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Shashidhar v. State Of Karnataka
L. Narayana Swamy, J.:— This petition is filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C with a prayer to quash the order dated 14th June 2013, First Information Report and Complaint in PCR No. 1 of 2013 on the file of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bellary.
2. A case has been registered against the petitioners No. 1 and 2, who are the accused No. 3 and 4, for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and Section 120(b), 427, 447, 506 read Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The challenge is on the following grounds. Firstly, there is no allegation of any corrupt practice as is alleged against the petitioners. Secondly, it is submitted that before issuance of summons to the petitioner and taking cognizance, the Court should have rejected the complaint itself on the ground of non-obtaining sanction as is required under Section 19 of the Act read with Section 190 of the Cr.P.C At the relevant point of time, the petitioners were working in the capacity as is referred to in the cause-title of the complaint. However, thereafter though they have been transferred from the said offices by virtue of promotion and on transfer even then they hold the office of the respondent-State Government. Hence, sanction must have been obtained as required under the provisions of law since obtaining sanction is mandatory. Having not obtained the sanction, the complainant is not entitled for registration of the said case. By reading the complaint, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that except making a one-line reference in item 2 of paragraph 17, there are no other references and there is absolutely no complaint against the petitioners. Hence, on this ground also the complaint has to be set aside and proceedings are to be quashed. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel referred to the judgment of this Court in Criminal Petition No. 14047 of 2012 between B.V ACHARYA v. N. VENKATESHAIAH disposed of on 3rd August 2012 wherein this Court quashed the proceedings against the petitioner assigning the reason that prior sanction has not been obtained. This court, while disposing of the said case, referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SUBRAMANTAN SWAMY v. MANMOHAN SINGH reported in (2012) 3 SCC 64 wherein it referred paragraphs 34 and 64.1 of judgment in the case of State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh reported in (2009) 6 SCC 372; and has observed that sanction prior to taking cognizance is mandatory. The learned counsel also referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ANIL KUMAR v. M.K AIYAPPA reported in (2013) 10 SCC 705 and placed reliance on paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 22 of the judgment and submitted that the on the reasons assigned therein, the case of the petitioners is to be allowed and the complaint is to be set aside.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent-Lokayukta Police submits that the method to be followed is only procedural in nature and shall not be treated as a mandatory. In support of the said submission, the learned counsel referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF BIHAR v. RAJMANGAL RAM in Criminal Apeal No. 708 of 2014 disposed of on 31st March 2014 wherein it is held that obtaining sanction is only a procedural requirement and it shall not be fatal to a case where an attempt is made to bring out the malpractice in the public administration.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the second respondent complainant, submits that obtaining sanction is required only before taking cognizance. This is the case where the cognizance has been taken and direction issued for investigation and at this juncture requirement of sanction is not mandatory. He submits that on investigation if the learned judge finds any untruth in the complaint then the same has to be rejected for which sanction is not required. He submits that sanction is required in respect of an officer who holds the post at the relevant point of time and further submits that time and period is the relevant criteria for obtaining sanction. In the instant case, the accused No. 3 and 5 are not holding the office at the time of filing complaint and hence prior sanction is not required. In support of this submission the learned counsel referred to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R.S Nayak v. A.R Antulay. reported in (1984) 2 SCC 183; in the case of PRAKASH SINGH BADAL v. STATE OF PUNJAB reported in AIR 2007 SC 1274; and in the case of Abhay Singh Chautala v. Central Bureau Of Investigation INVESTIGATION reported in (2011) 7 SCC 141 and the judgment of this court in Criminal Petition No. 11537 of 2013 between SRI. RAMANNA v. THE KARNATAKA STATE LOKAYUKTA POLICE disposed of on 25 August 2014.
5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. The issue involved in this case is whether sanction is mandatory for taking cognizance of offence. The requirement of sanction is referred under Section 19 of the Act. The said Section contemplates that the Court shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act. For issuance of notice, whether sanction is taken or not has been examined by this Court in Criminal Petition No. 11537 of 2013 referred to supra and while rejecting the said petition this Court has observed thus:
“…That does not mean that the requirement of obtaining sanction is not a mandatory requirement. Once it is noticed that there was no previous sanction, as already indicated in various judgments, referred to herein above, the Magistrate cannot order investigation against the public servants while invoking power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C” In the light of the above judgment, the case of the petitioners, it is only at the stage of in vectigation by In vestigating Officer. The provisions make mandatory that sanction has to be secured while taking cognizance. Merely, issuance of notice or referring the matter to the Investigating Officer, as it is done in the instant case, that itself cannot be taken as a cognizance. Cognizance has to be taken on the basis of the investigation and finding, if any, against the petitioners. In the circumstances, it is very premature to hold that sanction is very much required,”
6. In the light of the above judgment, what is required is that sanction is required only after the investigation and that too in case if it is found that there is substantial truth in the investigation report. Section 190 of the Cr.P.C reads thus:
190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may fake cognizance of any offence-
(a) Upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;
(b) Upon it police report of such facts;
(c) Upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed,
(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try.
7. Further, Section 173(2) Cr.P.C makes it clear that as soon as the investigation is completed, the officer in charge of the Police Station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take “cognizance” of the offence on a police report. When Section 173 is read with Section 190 Cr.P.C, it makes clear that cognizance is required to be taken under Section 190 Cr.P.C only after and on the basis of the police report as is referred in sub-section (2) of Section 173 Cr.P.C and the police report has to be submitted to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. ‘Cognizance of the offence’ is to be understood that the truthfulness of the complaint is more specifically dealt with. The question would be as to whether on the date of the complaint whether sanction is required even if the alleged accused persons are not in office. This has been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.R ANTULAY (supra). In the said judgment at paragraph 17 the Court has formulated a question as to “(a) what is the relevant date which reference to which a valid sanction is a prerequisite for the prosecution of a public servant for offences enumerated in Section 6 of the 1947 Act?” and the said question is answered at paragraph 19 wherein it is observed that “If it is contemplated to prosecute public servant who has committed such offences, when the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence, a sanction ought to be available otherwise the court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence.” It is further observed that “If therefore, when the offence is alleged to have been committed, the accused was a public servant but by the time the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence committed by him as public servant, he has ceased to be a public servant, no sanction would be necessary for taking cognizance of the offence against him.”
8. In ABHAY SINGH CHAUTALA's case supra, the requirement of ‘relevant time’ is discussed and at paragraphs 53, 54 and 56 of the judgment, it has been observed thus:
53. Same argument was tried to be raised on the question of plurality of the offices held by the public servant and the doubt arising as to who would be the sanctioning authority in such case. In the earlier part of the judgment, we have already explained the concept of doubt which is contemplated in the Act, more particularly in Section 19(2), The law is very clear in that respect. The concept of ‘doubt’ or ‘plurality of office’ cannot be used to arrive at a conclusion that on that basis, the interpretation of Section 19(1) would be different from that given in Antulay's case (cited supra) or Prakash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab (cited supra). We have already explained the situation that merely because a concept of doubt is contemplated in Section 19(2), it cannot mean that the public servant who has abused some other office than the one he is holding could not be tried without a sanction.
54. The learned senior counsel tried to support their argument on the basis of the theory of “legal fiction”. We do not see as to how the theory of “legal fiction” can work in this case. It may be that the appellants in this case held more than one offices during the check period which they are alleged to have abused; however, there will be no question of any doubt if on the date when the cognizance is taken, they are not continuing to hold that very office. The relevant time, as held in S.A Venkataraman v. State (cited supra), is the date on which the cognizance is taken. If on that date, the appellant is not a public servant, there will be no question of any sanction. If he continues to be a public servant but in a different capacity or holding a different office than the one which is alleged to have been abused, still there will be no question of sanction and in that case, there will also be no question of any doubt arising because the doubt can arise only when the sanction is necessary. In case of the present appellants, there was no question of there being any doubt because basically there was no question of the appellants' getting any protection by a sanction.
55. xxx xxx xxx
56, Thus, we are of the clear view that the High Court was absolutely right in relying on the decision in Prakash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab (cited supra) to hold that the appellants in both the appeals had abused entirely different office or offices than the one wnich they were holding on the date on which cognizance was taken and, therefore, there was no necessity of sanction under Section 19 of the Act as held in K. Karunakaran v. State of Kerala (cited supra) and the later decision in Prakash Singn Badal v. State of Punjab (cited supra). The appeals are without any merit and are dismissed.”
9. In the case of PRAKASH SINGH BADAL (supra), the contention of learned senior counsel in respect of permission to obtain sanction through out his service was negatived. At paragraphs 24 and 25 of the judgment, it is held as follows:
“24, The plea is clearly untenable as Section 19(1) of the Act is time and offence related.
Section 19(1) of the Act has been quoted above,
25. The underlying principle of Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 have been noted above. Each of the above Sections indicate that the public servant taking gratification (S.7), obtaining valuable thing without consideration (S.11), committing acts of criminal misconduct (S.13) are acts performed under the colour of authority but which in reality are for the public servant's own pleasure or benefit Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 apply to aforestated acts. Therefore, if a public servant in his subsequent position is not accused of any such criminal acts then there is no question of invoking the mischief rule. Protection to public servants under Section 19(1)(a) has to be confined to the time related criminal acts performed under the colour or authority for public servant's own pleasure or benefit as categorized under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15. This is the principle behind the test propounded by this court, namely, the test of abuse of office.”
10. The above judgments makes it appropriate to refer the case of the petitioners as to whether they were holding the relevant post as on the date of complaint. In the light of the above judgments, the case of the petitioners, i.e accused No. 3 and 5 is examined. Accused No. 3 was a Tahsildar at the relevant of time and thereafter on promotion as Assistant Commissioner moved to a different office. Similarly, accused No. 5, at the relevant point of time, was the Deputy Director Land Records, Bellary and was transferred from Bellary to Davanagere. By virtue of promotion and transfer of accused No. 3 and 5, it is to be held that as on the date and time of making complaint, they were not holding the office at Bellary. In view of the said facts, the cases referred to above gives answer to the effect that sanction is not required to file complaint against accused No. 3 and 5.
11. Taking cognizance in respect of an offence comes into picture only on the basis of police report as required under sub-section (2) of Section 173 Cr.P.C The investigation ordered by the learned judge is only to find out whether there is any truth in the complaint. Cognizance shall not be taken in cases where untruth is netted in the complaint. In the instant case, judgment of this Court in the case of SRI. RAMANNA supra in Criminal Petition No. 11537 of 2013 disposed of on 25 August 2014 is referred and it is held that sanction is not required. Obtaining sanction comes into picture only after taking the cognizance on the basis of police report under Sections 173 and 190 of Cr.P.C
12. Lastly, the case of the petitioners is that there is no specific information in the complaint for having committed the alleged misconduct against accused No. 3 and 5. This aspect has been examined in the light of the complaint. In paragraph No. 17(ii) of the complaint with regard to Tahsildar, who is accused No. 3, It is alleged that he had recommended for conversion on the same day after preparing exhaustive checklist. In respect of accused No. 5, in paragraph 25 it is referred to the effect that the officials of Land Records have prepared the sketch to suit the claim of accused No. 6 and thereby tried to change the entire set up of the properties which were prepared long back.
13. The gist of the complaint alleged against the accused is that a person by name Parameshwara Reddy, had purchased the land in an extent of 17 acre 25 cents and the same has been sold in favour of accused No. 6 totaling to 27 acre 25 cents. It is alleged that when the vendor had only 17 acre 25 cents, then where is the question of selling the land in an extent of 27 acre 25 cents. Out of the total extent of land sold by accused No. 6, 10 acres were acquired by the State Government and compensation was paid. Accused No. 6 made an application for conversion of ten acres including what has been purchased from Parameshwara Ready, which was acquired by the State Government, and it is alleged that the accused No. 1 to 5 have aided him by abusing their official power. It is alleged that accused No. 1 the Revenue Inspector has conducted spot inspection on 17 January 2011; accused No. 3 Tahsildar recommended it on the same day and Assistant Commissioner has given an endorsement to accused No. 6 on the very next date to the effect that the property is not the subject matter of acquisition; and hence all the officials have abused their official position. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no specific overt act against the accused. The complaint is made by a third party who is not directly injured. The complaint could be made or instituted by any person who gets the knowledge of injury to the public. An independent person in the society could only give information to the public authorities or to the Lokayukta to initiate action since it is believed that these public authority would not be in possession of relevant materials. That itself cannot be taken as irrelevant or absence of any allegation against the accused persons. It is for the investigation authority to earth out the illegalities, if any, committed by the accused and to make a police report and then the Magistrate has to take cognizance after obtaining sanction. The complaint only sets into motion with or without fullest materials and it is for the investigating officer to secure all the relevant materials. Under these circumstances, the case of the petitioners is examined and I find that there is no scope for interference. Accordingly the petition is dismissed.
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