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Diety Mandir Shri Chamunda Devi v. Krishan Lal

Himachal Pradesh High Court
Nov 2, 2012
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Regular Second Appeal (Judge: Rajiv Sharma)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from a suit filed by the predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 1(a) to 1(g) (the plaintiff's predecessor, Krishan Lal) seeking declaration and specific performance in respect of a 0-07-05 hectare parcel (5/16 share of the broader plot) identified in Khata/Khatauni and Khasra particulars situate in Mohal Paddar, Mauza Jadrangal, Tehsil Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. The plaintiff alleged that defendants No. 1 to 5 agreed to sell the 5/16 share to him by an agreement dated 19.04.1989 (Ex. PW-5.A) for Rs. 90,000/-, that he paid the entire consideration, was put in possession and had constructed three shops on the land, but the defendants failed to execute the sale deed as promised. Instead, the defendants executed a gift deed in favour of the deity (Mandir Shri Chamunda Devi — defendant No. 6) on 05.07/08.07.1991 which the plaintiff challenged as not bonafide.

The trial court (Senior Sub Judge, Kangra) partly decreed the suit on 31.03.1999, granting a declaration of possession (of an undefined portion), holding the gift deeds void to the extent of the donors' 5/16 share, and granting specific performance directing defendants No. 1 to 5 to execute the sale deed for their 5/16 share. The appellant (the temple/mandir) appealed (Civil Appeal No. 74-D/99) and the plaintiff filed cross-objections; the first appellate court dismissed both the appeal and cross-objections by judgment and decree dated 17.12.2001. The regular second appeal under consideration challenges those decrees.

Subsequent events relevant to relief: during pendency, notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (1894) was issued (22.12.2005) and the Collector made an award on 10.06.2008. The Collector deposited compensation before the District Judge on 13.08.2008. The appellant-mandir received compensation of Rs. 10,03,743/- for its award share according to the record.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether findings of the courts below are perverse or based on mis-reading/misconstruction of evidence, and whether a decree for mandatory injunction requiring defendants No. 1 to 5 to execute sale of the 5/16 share under agreement dated 19.04.1989 is sustainable when the suit was brought after a long delay and the property was already gifted to the appellant after the plaintiff allegedly agreed to refund of sale consideration.
  2. Whether in view of rise in price and the plaintiff not having been put in actual possession of the property, the discretionary relief of specific performance could be granted when the plaintiff was allegedly only entitled to damages.
  3. Whether on proper construction of the Specific Relief Act and settled principles for grant of specific performance (references made to authorities including 1996 S.C. 2150 and 1997 S.C. 1571), the decree for mandatory injunction and equitable relief of specific performance could be granted when certain issues had been partly decided against the plaintiff.
  4. Whether the gift deed executed by defendants No. 1 to 5 in favour of the appellant-defendant could be decreed null and void and whether a decree for mandatory injunction could be enforced without proper relief or foundation against the appellant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Defendant — Mandir Shri Chamunda Devi) — Principal Arguments

  • During the pendency of proceedings the suit land was acquired by the State and an award was made (10.06.2008); therefore, the agreement cannot be executed after acquisition.
  • The suit was barred by limitation (argument that plaintiff delayed); specific performance should not be granted.
  • The plaintiff was only entitled to damages (i.e., not specific performance).
  • The gift deed dated 08.07.1991 in favour of the appellant was validly executed.

Respondents (Plaintiff/Predecessor and Defendants No. 1–5 as described in pleadings) — Principal Arguments

  • The plaintiff (predecessor) asserted execution of a valid agreement dated 19.04.1989, payment of Rs. 90,000/-, delivery of possession, construction of shops and readiness and willingness to perform the contract; sale deed was to follow after mutation attestation but was not executed by defendants.
  • Defendants replied that execution of a sale deed was restrained by stay orders in an earlier suit titled "Ram Lal v. Parveen Kumar" (defendants alleged that the plaintiff's Jamabandi was wrong and that the land was jointly owned by five defendants and others, and they claimed to have gifted the land to the deity at the request of local important persons).
  • Evidence was led (oral and documentary) including witnesses corroborating agreement execution, payment, possession and construction works; defendants at least admitted receipt of the Rs. 90,000/- and agreement existence in parts of their testimony.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Manjini v. Rajakumari, Madras Law Journal Vol. 2 1997 633 When acquisition proceedings make a contract wholly or partly incapable of performance (referring to Section 12(c) of the Specific Relief Act), specific performance cannot be ordered; a contract becomes impossible to perform due to acquisition. The court relied on the reasoning in Manjini to support the proposition that acquisition proceedings rendered specific performance of the agreement impossible and therefore not grantable after acquisition notification/award.
Thiriveedhi Channaiah v. Gudipudi Venkata Subba Rao (AIR 2007 SC 2439) Agreement for sale cannot be enforced after an acquisition notification has been issued; where there is no forfeiture clause, advance paid cannot be forfeited and should be refunded. The court cited this decision to hold that post-notification the sale agreement cannot be enforced and to justify ordering refund of the advance (Rs. 90,000/-) paid under the agreement in the present matter.
Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal (2002) 1 SCC 134 Explains the meaning of "reasonable time" to seek specific performance; the person must approach the court within a reasonable time, i.e., as soon as circumstances permit. The court used the principle to evaluate delay issues and to frame reasoning on whether the plaintiff had been prompt in seeking relief; the opinion recites the definition and applies the reasonableness concept to the facts.
1996 S.C. 2150 and 1997 S.C. 1571 Referenced as authorities concerning well-settled principles for the grant of specific performance (as cited in the admitted substantial questions of law). These authorities were referenced in framing the legal issues (Question No. 3). The opinion does not contain an extended substantive discussion or detailed application of these specific citations beyond their mention in the issues.
Ram Lal v. Parveen Kumar Referenced by defendants as an earlier suit that resulted in stay orders said to restrict alienation of the property. The court noted the defendants' contention that this suit prevented execution of the sale deed, but observed defendants did not place on record the judgment/order in the Ram Lal suit; thus the alleged restraint was not substantiated for the purpose of defeating the plaintiff's claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first assessing the factual record and evidence regarding the existence and performance of the agreement dated 19.04.1989 (Ex. PW-5.A). The court found on evidence (oral testimony of plaintiff and witnesses and admissions by defendant Parveen Kumar) that:

  • A valid agreement to sell the 5/16 share for Rs. 90,000/- existed and was executed on 19.04.1989.
  • The plaintiff (predecessor) paid Rs. 90,000/- and was put in possession; he constructed three shops and was ready and willing to perform his part and had served notice upon the defendants to execute the sale deed.
  • Mutation No. 378 was attested and the sale deed was to be executed within one month thereafter; defendants failed to execute the sale deed.
  • Defendants asserted that a stay in an earlier suit (Ram Lal v. Parveen Kumar) prevented alienation, but they failed to produce the purported order or judgment to substantiate that restraint.
  • The defendants executed gift deeds in favor of the temple on 08.07.1991 which the court found to have been executed to frustrate the execution of the agreement.
  • The suit was filed on 27.08.1991 and the court concluded it was within limitation and not subject to delay such as would bar relief on that ground.

Having established (on the facts) the plaintiff's entitlement to specific performance at the time of judgment below, the court then considered subsequent supervening events: a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act had been issued (22.12.2005) and an award made (10.06.2008). The court applied authoritative precedent (including Manjini and the Supreme Court in Thiriveedhi Channaiah) establishing that an agreement for sale cannot be enforced after acquisition proceedings have proceeded to notification/award and that the contract becomes impossible of performance under Section 12(c) of the Specific Relief Act in such circumstances.

On that legal basis, the court concluded that specific performance of the agreement dated 19.04.1989 could no longer be ordered due to the acquisition of the suit land by the State. Applying the principles in the cited Supreme Court decision, the court held that the plaintiffs (predecessors) were entitled to refund of the amount paid under the agreement rather than specific performance; consequently, the decrees for specific performance passed by the courts below had to be modified.

The court also relied on the legal discussion of "reasonable time" (Veerayee Ammal) when addressing delay and limitation contentions, and it explicitly records that the suit was filed within limitation on the facts before it. The defendants' contention that the gift deeds were valid was rejected on the finding that they were executed to frustrate the agreement.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: Regular Second Appeal partly allowed.

Direct consequences and relief awarded:

  • The decrees passed by both the trial court and the first appellate court ordering specific performance of the agreement (Ex. PW-5.A) are modified.
  • The appellant (Mandir Shri Chamunda Devi) and respondents No. 2 to 6 are ordered to pay Rs. 90,000/- to the plaintiffs (successors/L.Rs of the predecessor) with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the suit, i.e., 27.08.1991.
  • Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. The court awarded no costs.

Broader implications stated or implied by the opinion:

  • The court reaffirmed the settled principle that specific performance cannot be ordered where performance has become impossible because of governmental acquisition of the subject land; in such circumstances the appropriate remedy is refund of the advance/consideration (subject to contract terms such as forfeiture clauses, which were not held to permit forfeiture here).
  • The decision did not purport to set a new legal principle but applied established authorities (Supreme Court and High Court precedents) to the facts of the case; the immediate practical effect is modification of specific performance decrees into a monetary refund with interest.

If any particular detail or excerpt requested in a section above was absent from the provided opinion, the summary reflects only the information expressly contained in the opinion and does not infer additional facts or law.

Show all summary ...

Rajiv Sharma, Judge:

This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 17.12.2001, passed by the learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P in Civil Appeal No. 74-D/99.

2. Material facts necessary for adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal, are that the predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 1(a) to 1(g)-plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as ‘the plaintiffs for the sake of convenience), namely, Krishan Lal has filed a suit seeking a decree of declaration that he was in possession of a parcel of land measuring 0-07-05 hectares, which was 5/16 share of the land comprised in Khata No. 57, Khatauni No. 113, Khasra Nos. 430 and 431, Kitas 2, measuring 0-22-57 hectares, situate in Mohal Paddar, Mauza Jadrangal, Tehsil Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land). He has constructed three shops shown as No. 1, 2 and 3 in the site plan. The sale consideration of Rs. 90,000/- regarding the suit land has been received from him by the defendants No. 1 to 5, as arrayed in Civil Suit No. 148/91 (RBT No. 18/93), namely, Shri Parveen Kumar, Shri Bansi Lal, Smt. Raman Kumari, Smt. Seema Kumari and Smt. Kamlesh Kanta and that the gift deed, dated 5th July, 1991, executed by these defendant in favour of defendant No. 6, i.e, The Deity in Mandir Shri Chamunda Devi, not being bonafide was null and void and, thus, not binding on his right to own and possess the suit land. According to the plaintiff, the defendants No. 1 to 5 had agreed to sell in his favour the land owned and possessed by them for a consideration of Rs. 90,000/- vide agreement, dated 19 April, 1989, Ex. PW-5.A. He has paid the entire sale consideration and was delivered possession of the suit land. The vendor defendants agreed to execute a sale deed in respect of the suit land in his favour within a month of sanction of mutation regarding the revenue entries. However, they have failed to honour their promise. The mutation was sanctioned on 12 December, 1989. The defendants were called upon to execute the sale deed, but to no avail. He had requested them to do the needful.

3. The suit was contested by the defendants. According to them, the sale deed could not be executed in view of the stay orders passed in Civil Suit titled ‘Ram Lal v. Parveen Kumar’. According to them, the Jamabandi obtained by the plaintiff was wrong. They have refuted the claim of the plaintiff for possession. According to them, the suit land was jointly owned and possessed by five of them, i.e, defendants No. 1 to 5 and many co-owners. They were approached by very important persons of the locality and they requested them to gift the suit land in favour of the deity Mata Chamanda Devi (defendant No. 6). Their request was acceded to and the suit land was gifted in favour of the deity.

4. The plaintiff filed the replication. The learned Senior Sub Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P decreed the suit partly on 31.03.1999 and a decree of declaration to the effect that the plaintiff was in possession of an undefined portion of the suit land and that the gift deeds executed by defendants No. 1 to 5 in favour defendant No. 6, are null and void to the extent they relate to the doners' 5/16 share in the suit land that was agreed to be sold by them to the plaintiff was granted in his favour. A decree of specific performance of the agreement, dated April 19, 1989 was also granted in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants No. 1 to 5 were directed to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff of their 5/16 share in the suit land which they had agreed to sell in his favour vide agreement, dated 19 April, 1989.

5. Appellant-defendant, i.e, Diety Mandir Shri Chamunda Devi (hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendant’ for the sake of convenience) has filed Civil Appeal No. 74-D/99 before the learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala. The plaintiff also filed Cross-Objections bearing No. 8-D/2000. The learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 74-D/99 as well as Cross-Objections bearing No. 8-D/2000 on 17.12.2001 Hence, this Regular Second Appeal.

6. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 21.05.2002:

“1. Whether the findings of the Court below are perverse and based on mis-reading, mis-construction of oral and documentary evidence and pleadings of the parties and a decree for mandatory injunction to defendants No. 1 to 5 to execute the sale of 5/6 share on the basis of agreement, dated 19.09.1989, Ex. PW-5.A is sustainable when the suit was brought after a long delay and the property already gifted to the appellant after the plaintiff had agreed to have refund of sale consideration?

2. Whether in view of the meteoric rise in the price of the suit property and the plaintiff having not been put in actual possession of the property, the discretionary relief of specific performance could be granted when the plaintiff was only entitled to damages?

3. Whether on proper construction of the provisions of Specific Relief Act and the well settled principle for the grant of specific performance enunciated in 1996 S.C 2150 and 1997 S.C 1571, the decree for mandatory injunction and equitable relief of specific performance could be granted when issues No. 1 & 9 had been partly decided against the plaintiff?

4. Whether the gift deed executed by defendants No. 1 to 5 in favour of defendant-appellant could be decreed as null and void and decree for mandatory injunction enforced against the plaintiff without proper relief or foundation against the appellant?”

7. Mr. K.D Sood, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that during the pendency of these proceedings, the suit land has been acquired by the State Government and the award has been made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 10.06.2008 The total compensation for the acquired land and the other land which was acquired alongwith the land in dispute, amounting to Rs. 25,79,870/-, has been deposited by the Land Acquisition Collector before the learned District Judge, Kangra on 13.08.2008/. Thus, his submission is that the agreement cannot be executed after the land has been acquired by the State Government. He also contended that the suit was barred by limitation. He also argued that the plaintiff was only entitled to damages. He lastly contended that the gift deed, dated 08.07.1991 was validly executed in favour of the appellant.

8. Mr. S.S Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, for respondents No. 1(a) to 1(g) has supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.

9. The plaintiff has died during the pendency of this appeal and his L.Rs were brought on record vide order, dated 10.01.2012

10. Since all the substantial questions of law are interconnected and interlinked, the same are taken up together for determination to avoid the repetition of discussion of evidence.

11. Plaintiff has appeared as PW-1. According to him, the agreement was executed with the defendants on 19.04.1989 for a consideration of Rs. 90,000/- for the land measuring about 1 Kanal 17 Marlas. He was handed over the possession by the defendants. The defendants have agreed to execute the sale deed after one month of the correction of mutation No. 378. The same was attested on 19.10.1989 He has also served notice upon the defendants through his Advocate. He was ready and willing to execute the sale deed. The suit property was gifted without his permission. He was in possession of the suit land. He has constructed three shops on the same. He has also installed three electricity meters. He has constructed one shop in 1989 and two shops between March and May 1991.

12. PW-2 has deposed that he has supplied stones and bricks. PW-3, Shri Shiv Singh has deposed that he has undertaken the electricity fittings in the shops. PW-4, Shri Kishori Lal has deposed that he has undertaken the wooden work of plaintiffs' shops. PW-5, Sh. K.S Rajput, Advocate has deposed that agreement Ex.PW-5.A was scribed by Angat Ram at the instance of Parveen Kumar. He has read over the contents of the same to them and thereafter Parveen Kumar and others signed the same after admitting the contents of the same to be correct. He also signed Ex. PW-5.A.

13. PW-6, Sh. Angat Ram has deposed that he has scribed Ex. PW-5.A. He has read over the contents of the same. Sh. K.S Rajput, Advocate and Shri Jagdish have signed Ex. PW-5.A as witnesses. He has made initials on 19.04.1989 at Sr. No. 129. The defendants have also put their signatures on the register.

14. Shri Krishan Lal has also appeared in rebuttal. According to him, he has constructed the shops and given the same to two different persons on rent. According to him, the defendants have never offered to pay back Rs. 90,000/-. The defendants had no right to gift the land in favour of Chamunda Mandir.

15. One of the defendants, Parveen Kumar has appeared as DW-1. He has admitted the execution of agreement with the plaintiff. They were ready and willing to return the money to the plaintiff. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that they have received a sum of Rs. 90,000/- towards consideration. He has also admitted that the sale deed was to be executed after one month of the attestation of mutation in the name of Shri Bishambher. He has also admitted that mutation No. 378 was attested. He also admitted that they have not informed the plaintiff in writing to execute the sale deed.

16. DW-2, Sh. B.L Rana has deposed that he was the Temple Officer of Chamunda temple for two years. Three gift deeds were executed in favour of the temple. DW-3, Shri Rajinder Awasthi has deposed that he has signed the gift deeds, Ex. DW-2.A, Ex.-DW-2.B and Ex. DW-2.C as donee. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that the gift deeds were scribed in the office of Sub Registrar at Dharamshala.

17. DW-4, Shri Bansi Lal has testified that he was working as Deed Writer at Dharamshala. According to him, the gift deeds, dated 05.07.1991 were scribed by him and these were registered at Sr. Nos. 38, 39 and 40. DW-5, Shri Shashi Sharma has deposed that he has signed Ex.-DW-2.A, Ex. DW-2.B and Ex. DW-2.C as a witness. DW-6, Kumari Shama Mehta has also identified her signatures on Ex. DW-2.A.

18. What emerges from the record as well as documentary evidence, is that a valid agreement was executed between the parties on 19.04.1989, whereby the defendants No. 1 to 5 have agreed to sell the suit land to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 90,000/-. The plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs. 90,000/- to defendants No. 1 to 5 and he was also put in possession of the suit land. He was always ready and willing to execute the agreement. He has also served a notice upon defendants No. 1 to 5 for executing the sale deed. The sale deed was to be executed after a period of one month after the attestation of mutation. The mutation was also attested, but even thereafter, the sale deed was not executed. The defendant, Parveen Kumar in his statement, has deposed that the sale deed could not be executed due to the pendency of Civil Suit titled Ram Lal v. Parveen Kumar and they were restrained from alienating the property. The defendants No. 1 to 5 have not placed on record the copy of the judgment/order, passed by the Court in case titled Ram Lal v. Parveen Kumar. The defendants No. 1 to 5, in order to frustrate the execution of agreement, dated 19.04.1989, have executed the gift deed in favour of Shri Chamunda Devi temple on 08.07.1991 The plaintiff has never agreed to receive back the money. The plaintiff was always ready and willing to do his part, but respondents No. 1 to 5 were reluctant to execute the sale deed and, in fact, have executed the gift deed in favour of the temple on 08.07.1991 The suit was filed within limitation. There was no delay in filing the suit on the basis of agreement, dated 19.04.1989 The plaintiff has been put in possession of the suit land, but not of a defined share. The Courts below have rightly held the gift deed, dated 08.07.1991 null and void.

19. The suit was partly decreed by the learned trial Court, as noticed above, on 31.03.1999 and the appeal preferred against the same by the appellant-plaintiff, was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P on 17.12.2001, but the operation of the judgment and decree were stayed by this Court on 05.04.2002 and the same was made absolute on 21.05.2002 The suit land, as per the averments contained in C.M.P No. 1116 of 2011 filed by the appellant/defendant, was acquired on the basis of notification, dated 22.12.2005, issued by the Land Acquisition Collector. The award has been made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 10.06.2008 The defendants No. 1 to 5 were owners of 5/16 land, which has been agreed to be sold to the plaintiff vide agreement, dated 19.04.1989 The appellant has also placed on record the copy of award, dated 10.06.2008 According to this award, the appellant-Mandir has been awarded a sum of Rs. 10,03,743.00/- by way of compensation. Since the suit land has been acquired by the State, the agreement, dated 19.04.1989 cannot be executed.

20. The Hon'ble Madras High Court in Manjini v. Rajakumari, Madras Law Journal Vol. 2 1997 633 has held that the party cannot seek specific performance of the sale agreement due to reason of the acquisition proceedings. The Hon'ble High Court has held as under:

“21. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Masilamani appearing for the appellant would again submit that even though there is an acquisition proceeding, the plaintiff is prepared to buy whatever is left over all such acquisition and that the plaintiff would be entitled to make a claim for the compensation for the extent acquired. Such an argument is not available to the plaintiff. Sec. 12(c) makes it clear that when the contract becomes either wholly or partly incapable of performance, specific performance cannot be ordered by the Court. The plaintiff was aware of the acquisition proceedings at the time when he filed the suit. A part of the property was acquired during the pendency of the appeal and some more portion of the property was acquired subsequently with the result, now the property available is about half of the originally agreed property to be sold. Therefore, the contract has to be held as one impossible of performance by reason of the acquisition proceedings. Moreover, it is not mentioned in the agreement about the proposed land acquisition. In fact, from the evidence available, we can infer that even on the date when plaintiff filed the suit he was aware of the land acquisition proceedings. In spite of it, he has not chosen to make a proper pleading to the effect that in the alternative he is prepared to buy the property whatever that is made available to him, after the acquisition proceedings, and for the same price. This Court cannot bring about a new contract or substitute it with a difference one not agreed to by the partners.”

21. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thiriveedhi Channaiah v. Gudipudi Venkata Subba Rao (D) by LRs.AIR 2007 Supreme Court 2439 have held that the agreement for sale cannot be enforced after the acquisition notification has been issued. Their Lordships have further held that if there is no forfeiture Clause in the agreement for sale, the advance paid could not be forfeited and their Lordships have issued directions for the refund of the advance paid. Their Lordships have held as under:

“10. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on 02.01.1982 Appellant evidently was of the view that the respondent was aware of the intention of the State to acquire the said property, but despite his knowledge, he executed the said Agreement for sale.

11. The notice dated 4.3.1983 was issued on behalf of the appellant on the said premise that the respondent did not have any transferable title. It was on that basis refund of Rs. 50,000/-, which was paid by way of advance, was sought for from the respondent. It is only at that stage, the respondent invoked the forfeiture clause.

12. The only question which arises for our consideration is as to whether in a situation of this nature, the respondent could exercise his right of forfeiture of the entire amount. It is not his case that he had suffered any damage. He did not deny or dispute that after the Agreement of Sale was executed, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act had been issued. He himself raised a contention that the Agreement stood frustrated. It may be true that he not only questioned the validity of the said notification, but had also filed a suit, but indisputably the parties were aware that unless and until, the notification was set aside, the Agreement for Sale, in the aforementioned situation, cannot be enforced by either of them.

13. In the aforementioned facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the respondent could not have forfeited the amount of advance. The High Court, in our opinion, committed a manifest error in that behalf in arriving at the finding that the respondent was justified in forfeiting the said amount. We, however, agree with the High Court that enforcement of agreement for sale would be inequitable.

14. We, therefore, direct that respondents to refund the amount of advance paid by the appellant to him. Such payment should be made within a period of four weeks from date; failing which the same would carry interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the said date till the date of actual payment.”

22. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal.(2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 134 have held that the person seeking specific enforcement of agreement, must approach the Court within a reasonable time, even if time is not of the essence of the contract. Their Lordships further held that “reasonable time” means, as soon as circumstances permit. Their Lordships have explained the words “Reasonable time” and “Reasonable” as under:

“13. The word “reasonable has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. The reason varies in its conclusion according to ideosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the “reasonable time” is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means as soon as circumstances permit. In Law Lexicon it is defined to mean “A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstance will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than ‘directly’; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea.”

14. In the instant case the parties had agreed to complete the sale by 15.6.1980 despite the fact that the time was not the essence of the contract. The appellant-plaintiff is stated to have issued letters to the respondent-defendant calling upon to execute the sale deed and thereafter also issued notice. It was further alleged and held proved by the courts of fact that the nature of the property was wet land which continued to be such during the trial. As the appellant-plaintiff had contracted to purchase the land with a view to construct a residential house, the respondent-defendant had undertaken to remove the telegraph pole in one part of the property. The Trial as well as the First Appellate Court found that in pursuance of the agreement the said pole was got removed in the first week of November, 1980 and the appellant-plaintiff issued a notice (Exhibit A-4) on 11.11.1930 calling upon the respondent-defendant to execute the sale deed. The appellant-plaintiff also made a publication on 13.11.1980 in a daily newspaper intimating the people at large not to purchase the property of the respondent-defendant as the same was the subject matter of agreement to sell executed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff. On the failure of the respondent-defendant to comply with the conditions of the Agreement, the demands made in the letters and the notice, the appellant-plaintiff filed OS No. 1249 of 1980 in the month of November, 1980 itself. The legal action initiated by the appellant-plaintiff was rightly held by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court to have been commenced without delay and definitely within a reasonable time. The High Court was not justified in disturbing the finding of fact arrived at on appreciation of the evidence, while disposing of the second appeal.

23. The purpose of executing the gift deed in favour of the temple on 08.07.1991, was only to deprive the plaintiff to get the agreement to sell executed. The plaintiff was always ready and willing to do his part. The mutation No. 378 was also attested and thereafter the sale deed was to be executed within a period of one month. The suit was filed on 27.08.1991 and, thus, it cannot be held that it was filed beyond the period of limitation. The plaintiff has also issued a legal notice to the defendants to execute the agreement, but to no avail.

24. The agreement to sell could not be executed in view of the interim order of this Court, dated 05.04.2002, which was made absolute on 21.05.2002 In the meantime, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been issued for acquiring the suit land on 22.12.2005 The award has been made by the learned Collector on 10.06.2008 In view of this, the decree for specific performance of the agreement cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiffs and they would be entitled only to refund of sum of Rs. 90,000/-, which was paid by their predecessor-in-interest at the time of entering into agreement, Ex. PW-5.A. The substantial questions of law are, thus, answered accordingly.

25. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case enumerated hereinabove, since the specific performance of agreement, dated 19 April, 1999 cannot be ordered after the acquisition of the suit land, the Regular Second Appeal is partly allowed, to the extent that the decrees passed by both the Courts below for specific performance of agreement, Ex. PW-5.A, are modified by ordering the appellant and respondents No. 2 to 6 to pay a sum of Rs. 90,000/- to the plaintiffs with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the suit, i.e, 27.08.1991 The pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.