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Ram Anuj Sewak Singh (Objector) v. Hingu Lal (Decree-Holder).

Allahabad High Court
Feb 10, 1881

Pearson, J. and Oldfield, J.:— In this case the decree-holder obtained a decree against a sole judgment-debtor. Application for execution of the decree was made against the judgment-debtor within time, and on his death execution was taken out against two representatives of the deceased, his son Kai Nar Singh, and his Widow Ablakhi Kuar, also within time, the last application being made on the 5th April, 1880. On the 17th May the decree-holder petitioned the Court executing the decree that his application of the 5th April, 1880, might be amended by adding the name of Ram Anuj Sewak Singh, the minor grandson of deceased, under the guardianship of Rai Nar Singh, and execution should proceed against him, the decree-holder having now obtained information that he was one of the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor and in possession of the property. The Court ordered that the petition be filed and notice should issue to the said Ram Anuj Sewak Singh. The latter objected that the execution of the decree was barred by limitation against him, and the Court disallowing the objection this appeal has been instituted. The application which is the subject of this appeal has been made within time from the date of the last application against the son and widow of the deceased, but it is contended that the application to execute the decree against the other representatives of the deceased is not an application within the meaning of cl. 4, art. 179, Limitation Act, so as to give a period from which limitation will run. We have to determine the question entirely with reference to the provisions of cl. 4, art. 179. What the law requires is that within the period allowed there shall have been an application “in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree or order.” It cannot be said that the application against the representatives of the judgment-debtor does not meet the above requirements of the law. The omission to ask for execution in it against the appellant as one of the representatives of the judgment-debtor does not affect its legality. The appellant can only succeed in his contention, if it can be held that the application for execution made against one legal representative of a sole judgment-debtor, although it may meet the requirements of the law, shall not take effect for the purpose of saving limitation against another representative of the judgment-debtor who is only liable for the property in his possession. But the law makes no such provision, and its omission to do so is significant, for Explanation I to art. 179 provides that “where the decree has been passed severally against more, persons than one, distinguishing portions of the subject-matter as payable or deliverable by each, the application shall take effect against only such of the said persons or their representatives as it may be made against. Had it been intended that the legal representatives of a sole judgment-debtor or of jointly liable judgment-debtors should have the benefit of a similar provision on the analogous grounds that they are only liable to the extent of the property in their possession, it is reasonable to suppose that the Legislature would have extended the provision to them. The position, however, of several representatives of a sole judgment-debtor is very different quoad the decree-holder from that of several judgment-debtors with separate liabilities found by the decree. We dismiss the appeal with costs.

Appeal dismissed.