Lachman v. Juala

Mahmood, J.:— The learned counsel who his appeared in support of the application contends that the action of the Joint Magistrate in discharging the accused was illegal and improper, inasmuch as the discretion given to him by s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code did not extend to weighing evidence; that the expression “sufficient grounds” as used in that section did not include the power of discrediting eye-witnesses; that in a case of this nature and in consideration of the kind of evidence produced before him, the Magistrate was bound to commit the accused to the Court of Section, whose duty it would be to weigh the evidence produced by the prosecution and to arrive at its own conclusions, in support of this contention the learned counsel has referred to the change of language in s. 215, where, instead of the expression “sufficient grounds,” the phrase “if he finds that no offence has been proved” has been used; and similarly in s. 216 the phrase “if the Magistrate finds that an offence has been apparently proved” has been used, instead of another phraseology in s. 196, Criminal Procedure Code. The argument in support of the application is, that this circumstance necessarily indicates that the powers of Magistrates in cases triable by himself, and in which he is empowered to convict or acquit the accused, were intended by the Legislature to be greater than in those triable exclusively by the Court of Session; and that in the latter class of cases he in bound to commit the accused if the evidence produced by the prosecution is such that, if it were believed, it would end in a conviction.

I am of opinion that this contention, though plausible, is not sound. The object of the law in providing that the inquiry shall be held by the Magistrate before the accused has to undergo trial in the Court of Session, seems to be to prevent the commitment of cases in which there is no reasonable ground for conviction. This provision of the law is calculated, on the one hand, to save the subjects from prolonged anxiety of undergoing trials for offences not brought home to them; and, on the other hand, to save the time of the Court of Session from being wasted over cases in which the charge is obviously not supported by such evidence as would justify a conviction. Taking this view of the law, I am of opinion that power given to Magistrates under s. 195 extends to weighing of evidence, and the expression “sufficient grounds must be understood in a wide sense. I must not however, he understood to lay down that this discretionary power should be exercised by the Magistrate without due caution, or that he should take upon him-self to discharge the accused in Sessions cases in the face of evidence which might justify a conviction. But when the evidence against, the accused is such that, in the opinion of the Magistrate, it cannot possibly justify a conviction, I hold that there is nothing in the law which prohibits' the discharge of the accused, even though the evidence against him consists of witnesses who state themselves to be eye-witnesses, but whom the Magistrate entirely discredits. This being so, I could interfere in revision only, if, on considering the evidence produced on behalf of the prosecution, I came to the conclusion that Magistrate had made a “material error” in discharging the accused, or had illegally and improperly under-rated the value of the evidence. But having examined the record, I can arrive at no such conclusion. I therefore decline to interfere, and reject this application.