that the so called discrepancies in the evidence are not material enough to throw out the prosecution case. She would point out that actually, there is no contradiction in terms as such in the matter of giving the name of the vehicle. Apart from the fact that PW1, at a time when he was in great pain and was administered with pain killers, had given the name of the jeep, no effective cross examination in respect of the same bringing out any material contradiction in the evidence has been done by the defence. She points out that all the witnesses categorically say that the injured was standing by the side of the road and the vehicle driven by the accused hit him at a place away from the tarred road. According to her, the fact that the scene of occurrence is beyond the road itself would be sufficient to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since if the petitioner was not rash and negligent, the accident would not have occurred by hitting PW1 who was standing by the side of the road. The learned Public Prosecutor would also point out that the petitioner had no case that any of the witnesses had any motive for implicating the petitioner wrongly in the case. It is further pointed out that two of the eye witnesses, including the injured, were young boys aged only 12 years at the time of accident and their evidence should be appreciated in that perspective. They have absolutely no reason whatsoever to implicate the petitioner wrongly in the case. It is the contention of learned Public Prosecutor that the witnesses had given categoric evidence to the effect that after the accident the injured PW1 was taken to the hospital in the same jeep, which caused the accident itself, which would go a long way to prove the identity of the vehicle and the accused. It is further pointed out that all the witnesses would assert that the petitioner was a person who is usually seen in the locality driving a jeep carrying milk, which the offending vehicle was. Therefore, all the witnesses knew the petitioner by sight and they identified the petitioner as the person who was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. Therefore, there could not have been any doubt as to the identity of the vehicle and the accused, is the contention raised.

4. I have considered the rival contentions in detail.

5. Despite the persuasive arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am unable to subscribe to the contentions raised by him. It is true that in the First Information Statement, PW1 referred to a name for the jeep. It is also true that the prosecution did not choose to bring out the name at the time of evidence. But I am of opinion that that discrepancy, if at all it is a discrepancy, cannot have the consequence of disbelieving the prosecution evidence. PWs 1 and 2, who are eye witnesses, out of whom PW1 is the injured witness, have categorically asserted that they were standing by the side of the road when the vehicle driven by the petitioner at great speed suddenly came and hit PW1. In fact, in cross examination, the accused asked PW1 as to whether or not the accident occurred when the vehicle was abruptly turned to avoid collision with the jeep coming from the opposite direction. Of course, in further cross examination, the accused has put a suggestion that the accident occurred while PW1 attempted to cross the road. But the overall effect of the evidence of PW1 is that the vehicle hit him while he and PWs 2 and 3 together were standing by the side of the road. The same is corroborated by the evidence of the other witnesses also. Despite the contradiction tried to be pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis of the word ‘tar end’ occurring in the scene mahazar and the evidence of PW6, who proved the scene mahazar, I am not satisfied that the same is sufficient even to put a doubt on the evidence of PWs 1 and 2. The scene of occurrence as the ‘tar end’ in the scene mahazar cannot be the actual place of occurrence as such. It need not exactly mean that the accident occurred inside the tar end. When PWs 1 and 2 categorically asserted that they were standing by the side of the road, especially when they have nothing to gain by stating a falsehood, I am of opinion that, that evidence should be believed. I am not satisfied that there are two sets of evidence adduced by the prosecution as contended by the petitioner. Therefore, there is no question of application of the decision cited in that regard. Of course, in the decision of the Supreme Court in Syad Akbar's case (supra) the standard of proof required in the case of rash and negligent driving has been spelled out. But, here is a case where the accident occurred when PW1 was standing by the side of the road where the vehicle driven by the petitioner was not expected to be there. The same coupled with the suggestion put by the accused himself that the accident occurred when he suddenly turned the vehicle to avoid collision with the jeep which was coming from the opposite direction, would go to show that the accident occurred because of culpable negligence which would answer the epithet ‘reckless’ in driving the vehicle, as held in the decision of the Supreme Court.

6. I also do not find any substance in the contention of the petitioner that the courts below have appreciated only the evidence in support of the prosecution and ignored the evidence brought out by the accused in cross examination. I am of opinion that the courts below have referred to the evidence in favour of the accused as well. In any event, despite my considering both the evidence in support and against the accused, I am unable to come to a conclusion in favour of the petitioner.

7. From the overall appreciation of the evidence adduced, I am satisfied that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the conviction of the petitioner entered by the courts below. But, I am inclined to confine the sentence to one of fine alone in the particular facts and circumstances of the case.

8. Accordingly, the sentence of imprisonment on both grounds is set aside The sentence is confirmed to one of fine alone. The petitioner shall pay the fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence under Section 279 I.P.C and the fine of Rs. 1000/- for the offence under Section 338 I.P.C In default of payment, the petitioner shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month.

The Criminal R.P is disposed of as above.