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Smt. Damini & Anr. v. Managing Director, Jodhpur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Jodhpur

Rajasthan High Court
Jun 29, 2015
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — P.K. Lohra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment and decree dated 23 April 2015 of the District Judge, Jaisalmer, which rejected the appellants' claim for compensation under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1885 as barred by limitation.

Factual background (as pleaded): The deceased, Pradeep Bhai Patel (husband of the first appellant and father of the second appellant), was a bus driver on a journey from Ahmedabad to Rajasthan. On the night of 14 September 2008 the bus reached Ramdevra Nagori Dharamshala. While on the bus roof to collect luggage, the deceased touched a naked live electricity wire, was electrocuted and fell from the bus; he was later declared dead at Pokaran Hospital. A report under Section 174 Cr.P.C. recorded electrocution and attributed negligence to the respondent department (noting a loosely knitted live wire with easy human access).

Procedural history: The appellants filed a suit/claim under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act seeking Rs. 22,68,000/- and also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The respondent contested limitation and denied liability, alleging the deceased's own negligence. At trial, pleadings resulted in three issues; evidence was led by both sides and the trial Court held the suit barred by limitation under Article 82 of the Limitation Act and treated the Section 5 application as redundant, dismissing the claim. The appellants appealed; the present opinion disposes of that first appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a claim for compensation under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act is barred by limitation where it is filed after two years from the date of death, applying Article 82 of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether Article 113 (the residuary clause) of the Limitation Act can be invoked for a claim under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act (i.e., whether the residuary provision applies when a specific period is prescribed).
  3. Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act (condonation of delay) is applicable in original proceedings such as the plaintiffs' suit under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act.
  4. Whether the first appeal could be summarily dismissed in limine under the amended Order 41 Rule 11 CPC without calling for trial court records, subject to the requirement of a reasoned order.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The trial Court erred in applying Article 82 of the Limitation Act; instead Article 113 (the residuary clause) should apply to their claim.
  • The claim was founded on tort (negligence/strict liability of the respondent) and so the limitation under Article 113 should govern rather than the two-year period under Article 82.
  • An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed seeking condonation of delay.
  • The appellants relied upon several precedents (listed in the record) in support of their contention that Article 113 and tort principles/strict liability should govern the limitation issue.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The suit is barred by limitation because claims under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act are governed by a two-year limitation under Article 82 of the Limitation Act; the plaintiffs' suit was filed after expiry of two years.
  • The respondent denied negligence on its part and alleged the electrocution resulted from the deceased's own negligence in stopping the bus under an L.T. line and/or from iron articles on the bus roof touching the live wire.
  • On these grounds the respondent prayed for rejection of the claim.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [(1994) 4 SCC 1] Cited by appellants in support of their contention (as placed before the Court) regarding limitation/residuary principles and the applicability of Article 113/related propositions advanced by them. The Court examined this precedent but found it distinguishable on the facts and pleadings in the instant case; it was not applied to override Article 82.
Kerala State Electricity Board v. K.V. Bhaskaran Nair (AIR 2003 Kerala 57) Cited by appellants (relied upon by them in support of their legal contentions regarding limitation or tortious liability). The Court examined this authority and held it distinguishable on the facts and pleadings; it did not cause the Court to depart from Article 82.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy (AIR 2000 SC 2083) Cited by appellants in support of their contention (as presented to the Court). The Court considered this precedent but treated it as distinguishable on the facts and pleadings and did not apply it to allow invocation of Article 113.
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Sheo Narain Kushwaha [(2011) 6 SCC 456] Cited for interpretation of amended Order 41 Rule 11 CPC — permitting dismissal of a first appeal in limine after preliminary hearing without calling for trial court records, but requiring a reasoned order. The Court relied on this authority to justify summary dismissal of the first appeal without calling for the trial court record, subject to having recorded reasons; the Court applied the principle and followed the requirement that the dismissal be reasoned.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from the pleadings and the record. The key steps of the reasoning, as stated in the opinion, are:

  1. Characterization of claim: The Court observed that the pleadings, the plaint and the application for condonation, were all framed as a claim under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act (the Act). The appellants could not be permitted to disown those pleadings and re-characterize the claim as one founded on general tort principles for the purpose of invoking a different limitation period.
  2. Applicable limitation provision: The Court noted that Article 82 of the Limitation Act specifically prescribes a two-year period "By executors, administrators or representatives under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act" (the text of Article 82 is reproduced in the opinion). Because a specific limitation period is prescribed for claims under the Fatal Accidents Act, the residuary provision (Article 113) could not be invoked. The residuary clause applies only where no specific period is prescribed.
  3. Treatment of precedent relied upon by appellants: The Court examined the precedents cited by the appellants but found them distinguishable on the facts and the pleadings in the present case; therefore those authorities did not lead to a different result.
  4. Section 5 Limitation Act (condonation): The Court agreed with the trial Court's conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in original proceedings (the Court treated the Section 5 application as redundant in the context of the original suit under Section 1A).
  5. Procedural posture of the appeal: The Court observed that under amended Order 41 Rule 11 CPC a first appeal can be dismissed after preliminary hearing without calling for the trial court record if the appeal is found to have no merit, but such dismissal must be by a reasoned order. The Court referred to U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Sheo Narain Kushwaha for this principle and applied it to the present appeal.
  6. Ancillary factual points supporting characterization: The Court noted that the plaintiffs paid the fixed court fee under the proviso to Section 21 of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961 (which provides for a fixed fee in actions under the Fatal Accidents Act), further indicating that the suit was framed and prosecuted as one under the Fatal Accidents Act rather than under general tort law.
  7. Conclusion from chronology: The Court accepted the trial Court's finding that the cause of action accrued on 15 September 2008 and that the suit was filed after expiry of the two-year period; hence the suit was barred by limitation under Article 82.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED — The appeal is dismissed summarily. The Court affirmed the trial Court's conclusion that the suit under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act was barred by limitation (Article 82 of the Limitation Act prescribes two years) and that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable in original proceedings and therefore redundant.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellants' claim for compensation under Section 1A was held to be time-barred and their appeal was dismissed; the trial Court's dismissal of the suit by reason of limitation is affirmed.
  • On legal principle: The Court reaffirmed that where a specific period of limitation is prescribed for a statutory cause of action (here, Article 82 for the Fatal Accidents Act), the residuary Article 113 cannot be invoked to extend or change that period. The Court also reaffirmed that Section 5 Limitation Act does not apply in original proceedings of this character, as applied by the trial Court.
  • Procedural note: The Court applied the principle in U.P. Avas that a first appeal may be dismissed in limine under Order 41 Rule 11 CPC without calling for the trial court record, provided the dismissal is by a reasoned order; the Court disposed of this appeal summarily with reasons recorded.
  • No new precedent: The opinion does not purport to set new law beyond applying existing statutory provisions and precedent; the Court distinguished authorities relied upon by the appellants on facts and upheld the established position concerning Article 82 and the (non-)applicability of Section 5 in original proceedings.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

P.K Lohra, J.:— Appellants have preferred this first appeal challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 23rd of April, 2015 passed by learned District Judge, Jaisalmer (learned trial Court), whereby the learned trial Court has rejected their claim for compensation under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1885 (for short, ‘Act’) as barred by limitation. While submitting their claim before the learned trial Court, appellants also made endeavour for seeking condonation of delay and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is filed but that effort also proved abortive inasmuch as learned trial Court considered it to be redundant by observing that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in original proceedings.

2. Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that first appellant's husband and second appellant's father Pradeep Bhai Patel was a vehicle driver, who on the fateful day of 11th September 2008 was plying Bus No. GJ-18-U-9938 carrying passengers from Ahmedabad to Rajasthan. In the night of 14 September, 2008, the bus reached Ramdevra Nagori Dharamshala where all the passengers alighted from bus and entered inside Dharamshala. Pradeep Bhai Patel and the Conductor of the bus for taking their luggage had gone on the rooftop of the bus and when Pradeep Bhai Patel was on roof, a naked electricity wire touched his hand and due to high voltage current flowing in the live wire he was electrocuted and immediately fell down from the bus. Upon falling of Pradeep Bhai Patel, Bus Conductor Ramesh Bhai and other passengers rushed to Pokaran Hospital where he was declared dead by the doctors. Taking into account the unnatural death of Pradeep Bhai Patel, SHO, Police Station, Pokaran made endeavour to inquire and report on suicide of the deceased under Section 174 Cr.P.C In the report under Section 174 Cr.P.C, it was found that cause of death of Pradeep Bhai Patel was electrocution and the wire in which current was flowing was loosely knitted having easy access for the human being. Therefore, while attributing negligence on the part of the respondent department, the appellants submitted claim under the Act and quantified compensation to the tune of Rs. 22,68,000/-. Alongwith the suit/plaint, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is also filed for condonation of delay.

3. The respondent submitted their written statement wherein a specific objection is raised that the suit filed by the appellants is barred by limitation as the same has been filed after expiry of two years, which is beyond the prescribed period of limitation for filing claim under Section 1A of the Act. Joining issue with the appellants on merits, the respondent completely repudiated the allegation of negligence on the part of department and submitted that the cause of electrocution was own negligence of the deceased inasmuch as he stopped the bus under L.T Line. It is also submitted in the return that on the roof of the bus some iron articles were there and when those iron articles touched the live wire, current flown which resulted into the calamity. With all these pleadings, the respondent prayed for rejection of the claim.

4. The learned trial Court, on the basis of pleadings of rival parties, framed three issues for determination. In support of the claim, first appellant herself appeared in the witness box and examined two other witnesses, viz., AW1 Moolji Bhai and AW2 Kanti Bhai. That apart, 10 documents were exhibited. To counter the evidence of the appellants, on behalf of respondent, witness NAW Hanumana Ram, Assistant Engineer, appeared in the witness box and testified on oath. Respondent also produced Photo Ex.A/1.

5. After conclusion of the evidence of rival parties, the learned trial Court heard final arguments and decided Issue No. 1 & 2 simultaneously. While considering Issue No. 1 & 2 in conjunction with the evidence tendered by rival parties, the learned trial Court recorded a definite finding that in a claim under Section 1A of the Act, period of limitation is two years as per Article 82 of the Limitation Act, and since the suit has been filed after expiry of the period of limitation, the same is barred by limitation and therefore merits rejection. The learned trial Court also made endeavour to examine the averments contained in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act submitted by appellants for condonation of delay. While considering the aforesaid application, the learned trial Court recorded a clear and unequivocal finding that Section 5 is not applicable in original proceedings and consequently the said application is redundant. While treating the suit to be barred by limitation, the learned trial Court also decided Issue No. 3 against the appellants and eventually dismissed the claim.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. L.D Khatri submits that the learned trial Court has committed serious error of law and fact in applying Article 82 of the Limitation Act whereas for such claims Article 113 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the claim of the appellants was founded on tortuous act of the respondent and therefore taking into account the principles of strict liability, provisions of Article 113 of the Limitation Act are attracted, and by not applying the said Article, the learned Court below has acted dehors the law making the impugned order vulnerable. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on following judgments:

• Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State Of Gujarat. [(1994) 4 SCC 1]

• Kerala State Electricity Board v. K.V Bhaskaran Nair (AIR 2003 Kerala 57)

• State of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy (AIR 2000 SC 2083).

7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the impugned judgment and also examined the averments contained in the suit/claim as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which is brought to my notice during the course of hearing by the learned counsel for the appellants.

8. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment in conjunction with the averments contained in the suit/claim-petition as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, there remains no quarrel that appellants have taken shelter of Section 1A of the Act for claiming the compensation. The entire pleadings in the plaint as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act are in terms of a claim under Section 1A of the Act. In that background, the appellants cannot be permitted to disown the averments contained in the plaint as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to project an improved version that their claim was under common law of torts and not under Section 1A of the Act. The legal position is no more resintegra that for claiming compensation under Section 1A of the Act, period of limitation is prescribed under Article 82 of the Limitation Act. Article 82 reads as under:

82.By executors, administrators or representatives under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (13 of 1855)Two yearThe date of the death of the person killed.

9. When for a claim under Section 1A of the Act there is a specific provision prescribing limitation of two years, it is obviously not possible to resort to residuary clause envisaged under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. The residuary clause under Section 113 of the Limitation Act is applicable vis-à-vis suits for which no period is prescribed. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, that Article 113 of the Limitation Act is applicable, is misplaced and cannot be sustained. The legal precedents, on which the learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance, are examined by me but taking into account the factual scenario in the instant case and the pleadings of the appellants in their plaint as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, these legal precedents are clearly distinguishable. Well it is true that for negligence of the respondent on account of their total apathy to take utmost care for the safety of the citizens, respondent can be castigated for their tortuous act and can also be sued to recover damages, but then the Act is also enacted on the common law of torts providing remedy to the victims of fatal accident or to the legal heirs of a victim in the event of death. The entire pleadings in the plaint are in terms of a claim under Section 1A of the Act and the plaint is not founded on the general principles of law of torts, therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, that claim of the appellants be treated as a claim under the general law of torts by applying principles of strict liability, cannot be countenanced.

10. Although in first appeals normally the Courts are summoning the record of the trial Court but looking to the peculiar facts of the case and considering the amended provisions under Order 41 Rule 11 CPC, it is not necessary to call for the record of the learned Court. Reliance in this behalf can be placed on U.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Sheo Narain Kushwaha [(2011) 6 SCC 456], wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court while interpreting the amended Rule 11(1) of Order 41 CPC, has held that dismissal of first appeal in limine is permissible but has put a rider that it is required to be dismissed by a reasoned order. The Apex Court made following observations in Para 7, 9 & 10:

7. It is evident from sub-rule (1) that an appellate court can dismiss an appeal after a preliminary hearing without calling for the records of the trial court and without issuing notice to the respondent, if it is satisfied that the appeal has no merit. Subrule (1) does not however state that such dismissal can be without assigning any reasons.

9. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 11 does not enable the High Court to dismiss first appeals by one-line orders to the effect that “appeal is dismissed” or by non-speaking orders. The order of the High Court dismissing the first appeal should be sufficiently reasoned to disclose the application of mind to the grounds of appeal and make out that the High Court was resorting to dismissal in limine as it found the appeal either to be vexatious or wholly without merit. Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code, while relieving the High Court from the obligation to write a “judgment”, does not dispense with the obligation to assign reasons in brief, when summarily dismissing the appeal.

10. Unless the order is reasoned, there will be no way of knowing whether the appellate court has examined the appeal before deciding that it did not deserve admission. As a limited right to appeal to the Supreme Court is available against the appellate judgments of the High Court, unless there are reasons in the order of dismissal, it will not be possible for the Supreme Court to examine whether the High Court has rightly rejected the appeal. The appellant who has filed the first appeal in pursuance of a statutory right to file such appeal, paying necessary court fee, can legitimately expect reappreciation of the evidence and redetermination of the questions raised, unless the statute providing for the appeal provides otherwise.

11. One more redeeming feature is that alongwith the plaint appellants have tendered fixed court fee as per proviso to Section 21 of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961 (for short, ‘Act of 1961’) and has not paid ad valorem court fee counted on the amount claimed. Section 21 of the Act of 1961 reads as under:

21. Suits for money:- In a suit for money (including a suit for damages or compensation, or arrears of maintenance, of annuities, or of other sums payable periodically), fee shall be computed on the amount claimed:

[Provided that in an action or suit for damages under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (Central Act 13 of 1855) a fixed fee of rupees ten shall be payable on the plaint or the memorandum of appeal.]

12. In this view of the matter, very framework of the suit clearly indicates that it was a suit for damages under the Act and not a suit for damages under general law of torts. It is an admitted fact that cause of action accrued to the appellants on 15 September 2008 and the suit was filed after expiry of two years, i.e, beyond the period of limitation, and as such, in my considered opinion, learned trial Court has not committed any error in rejecting the suit by the impugned judgment and decree treating it to be barred by limitation. As regards applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is trite that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in case of original proceedings and therefore the conclusion of the learned trial Court in this behalf is also just and proper.

13. The upshot of the above discussion is that the instant appeal is bereft of any merit, and the same is, therefore, dismissed summarily.