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Hemanta Mondal & Ors. v. Sri Ganesh Chandra Naskar.

Calcutta High Court
Aug 1, 2013
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Tapan Kumar Dutt, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 04 of 1993 seeking specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 04.02.1992 (exhibit-1) for land described in Schedule 'A' and, alternatively, refund of earnest money with damages as per Schedule 'B'. The agreement referred to 16 sataks (roughly 10 cottahs) for a total price of Rs. 1,50,000/-, of which Rs. 60,000/- was paid as earnest money and Rs. 90,000/- remained payable. After a survey, the plaintiff claimed the actual area was 8 cottahs 14 chitaks 24 sq. ft. and sought specific performance on that basis.

The defendant(s) contested the suit, raising disputes over measurement and other matters. The Trial Court (Civil Judge, Senior Division) by judgment dated 29.06.2002 granted only the alternative relief — refund of earnest money of Rs. 60,000/-, and directed deposit of that sum in Court. The plaintiff appealed (Title Appeal No. 139 of 2002). The First Appellate Court (Additional District Judge, Howrah) by judgment dated 22.12.2003 allowed the appeal and decreed specific performance, directing the plaintiff to deposit the balance consideration and directing the defendants to execute sale deed.

The defendants (appellants) challenged the First Appellate Court's decision in this appeal (S.A. 430 of 2004). A Division Bench admitted the appeal on substantial questions of law, including issues about the survey conducted by P.W.2 and questions related to the agreement and subject matter.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the survey/measurement carried out by P.W.2 (the surveyor) is reliable and may be acted upon by the Court, given the defendant's objection to the measurement and the absence of signatures on the survey documents.
  2. Whether, in the absence of evidence that the defendant participated in or accepted the survey, the measurements taken by the plaintiff's surveyor can form the basis for calculating the balance consideration.
  3. Whether the agreement for sale (binanama patra) is void or unenforceable because it was signed only by the vendor (original defendant) and not by both parties.
  4. Whether the plaintiff, having obtained an alternative decree for refund of earnest money from the Trial Court, could nevertheless maintain an appeal seeking specific performance (i.e., whether obtaining the alternative relief at trial precludes an appeal contesting denial of the primary relief).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The agreement for sale is void or not enforceable because it was signed only by the original defendant and not by both parties; a binanama must be signed by both parties for specific performance to be granted (relying on AIR 1998 S.C. 1400 and other authorities as cited).
  • The plaintiff had also sought the alternative relief of refund of earnest money and the Trial Court granted that relief; accordingly, the plaintiff is not an aggrieved party and cannot maintain the appeal against denial of specific performance (relying on AIR 1977 Madras 223 and AIR 2004 Karnataka 450).
  • The survey/measurement produced by P.W.2 is unreliable and one‑sided because there is nothing on record to show the defendant had an opportunity to participate in the survey or that the defendant actually did participate; the survey documents lack signatures of parties and the basis of the survey is unclear.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • An agreement of sale signed by the vendor alone and delivered to the purchaser may be a valid and enforceable contract; even oral agreements can be valid — thus the vendor-only signature does not render the agreement void (relying on AIR 2009 S.C. 1527).
  • Grant of the alternative relief (refund) at trial does not preclude the plaintiff from appealing the denial of the primary relief of specific performance; subsequent authority (a Full Bench decision) supports that an appeal is competent where the trial court grants only the alternative relief (relying on AIR 1990 Madras 361 and AIR 2006 SC 145).
  • Clause 3 of the agreement (providing adjustment on actual measurement at Rs. 15,000/- per cottah if area is less than ten cottahs) does not give the plaintiff an unfair advantage nor impose unforeseen hardship on the defendant; both parties agreed to actual measurement, so Clause 3 cannot be described as unfair (relying on AIR 2008 SC 1786).
  • Documentary correspondence shows the plaintiff offered the defendant opportunity (including inviting the defendant to appoint his own surveyor) to participate in measurement, and the defendant did not follow up; therefore the plaintiff's survey evidence (P.W.2) should be accepted unless the defendant applies for court-appointed measurement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1998 S.C. 1400 Paragraph 12 observes that when an agreement is reduced into writing and a formal document is executed the parties should affix their signatures or thumb impressions on such document to be bound. The Court noted that the paragraph does not say every binanama must be signed by both parties; it rejected the appellants' contention that the agreement was void merely because only the vendor signed it.
AIR 2009 S.C. 1527 Paragraph 7: even an oral agreement to sell is valid; an agreement signed by the vendor alone and delivered to the purchaser has been considered a valid contract enforceable by the purchaser on breach by vendor. The Court relied on this authority to hold that the vendor-only signature did not render the agreement invalid, since the signed agreement had been handed over to and produced by the plaintiff.
AIR 1977 Madras 223 Paragraph 15: observed that if a plaintiff seeks alternative reliefs and the court grants one, the plaintiff cannot later appeal to obtain the other relief; choice of reliefs is with the plaintiff and alternative reliefs stand on a par. The Court recorded this authority was relied on by the appellants, but noted that subsequent Full Bench authority overruled contrary observations in this report.
AIR 1990 Madras 361 (Full Bench) Holds that where a plaintiff obtains only the alternative relief (refund) and is denied specific performance, such a decision is materially adverse and an appeal by the plaintiff is a competent appeal (see paragraph 2 and paragraph 4 overruling earlier contrary observations). The Court treated this Full Bench authority as overruling the contrary view and relied upon it to conclude the plaintiff's appeal was competent; accordingly appellants' contention about non‑maintainability was held to lack substance.
AIR 2006 S.C. 145 Paragraph 32: an alternative plea of refund of earnest amount and damages cannot itself be a bar to claim a decree for specific performance. The Court cited this authority to support the conclusion that the grant of alternative relief below did not preclude the plaintiff from pursuing specific performance on appeal.
AIR 2008 S.C. 1786 Paragraph 8: specific performance may be refused where it would give an unfair advantage to the plaintiff or involve hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee. The Court applied this principle to Clause 3 of the agreement and concluded Clause 3 did not confer an unfair advantage or impose unforeseen hardship on the defendant; both parties agreed to actual measurement.
AIR 2004 Karnataka 450 This opinion cited the decision but did not set out the rule or principle from that decision in the provided text. The opinion records that this judgment was cited by the appellants in support of their contention regarding alternative reliefs; the text also notes that it refers to AIR 1977 Madras 223. No further application of its specific principle is described in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

(This section follows the structure and substance of the Court's step-by-step reasoning as stated in the opinion.)

  1. The Court first summarized trial and appellate findings: the Trial Court refused specific performance—finding Clause 3 gave the plaintiff unfair advantage, the plaintiff guilty of laches, and the survey evidence (P.W.2) unreliable—while the First Appellate Court reversed and granted specific performance, accepting P.W.2's measurements and the rough survey book (exhibit-12).
  2. On the challenge that the agreement was void because only the vendor signed it, the Court examined authorities. It observed that the cited Supreme Court authority did not require that every binanama be signed by both parties, and relied on a later Supreme Court decision that recognized vendor-signed and delivered agreements as valid. Because the signed agreement was produced by the plaintiff, the agreement was not void for lack of the plaintiff's signature.
  3. On appellant's contention that the plaintiff cannot appeal after obtaining the alternative relief at trial, the Court considered the sequence of authorities: earlier Madras High Court authority supporting the appellants' contention was held to have been overruled by a subsequent Full Bench (AIR 1990 Madras 361). The Court further relied on a Supreme Court authority (AIR 2006 SC 145) stating that alternative plea of refund is not a bar to claiming specific performance. Hence the Court found the appellants' submission on non-maintainability to be without substance.
  4. On the Trial Court's conclusion that Clause 3 conferred an unfair advantage on the plaintiff, the Court found no reasoned basis in the Trial Court's judgment for that conclusion. Applying the principle that specific performance may be refused if it gives unfair advantage or unforeseen hardship (AIR 2008 SC 1786), the Court analyzed Clause 3 and concluded both parties had agreed to base the transaction on actual measurement; Clause 3 therefore did not confer an unfair advantage nor create unforeseen hardship.
  5. Regarding the contested measurement, the Court noted evidentiary gaps: survey documents lacked parties' signatures; P.W.2 asserted that both parties identified the property but also stated in cross-examination that the defendant did not give anything in writing to him; the basis and method of the survey were not clearly established on record. The Court acknowledged correspondence showing the plaintiff offered the defendant opportunity to appoint a surveyor; the defendant disputed the measurement and did not subsequently appoint a surveyor.
  6. The Court concluded the central dispute remained the actual measurement of the land. While the First Appellate Court accepted P.W.2's measurement, the present Court considered it would have been preferable for the First Appellate Court to have decided after receiving a report from a competent and qualified person (a court-appointed commissioner) to measure the land. Noting that neither party had applied for appointment of a Commissioner earlier, the Court exercised its supervisory discretion to remand the matter for fresh determination limited to the measurement issue.
  7. Procedurally, the Court set aside the Trial Court's judgment, affirmed the First Appellate Court's declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance in terms of the agreement, but set aside the First Appellate Court's calculation of the balance amount based on P.W.2's measurement. The Court remanded the matter to the First Appellate Court with directions permitting the defendant to apply within four weeks for appointment of a competent Commissioner to measure the property; if no application is made, the First Appellate Court is to proceed on the basis of P.W.2's measurements.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISPOSED OF.

Holding (direct effect on the parties):

  • The Trial Court's judgment and decree (which had granted refund of earnest money) is set aside.
  • The First Appellate Court's judgment and decree is affirmed insofar as it declares that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance in terms of the agreement dated 04.02.1992.
  • The First Appellate Court's directive fixing the balance amount (Rs. 73,125/-) on the basis of P.W.2's measurement is set aside.
  • The matter is remanded to the First Appellate Court with directions:
    • The defendant may apply within four weeks from receipt of records for appointment of a competent Commissioner to conduct fresh survey and measurement;
    • If such application is made, the First Appellate Court shall appoint a competent person/Commissioner and decide the appeal in light of the Commissioner's report;
    • If no application is made within the stipulated period, the First Appellate Court shall dispose of the appeal on the basis of the measurements already on record (P.W.2) and in light of the present judgment;
    • The First Appellate Court should fix a timeframe for the Commissioner's report and try to dispose of the appeal as early as possible.
  • Lower court records are to be returned immediately to the Lower Appellate Court by special messenger; the appellants must deposit the special messenger cost within one week.
  • Urgent certified xerox copies of the judgment shall be provided on compliance with formalities.

Broader implications:

  • The Court reaffirmed that a vendor-signed agreement, delivered to and produced by the purchaser, can be enforceable and is not ipso facto void for want of the purchaser's signature.
  • The Court confirmed that obtaining an alternative relief (refund of earnest money) at trial does not automatically preclude the plaintiff from appealing the denial of the primary relief (specific performance) where that denial is materially adverse.
  • The opinion emphasizes the desirability of fact-finding via a court-appointed competent surveyor/Commissioner where measurements are in dispute and the documentary evidentiary basis is unclear.
  • The Court did not lay down a new legal precedent displacing existing Supreme Court authority; it applied existing authorities and remanded for a fact-specific determination on measurement.

End of summary. This summary is strictly confined to the content of the provided opinion and does not add external facts or inferences beyond the opinion text.

Show all summary ...

Tapan Kumar Dutt, J.:— This Court has heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties and has considered the materials on record. The facts of the case, very briefly, are as follows:

2. The plaintiff/respondent filed a suit being Title Suit No. 04 of 1993 against the predecessors-in-interest of the present appellants praying, inter alia, for a decree for specific performance of contract for sale of the property described in ‘A’ schedule to the plaint. The plaintiff, alternatively, prayed that if the Court finds a decree for specific performance of contract for sale cannot be granted by the Court to the plaintiff then a decree for refund of the earnest money with damages in terms of Schedule ‘B’ to the plaint should be granted in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case was that the original defendant entered into an agreement for sale with the plaintiff for sale of the 16 sataks of land in question in terms of an agreement for sale dated 04.02.1992 The said agreement for sale has been marked as exhibit-1 in the suit. According to the plaintiff, even though in the agreement for sale it was mentioned 16 sataks of land, it was also stipulated in the said agreement that if on the actual measurement it is found that the land in question is less than 16 sataks, then in that event the said land would be sold at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per cottah. Since the said 16 sataks is roughly equivalent to 10 cottahs the total price that was fixed for the said purchase was Rs. 1,50,000/-. Out of such consideration money the defendant had accepted Rs. 60,000/- and the balance Rs. 90,000/- was required to be paid by the plaintiff in terms of the said agreement. According to the plaintiff the measurement was done and it was found to be 8 cottahs 14 chittaks 24 square ft. of danga land. The plaintiff, accordingly, prayed for a decree of specific performance on the basis of such measurement as the defendant was trying to avoid the agreement.

3. The defendant contested the said suit by filing a written statement and it appears that such written statement was also amended subsequently; a plea was taken that the subject matter of the agreement for sale was an unpartitioned property and the area of land purchased by the original defendant was 16 and ½ sataks and thus it appears that a dispute was raised with regard to the measurement of the land. The said suit was placed before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 3 Court, Howrah and the learned Trial Court by judgement and decree dated 29 June, 2002 decreed the said suit in part by directing that the plaintiff does get a decree for refund of the earnest money of Rs. 60,000/- from the defendant and direction was given to the defendant to deposit such money in Court as stipulated in the said decree. The plaintiff was aggrieved by the said judgement and decree of the learned Trial Court and, consequently, filed Title Appeal No. 139 of 2002 which was placed before the learned 3 Court of Additional District Judge, Howrah and the learned First Appellate Court by judgement and decree dated 22 December, 2003 allowed the said Title Appeal by granting a decree to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for specific performance of contract for sale and the plaintiff was directed to deposit the balance consideration money before the learned Court concerned within the stipulated period of time and the defendants (on the death of the original defendant, the present defendants/appellants were substituted) were directed to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within a stipulated period of time.

4. It may be noted here that the learned Trial Court was of the view that the condition number 3 in the said agreement dated 04.02.1992 gave an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant and thus the Court, according to the learned Trial Court, can refuse to grant a decree for specific performance of contract. The learned Trial Court was of the view that reliance cannot be placed on measurements done by the surveyor at the instance of the plaintiff as according to the learned Trial Court the basis of the measurement done by the surveyor is not clear and it cannot be said from the documents adduced in evidence that the defendant had participated in such measurement-work. It appears from a perusal of the judgement of the learned Trial Court that the learned Trial Court was not satisfied with the measurement done by the surveyor at the instance of the plaintiff and the marking made by the surveyor did not appear to be a correct one. The learned Trial Court found that in the plan, which was sought to be brought on record, there is no signature of any of the parties. The learned Trial Court found that in the exhibit-12, which is included in an exercise book, also no signature of the parties appear and thus the learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that it cannot be proved that both the parties had participated at the time of survey work. The learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff is not satisfactory and the plaintiff is guilty of laches and since the said condition No. 3 of the said agreement for sale gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant, no decree for specific performance can be granted in favour of the plaintiff.

5. The learned lower appellate court found, inter alia, that there is no dispute with regard to the agreement for sale and that parties had agreed that calculation will be made on the basis of actual measurement of the land at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per cottah. The learned First Appellate Court also found that the plaintiff had arranged for holding the actual measurement by surveyor and the said surveyor was examined as P.W 2 who made the survey of the suit property and came to finding that on actual measurement it was found that the suit property is 8 cottahs 14 chitaks 24 Sq.ft The learned First Appellate Court has also relied upon the rough survey book (exhibit-12). There is no dispute that the defendant had accepted Rs. 60,000/- as earnest money. The learned First Appellate Court found that the plaintiff had performed his part of the obligation by holding survey and the plaintiff agreed to pay the balance amount but the defendant did not perform his part of the obligation. The learned First Appellate Court was also of the view that there is no ingredient to show that the plaintiff had any unfair advantage over the defendant. The learned First Appellate Court, however, made a finding that since the plaintiff took steps for holding measurement and no step was taken by the defendants for measuring the suit property by the surveyor or otherwise the learned First Appellate Court was constrained to hold that the measurement done by the surveyor (P.W 2) is a correct one. Accordingly, the learned First Appellate Court granted a decree as indicated above.

6. The defendants, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgement and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court, have preferred the instant appeal being S.A 430 of 2004. It appears that by order dated 25.06.2004 a Division Bench of this Court admitted the appeal on certain substantial questions of law. It appears that two of such substantial questions of law are with regard to the survey work done by the P.W 2 and the other two substantial questions of law related to the agreement in question and the subject matter of the contract.

7. The learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant/appellant argued that since the agreement for sale was signed only by the original defendant and not by both the parties the said agreement is a void one and it cannot be relied upon. According to the said learned Senior Advocate unless the binanama patra, i.e agreement for sale, is signed by both the parties no decree for specific performance can be granted in respect of such agreement. He relied upon a decision reported at AIR 1998 S.C 1400 and referred to paragraph 12 of the said reports in support of his contention that in the said paragraph 12 it has been observed that when an agreement is reduced into writing and a formal document is executed the parties to the said agreement should affix their signatures or thumb impression on such document so as to be bound by the terms of the agreement set out in that document. The said paragraph of the said reports does not, however, say that in every Binanama Patra both the parties will have to put their respective signatures. On the contrary, the learned Senior Advocate for the respondent cited a decision reported at AIR 2009 S.C 1527 in support of his contention that even if the vendor only signs on the binanama patra it is a valid document and there is no bar in granting a decree for specific performance of contract on the basis of such agreement for sale. In paragraph 7 of the said reports the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe that even an oral agreement to sell is valid. The said Hon'ble Supreme Court has also been pleased to observe that in India an agreement of sale signed by the vendor alone and delivered to the purchaser, and accepted by the purchaser, has always been considered to be a valid contract and in the event of breach by the vendor, it can be specifically enforced by the purchaser. Thus, it appears to this Court that the argument made by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants has no substance on such point. In the instant case it is true that the agreement for sale was signed by the original defendant alone but such agreement for sale came into evidence from the plaintiff and it was marked as exhibit-1. Thus, obviously, the said agreement after being signed by the original defendant was handed over to the plaintiff and the plaintiff subsequently adduced such agreement in evidence. Therefore, it cannot be said that such agreement is a void one only because the defendant alone had signed such agreement.

8. The next submission made by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants is that since the plaintiff had made an alternative prayer for refund of the earnest money and the learned Trial Court had granted such decree the plaintiff had no right to file an appeal against such decree on the ground that the learned Trial Court illegally did not grant a decree for specific performance of the agreement dated 04.02.1992 The said learned Senior Advocate submitted that since the alternative prayer has been granted by the learned Trial Court in terms of the prayer made by the plaintiff in the plaint it cannot be said that the plaintiff is an aggrieved party. The said learned Advocate submitted that such prayer was an alternative prayer and at par with the other prayers made with the plaint and, therefore, the First Title Appeal filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable. In support of such submission, the said learned Senior Advocate cited a decision reported at AIR 1977 Madras 223 and referred to Paragraph 15 of the said reports. It is true that the said reports supports the contention of the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants as in paragraph 15 of the said reports it has been observed that the choice of reliefs is always with the plaintiff and he can seek for more than one independent relief or ask for alternative reliefs but if the plaintiff asks for the alternative reliefs then he is placing the reliefs so sought for by him on a par with each other and if the Court trying the subject matter grants him one relief, then it follows that he has the benefit of the relief and the plaintiff cannot throw overboard such a benefit with a design or motive or to further his own cause by seeking umbrage in an appellate court and ask for the relief not granted to him. The said learned Senior Advocate cited another judgement reported at AIR 2004 Karnataka 450 also in support of his aforesaid contention and it appears that the said judgement reported at AIR 1977 Madras 223 was referred to in the said reports.

9. The learned Senior Advocate for the respondent submitted that the submissions made by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants in this regard are not correct as in a subsequent Full Bench decision, reported at AIR 1990 Madras 361, it has been found that in a case where the plaintiff had obtained the only alternative relief of refund of advance money and the plaintiff subsequently filed an appeal as the relief of specific performance was denied to him the Court found that such appeal is a competent appeal. The learned Court was of the view that since the decision of the First Appellate Court, in so far as it negatives the primary relief of specific performance, is materially adverse to the plaintiff, an appeal by such a plaintiff is competent appeal. (Paragraph 2 of the reports)

10. In paragraph 4 of the reports the Hon'ble Full Bench was pleased to observe that any observation in the said AIR 1977 Madras 223 running contrary to what the Full Bench had observed in the said reports, stands over ruled.

11. Thus it is found that the view taken in the said AIR 1977 Madras 223 has been over ruled by a subsequent Full Bench decision.

12. The said learned Advocate for the respondent cited another decision reported at AIR 2006 SC 145 and referred to paragraph 32 of the said reports wherein it has been observed that an alternative plea of refund of earnest amount and damage cannot itself be a bar to claim a decree for specific performance of contract.

13. Thus it appears that the point raised by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants with regard to the non-maintainability of the said Title Appeal at the instance of the plaintiffs is also devoid of any substance.

14. The learned Senior Advocate for the appellants relied upon the finding of the learned Trial Court that owing to the existence of Clause 3 of the conditions in the agreement for sale the plaintiff has taken an unfair advantage over the defendant. However, the learned Trial Court has not given reasons as to why it found that the Clause 3 of the conditions contained in the said agreement for sale can be described to be as an unfair one.

15. The learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent has referred to a decision reported at AIR 2008 SC 1786 and referred to paragraph 8 of the said reports wherein the Hon'ble Court was pleased to observe, inter alia, that no specific performance of a contract, though it is not vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation, can be granted if it would give an unfair advantage to the plaintiff and where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant, which he did not foresee. In the present case both the parties have agreed to the terms of agreement for sale and in Clause 3 of the conditions it has been stipulated that in the event it is found, subsequent to the execution of the agreement for sale, that on actual measurement of the property contemplated to be sold such property is less than 10 cottahs then in that event the area of the land which may be found less after measurement than ten cottahs will be calculated at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per cottah and adjustment would be made accordingly from the total consideration price of Rs. 1,50,000/-. When such is the condition in the agreement for sale it cannot be said that the defendant in the suit was likely to face any hardship which he did not foresee. It appears that both the parties have thought it fit at the time of the agreement that the property in question should be measured physically without relying upon the measurement as it might appear from various records. Thus it was a very simple thing. Both the parties, in effect, agreed to the transaction on the basis of actual measurement. This can hardly be described as the plaintiff taking any unfair advantage over the defendant. Thus this Court finds that the finding arrived at by the learned Trial Court in this regard was not the correct one.

16. The learned Trial Court was of the view that the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant had participated at the time of taking measurement by the surveyor. It appears from the records concerned that the papers produced in evidence with regard to the said survey work did not contain any signature of either of the parties. It is true that P.W 2 (Surveyor) has stated in evidence that the defendant and the plaintiff had identified the suit property to him but it is also true that the said P.W 2 also stated in evidence in cross examination that the defendant did not give anything in writing to the said witness to do the survey work. It is the P.W 2's evidence that the defendant orally asked the former to do the survey work. In exhibit 12 which purports to show the measurement of the property in possession of the defendant and also in the sketch plan, which appears on record but it has not been marked as an exhibit, none of the parties have put their signatures on such documents. It also appears from the evidence that it is not clear as to on what basis the surveyor has done the survey work and whether such survey work has been done in accordance with the established principles involved in such survey.

17. The learned Senior Advocate for the respondent referred to some of the letters exchanged in between the parties and such letters have been adduced in evidence. It is true that in one of such letters the plaintiff wrote that the measurement was taken in presence of the defendant but the defendant in his reply disputed the correctness of such measurement. The defendant in his reply asked the plaintiff to fix another date for doing the work of survey when the defendant may be able to be present at the time of such survey. It also appears from records that in one of the letters the plaintiff asked the defendant to appoint his own (defendant) surveyor if the defendant so wishes and inform the plaintiff accordingly. Thereafter, it seems the defendant did not take any further steps for appointing a surveyor to do the necessary work. The defendant has consistently disputed the measurement taken by the P.W 2 and the learned Senior Advocate for the defendants/appellants submitted that when there is nothing on record to show that the defendant had any opportunity to participate in the survey work done by the P.W 2 and there is also nothing on record to show that the defendant had actually participated in such survey work, no reliance can be placed on the measurement taken by the P.W 2 as such measurements are one sided affair. The learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that if the defendant, in spite of having opportunity, did not choose to appoint a surveyor, as requested by the plaintiff, then the defendants have to accept the survey work done by the P.W 2.

18. It appears from the submissions made by the learned Counsels for the respective parties and the materials on record that the dispute really lies with regard to the actual measurement of the area of land which is the subject matter of the agreement for sale. With regard to the agreement for sale dated 04.02.1992, as aforesaid, it cannot be said that the said agreement was illegal and/or a void one. However, since the parties are at dispute with regard to the measurement of the actual area of the land it would have been proper if the learned First Appellate Court had considered the matter after the actual measurements were brought before the Court by way of a report from a competent and qualified person in this regard. It is also true, however, that none of the parties applied for appointment of any Commissioner to take the actual measurements of the land in dispute.

19. This Court is of the view, in view of the discussions made above, that the matter should be sent back to the learned First Appellate Court concerned for a fresh decision after giving the parties an opportunity to make an appropriate application for having the property in dispute measured by a competent person. It is only on this ground that this Court is inclined to send the matter back to the learned First Appellate Court.

20. In view of the discussions made above, the present appeal is disposed of as follows:

21. The judgement and decree passed by the learned Trial Court is set aside. The judgement and decree of the learned First Appellate Court so far as it declares that the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for specific performance of contract in terms of the said agreement for sale dated 4.2.1992 is concerned is affirmed by this Court but the other part of the decree of the learned First Appellate Court whereby it specifies an amount as the balance amount to be deposited by the plaintiff on the basis of the measurements taken by the said P.W 2 is set aside and for the purpose of enabling the parties to have fresh measurements by way of having a competent person appointed through Court and thereafter a decree being passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the matter is being sent back on remand to the learned First Appellate Court. The judgement and decree of the learned First Appellate Court is accordingly modified, as indicated above, and the matter is being sent back to the learned First Appellate Court with the following directions:

22. The judgement and decree of the learned First Appellate Court in so far as it directs the plaintiff to deposit Rs. 73,125/- on the basis of the measurement taken by the P.W 2 is set aside but in so far as the said decree declares that the plaintiff is entitled to get specific performance of contract in terms of the said agreement dated 4.2.1992 is affirmed. The impugned judgement and decree thus stands modified. After the matter is remanded back to the learned First Appellate Court, the learned First Appellate Court shall allow the defendant in the suit to apply for appointment of a Commissioner who should be competent to do the necessary survey-work as the defendant has disputed the measurements appearing on record. If the defendant makes an appropriate application for such purpose within four weeks from the date of receipt of the records by the learned First Appellate Court, then in that event, the learned First Appellate Court shall appoint a competent person to do the survey work for the purpose of taking the actual measurements of the property in dispute and, thereafter, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the findings that may be made by the learned First Appellate Court on the basis of the report that may be submitted by such Commissioner. In the event the defendant does not make an application for appointment of an appropriate Commissioner within the time stipulated above, the learned First Appellate Court shall dispose of the appeal on the basis of the measurements taken by the P.W 2 which are already appearing on record and in the light of the present judgement. The learned First Appellate Court shall try to dispose of the appeal as early as possible. The learned First Appellate Court will a fix time-frame within which the Commissioner should submit his report, in the event such Commissioner is appointed by the learned First Appellate Court.

23. Let the lower court records be sent back to the learned Lower Appellate Court concerned immediately by special messenger and the special messenger cost for such purpose shall be put in by the appellants within one week.

24. Urgent certified xerox copy of this judgement, if applied for, shall be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible on compliance of all necessary formalities.