Dipankar Datta, J.:— The secured creditor (respondent no. 2) approached the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore Court, South 24 Parganas (hereafter the said magistrate) with an application under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets & Enforcement of Security Interests Act, 2002, giving rise to Misc. Case No. C - 5766 of 2010. While the application before the said magistrate was pending, the respondent no. 2 had also applied under Section 14 of the Act before the District Magistrate, South 24 Parganas. Pursuant thereto, the authorised officer of the respondent no. 2, i.e the respondent no. 3 and the petitioner were called upon to attend a hearing on November 23, 2012 in the chamber of the Additional District Magistrate (Dev), South 24 Parganas. Admittedly, no order has yet been passed on such application detrimental to the petitioners' interests.

2) It is claimed in the writ petition by the petitioners that Misc. Case No. C - 5766 of 2010 was heard by the said magistrate on February 23, 2012 and August 18, 2012 and December 29, 2012 was fixed as the next date. They appeared before the said magistrate and challenged the maintainability of the action initiated by the respondent no. 2 under Section 14 of the Act by filing a petition dated December 29, 2012. The said magistrate, on hearing the parties, fixed June 7, 2013 as the date of hearing of the maintainability petition. It is further claimed in the writ petition that on or about February 6, 2013, police officials attached to the Kasba Police Station attempted to take possession of the secured asset i.e a three-storied building, by forcibly removing the petitioners and their tenants therefrom. On enquiry, the police officials informed the petitioners that they were acting on the basis of an order passed by the said magistrate dated December 28, 2012 on an application under Section 14 of the Act preferred by the respondent no. 2, registered as Misc. Case No. C - 4069 of 2012. However, despite requests made by the petitioners, the police officials were unable to produce copy of such order.

3) Challenging the order dated December 28, 2012 passed by the said magistrate in Misc. Case No. C - 4069 of 2012, this writ petition has been filed before the Court.

4) It has been ascertained from Mr. Pal Chowdhury, learned advocate for the respondents 2 and 3, that symbolic possession of the secured asset has since been taken in terms of the order of the said magistrate dated December 28, 2012.

5) Mr. Mitra, learned advocate representing the petitioners, contends that the order dated December 28, 2012 suffers from a gross jurisdictional error inasmuch as the respondent no. 2, having regard to the scheme of Section 14 of the Act, could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the said magistrate. According to him, it is the District Magistrate, South 24 Parganas who should have been approached by the respondent no. 2 and an application to this effect having already been made by the respondent no. 2, coupled with the fact that the earlier application before the said magistrate giving rise to Misc. Case No. C - 5766 of 2010 was pending, the respondent no. 2 has abused the process of law by filing successive applications before different authorities.

6) In support of his contention that no application could be presented before the said magistrate having regard to the express provisions in Section 14 of the Act and that the order passed by the said magistrate is a nullity, Mr. Mitra relied on the unreported judgment of this Court dated February 1, 2013 in W.P No. 27120 (W) of 2012 (Shri Dinesh Kumar Agarwal v. State of West Bengal). He, accordingly, prayed for setting aside of the order dated December 28, 2012.

7) Mr. Pal Chowdhury opposed the writ petition. According to him, the approach of the respondent no. 2 does not suffer from any infirmity. Referring to the provisions of Sections 2 (k) and 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he submitted that the Chief Judicial Magistrate in a non-metropolitan area stands on the same footing as the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in a metropolitan area and, therefore, the former is vested with all the powers that the latter exercises in respect of a metropolitan area. Reliance in this connection was placed on a Bench decision of this Court dated December 21, 2011 in AST No. 1899 of 2011 (Abinash Biswas v. State Bank of India). He contended that the Bench decision is binding on this Court and, therefore, the writ petition ought to be rejected in limine.

8) This Court has heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the decisions they have cited.

9) It would be the foremost duty of this Court to examine the decision in Abinash Biswas (supra) to ascertain its ratio. Indeed, if the ratio applies in the present case, the decision would have the effect of a binding precedent.

10) The writ jurisdiction of the Court had been invoked by Abinash Biswas on the ground that the Additional District Magistrate (Gen), North 24 Parganas at Barasat had passed an order under Section 14 of the Act, although power thereunder is exercisable only by the District Magistrate. The writ petition was dismissed by a learned Judge of this Court on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy before the tribunal having jurisdiction under Section 17(1) of the Act. Having recorded the aforesaid facts, the Bench proceeded to hold as follows:

“In the trial Court as well as before us, the writ petitioner/appellant tried to contend that the Additional District Magistrate (Gen) has no power to pass any order under Section 14 of the said Act. On the contrary, it appears to us that the proper reading of Sections 6, 8, 11, 12 and 17 of the said Act would clearly indicate that the Chief Judicial Magistrate in a non-metropolitan area stands on the same footing as of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in a metropolitan area and the power has been vested on the Additional District Magistrate since the District Magistrate includes Additional District Magistrate also. It would be evident from the circular issued by the Government under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This question has already been decided by the Court and the matter has already been dealt with regard to a question arose before us that whether a Chief Judicial Magistrate has power to pass any order under Section 14 of the said Act and the same has already been dealt with by the Division Bench of this Court in an unreported decision in Anil Kumar Banerjee v. Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd. in MAT 494 of 2010 arising out of W.P No. 6012 (W) of 2010 and the said judgment was delivered on 25th August, 2011.

In our considered opinion, we are bound by the said decision since one of us is also a party to the said decision and, therefore, the issue which is tried to be raised before us has also been dealt with in the said decision and further the Additional District Magistrate or the District Magistrate is functioning under Section 14 of the said Act is inexecutory in capacity and not as an adjudicatory authority. Therefore, we find that the order passed by the trial Court does not suffer from any illegality and/or irregularity and hence this appeal stands dismissed. The connected application is also dismissed.”

11) Whether or not the Chief Judicial Magistrate could be approached under Section 14 of the Act did not fall for decision in the writ petition filed by Abinash Biswas. The observation in the aforesaid extract that proper reading of Sections 6, 8, 11, 12 and 17 of the Act clearly indicates that the Chief Judicial Magistrate in a non-metropolitan area stands on the same footing as the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in a metropolitan area, in the humble view of this Court, appears to be obiter. A decision on a point which has not been argued does not operate as a precedent is settled law (See AIR 1990 SC 781). This Court, therefore, is of the respectful view that even if Abinash Biswas (supra) lays down any principle of law, the same does not apply here.

12) The other aspect, adverted to by the Bench, now requires consideration. Reference has been made by the Bench to another Bench decision dated August 25, 2011 in MAT 1194 of 2010 (Anil Kumar Banerjee v. Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd.). The said decision has since been reported in 2011 (5) CHN (Cal) 30. The Bench in Abinash Biswas (supra) observed that the question as to whether a Chief Judicial Magistrate has power to pass any order under Section 14 of the Act had been answered by the decision in Anil Kumar Banerjee (supra).

13) Though it may sound repetitive, one has again to examine whether the issue has been answered in Shri Anil Kumar Banerjee (supra) or not. If yes, the same would operate as a binding precedent.

14) On reading the decision in Anil Kumar Banerjee (supra), it appears that one of the issues raised by learned senior counsel appearing for the borrower was that a Chief Judicial Magistrate had no power to pass any order under Section 14 of the Act (paragraphs 14 and 15 of the report). In reply to such contention, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the secured creditor i.e Indiabulls contended that proper reading of Sections 6, 8, 11, 12 and 17 read with Sections 2(k) and 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code will clearly indicate that the Chief Judicial Magistrate in a non-metropolitan area stands on the same footing as a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in a metropolitan area and, therefore, he is vested with all the powers of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in a metropolitan area. Further submission of the said learned senior counsel has been noted to the effect that the provisions in Section 14 are procedural provisions and the power that is exercised thereunder is executory in nature and not adjudicatory. These contentions are noted in paragraphs 43 and 44 of the report.

15) Upon consideration of the rival submissions, the Bench, inter alia, observed in paragraph 45 as follows:

“We find that the Act itself is a complete Code, which provides for alternative Forum for redressal of all disputes raised by the appellant herein. In the given facts, in our opinion, the Writ Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in entertaining such disputes or contentions when the Debt Recovery Tribunal has been clothed with all such powers.”

Paragraphs 46 and 47 of the report refers to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 and the law laid down therein.

Thereafter, the conclusions have been recorded in paragraphs 48 and 49 as follows:

After considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the Court is duty bound to consider the test laid down by the Supreme Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and after applying such test we find that there are factors which can not allow the writ petitioner/appellant to have an order in this jurisdiction and the appellants have an alternative remedy to redress their grievances before the Debt Recovery Tribunal.

In these circumstances, we do not find any merit in this appeal. Hence, we dismiss the appeal. However, this order will not stand in the way to file any application by the appellant to take steps before the Debt Recovery Tribunal in accordance with the law.”

16) A close reading of the decision in Anil Kumar Banerjee (supra) would reveal that the point that had been raised on behalf of the borrower that a Chief Judicial Magistrate has no authority to exercise power under Section 14 of the Act was not at all answered. The said decision, therefore, does not aid the respondents 2 and 3 here.

17) This Court had the occasion to consider a similar point in Dinesh Kumar Agarwal (supra). A previous decision of the Court dated October 18, 2011 in AST 1337 of 2011 (Ronit Nirman Pvt. Ltd. v. State Bank Of India) had been considered, where it had been ruled as follows:

“Section 14 of the Act does not refer to the Chief Judicial Magistrate as an authority who is empowered to direct assistance, if approached by a secured creditor. On a plain reading of the statute it is clear that in so far as a non-metropolitan area is concerned, the concerned District Magistrate has to be approached. The decision in Solaris System Pvt. Ltd. (supra) does not take into consideration the fact that for a non-metropolitan areas, the District Magistrate has been vested with the jurisdiction to extend assistance. Once an authority has been named for the purpose of rendering assistance, the Court cannot confer jurisdiction on an authority who has not been named in the statutory provision for exercising such power. That would amount to usurping legislative function.

It is settled law that a statutory authority can exercise powers to the extent the same is conferred on it whereas a natural person has the power to do every such act unless the same is curbed by a statutory provision (See 40 CWN 17, Maniuddin Bepari v. State of West Bengal]. The learned Judge of the Kerala High Court appears to have proceeded by posing a wrong question i.e whether the Act debars the Chief Judicial Magistrate to exercise Section 14 powers or not. The question that ought to have been framed is whether the Act empowers the Chief Judicial Magistrate to exercise Section 14 powers or not. The answer to such question would have obviously been in the negative.

While respectfully disagreeing with the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court, I record my concurrence with the view expressed by the Bombay High Court and hold that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barasat acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the application under Section 14 of the Act.”

18) It is necessary to bear in mind the principles relating to statutory interpretation while deciding the issue that has arisen here.

19) Law is well-settled that the courts can neither by means of an interpretative process nor under the guise of ensuring parity in what it may seem to the court would be desirable to achieve uniformity (an area once again exclusively pertaining to policy of legislation) add to or alter the language, structure and content of a provision by reading into it what was not specifically intended or what perhaps was deliberately and consciously avoided by the Parliament itself [see (2001) 4 SCC 558 (Vijayalakshmamma v. B.T Shankar].

20) It is also settled law that the intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided [See (2003) 6 SCC 659 (Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers].

21) It would now be profitable to read Section 14 of the Act. The same reads as follows:

“14. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate to assist secured creditor in taking possession of secured asset. - (1) Where the possession of any secured asset is required to be taken by the secured creditor or if any of the secured asset is required to be sold or transferred by the secured creditor under the provisions of this Act, the secured creditor may, for the purpose of taking possession or control of any such secured asset, request, in writing, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate within whose jurisdiction any such secured asset or other documents relating thereto may be situated or found, to take possession thereof, and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or, as the case may be, the District Magistrate shall, on such request being made to him -

(a) take possession of such asset and documents relating thereto; and

(b) forward such asse ts and documents to the secured creditor.

(2) For the purpose of securing compliance with the provisions of subsection (1), the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate of the District Magistrate may take or cause to be taken such steps and use, or cause to be used, such force, as may, in his opinion, be necessary.

(3) No act of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate done in pursuance of this section shall be called in question in any court or before any authority.”

22) The provision says what it means and there is no need to gather materials from other statutes for understanding what the legislature intended. In our country, in each and every district forming part of a State, there is a District Magistrate as well as a Chief Judicial Magistrate. While there are Additional District Magistrates, there are Additional Chief Judicial Magistrates. If indeed it were the legislative intent that it is the ‘Chief Judicial Magistrate’ of a district who would have the power to pass an order under Section 14 of the Act, there would not have been any reference to ‘District Magistrate’ in Section 14 of the Act; instead, the legislature could have used ‘Chief Judicial Magistrate’. When the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, the literal rule of interpretation is to be followed is settled law. Reading ‘Chief Judicial Magistrate’ in place of ‘District Magistrate’ would amount to re-writing the law, which is impermissible.

23) This Court, therefore, finds no reason to take a view different from the one taken in Ronit Nirman (supra) and Dinesh Kumar Agarwal (supra).

24) The action of the respondents 2 and 3 in approaching the said magistrate is not supported by any provision of law and is, therefore, declared illegal. Since the application was not entertainable by the said magistrate, the order passed on such application must be treated to be non-est.

25) The respondents 2 and 3 shall immediately withdraw the notice issued by them taking symbolic possession of the secured assets.

26) The writ petition stands allowed, without costs.

27) It is made clear that nothing contained in this order shall preclude the respondents 2 and 3 to press the application under Section 14 of the Act, which is pending before the Additional District Magistrate (Dev), referred to above.

Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, shall be furnished to the applicant at an early date.