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Kantilal Ambalal Patel & 1 Petitioner(S) v. State Of Gujarat & 1 (S)

Gujarat High Court
Oct 17, 2013
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Judgment Summary — Common Judgment by Harsha Devani, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

A consolidated first information report (FIR) was lodged at Gandhinagar Zone Police Station (I.C.R No. 5/2012) against the petitioners and others alleging offences under sections 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120B and 477A IPC relating to events from 1984 up to 21 May 2012. Subsequently, five identically worded FIRs (Makarpura Police Station I-C.R Nos. 50/2013 to 54/2013, dated 19 February 2013) were registered, likewise naming the petitioners (Kantilal Ambalal Patel and Dollyben Kantilal Patel) among other accused and alleging offences under sections 408, 420, 465, 468, 120B, 471 and 477A IPC.

The petitioners challenged the subsequent FIRs primarily on the ground that once an FIR is registered for an offence, a second FIR in respect of the same offence is not maintainable. The matters were heard together after waiver of service by the first respondent's counsel, taken up for final hearing and disposed of by this common judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the subsequently registered FIRs (Makarpura I.C.R Nos. 50/2013 to 54/2013) are tenable in view of the earlier consolidated FIR (Gandhinagar I.C.R No. 5/2012) — that is, whether the subsequent FIRs amount to impermissible "second FIRs" in respect of the same offence/occurrence.
  2. Whether, by applying the judicially developed test of "sameness", the subsequent FIRs relate to distinct offences/occurrences with a different scope of inquiry, or whether they form part of the same transaction/conspiracy already encompassed by the earlier FIR.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (Mr. Jal Unwala)

  • The petitioners are family members (father, mother and daughter) and named in an earlier consolidated FIR (Gandhinagar I.C.R No. 5/2012) which already contains detailed allegations covering incidents from 1984 to 21 May 2012.
  • The five subsequent FIRs relate to the same facts and incidents referred to in the penultimate paragraph of the earlier FIR; therefore they are second FIRs in respect of the same offence and are not maintainable.
  • It is settled law that two FIRs cannot be lodged for the same offence; the impugned FIRs are an abuse of the process of court and violate Article 21 of the Constitution.
  • Relied on Supreme Court decisions (including Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI and Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P.) to submit that the court must apply the "sameness" test to determine whether the subsequent FIRs relate to the same incident/occurrence or to distinct incidents with a different scope of inquiry; under that test the present subsequent FIRs fall within the same transaction and are liable to be quashed.

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. Tushar Mehta)

  • The District Registrar (second respondent) in discharge of statutory functions under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, discovered commission of offences and filed the subsequent FIRs in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Though some facts overlap, the subsequent FIRs cover different and distinct offences and a broader/wider conspiracy than the earlier FIR; therefore they must be investigated impartially and independently.
  • If the later FIRs empower investigation on a larger canvas, discretion should not be exercised to favour the accused; overlap does not mean identity.
  • Relied on Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) to submit that where a subsequently discovered conspiracy covers a larger canvas and broader ramifications it cannot be equated with an earlier, narrower conspiracy; applying the "sameness" test to the present facts would reveal that the offences are distinct and no interference is warranted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) (1979) 2 SCC 322 Second FIR permissible where the subsequently discovered conspiracy covers a much larger canvas with different conspirators/objects; question is whether conspiracies are the same in substance and truth. The Court summarized Ram Lal Narang and used it as the benchmark for situations where a later FIR covers broader ramifications. It then distinguished that case on facts: unlike Ram Lal Narang, the earlier FIR here (Gandhinagar I.C.R No.5/2012) already covered the larger conspiracy, so Ram Lal Narang did not validate the subsequent FIRs in this case.
Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2013) 6 SCC 384 There cannot be more than one FIR about the same occurrence; the court must apply the "sameness" test—examine whether a subsequently registered FIR relates to the same incident/occurrence or is based on distinct facts with an entirely different scope of inquiry. The Court relied on Anju Chaudhary to articulate the legal framework: apply the test of "sameness" and examine facts/circumstances (proximity of time, unity, continuity, commonality of purpose) to determine whether the second FIR is liable to be quashed. The Court applied this test to the two sets of FIRs and found they related to the same occurrence.
Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2013) 6 SCC 348 Where the entire larger conspiracy is covered in the first FIR, filing of a fresh FIR is contrary to the principle; further investigation should be by way of further reports and not by registering a fresh FIR; statutory scheme of Sections 154, 156, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of CrPC supports that only the earliest information satisfies Section 154. The Court cited this decision to reinforce the proposition that if a larger conspiracy is already covered in the first FIR, a fresh FIR is impermissible. The Court used Amitbhai to support the conclusion that subsequent FIRs here were impermissible and that further information should be treated as part of the original investigation under the earlier FIR.
Babubhai v. State of Gujarat Distinction between two FIRs relating to the same incident and two FIRs relating to different incidents; courts must rationalise facts and apply the "sameness" test. The Court referred to Babubhai as authority for distinguishing same-incident FIRs from distinct-incident FIRs and applied that reasoning in assessing whether the later FIRs were part of the conspiracy already disclosed by the first FIR.
Chirra Shivraj v. State of A.P. There cannot be a second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because further information is in furtherance of the first FIR. The Court quoted Chirra Shivraj to support the general proposition that a second FIR on the same event/offence is not permissible and used it in applying the sameness test to the present facts.
Reeta Nag v. State of W.B. and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali (referenced) Illustrations concerning Section 154 and Section 167(2) of the CrPC — emphasising constraints on re-investigation/de novo investigation and the scheme of the Code. The Court referenced these cases while discussing the limits on re-investigation and the inbuilt safeguards of Section 154 and Section 167(2) CrPC; they provided context for why a second FIR should not ordinarily be allowed to effect a de novo investigation.
T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 There can be no second FIR and no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. The Court invoked T.T. Antony to support its holding that the subsequent FIRs violated the principle against second FIRs and that registering fresh FIRs for the same occurrence was impermissible, thereby impacting the petitioners' constitutional rights (Articles 14, 20 and 21).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the sole question as whether, in the face of the allegations made in the earlier FIR (Gandhinagar I.C.R No. 5/2012), the subsequent FIRs (Makarpura I.C.R Nos. 50/2013 to 54/2013) are tenable. The analysis proceeded in the following steps, grounded on the authorities cited:

  1. Exposition of legal principles: The court reviewed Supreme Court precedents (Ram Lal Narang, Anju Chaudhary, Amitbhai Shah, Babubhai, Chirra Shivraj, T.T. Antony) and distilled the governing principles:
    • There cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence/occurrence, but a second FIR is permissible where the subsequent incident is separate, or where the later-discovered conspiracy covers a substantially larger canvas and is not identical in substance.
    • The correct approach is a fact-sensitive application of the "sameness" test: examine whether both FIRs relate to the same incident/occurrence, to parts of the same transaction, or to completely distinct occurrences; consider proximity of time, unity or continuity of action, commonality of purpose/design and scope of inquiry.
    • Where the first FIR already discloses the larger conspiracy, filing a fresh FIR on the same occurrence is impermissible; further information should be treated as part of the original investigation and processed under the scheme of Sections 154/156/162/169/170/173 CrPC (and sub-section (8) of Section 173 for further reports), rather than by registering a new FIR.
  2. Detailed factual comparison of the FIRs: The court carefully compared the contents of the earlier consolidated FIR and the subsequent FIRs:
    • The earlier FIR (Gandhinagar I.C.R No.5/2012) is a consolidated complaint spanning incidents from 1984 to May 2012 and alleges a well-planned conspiracy to grab land belonging to 710 members across five groups of Gayatrinagar Co-operative Housing Society; it details how lands were sold, how consideration travelled back to the accused, and states in its penultimate paragraph facts about taking the society into liquidation by obtaining false audit reports and misleading the Liquidation Officer.
    • The subsequent FIRs (Makarpura I.C.R Nos.50–54/2013) are identically worded (with differences only in the names of certain Chairmen/Secretaries) and contain detailed allegations concerning the liquidation process, naming specific members whose resignations and receipts were allegedly forged or fabricated—facts which were in summary form in the penultimate paragraph of the earlier FIR.
  3. Application of the "sameness" test to the facts: Using the principles from Anju Chaudhary and related cases, the court concluded:
    • Common subject-matter: both FIRs concern the same Society, same lands (4,25,000 sq. metres), the same alleged conspiracy to grab those lands, and involve largely the same conspirators (petitioners and others).
    • Common objectives and offences: the objects of the alleged conspiracies are the same (to grab lands belonging to the Society), and the offences alleged substantially overlap (earlier FIR: sections 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120B, 477A IPC; subsequent FIRs: sections 408, 420, 465, 468, 471, 477A, 120B IPC).
    • Temporal and transactional continuity: the earlier FIR was a consolidated complaint covering the larger transaction, and the subsequent FIRs amount to detailed elaborations of the allegations already referred to in the earlier FIR's penultimate paragraph—i.e., they describe parts of the same transaction rather than a separate, larger conspiracy.
  4. Legal conclusion from facts: Because the earlier FIR already encompassed the larger conspiracy and the subsequent FIRs only elaborated upon episodes already included within that conspiracy, the subsequent FIRs are second FIRs in respect of the same offence/occurrence. The court held that those subsequent FIRs ought to have been treated as further information for the ongoing investigation under the first FIR, not as fresh FIRs triggering separate investigations.
  5. Constitutional dimension: The court held that permitting the subsequent FIRs to stand in these circumstances violated the petitioners' fundamental rights under Articles 14, 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India (as those protections are engaged where a second FIR results in prejudicial duplication of criminal process).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petitions were allowed. The court's operative ruling was:

DISPOSITION: The first information reports registered vide Makarpura Police Station I-C.R Nos. 50/2013, 51/2013, 52/2013, 53/2013 and 54/2013 dated 19 February, 2013 are hereby quashed and set aside.

Consequential directions and immediate implications:

  • The investigations carried out pursuant to the quashed (second) FIRs shall be treated as part of the investigation in respect of the earlier consolidated FIR (Gandhinagar I.C.R No. 5/2012).
  • All records of the subsequent FIRs are to be forwarded to the Investigating Officer of the earlier FIR, who shall consider the same and carry out investigation in respect of the detailed allegations contained therein.
  • The rule was made absolute (i.e., the petitions succeeded and the court granted relief quashing the subsequent FIRs).

The Court's decision applies the settled principles from Supreme Court precedents to the facts before it; the order addresses the parties' rights and the proper scope of investigation in the particular factual matrix of these matters. The judgment implements well-established precedent rather than pronouncing a novel legal principle.


Source: Summary prepared from the judgment authored by Harsha Devani, J., as provided. The summary reflects only information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Harsha Devani, J.:— Rule. Mr. Himanshu Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the first respondent in each of the petitions. Having regard to the controversy involved in the present case as well as the fact that all these petitions are directed against similar first information reports filed against the petitioners and lengthy submissions have been made by the learned advocates for the respective parties, the matters were taken up for final hearing and are accordingly disposed of by this common judgment.

2. The facts of the case stated briefly are that a first information report being Gandhinagar Zone Police Station I-C.R No. 5/2012 came to be lodged against the petitioners herein and others, alleging commission of the offences punishable under sections 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120B and 477A of the Indian Penal Code. Subsequently, five identically worded first information reports came to be registered against the petitioners and other co-accused alleging commission of the offences punishable under sections 408, 420, 465, 468, 120B, 471 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 being Makarpura Police Station I-C.R No. 50/2013 to 54/2013. All these petitions have been filed challenging the above referred first information reports mainly on the ground that once an offence is registered by way of a first information report, a second first information report in respect of the same offence is not maintainable.

3. Mr. Jal Unwala, learned advocate for the petitioners in each of the petitions submitted that the petitioners are father, mother and daughter. Previously a first information report making detailed allegations against both the petitioners, viz. Kantilal Ambalal Patel and Dollyben Kantibhai Patel and other co-accused came to be lodged by the power of attorney holder of one of the members of the Gayatrinagar Co-operative Housing Society in respect of the period from 1984 till the date of lodging of the first information report, that is, 21st May, 2012. Inviting attention to the allegations made in the said first information report, it was pointed out that various allegations have been made which relate to incidents of the year 1984 till the date of lodging of the said first information report. Reference was made to the penultimate paragraph of the said first information report to submit that the allegations made in the five subsequent first information reports are in relation to the same allegations that have been made in the said paragraph, and thus all the five subsequent first information reports are second first information reports in relation to the very same offence in connection with which the previous first information report has been lodged. It was argued that it is settled legal position that in respect of the same offence, two first information reports cannot be lodged and that the impugned first information reports are a glaring example of an abuse of the process of court, inasmuch as, the impugned first information reports are subsequent in point of time to the earlier first information report and cannot be allowed to continue as both the first information reports are in respect to and in continuation of the same incident, the same cause of action and the same occurrence as mentioned in the previous first information report. It was submitted that the version in the impugned first information reports cannot be said to be in respect of two different incidents/crimes and therefore also the subsequent first information reports cannot be permitted to be continued as the same would violate Article 21 of the Constitution of India and is in gross abuse of the process of law. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2013) 6 SCC 348, it was submitted that the court is required to examine both the first information reports and examine whether the subsequently registered first information reports are second first information reports about the same incident or offence or are based upon distinct and different facts and whether their scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It was argued that the court has to apply the test of “sameness” to find out whether both the first information reports relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence and are in regard to incidents which are in two or more parts of the same occurrence and in regard to incidents which are in two or more parts of the same transaction or relate to completely two distinct occurrences. It was submitted that if the first information report falls in the first category, the second first information report is liable to be quashed. In support of such submissions, the learned advocate placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2013) 6 SCC 384. Referring to the allegations made in both the first information reports in detail, it was submitted that by applying the test of sameness, it is abundantly clear that both the first information reports in fact relate to the same occurrences and they are in two parts of the same transaction and the subsequent first information reports are in fact in continuation of the very same incident and occurrence which are in fact two or more parts of the same transaction. Under the circumstances, the subsequent first information reports namely, the impugned first information reports are required to be quashed as the same amounts to an abuse of the process of court.

4. Opposing the petitions, Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the second respondent, in the discharge of his functions under the provisions of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, found commission of several offences which are punishable under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code. He, therefore, moved the machinery of law in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) and filed the impugned first information reports. It was contended that on a bare perusal of both the first information reports, it is abundantly clear that though some facts are alleged to be overlapping, both the first information reports cover different and distinct offences, hence, the subsequent first information reports are required to be investigated impartially, independently and in accordance with the provisions of the Code. It was argued that if the second first information reports have the potential of empowering the investigating agency to investigate on a larger canvass, discretion is not required to be exercised in favour of the person committing a criminal offence. It was submitted that though there may be some overlapping between the previous first information report and the subsequent first information reports, the same are not identical in nature. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, the first information report lodged by the second respondent namely, the District Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Vadodara, covers a wider conspiracy than the limited allegations made in the previous first information report registered vide Gandhinagar Police Station I-C.R No. 5/2012. Under the circumstances, the present case would be squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration)), (1979) 2 SCC 322, wherein the Supreme Court while dealing with a case where it was called upon to determine whether the two conspiracies, the first one forming part of the subsequent larger conspiracy which came to light on receipt of fesh information, were identical or not, held that the question is not whether the nature or character or the conspiracy has changed by the mere addition of few more conspirators as accused or by the addition of one or more among the objects of the conspiracy. The question is whether the two conspiracies are in substance and truth the same. Where the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a larger canvas with broader ramifications, it cannot be equated with the earlier conspiracy which covered a smaller field of narrower dimensions. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it was submitted that if the test of sameness is applied to the facts of the present case, the same would reveal that the offences are distinct and different and as such, there is no warrant for intervention by this court.

5. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts and submissions, it is apparent that the sole question that has been raised for consideration by this court is whether in the face of the allegations made in the previous first information report, the subsequent first information reports are tenable. Before adverting to the merits of the case, reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respective parties as regards the maintainability of a second first information report in respect of the same offence. Though, various decisions have been cited, it may not be necessary to refer to each of the decisions in detail, inasmuch as, the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court take into consideration all its earlier decisions.

6. The first decision on the question of maintainability of a second first information report is the celebrated decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration)) (supra), wherein the court has held thus:

“11. It is obvious that neither at the time when the FIR pertaining to the Ambala case was registered nor at the time when the charge-sheet was filed in the Ambala Court were the Narang brothers known to be in the picture. The investigating agency was also not aware of what Malik and Mehra had done with the pillars after they had obtained possession of the pillars from the Court and substituted and returned fake pillars to the Court. The FIR and the charge-sheet were concerned primarily with the offences of conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate committed by Malik and Mehra. At that stage, the investigating agency was not aware of any conspiracy to send the pillars out of the country. It was not known that the Narang brothers were also parties to the conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court. It was much later that the pillars surfaced in London and were discovered to be in the constructive possession of Narang brothers. Even then, the precise connection between Malik and Mehra on the one side and Narang brothers on the other was not known. All that was known was that the pillars which were stolen property within the definition of the expression in Section 410 IPC were found to be in the possession of Narang brothers in London. On the discovery of the genuine pillars in the possession of Narang brothers, without anything further to connect Narang brothers with Malik and Mehra, the police had no option but to register a case under Section 411 IPC against Narang brothers. That was what was done. No fault could, therefore, be found with the police for registering an FIR against the Narang brothers for the offence of conspiracy to commit an offence under Section 411 IPC. In the course of the investigation into this offence, it transpired that the Narang brothers were also parties to the original conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court by cheating. Facts came to light which indicated that the conspiracy, which was the subject-matter of the case pending in the Ambala Court was but part of a larger conspiracy. The fresh facts which came to light resulted in the filing of the second charge-sheet. The several facts and circumstances mentioned by us earlier and a comparison of the two FIRs and the two charge-sheets show that the conspiracy which was the subject-matter of the second case could not be said to be identical with the conspiracy which was the subject-matter of the first case. The conspirators were different. Malik and Mehra alone were stated to be the conspirators in the first case, while the three Narang brothers were alleged to be the principal conspirators in the second case. The objects of the two conspiracies were different. The alleged object of the first conspiracy was to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court by cheating and to misappropriate them. The alleged object of the second conspiracy was the disposal of the stolen property by exporting the pillars to London. The offences alleged in the first case were section 120-B read with section 420 and section 406 IPC, while the offences alleged in the second case were Section 120-B read with Section 411 IPC and Section 25 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. It is true that the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act had not yet come into force on the date when the FIR was registered. It is also true that Omi Narang and Manu Narang were not extradited for the offence under the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act and, therefore, they could not be tried for that offence in India. But the question whether any of the accused may be tried for a contravention of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act or under the corresponding provision of the earlier Act is really irrelevant in deciding whether the two conspiracies are one and the same. The trite argument that a Court takes cognizance of offences and not offenders was also advanced. This argument is again of no relevance in determining the question whether the two conspiracies which were taken cognizance of by the Ambala and the Delhi Courts were the same in substance. The question is not whether the nature and character of the conspiracy has changed by the mere inclusion of a few more conspirators as accused or by the addition of one more among the objects of the conspiracy. The question is whether the two conspiracies are in substance and truth the same. Where the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a much larger canvas with broader ramifications, it cannot be equated with the earlier conspiracy which covered a smaller field of narrower dimensions. We are clear, in the present case, that the conspiracies which are the subject-matter of the two cases cannot be said to be identical though the conspiracy which is the subject-matter of the first case may, perhaps, be said to have turned out to be part of the conspiracy which is the subject-matter of the second case. As we mentioned earlier, when investigation commenced in FIR R.C 4 of 1976, apart from the circumstance that the property involved was the same, the link between the conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate and the conspiracy to dispose of the stolen property was not known.”

7. Thus, in the said case, the Supreme Court on facts found that (i) the conspiracy which was the subject-matter of the second case could not be said to be identical with the conspiracy which was the subject-matter of the first case; (ii) the conspirators were different; (iii) the objects of the two conspiracies were different; and (iv) the offences alleged in the first case were section 120-B read with section 420 and section 406 IPC, while the offences alleged in the second case were section 120-B read with section 411 IPC and section 25 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972; and held that the question is not whether the nature and character of the conspiracy has changed by the mere inclusion of a few more conspirators as accused or by the addition of one more among the objects of the conspiracy. The question is whether the two conspiracies, in substance and truth, are the same. Where the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a much larger canvass with broader ramifications, it cannot be equated with the earlier conspiracy which covers a small field of narrower dimensions. The Supreme Court found that the earlier case related to a small field whereas the second case related to larger conspiracy and accordingly upheld the registration of the second first information report.

8. In Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), the Supreme Court held thus:

14. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there can be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the opening words of Section 154 suggest that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence shall be reduced into writing by the officer in-charge of a police station. This implies that there has to be the first information report about an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the investigating agency has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon completion of investigation, either for cancellation or alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned, may be in a given case, subject to the right of further investigation but wherever the investigation has been completed and a person is found to be prima facie guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, reexamination by the investigating agency on its own should not be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating powers by the police cannot be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the Code, as it would not only further the object of law but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, re-investigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not only the investigating agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section 167(2) of the Code. [Ref Reeta Nag v. State of W.B and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali of the same date.)

15. It has to be examined on the merits of each case whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR about the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not be appropriate for the court to lay down one straitjacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This will always be a mixed question of law and facts depending upon the merits of a given case.

16. In Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) the Court was concerned with the registration of a second FIR in relation to the same facts but constituting different offences and where ambit and scope of the investigation was entirely different. Firstly, an FIR was registered and even the charge-sheet filed was primarily concerned with the offence of conspiracy to cheat and misappropriation by the two accused. At that stage, the investigating agency was not aware of any conspiracy to send the pillars (case property) out of the country. It was also not known that some other accused persons were parties to the conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the court, which subsequently surfaced in London. Earlier, it was only known to the police that the pillars were stolen as the property within the meaning of Section 410 IPC and were in possession of the accused person (Narang brothers) in London.

17. The Court in Ram Lal Narang declined to grant relief of discharge to the petitioner in that case where the contention raised was that entire investigation in the FIR subsequently instituted was illegal as the case on same facts was already pending before the courts at Ambala and courts in Delhi were acting without jurisdiction. The fresh facts came to light and the scope of investigation broadened by the facts which came to be disclosed subsequently during the investigation of the first FIR. The comparison of the two FIRs has shown that the conspiracies were different. They were not identical and the subject matter was different. The Court observed that there was a statutory duty upon the police to register every information relating to cognizable offence and the second FIR was not hit by the principle that it is impermissible to register a second FIR of the same offence.

25. The first information report is a very important document, besides that it sets the machinery of criminal law in motion. It is a very material document on which the entire case of the prosecution is built. Upon registration of FIR, beginning of investigation in a case, collection of evidence during investigation and formation of the final opinion is the sequence which results in filing of a report under Section 173 of the Code. The possibility that more than one piece of information is given to the police officer in charge of a police station, in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences, cannot be ruled out. Other materials and information given to or received otherwise by the investigating officer would be statements covered under Section 162 of the Code. The Court in order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of ‘sameness’ to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences. If the answer falls in the first category, the second FIR may be liable to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, whether the version of the second FIR is different and they are in respect of two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. This is the view expressed by this Court in the case of Babubhai v. State of Gujarat. This judgment clearly spells out the distinction between two FIRs relating to the same incident and two FIRs relating to different incidents or occurrences of the same incident etc.

26. To illustrate such a situation, one can give an example of the same group of people committing theft in a similar manner in different localities falling under different jurisdictions. Even if the incidents were committed in close proximity of time, there could be separate FIRs and institution of even one stating that a number of thefts had been committed, would not debar the registration of another FIR. Similarly, riots may break out because of the same event but in different areas and between different people. The registration of a primary FIR which triggered the riots would not debar registration of subsequent FIRs in different areas. However, to the contra, for the same event and offences against the same people, there cannot be a second FIR. This Court has consistently taken this view and even in the case of Chirra Shivraj v. State of A.P, the Court took the view that: (SCC p.448, para 14)

“14. … There cannot be a second FIR in respect of same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first information report.”

44. It is not possible to enunciate any formula of universal application for the purpose of determining whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. Such things are to be gathered from the circumstances of a given case indicating proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action, commonality of purpose or design. Where two incidents are of different times with involvement of different persons, there is no commonality and the purpose thereof different and they emerge from different circumstances, it will not be possible for the court to take a view that they form part of the same transaction and therefore, there could be a common FIR or subsequent FIR could not be permitted to be registered or there could be common trial.

45. Similarly, for several offences to be part of the same transaction, the test which has to be applied is whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose or of cause and effect, or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Thus, where there is a commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences “committed in the course of the same transaction”.

(Emphasis supplied)

9. The principles that can be culled out from the above decision are: (i) there cannot be two first information reports registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the first information report recorded first, then a second first information report could be registered. (ii) It has to be examined on the merits of each case whether a subsequently registered first information report is a second first information report about the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. (iii) The Court in order to examine the impact of one or more first information reports has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of ‘sameness’ to find out whether both first information reports relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences. If the answer falls in the first category, the second first information report may be liable to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, whether the version of the second first information report is different and they are in respect of two different incidents/crimes, the second first information report is permissible. (iv) Where two incidents are of different times with involvement of different persons, there is no commonality and the purpose thereof different and they emerge from different circumstances, it will not be possible for the court to take a view that they form part of the same transaction and therefore, there could be a common first information report or subsequent first information report could not be permitted to be registered or there could be common trial. For several offences to be part of the same transaction, the test which has to be applied is whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose or of cause. and effect or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Thus, where there is a commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences “committed in the course of the same transaction”.

10. In Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI (supra), the Supreme Court held thus:

“54. In the light of the factual details, since the entire larger conspiracy is covered in the first FIR dated 1-2-2010 and in the investigation of the said FIR, the CBI, after investigating Tulsiram Prajapati's encounter recorded a finding in supplementary charge sheet dated 22-10-2010 filed in the killings of Sohrabuddin and Kausarbi case that the said encounter was a fake one, we are satisfied that the decision in Ram Lal Narang would not apply to the facts of the case on hand. Even otherwise, as pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, in Ram Lal Narang, the charge-sheet filed pursuant to the first FIR was withdrawn which was a fact which weighed with this Court while delivering the judgment in the second case.”

“Summary:

58.1 This Court accepting the plea of the CBI in Narmada Bai that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR directed the CBI to “take over” the investigation and did not grant the relief prayed for i.e, registration of a fresh FIR. Accordingly, filing of a fresh FIR by the CBI is contrary to various decisions of this Court.

58.2.The various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly show that an officer-in-charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 of the Code on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, the investigating officer has to form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 of the Code and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) of the Code.

58.3.Even after fling of such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, there is no need to register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further investigation normally with the leave of the court and where during further investigation, he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports which is evident from sub-section(8) of Section 173 of the Code. Under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the Code, only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 of the Code. Thus, there can be no second FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.

58.5 The first information report is a report which gives first information with regard to any offence. There cannot be second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first FIR.”

11. In line with the principles laid down in the above decisions, while considering the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the previous and subsequent first information reports relate to the same offences, the court in order to examine the impact of the first information report has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of ‘sameness’ to find out whether both the first information reports relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction, or relate completely to different occurrences. If the answer falls in the first category, the second first information report may be liable to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, whether the version of the second first information reports is different and they are in respect of two different incidents/crimes, the second first information reports are permissible. However, there cannot be a second first information report in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first information report. For offences to be part of the same transaction, the test which has to be applied is whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose or of cause and effect, or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Thus, where there is a commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences “committed in the course of the same transaction”. With a view to ascertain the above referred facts, it would be necessary to refer to the contents of both the first information reports in detail.

12. In the previous first information report registered vide Gandhinagar Zone Police Station I-C.R No. 5/2012, the first informant - Divyangbhai Upendrabhai Jha has alleged commission of the offences punishable under sections 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120B, 477A of the Indian Penal Code against both the petitioners and six other accused persons. The allegations made in the first information report are to the effect that:

“One Ranjit Dinkarrai Joshi had been allotted Plot No.A/71 of Gayatrinagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited in the year 1984 and the first informant had been given a power of attorney for taking care of the possession and ownership rights of the owner. Ranjit Dinkarrai had paid development charges, membership fees and the amount payable for allotment of plot in full and on 8th May, 1984, had become a member of the said Society. The details of the amounts paid etc. are referred to in the first information report. Shri. Ranjit Dinkarrai had been issued allotment letter and possession letter and had purchased the said plot and had been handed over the actual possession of the said plot. That in respect of Plot No.A/71, the first informant had sought for information under the Right to Information Act from the District Registrar, Co-operative Societies and had obtained complete information which reveals that the Society had been formed for the purpose of providing residential premises to its members on a ‘no profit no loss’ basis and is comprised of five groups (i) Valkeshwar group (ii) Parla group (iii) Khetiwadi group (iv) Alkapuri group and (v) Balasinor group, which had been registered with the Registrar, Co-operative Societies. The bye-laws of the said five groups had been sanctioned and thereafter, the office bearers of the societies had enrolled members and for the purpose of providing residential premises, lands bearing Survey No. 320, 320/1, 329 and 332 of mauje Kamlapura and Survey No. 40 to 45 of mauje Pipalia, taluka Waghodia, admeasuring approximately 4,25,000 square metres came to be purchased by way of registered sale deeds in the name of the Society. In respect of the lands so purchased, necessary plans were got passed and after obtaining building permission, the task of allotting plots came to be carried out by the office bearers of the Society. Development charges came to be recovered by Samir Builders Private Limited and members had been enrolled and plots had been allotted to them. Sanction of plans of approximately 710 plots had been obtained by the Society. Approximately 390 members were enrolled from 1984 to 1990. Thereafter, from time to time, inquiries were made from the Society and Samir Builders regarding development of the plot and further construction, however, there was no response thereto.

Thereafter, in October 2010, through Kantilal Ambalal Patel, an advertisement came to be issued in the daily newspapers for title clearance as he wanted to purchase the said lands, against which, some of the members had raised objections and had given counter advertisement in the daily newspapers and notices were also issued. Upon he and some other members, in all, about forty to fifty members coming to know about the same, they had personally submitted proof of ownership to the District Registrar in November, 2010 in respect of which inquiry was handed over to Shri. R.M Vasava, Assistant District Registrar, Co-operative Societies Panchayat, Vadodara pursuant to which inquiry was carried out and a report dated 1 January, 2010 came to be submitted disclosing administrative irregularities, misappropriation of funds, cheating, production of false evidence with a view to damage the rights of the members of the Society by using the same as genuine in the society and that valuable lands of the members of the Society came to be grabbed and were outright sold to Kantilal Ambalal Patel by way of registered sale deeds by the office bearers of the Society, including the Chairmen, thereby destroying the rights of the members. Mentioning the above in the report, he had sent his opinion to the effect that criminal proceedings be instituted against the office bearers of the society as well as (1) Kantilal Ambalal Patel, (2) Dolly Kantilal Patel, (3) the promoters of Jalaram Land Developers, etc., to Shri. C.B Kotecha, the District Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Vadodara, however, Shri. C.B Kotecha retained the entire record of the case with himself and did not take any further action thereon and with a view to help the accused, hatched a conspiracy and drew curtains over the entire episode. The said Shri. R.M Vasava had called for an explanation from Kantilal Ambalal Patel in December, 2010, as to whether necessary permission had been obtained from the Department for purchase of the said lands, in response to which, Kantilal Ambalal Patel had informed that in the year 2001, the Assistant District Registrar, Co-operative Societies Panchayat, Vadodara had given necessary permission for sale and had also produced copies of such permission. In this regard, Shri. R.M Vasava had called for a written explanation of the then officer Manibhai R. Parmar as to whether he had given any such permission and the said Manibhai R. Parmar in his written reply had informed that he had not given any such permission in the year 2001 and that it was not permissible to give such permission and Shri. R.M Vasava, Assistant District Registrar (Housing), Co-operative Societies, Vadodara in his report dated 4 January, 2011 had recommended initiation of criminal proceedings and had sent a report to C.B Kotecha, District Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Vadodara. However, Kantilal Ambalal Patel being a resident of Vadodara had not allowed criminal proceedings to be instituted. Thus, by hatching a well-planned conspiracy for grabbing the land admeasuring 4,25,000 square metres belonging to 710 members (1) Kantilal Ambalal Patel alongwith his partnership firm Samir Builders in connivance with the officer bearers of the Society formed an unlawful assembly and got a development agreement executed. Thus, Kantilal Ambalal Patel through his accomplices had grabbed the land from the Society and did not involve any of the members of the Society with the firm of developers in accordance with the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act, despite which, a development agreement between Gayatrinagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited and the partnership firm Samir Builders came to be executed. Despite the fact that the land bearing the above referred survey numbers originally were of the ownership of the members of the Society, with the malafide view to grab the same, in 2001, Kantilal Ambalal, in connivance with the then Chairman of the Society hatched a conspiracy and got a banakhat executed in respect of the entire land. Thereafter, Kantilal Ambalal sold the land to one Jalaram Land Developers by way of an agreement of sale. Thereafter, the said Jalaram Land Developers divided the land into 2600 plots and alongwith Kantilal Ambalal, made bookings, recovered funds from the public at large, out of which an amount of Rs. 6,00,000/- was taken by Kantilal Ambalal. Thereafter, in 2005, Kantilal Ambalal instituted a suit in the court at Vadodara and with the aid of the office bearers of the Society hatched a conspiracy and sought relief for execution of the sale deeds in respect of the land of the Society in his name. In the said case, the then officer bearers in connivance with each other, created a facade of compromise by way of an out of court settlement by appointing Jashbhai Shankarbhai Patel who was the Chairman of the Balasinor group as the power of attorney and got the reliefs prayed for in the suit granted. However, the court in its original judgment had observed that the lands of the Society can be sold only after obtaining the permission of the District Registrar.

In 2006, Jashbhai Shankarbhai Patel, the then Chairman of Balasinor group had sent a letter seeking permission to sell the land. However, since such permission could not be granted, the Assistant District Registrar did not grant such permission and had written a mandatory letter in that regard, despite which Kantilal Ambalal Patel and Dollyben Kantilal Patel alongwith the out of the Chairmen of the said Society viz. Ashokbhai Desaibhai Patel, resident of Shriramcheen Apartments, 2nd Floor, Manish Corner, Vallabhvidyanagar, Anand (2) Sachin Rajendra Patel, residing at Shriramcheen Apartments, 2 Floor, Manish Corner, Vallabhvidyanagar, Anand (3) Haresh Shashikant Patel, residing at Manjalpur, Vadodara (4) Kishor N. Bhatt office bearer residing at 114, Shaktinagar Society, Near Madhur School, Gotri Road, Vadodara (5) Jitendra Shashikant Patel, residing at B/1 Meghanagar Society, Vrudavan Cross Roads, Waghodia Road, Vadodara, got together and hatched a conspiracy and despite the fact that such permission could not be granted, bogus letters of different dates were got prepared and bogus Government seals were fabricated and using false signatures of the panchas to be true, without the necessary permission stipulated by the court in its order, and without getting permission of the District Registrar, the above land belonging to the members was illegally sold for only Rs. 48,93,550/- to Kantilal Ambalal Patel by way of different sale deeds whereas in actual fact, the value of the land is approximately Rs. 1,50,00,000/-. For the task of purchasing the necessary stamp papers of the documents executed in this manner as well as for preparing the documents and presenting them, as the identifier, Dollyben Kantilal Patel had remained present before the Sub-Registrar, Waghodia and had got the above referred documents executed in favour of her father Kantilal Ambalal Patel with Dollyben Kantilal Patel as witness. In the above referred sale deeds, Kantilal Ambalal Patel and the above referred Chairmen had stated that against the banakhat of 2001, Rs. 69,500/- was received by way of consideration and at the time of executing the deed on 22 November, 2000, the entire consideration amount was received, but in fact, in 2001, as per the record of the Society, the amount of Rs. 69,500/- was paid neither through cheque nor in cash, and if such amount was paid, Kantilal Ambalal Patel against the conveyance has paid the entire amount of Rs. 1,48,93,550/- through different cheques without deducting such amount which has been deposited in the account of the Society on 27 December, 2010. The said cheques have been signed by Dollyben. Thereafter, Kantilal Ambalal Patel's accomplices, the members of the Society, Chairmen and office bearers with a view to misappropriate the amount, created false expenditure vouchers for levelling the land, security, advocate's fees etc. out of the sale consideration and paid Rs. 78,15,184/- by issuing cheques in favor of Kantilal Ambalal Patel and returned it to him and Rs. 22,00,000/- to Dhara Nikul Barot, Rs. 25 lakhs to Wasim Sikander and Rs. 25 lakhs to Nikul Ashok Barot came to be paid by different cheques by the office bearers. Thus, in all, Rs. 72 lakhs came to be paid to these three persons and the amount so paid to these three persons came to be withdrawn from their accounts by Dollyben Kantilal Patel through bearer cheques by putting her signatures on the reverse side and thus, the entire amount of Rs. 1,50,35,148/- paid to the Society was taken back by Kantilal Ambalal Patel and Dolly Kantilal Patel.

The officer bearers of the said society used the name of Vallabhbhai Tribhovandas Patel, brother-in-law of Kantilal Ambalal Patel, forged his signatures and made him an office bearer of the Society and forged his signature on different resolutions and fabricated different resolutions for sale of the land of the Society/illegally prepared bogus resolutions for sale of the land of the Society and put up the forged signatures and the other office bearer (illegible) Shankarbhai Patel who was the Chairman of the Balasinor group and Manager of the other four groups, forged the signature of Jashbhai Ravjibhai Patel, the promoter member of the Alkapuri group of the Society and forged his signature on his resignation as well as on receipts showing that the amount had been received back from the Society in his name.

Thus, for the purpose of giving effect to the criminal conspiracy, after grabbing the land of the Society by registered sale deeds, with a view to destroy the very identity of the Society, despite the fact that there were members on the record of the Society - office record of the Society was prepared and giving false information/misleading the Government machinery by threatening/pressurizing, illegal audit reports were got prepared and keeping the District Registrar in the dark about such false audit reports, orders for liquidation of the Society were obtained and in the same manner, by misleading the liquidator and by committing breach of trust, the orders of cancellation of registration of the societies were obtained without the knowledge of the members.

Thus, the above (1) Kantilal Ambalal Patel, resident of 60 Vimani Society, Makarpura, Vadodara, (2) Dollyben Kantilal Patel residing at as above, (3) Ashok Desaibhai Patel, residing at Shriramchin Apartment, Second Floor, Manish Corner, Vallabhvidyanagar, District Anand, (4) Sachin Rajendra Patel, residing at Shriramchin Apartment, Second Floor, Manish Corner, Vallabhvidyanagar, District Anand, (5) Haresh Shashikant Patel residing at Manjalpur, Vadodara, (6) Kishor N. Bhatt, residing at 114, Shaktinanagar Society, Near Mother School, Gotri Road, Vadodara, (7) Jitendra Shashikant Patel, residing at B/1, Meghanagar Society, No. 5 Vrundavan Cross Roads, Vaghodia Road, Vadodara, and (8) Jashbhai Shankarbhai Patel, residing at 22 Krupa Society, Vibhag 1, Near Deep Chambers, Manjalpur, Vadodara, as well as the officers/employees of the office of the District Registrar, Vadodara, from the inception, by hatching a well-planned conspiracy, with a view to grab land admeasuring 4,25,000 square metres valued at approximately Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, by production of false seals and fabricated documents, despite being aware of the fact that such documents are fabricated, used the same as genuine and by misleading the court and disobeying the orders of the court, obtained membership fee, share contribution, land development charges, etc., lakhs of rupees and having taken funds from him and other similarly situated members, did not allot plots and thereby committed breach of trust qua the members of the Gayatrinagar Cooperative Housing Society and committed the acts of misappropriation, cheating, alongwith Government officers and employees in connivance with each other, by creating a false document and forging signatures of the members and preparing false resolutions and resignations, grabbed the aforesaid land and in this manner, committed the offence.”

13. The second first information reports in each of these petitions are dated 19 February, 2013 and are identically worded and the petitioners Kantilal Ambalal Patel and Dollyben Kantilal Patel are arraigned as accused No. 1 and 2. However, the names of the other accused No. 3 and 4, that is, the Chairman and Secretary of the societies are different in each of the first information reports and in two first information reports viz. C.R No. 52/2013 and 54/2013 there is no accused No. 6. For the sake of convenience, reference is made to the first information report registered vide Makarpura Police Station I C.R No. 50/13 which is subject matter of challenge in Special Criminal Application No. 2930 of 2013, and which as translated into English reads as follows:

“In connection with the offence in question, in terms of the report dated 20 October, 2012 of the District Registrar (Housing) Co-operative Societies, Vadodara, the facts are as follows:

(1) Kantilal Ambalal Patel (HUF) (2) Dolly Kantilal Patel, executor of Kantilal Ambalal Patel (HUF) (3) Chairman Haresh Shashikant Patel (4) Secretary Vikas Ramesh More (5) the former Chairman and the present Manager since 2010 Jashbhai Shankarbhai Patel (6) Chandubhai P. Patel as well as against those whose names are disclosed during the course of investigation, a report has been submitted for instituting criminal proceedings for offences under the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, the complaint is as follows:

The above referred Gayatrinagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited (Balasinor Registration No.D 11136) came to be registered as a housing society in the year 1984 and thereafter, lands bearing Revenue Survey No. 320, 320/1, 329, 332 of mauje Pipalia are lands running in the name of the said Society in the revenue record. After registering the members of the said Society, full consideration had been recovered from them and plots had been allotted to them and possession of such plots had also been handed over to them.

Vide a show-cause notice dated 12 July, 2012 issued by this office to the accused No. 3 and 4 and in terms of the representations made by the members of the Society from time to time and the action taken in connection therewith, it has been brought on record that the said accused and their accomplices had hatched a conspiracy as below and committed acts against the interest of the members of the Society. An order was made whereby the task of carrying out the audit of the accounts of the Society was entrusted to Bharatkumar R. Bhatt in June, 2011. Pursuant to such order, in connection with the task of audit, one Chandubhai Patel from the said Society had come to the office of the District Registrar and had taken Bharatkumar R. Bhatt to the lands held by the Society at mauje Pipalia, district Vadodara and after reaching there, Bharatkumar R. Bhatt inquired about the record of the Society whereupon Chandubhai Patel took him to the residential premises of Kantilal Ambalal Patel at 60, Vimal Society, Makarpura Road, Vodadara on 20 July, 2011 and informed him that the records of the Society were kept there since years and that Kantilal Ambalal Patel would furnish all the record necessary for audit and thereafter during the period 20 July, 2011 to 22 July, 2011, the audit of the said Gayatrinagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited (Cooperative Societies) for the period 1 April, 2010 to 31 March, 2011 was carried out.

(1) In respect of lands bearing Revenue Survey No. 320, 320/1, 329, 332 of mauje Pipalia, sale deed No. 2550 dated 22 November, 2010 came to be executed by the Chairman of the Society Haresh Shashikant Patel in favour of the accused No. 1 and such sale deed was unauthorised and without consideration and towards consideration for such registered sale deed, no amount had been received by the Society. Besides, in the said sale deed, there is no reference to any details regarding payment of any consideration and such sale deed has, in an illegal manner, been executed in favour of the accused No. 1 for his benefit. However, the Society has not allotted any plot to the accused No. 3 in this regard and he was not authorised to sell the land of the Society and the process of election of the Society had not been followed and the accused No. 3 had on his own become the Chairman and in his capacity as Chairman, illegally executed a sale deed in respect of the land of the said Society in favour of the accused No. 1 and thus, benefited the accused No. 1.

(2) Without the knowledge of other members of the society like Shri. Suresh Kanchanlal Bhatt, Arvind Kanchanlal Bhatt, Vasant R. Chavda, Indiraben Ratilal Aadhhiya, Manjulaben Arvindkumar Shah, Nainaben Sureskhumar Parikh, Urmilaben Gokaldas Sura, Shobhanaben A. Desai, Renukaben Balwant Trivedi, Harshaben Dave, Jayaben Kodarlal Parikh, Usnal Navinchandra Kacheriya and other innumerable members, such members were removed from the record of the Society in an unauthorised manner and the interest of the Government and the public has been affected and an offence has been committed against the members of the Society and the public and in this act, the accused No. 3\ and 4 during the course of the audit, had produced resolutions showing that all the members of the Society have resigned and now only eleven members remain and in the General Board Register, vide Resolution No. 3 dated 27 May, 2011, made reference to resolutions approving of their resignations and also statements in this regard to the effect that names of none of the members remain and that out of the members of the Society, nine members have given their resignation on 3rd June, 2011. The said accused No. 3 and 4 during the course of audit, have produced the same before the Government Auditor and on the basis of the aforesaid false representations and documents produced in support thereof, by misleading the Government auditors and suppressing the correct facts, obtained a report for taking the Society in liquidation and on the basis of such report, obtained the orders for taking the Society in liquidation. However, the members of the said Society had never given their resignations and interest of innumerable members as well as the Government and general public has been affected and offence has been committed against the members of the Society as well as the public at large and the accused No. 3 and 4 have passed a resolution to the effect that during the course of audit, all the members of the Society have resigned and now only eleven members remain and accordingly, a resolution to that effect came to be recorded vide Resolution No. 3 in the Annual General Meeting Register of the Society and along therewith resolutions in support of such resignation of members and statements in that regard wherein it is mentioned that they have not suppressed anything from the members and that nothing remains to be shown to them and by 3 June, 2011, nine members of the society had given their resignation. Thus, the accused No. 3 and 4 by producing supporting evidence and making false representations during the course of audit and fabricating documents in support thereof, misled the Government auditors and by suppressing the correct facts, obtained a report from them to take the Society in liquidation. However, in fact, the members of the Society had never tendered their resignations and in this context, innumerable members have given their affidavits which are produced with the complaint. Contrary to the Co-operative laws and in an unauthorised manner, innumerable members of the Society have been removed from the record by accused No. 3 and 4 with a view to give benefit to the accused No. 1 and the accused No. 1 being the main beneficiary in the transaction, with a view to see that all the lands of the Society are registered in his name has committed the above offences and such resolutions have been used as genuine evidence and with a view to see that the Government auditor Bharatkumar R. Bhatt endorses the false case that there are no members on record, accused No. 3 Chairman Haresh Shashikant Patel and accused No. 4 Vikas Ramchandra More have in writing and under their signatures made such false representation and have accordingly fabricated false evidence and during the course of audit of the Society between 20 July, 2011 to 22 July, 2011, during such period, resolutions for taking the Society in liquidation were prepared and placed on the record of the Society and a special report was obtained from the Government auditor - Bharatkumar R. Bhatt on 1 August, 2011 recommending taking the Society into liquidation and by placing the above evidence and misleading the members on the basis of the Special Report dated 1 August, 2011, the accused No. 3 and 4 obtained orders dated 8 September, 2011 from the office of the District Registrar to take the Society into liquidation.

(3) Additionally, Laxmanbhai Harmanbhai Parmar, the Liquidator, discharging duties at the office of the District Registrar, on the basis of the order dated 8 September, 2011, was entrusted with the task of winding up of the Society and he took charge as Liquidator on 13 September, 2011 and commenced the procedure for taking the Society in liquidation. Thereafter, at the office of the District Registrar, on behalf of the said Society, Chandubhai Patel remained present before the Liquidator Laxman Harkhabhai Parmar during the course of liquidation proceedings who, with a view to take over the movable and immovable properties of the Society for the purpose of the audit of the liquidation, took him from the office of the District Registrar to the residential premises of Kantilal Ambalal Patel at 60, Vimal Society, Makarpura, Vadodara and informed him that the entire administration and record of accounts and other documents etc. were since years kept at the said address and that in the previous years also, the audit was carried out at the said place and that the entire record was available there and that the record in relation to liquidation proceedings would be produced by Kantilal Ambalal Patel and had taken him to the aforesaid place on 13 September, 2011 and thereafter, on 20 September, 2011, the office bearers of the Society and the accused No. 3 to 6 in the said case, had produced the challan of liquidation fee and audit fee and on that basis, got the audit regarding liquidation of the Society done and at that time, in this case, in the presence of accused No. 3 and 4, the accused No. 1 and 2 had submitted resignations dated 11 May, 2011 bearing the signatures of the following members namely, Ravjibhai A. Patel, Bipinchandra A. Parikh, Parikshit Ambalal Patel, Nareshkumar C. Patel, Kanubhai A. Vyas, Ratilal A. Patel, Sunil Premkumar Jethmalani, Rekha S. Patel and Jashbhai Shankarbhai Parikh and had also produced receipts evidencing payment of funds to them from the Society and had produced sales vouchers bearing signatures of the said members and the accused No. 3 and 4 had represented to the Liquidator that now no members remain in the said Society and submitted that recommendation be made for cancellation of the registration of the said Society and action be taken in that regard. and in support of such representation, the accused No. 3 and 4 produced resolutions on the basis of which a report had been given by the Liquidation Officer to the District Registrar. In the said case, on the basis of the representation made by the members of the Society on 17 July, 2012, it was learnt that out of the aforesaid members who are stated to have given resignations, Parikshit Ambalal Patel had expired on 17 May, 2004 despite which his resignation dated 11 May, 2011 as well as receipt evidencing receipt of funds had been forged and fabricated and resignation dated 11 May, 2011 as well as receipt evidencing receipt of funds of Sunilkumar Premkumar Jethmalani who had obtained citizenship of United Kingdom in 2003 and had settled there, had been forged. By adopting the aforesaid procedure, the accused No. 3 and 4 in connivance with each other had formed an unlawful assembly with the sole object of benefiting the accused No. 1 and the accused No. 1 being the main beneficiary of the entire case, with a view to see that the entire lands of the Society are registered in the name of the accused No. 1 and the rights of the members are destroyed and with that object, as detailed hereinabove, forged documents had been produced by way of evidence by accused No. 1 and 2 and during the process of liquidation of the said Society in the presence of accused No. 3 and 4, produced the same as real evidence and used the same as genuine before the Liquidation Officer-Laxmanbhai Harkhabhai Parmar. The administrative record of the said Society with the above referred forged documents, resignation etc. created a picture and report that none of the members of the Society remain on record and in support of such facts, produced resolutions accordingly, and such resolutions were produced by accused No. 3 and 4 and such false evidence was got up and during the course of liquidation of the said Society between 13 September, 2011 to 28 September, 2011, the above referred forged and bogus supporting evidence was produced and keeping the Government Liquidation Officer in the dark, misleading him, the existence of the Society as well as the rights of the members of the Society and other record and evidence was destroyed and as a part of the pre-planned conspiracy, by forming an unlawful assembly in connivance with each other, accused No. 1 and accused No. 2 in the presence of accused No. 3 and 4, submitted the above referred false record as genuine and by using the same, obtained a report dated 28 September, 2011 for getting the registration of the Society cancelled and accordingly obtained the orders dated 3 October, 2011 on the basis of such forged documents despite the existence of the Society as well as the existence of innumerable members of the Society.

(4) In the above manner, the forged documents prepared by the accused No. 1 and 2 were, in the presence of accused No. 3 and 4, produced by them before the Government Auditor as well as the Government Liquidator during the course of their work and by committing the serious offence of destroying the existence of the Society and with the malafide intention of grabbing the valuable land of the Society committed the above offence. Hence, accused No. (1) Kantilal Ambalal Patel (HUF) (2) Dolly Kantilal Patel-executor of Kantilal Ambalal Patel (HUF) (3) Haresh Shashikant Patel, (4) Secretary Vikas Ramesh More (5) Manager Jashbhai Shankarbhai Patel and (6) Chandubhai B. Patel as well as all those whose names are disclosed during the course of investigation, against all of them the offence of preparing false documents and using the same as true and to misappropriate the funds of the Society as well as with a view to grab the valuable land and property of the Society in favour of the accused No. 1 as well as by hatching a pre-planned conspiracy and as a part thereof forming an unlawful assembly in connivance with each other, the accused No. 2 created false documents in the presence of accused No. 3 and 4 and produced the same and used the same as genuine and with the object of benefiting the accused No. 1 who was the main beneficiary, the accused No. 1 and 2 with accused No. 3 to 5, with a view to further the conspiracy, committed the offence under sections 408, 420, 465, 468, 471, 488A and 120B of the IPC.”

14. Identically worded four other first information reports have been registered except that the names of the accused No. 3 and 4, that is, the President and Secretary are different, and in two cases there is no accused No. 6.

15. In the above referred decisions of the Supreme Court, it has been held that there cannot be a second first information report in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the 1 first information report. Thus, in the instant case, what has to be examined is whether the subsequently registered first information reports are second first information reports about the same incident or offence or are based upon distinct and different facts and whether their scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. Examining the contents of both the first information reports, the 1 first information report registered vide Gandhinagar Zone Police Station I-C.R No. 5/2012 is a consolidated first information report which relates to incidents right from 1984 till the date of lodging of the first information report, that is, 21 May, 2012. The 1 first information report encompasses several incidents including the fact that in the year 2010, accused No. 1 - Kantilal Ambalal Patel had given an advertisement for title clearance certificate pursuant to which various objections were raised by members of the societies. In this regard, an inquiry was carried out by Shri. R.M Vasava, Assistant District Registrar, Co-operative Societies Panchayat, Vadodara, who, had submitted a report dated 1 January, 2010 recommending initiation of criminal proceedings against the accused persons. Such report had been submitted to Shri. C.B Kotecha, the District Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Vadodara, who, however, kept the entire record with himself and did not take any steps in furtherance thereto. The said first information report also alleges a well-planned conspiracy for grabbing lands belonging to 710 members of all the five groups of the Society admeasuring 4,25,000 square metres. The said first information report makes detailed averments with regard to the manner in which the subject lands were sold to the accused No. 1 and how the consideration received by the Society towards such land travelled back to the accused No. 1. In the second last paragraph of the said first information report, it has been stated that Kantilal Patel with a view to fulfil the criminal conspiracy hatched by him, after grabbing the lands of the said Society by way of sale deeds, with a view to destroy the existence of the said Society, despite the fact that there were members on record, prepared false record of the Society and gave false information and by misleading the Government machinery and threatening and pressurizing, obtained illegal audit reports and on the basis of such false audit reports, by keeping the District Registrar in the dark, the Liquidation Officer was misled and without the knowledge of the members of the society, by committing cheating and breach of trust, the registration of the society was got cancelled.

16. On a conjoint reading of both the first information reports, the following common facts emerge. The Gayatrinagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. is comprised of five groups, which jointly hold land admeasuring 4,25,000 square metres. The petitioners Kantilal Ambalal and Dollyben Kantilal along with the other accused hatched a conspiracy to grab the lands of the Society. Thus, the lands, in respect of which the conspiracy to grab the lands is alleged to have been hatched in the 1 first information report as well as all the five subsequent first information reports are common. There is no demarcation regarding the lands held by any individual group of the Society. Each of the subsequent five first information reports are identically worded except for the names of the accused No. 3 and 4, whose names change in accordance with the concerned Chairman and Secretary of the said society and in two of the cases, there is no accused No. 6. The entire lands are held by the five groups of the Gayatrinagar Co-operative Housing Society in respect of which the 1 first information report has been lodged. In the penultimate paragraph of the 1 first information report, the facts regarding taking the society into liquidation by obtaining false audit reports and by misleading the Liquidation Officer are stated in brief, whereas in the subsequent first information reports, these facts have been elaborately stated with specific instances and detailed facts regarding names of the members whose resignations are stated to have been falsely obtained as well as details regarding a member who was dead at the relevant time and his resignation has been fabricated and another member who had obtained the citizenship of the United Kingdom and had settled there, whose forged and fabricated resignation as well as receipt of payment of consideration etc. were produced on record. Thus, the second first information reports are detailed first informationj reports of the allegations made in the penultimate paragraph of the 1 first information report. Thus, though detailed allegations in respect of how the societies were taken into liquidation are made in the subsequent first information reports, such allegations find reference in the 1 first information report and form part of the conspiracy alleged therein. The 1 first information report is, therefore, a consolidated complaint disclosing the entire conspiracy which includes the offence which has been alleged to have been committed in the subsequent first information reports. Evidently, therefore, the 1 first information report itself encompasses the larger conspiracy, which includes the offence alleged in the second first information reports. As a necessary corollary, therefore, the second first information reports which relate to a part of the same conspiracy which is already included in the 1 first information report cannot but be said to be second first information reports in respect of the same offence.

17. On behalf of the respondents, it has been sought to be contended that the subsequent first information reports filed by the District Registrar cover a wider conspiracy than the limited allegations made in the 1 first information report. However, from the facts noted hereinabove, it is apparent that in fact the actual situation is converse, viz., it is the 1 first information report which covers a wider conspiracy and in fact, the second first information reports, though contain detailed allegations in respect of the allegations made in the penultimate paragraph of the 1 first information report, form a part of the conspiracy which is already alleged in the 1 first information report. This finding is based on the fact that the subject matter of the conspiracy is the same in both the first information reports; the conspirators are the same; the objects of both the conspiracies are the same, viz. to grab the lands belonging to the Society; the offences alleged in both the first information reports are also more or less the same viz. sections 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120B, 477A of the Indian Penal Code in the 1 first information report and sections 408, 420, 465, 468, 471, 477A, 120B of the Indian Penal Code in the subsequent first information reports. Thus, in sum and substance, both the conspiracies are the same, only that, the 1 first information report covers a larger conspiracy encompassing the manner in which false and fabricated documents were produced and the lands belonging to the society were transferred in favour of Kantilal Ambalal Patel and the funds paid by way of consideration travelled back to him and his daughter as well as the manner in which the society was taken into liquidation with a view to destroy its very existence by obtaining false audit reports based upon incorrect facts by misleading the Government auditors, whereas the subsequent first information reports cover a narrower conspiracy relating to the manner in which the society was taken into liquidation, wherein facts in this regard are stated in detail. Thus, this is not a case where the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a much larger canvas with broader ramifications, as was the case in Ram Lal Narang (supra). In the present case, the subsequent conspiracy already formed part of the larger conspiracy discovered in the 1 first information report.

18. Applying the test of sameness to the facts of the present case, it is found that both the first information reports relate to the same incident and same occurrence. The 1 first information report relates to the entire transaction, which covers a wider period, whereas the second first information reports relate to part of the transaction already covered in the 1 first information report and relate to the latter period. Thus, there is commonality of purpose in both the first information reports, and the transactions involved in both the first information reports are the result of one continuous action and relate to the same offence. In the light of the principles laid down in the above referred decisions, there cannot be a second first information report in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first information report. As noticed hereinabove, the second first information reports are in respect of the same offence in respect of which the 1 first information report has been lodged, and hence ought to have been treated as further information received by the investigating agency and not as fresh first information reports. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of T.T Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181, there can be no second first information report and no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. Under the circumstances, the second first information reports filed in respect of the same transaction which is already subject matter of the 1 first information report are violative of the petitioners' fundamental rights under Articles 14, 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India and as such are not tenable and cannot be sustained.

19. In the light of the above discussion, the petitions succeed and are accordingly allowed. The first information reports registered vide Makarpura Police Station I-C.R No. 50/2013, 51/2013, 52/2013, 53/2013 and 54/2013 dated 19 February, 2013 are hereby quashed and set aside. As a consequence thereof, the investigation carried out pursuant to the second first information reports, shall be treated as part of the investigation carried out in respect of the 1 first information report and the entire record of the subsequent first information reports shall be forwarded to the Investigating Officer of the 1 first information report, who shall consider the same and carry out investigation in respect of the detailed allegations made therein. Rule is made absolute accordingly.