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Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Guru Persad Doss
Full Bench Opinion — Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The Full Bench delivered opinions on a reference made by a Division Bench. The legal question referred was whether, under the Statute of Limitation and Hindu law, reversionary heirs obtain a fresh cause of action at the death of an intervening female heir (for example, a widow, mother, or daughter) or whether they are barred by limitation to the same extent as the female heir would have been barred. The Court noted there were conflicting decisions on this point in the same Court and that the point required construction of the Statute of Limitation with regard to the nature of the respective estates under Hindu law.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether reversionary heirs acquire a new and independent cause of action upon the death of an intervening female heir (so that limitation runs from the date of that death), or whether they merely succeed to the same cause of action which was vested in the female heir in her lifetime (so that limitation runs from the date the cause of action originally accrued).
- How the Statute of Limitation must be construed in respect of proprietary rights held by a female heir under Hindu law and the rights of the reversionary heirs who succeed after her death.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's (pleader's) Argument
- The pleader for the plaintiff argued that because a Hindu widow (or similar female heir) is generally incompetent, except in limited cases, to alienate her husband's estate so as to bind reversionary heirs, she ought not to be permitted indirectly to effect the same result through permissive or acquiesced adverse possession. In short: a widow should not be allowed indirectly (by allowing adverse possession) to accomplish what she cannot do directly by sale or alienation.
Other Parties / Respondents
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' or other parties' specific legal arguments; it instead discusses authorities, principles of Hindu law and limitation, and the Court's view of the proper construction of the Statute of Limitation for the situation in question.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Doe d. Colly Doss Bose v. Debnarain Koberauj | Submitted to show the opinion of the late Supreme Court on the subject of limitation and female heirs. | The Court observed that the grounds of that decision were unclear from the report. Sir John Grant's judgment did not clearly state whether it rested on limitation or on a presumption of a grant by the female heir that would not bind beyond her life. The case was discussed but not treated as determinative. |
| Goluckmoney Dabee v. Diggumber Day | Authority for the proposition that a widow "fully represents the estate" and that adverse possession which bars her bars the heir also; distinguishable from English life-tenancy principles. | The Court relied on Sir Lawrence Peel's statement in that case to support the representation theory: a widow in succession stands in the position of the heir and adverse possession that bars her also bars the heir. |
| Shivagunga case (Privy Council) | Held that, absent fraud or collusion, a decision against a widow regarding her deceased husband's estate will bind the reversionary heirs. | The Court invoked this Privy Council decision to support the conclusion that decisions and adverse possession which bar the widow will likewise bar reversionary heirs, provided there is no fraud or collusion. |
| The Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah | Comment that comparing a Hindu widow to an English tenant for life is misleading. | Used to reinforce the Court's view that English analogies (e.g., life tenant / remainderman) may mislead; the Hindu widow occupies a representational position distinct from an English life tenant. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench approached the question by examining prior decisions and underlying Hindu law principles and then applied the Statute of Limitation to the facts and legal categories involved. The reasoning proceeded in these main steps:
- Identification of the Legal Problem — The Court framed the issue as a question of whether reversionary heirs obtain a fresh cause of action upon the death of a female heir or whether they succeed to the same cause of action which vested in the female heir, so that limitation runs from the original accrual of the cause of action.
- Survey of Authorities — The Court examined conflicting decisions in the Court's reports and the late Supreme Court, noting (a) the Doe d. Colly Doss Bose case but observing its unclear grounds; (b) Goluckmoney Dabee, where it was said a widow "fully represents the estate" and adverse possession that bars her bars the heir; and (c) the Privy Council (Shivagunga) decision that a decision against a widow without fraud or collusion binds reversionary heirs. These authorities supported the representational view of the female heir.
- Role of the Statute of Limitation — The Court emphasized that the Statute of Limitation exists for defendants' benefit and to avoid stale claims when evidence is lost over time. It would be anomalous to hold a widow barred by limitation but allow reversionary heirs a fresh cause of action simply because they only became entitled after the widow's death.
- Representative Character of the Female Heir — Drawing analogies to executors/administrators (who succeed to their predecessor's cause of action and do not obtain a fresh cause), the Court concluded that a widow or other female heir, under Hindu law, holds in a representative capacity "for the benefit of the deceased" and thus the reversionary heir succeeds to the same cause of action rather than acquiring a new one at the date of succession.
- Resolution of the Pleader's Objection — The Court addressed the plaintiff's argument that a widow should not be able indirectly to effect an alienation by allowing adverse possession. The Court responded that reversionary heirs and creditors have remedies (for example, suits to prevent waste or to reduce the estate into possession) and that fraud or collusion by the widow would permit relief. Absent fraud or collusion, limitation would operate against reversionary heirs as it would against the female heir.
- Qualification and Exceptions — The Court recognized exceptions: if the female heir actually alienated property (and such alienation is effective for her life but avoidable on succession) then the cause of action of the reversioner may not accrue until the female heir's death. Similarly, if possession or dealing with the property ceases to be a mere non-trespass while the female heir is alive and only becomes a trespass after she dies or upon her questionable alienation, the cause of action then arises at that later time. Thus the Court accepted that in some situations the reversionary heir's cause of action may first accrue upon the death of the female heir.
- Application to the Present Case — Applying these principles, the Chief Justice and two concurring judges held that in the present case the cause of action accrued during the female heir's lifetime (because the property had been held adversely throughout) and thus the reversionary heir was barred by limitation unless proceedings had been instituted within the statutory period measured from that earlier accrual.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench answered the referred question in the negative to the extent that the period of limitation for a reversionary heir is not to be reckoned from the date he or she succeeds (i.e., the death of the female heir), but from the date at which the limitation would have been reckoned if the female heir had lived and brought the suit. In other words, where the cause of action accrued during the life of the female heir, the reversionary heir merely succeeds to that cause of action and is subject to the same bar of limitation as the female heir. (The Court qualified that where the cause of action only arises on the death of the female heir—for example, where an alienation by her is not actionable until her death—the limitation may begin at her death.)
Implications:
- Direct effect in the present matter: The plaintiff was held to be barred on the facts of this case (as explicitly stated by L.S. Jackson, J.). The Division Bench that referred the question was to be informed that limitation against a reversionary heir runs from the date it would have run against the female heir.
- Practical consequence: Reversionary heirs who succeed after an intervening female heir will generally be barred if the adverse possession or other cause of action that would have barred the female heir occurred and matured during her lifetime, unless the reversionary heir can show fraud, collusion, or that the cause of action only first arose upon the death or upon a posthumous event.
- Remedies preserved: The Court recognized that where there is fraud, collusion, or where a proper case is made (for example, to prevent waste), reversionary heirs and creditors retain remedies to prevent rights being lost through the female heir's conduct; the holding does not deny relief in cases of fraud or collusion.
- No novel rule beyond this construction was announced: The opinion applies existing authorities and interprets the Statute of Limitation in light of the representative character of the female heir under Hindu law; it sends the case back to the Division Bench with the stated opinion on limitation.
This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add information not contained therein.
The following opinions were delivered by the Full Bench:—
Peacock, C.J (after stating the facts, continued). — The question of law which is raised for our opinion is, whether, if a person dies leaving a female as his heir-at-law, the reversionary heirs have a fresh cause of action in regard to the estate of the ancestor at the time of the death of the female heir, or whether they are barred by limitation if the female heir would have been barred. The question is a very important one, and depends upon the proper construction of the Statute of Limitation, having regard to the nature of the respective estates under the Hindu law of a female heir and of the reversionary heirs.
There are several conflicting decisions upon the point in this Court and it is upon the ground of those decisions that we have to determine the question.
The arguments adduced by the Judges in support of their several views are of considerable weight, and they have been substantially incorporated in the argument of the vakeels before us.
A case was cited — Doe d. Colly Doss Bose v. Debnarain Koberauj — for the purpose of showing the opinion of the late Supreme Court upon the subject; but it is not very clear what are the grounds upon which that case turned. The female heir in that case had entered into possession. Sir John Grant, who delivered the judgment, did not state whether his opinion was founded upon the point of limitation simply, or upon the ground that a grant by the female heir might be presumed, and, if so, that it would not be binding beyond her own life. He says:— I think that, if we were to presume a grant, it would not be binding beyond the widow's life.
It is unnecessary for us to determine in this case when the cause of action of the reversionary heirs would accrue if the female heir were to sell the estate without lawful cause. In that case, the purchaser entering into possession would not be a wrong-doer during the life of the female heir. No cause of action would accrue to the female heir against him for entering under her grant, although it would not be binding as against the reversionary heirs, and possibly might not be so against creditors of the ancestor.
In this case, a cause of action did accrue to the female heir, and the question is, whether the reversionary heirs upon her death acquired a new and independent cause of action within the meaning of the Statute of Limitation, or merely succeeded to the same cause of action which was vested in the female heir in her lifetime.
Whatever may have been the date of the decision in the case cited from Fulton's reports, it must have been before the decision of the late Supreme Court in Goluckmoney Dabee v. Diggumber Day, which is set out in Mr. Justice Macpherson's book on Mortgages, 2nd edition, p. 20. Sir Lawrence Peel in that case says:— “It has been invariably considered for many years that the widow” (speaking of the widow succeeding as heir) “fully represents the estate; and it is also the settled law that adverse possession which bars her, bars the heir also after her, which would not be the case if she were a mere tenant for life as known to the English law.”
It was also held by the Privy Council in the Shivagunga case, that in the absence of fraud or collusion, a decision against a widow, with regard to her deceased husband's estate, would be binding upon the reversionary heirs.
In The Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah, it was said that comparing a Hindu widow to n tenant for life was calculated to mislead. In the Shivagunga case (L), the widow was compared to a tennant-in-tuil; but the heirs in that case were not likened to remaindermen, and must, therefore, have been in the position of tenants-in-tail. Such heirs would be bound if the tenant-in-tail was barred, though the remainderman might not be.
If, then, in the Shivagunga case, the widow was like a tenant-in-tuil, and the reversionary heirs were like the issue-in-tail, and the same likeness exists in the present case, the reversionary heirs would be barred by limitation which ran against the female heir. If the female heir in the present case had sued the wrong-doer, and, without fraud or collusion, had failed to make out her case to turn him out of possession, the reversionary heirs would have been bound by the decision. I am assuming that they are not claiming through the female heir. For instance, if the female heir had sued the wrong-doer, and he had set up a purchase from the ancestor, and had succeeded in that defence at the suit of the female heir, the reversionary heirs would be barred by the decision in the absence of fraud or collusion.
The law of limitation is passed for the benefit of defendants, partly upon the ground that after length of time they may have lost the evidence in support of their right; and it would be anomalous to hold that a female heir was barred by limitation, lest the defendant should have lost his evidence to prove his right against her, and to hold that the reversionary heirs, who would have been barred by a decision against the widow if she had brought her suit in time, are not barred by limitation against her.
Possibly, if we could trace the Hindu law to its origin, we should find that a widow did not succeed to her husband's estate as his heir. It was doubtful at one time whether she did so. It was supposed that she took, because she was part of the husband. In the Dayabhaga, Ch. xi, s. 1, vv. 1 and 2, it is said:— “In regard to the wealth of a deceased person who leaves no male issue, authors disagree in consequence of finding contradictory passages of law. Thus Vrihaspati says:— ‘In scripture and in the code of law, as well as in popular practice, a wife is declared by the wise to be half the body of her husband, equally sharing the fruit of pure and impure acts. Of him whose wife is not deceased, half the body survives. How, then, should another take his property while half his person is alive.? Let the wife of a deceased man who left no issue take a share, notwithstanding kinsmen, a father, a mother, or uterine brother be present.’ This would account for the rule which says that the reversionary heirs of the husband are those who would have been his heirs if he had lived up to the time of the death of his wife.
It is difficult to reconcile the above principle with the fact of sons and grandsons taking during the life of the widow. I have never been able to find the principle accurately defined by which sons take in preference to a widow. The Dayabhaga rests the right of the sons upon the doctrine that succession is grounded solely upon the benefits conferred — Dayabhaga, Ch. xi, s. 1, vv. 32, 33, and 34; but, probably, the right of the sons in preference to that of the widow depends upon the doctrine, that a son or other descendant is consubstantial with the father or other ancestor. Menu says:— “The husband, after conception by his wife, becomes himself an embryo, and is born a second time here below”. See also 3 Colebrooke's Hindu Law, p. 459 : 1 Vyavastha Darpana, 1st Edition, p. 33, note.
However this may be, it is settled that the wife does take as heir to her husband in default of issue, and, that upon her death, those persons succeed as reversionary heirs who would have been the heirs of the husband if he had died at that time. It is a very anomalous position that a person should take as heir, and that his right to take as heir should be determined according to a state of facts not existing at the time of the death of the ancestor, but caused by events which may have occurred many years after his death.
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that a reversionary heir, who is bound by a decision against a widow respecting the subject-matter of inheritance, is also barred by limitation, if without fraud or collusion, the widow is barred by limitation.
It has been contended that as the widow cannot absolutely convey away her husband's estate without sufficient cause, so as to be binding upon the reversionary heirs, they ought not to be barred by limitation against the widow, otherwise she will be able, if she lived a sufficient time, to do indirectly, by allowing adverse possession to be held against her, that which she could not do directly, by a sale without sufficient cause. But reversionary heirs presumptive have a right, although they may never succeed to the estate, to prevent the widow from committing waste; and I have no doubt that if a proper case were made out, reversionary heirs would have a sufficient interest, as well as creditors of the ancestor, by suit against the widow and the adverse holder, to have the estate reduced into possession, so as to prevent their rights from becoming barred by limitation.
In the ease of moveable property, such as Government paper, a Hindu, although he is not bound to do so, may obtain probate or letters of administration. Adverse possession or wrongful detention of Government paper, or the like, would give a cause of action to the heirs, or in the case of probate or letters of administration, to the executor or administrator. If an executor or administrator should fail to sue to recover the Government paper within the time limited by law, he would be barred by limitation, but I have no doubt that a suit could be maintained against him and the wrong-doer by legatees or creditors of the deceased owner, or by the heirs who are in the same position as the next-of-kin would be in England, to compel the recovery of the Government paper, and the application of it in due course of law.
The cause of action of the executor or administrator would arise from the time of the wrongful detention of the paper from him. But suppose he should die after the paper had been detained against him for five years, and the next person in succession should take out letters of administration with the will annexed, or if there were no will, simple letters of administration of the property not administered by the deceased executor or administrator, the cause of action of the administrator de bonis non would not accrue at the time of the death of the former executor or administrator, but he would merely succeed to the cause of action which was vested in the former executor, and limitation would date as against him from the same period as it would have dated if the former executor or administrator had lived.
It has been held in England that an executor of an executor, or an administrator de bonis non, has a right to sue if he commences his suit within one year after the death of the preceding executor or administrator, notwithstanding that period may exceed the period of limitation which the former executor or administrator had.
It is unnecessary to say whether a similar law would apply here. I mention it merely because I think it is an argument to show that in the case of representatives, where one is substituted for another in consequence of death or other cause, the substituted representative has only the same cause of action as the representative for whom he is substituted.
Now, according to the Hindu law, it appears to me that the widow although she has a beneficial interest in the property, is still only to some extent a representative, and holds the property, not merely for her own benefit, but for the benefit of the deceased.
It is said that the reversionary heirs could not sue during the lifetime of the widow, and that, therefore, they ought not to be barred by any adverse holding against the widow at a time when they could not sue. But when we look at the widow as a representative, and see that the reversionary heirs are bound by decrees relating to her husband's estate which are obtained against her without fraud or collusion, we are of opinion that they are also bound by limitation, by which she, without fraud or collusion, is barred. When, therefore, we construe the words “cause of action” in the Statute of Limitation, we must consider them as referring, not to a now cause of action accruing to the reversionary heirs personally and individually, but to the cause of action which accrued to the heir or representative, for the time being, of the deceased.
This is not the only instance in which a person may be barred by time which has elapsed before he has a right to sue. If an ancestor is dispossessed, the cause of action of his heir accrues, not at the time when the ancestor dies, and when he could sue, but at the time when the ancestor was dispossessed, and ought himself to have sued; and there is no more reason why a reversionary heir should have a fresh cause of action from the death of the widow, because he could not sue during her lifetime, than that an immediate heir should have a fresh cause of action commencing at the date of the ancestor's death because he could not sue during the lifetime of the ancestor.
A reversionary heir cannot sue during the lifetime of the widow, because during her life the estate of the deceased is represented by her as the heir-at-law. I have spoken of a widow in many parts of this judgment, but the remarks which I have made apply equally to other female heirs, such as mothers, daughters, and the like.
It appears to me that this case ought to go back to the Division Bench which referred it, with the expression of our opinion that the period of limitation against a reversionary heir is not to be reckoned from the time at which he succeeded, viz., from the date of the death of the female heir, but from the date at which it would have been reckoned if the female heir had lived and brought the suit.
L.S Jackson, J.:— I entirely concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice, that the plaintiff was barred in the present case. We sit here unquestionably to administer the Hindu law in those cases to which that law applies, and on all points not decided we are clearly bound to refer to the original sources of that law, and to interpret them to the best of our ability; but where any point having already arisen has been decided by the authority of the highest Court which takes cognizance of questions of Hindu law, we are, I think, as clearly bound implicitly to guide ourselves by the decisions of that tribunal. It has been distinctly held by the Privy Council in the Shivagunga case that a decision fairly arrived at without fraud or collusion in the presence of a Hindu widow in possession of the estate will bind reversionary heirs. That being so decided, it appears to me impossible to escape the conclusion that an adverse possession which barred the widow will also bar the heirs, and in that opinion we are fully and strongly supported by the decisions of the late Supreme Court in the case to which His Lordship the Chief Justice has referred.
It was an argument of the pleader for the plaintiff in this case that a widow who is incompetent, except in certain cases, to alienate the estate left by her husband, ought not to be allowed indirectly to do that which she cannot do directly. It appears to me incorrect to say that in such a case as this, the widow has done anything in the nature of an alienation indirectly or directly. If, indeed, it could be shown that she had colluded with the persons holding adverse possession, so that in fact a case of fraud could be made out, then no doubt she might be held to have done indirectly that which the Hindu law forbids her doing directly. But in such a case as this, undoubtedly, a reversioner aggrieved by such frauds would be entitled to bring his action.
I state very shortly the principal reasons upon which my own conclusions are founded, because, although, I am very far from dissenting from any observations contained in the elaborate judgment which we have just heard, I am not at this moment prepared unreservedly to assent to the whole of them.
Phear, J.:— I too desire to avoid pledging myself to all the illustrations which have fallen from the Chief Justice; but with this exception, I concur entirely in the reasoning which he has given in support of his conclusions, and I concur also in the remarks which have been made by Jackson, J.
I will add that it seems to me that when a reversionary heir succeeds to the property of his ancestor on the death of an intervening female, heir, he takes substantially the same proprietary right as she enjoyed, and no more, though doubtless, she was fettered in a way that he is not, with regard to the dealings with the property, viz., her alienations are often liable to be avoided by him when he succeeds to the right of succession. If, the D, that proprietary right was invaded while in her hands, the cause of action accruing from the act of invasion can be none other when it conies to be pursued by the reversionary heir than it was when the female heir herself was the person to do so. Both the right which is infringed, and the act complained of as the infringement, are the same, whether it is he or she who sues. It follows that if the reversionary heir brings a suit founded upon that act of invasion of the proprietary right, the time prescribed in the Statute of Limitation runs against him from the date of the act. Of course, it may be that the possession of a third party, which is no trespass on the proprietary right when in the hands of the female heir, may, if persisted in, become so when that proprietary right passes to the reversionary heir. In such a case, the infringement of the proprietary right first commences on the death of the female heir, and with it the cause of action arises. This is so when the female heir conveys under such circumstances that her alienation can be questioned by the reversionary heir.
With these views, I entirely agree in the answer which the Chief Justice proposes to send to the Division Bench.
Macpherson, J.:— I also concur in the proposed answer. But a very great difference exists between the case immediately before us, and the case in which a mother (or other Hindu female having an estate similar to that of a childless widow) has herself alienated property belonging to the estate which she has taken as heiress, without sufficient reason for making such alienation. In the latter case, the alienation is good as against her, and so far as her own life-interest is concerned; therefore, in fact, no cause of action necessarily arises at all with respect to her alienation so long as she lives. The cause of action does not arise until her death, when the reversioner's cause of action for the first time accrues. In the case before us, the property having never reached the hands of the mother at all, having been through out held adversely to her, the cause of action accrued in the mother's lifetime; and therefore, a suit to recover possession, by whomsoever it may be brought, is barred, unless instituted within twelve years from the commencement of the adverse possession.
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