Stuart, C.J:— My answer to this reference is in the negative. The sale-deed under which the plaintiff makes his claim in the suit was executed on the 3rd July, 1877, when Regulation XVII of 1806 was in full force, and the Transfer of Property Act did not come into operation until the 1st day of July, 1882, or about five years after the date of the conditional sale-deed. The rights therefore created by that deed are saved by s. 2 of the Transfer of Property Act which, after repealing certain enactments in the schedule thereto, provides as follows:—“But nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect * * * any right or liability arising out of legal relation constituted before this Act comes into force, or any relief in respect of any such right or liability.”

This clearly applies to the case now before us, and the right or liability constituted by the deed included, in my opinion, the procedure by notice and foreclosure which was in force at the time the deed was executed—that is, the procedure prescribed by the regulation of 1806, including, among other things, the right to a year's notice, which is a beneficial right of a most important and serious nature, for by means of it a conditional vendor might be enabled to pay off his mortgage-debt and save his property. Even if s. 2 were less distinct than it is, it could never, I think, have been intended by any retrospective operation of it to deprive a mortgagor or conditional vendor of his right to a year's notice, and to cut it down to half of that time. The effect again of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act I of 1868 is to save all rights of procedure existing before the repealing Act came into force. In fact the legal effect of s. 2 of the Transfer of Property Act, read especially with the provisions of the General Clauses Act, is to save from the operation of that Act all rights whatever constituted and existing before it came into force,—that is, that such rights or liabilitias with their remedies the left in precisely the same position as if the Transfer of Property Act had never been passed.

Something was said at the hearing about the limitation period of sixty years, but that is a limitation that applies to either view of the case, whether under the Regulation of 1806 or the Transfer of Property Act of 1882, and does not in the slightest degree affect the question at to the effect of s. 2 of the latter Act.

Oldfield, J.:— The suit out of which this reference has arisen is one to foreclose a mortgage with conditional sale made by deed executed on the 3rd July, 1877. The suit has been brought under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and the question raised is, whether the provisions of that Act relating to suits for foreclosure of mortgage by conditional sale or those of ss. 7 and 8, Regulation XVII of 1806 which it repealed, are to be enforced, the mortgage having been made before the Transfer of Property Act of 1882 came into force.

It is contended for the defendant that his right to have for a closure made under the Regulation is saved by clause (c), s. 2 of the Transfer of Property Act S. 2 is as follows:—In the territories to which this Act extends for the time being the enactments specified is the scledule hereto annexed shall be repealed to the extent therein mentioned. But nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect.

(a) the provisions of any enactment not hereby expressly repealed:

(b) any terms or incidents of any contract or constitution of property which are consistent with the provisions of this Act and are allowed by the law for the time being in force:

(c) any right or liability arising out of a legal relation constituted before this Act comes into force, or any relief in respect of any such right or liability: or,

(d) save as provided by s. 57 and Chapter IV of this Act, any transfer by operation of law or by, or in execution of, a decree or order of a Court of competent jurisdiction; and nothing in the second chapter of this Act shall be deemed to afreet any rule of Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist law.”

It is upon clause (c) that the answer to this reference will depend; and in my opinion that clause does not require that foreclosure shall be made under the old Regulation. What the Transfer of Property Act by clause (c) will not affect is any right or liability arising out of a legal relation constituted before the Act came into force, or any relief in respect of such right or liability. The right or liability must arise out of a legal relation—that is, in the case before us, out of the mortgage-contract or the relation to mortgagor and mortgagee.

The provisions of ss. 7 and 8, Regulation XVII of 1806, constituted a procedure for [redemption and foreclosure of mortgages by conditional sale which has now been repealed, and in its place the procedure prescribed by the Transfer of Property Act has been substituted.

There is no vested right to have recourse to a particular procedure for enforcing a contract; such a right cannot be claimed by the parties to a mortgage, as being in any sense a right which arise out of the legal relation of a mortgagor and mortgaged to alter the procedure involves no breach of their contract.

Their rights and liabilities under their contract, and the relief they are entitled in respect of such rights and liabilities, are different things. From the procedure necessary to enforce such rights liabilities, and relief. And although the]procedure for redemption and foreclosure of mortgage by conditional sale has been altered, it can scarcely be said that the mortgagor has been injuriously affected by the charge. The Regulation prescribed certain ministerial proceedings to be taken, under which a year was allowed to be mortgagor to pay the debt, before a suit could be brought for possession, or to obtain a declaration of absolute title, whereas the present Act has done away with the preliminary proceedings, and allows the mortgagee to bring a suit for foreclosure, and if be succeeds, directs that the decree shad order an account to be taken or declare the amount due, and allow the mortgagor six ??? on tbs to pay the amount from the date of declaring in Court the amount doe, and failing payment the mortgagor shall be absolute do barred of all right to redeem the property, and a power is given to the Court to enlarge the time for payment on good cause being shown. Much stress has been laid upon the mortgagor's right to a year's time in which to pay the amount due under Regulation XVII of 1806 having been affected by the Act, but the mortgagor cannot be said to be injuriously affected on this score, when the Act allows the Court to extend the time for payment on cause being shown. Besides, the right given to the mortgagor of a year's grace in which to redeem the mortgage was conferred by the Legislature, and did not arise out of the legal relation of the parties—indeed quite the reverse, for it was opposed to the terms of the contract, and modified the strict rights of the parties under the contract, and any right of the kind was defendant on the Regulation, and could only be enforced under it, and ceased to have effect upon its repeal.

The following passage from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes may be cited as bearing on the case before us:—It dots not follow that because a suitor has a cause of action, he has also a vested right to enforce it by a course of procedure and practice which was in force when he began his suit. He has only the right of prosecuting it in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which he sales, and if an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. The remedy does not alter the contract or tort, it takes away no vested right, for the defaulter can have no vested right in a state of the law which left the injured party without or which only a defective remedy,” And cases are cited, as when the Legislature gave a new remedy for enforcing rights in the Admiralty by the Admiralty Acts of 1840 and 1861, those Acts were held to extend to rights which had accrued before the new remedy had been provided.

It may be observe also that Regulation XVII of 1806 has been absolutely and without reservation repealed by s. 2 of the Transfer of Property Act; and it is difficult to see how the provisions of a repealed statute can be enforced for obtaining foreclosure, and the great inconvenience of giving effect to the provisions of the repealed Regulation in the case of old mortgages for the next sixty years or more is so opinions that it seems impossible to suppose it was intended to keep in force the Regulation, and it may be added that had there been such an intention, it is reasonable to suppose that it would have been expressed in distinct terms.

The answer to this reference therefore is, that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act relating to suits for foreclosure of mortgage by conditional sale are applicable to this suit.

Brodhurst, J.:— I concur.

Tyrrell, J.:— I am entirely of opinion that my brother Oldfield's answer to this reference is not logically and legally sound, but also is strongly recommended by the argument at convenienti.

Straight, J.:— I concur with my Hon'ble colleague Mr. Justice Oldfield. The provisions of s. 8 of Regulation XVII of 1806, declaring “how a mortgagee or holder of a deed of conditional sale is to proceed when desirous of foreclosing a mortgage or rendering a conditional sale conclusive,” was one concerning the procedure to be followed by the mortgagee at the time of seeking to enforce the contract of mortgage or conditional sale, and it did not operate to create any right in either of the parties to the contract, nor by reason thereof did any right arise to them out of the relation of mortgagee and mortgagor. Their respective rights and liabilities under the contract, existed and were to be determined by the terms of the instrument, and all s. 8 of the Regulation did was to lay down the procedure to be followed by one of them, ??? the mortgagee when seeking to foreclose. No right to twelve months' notice arose to the mortgagor out of the contract of mortgage itself, nor in respect of his relation with the mortgagee, but the latter was directed to follow a certain course of proceeding “No suitor has any vested interest in the course of procedure,” says, Mellish, L.J, in Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger (1). So again, James, L.J, in Warner v. Murdoch (2) remarks:—“No one has a vested right in any particular form of procedure”; and an authoritative decision upon this point is the case of Wright v. Held (3): see also the judgment of Lord Wensleydale at p. 227 of 33 L.J, Exch. The principle thus enunciated in these cases may I think with propriety be adopted and acted upon in the Courts here except is so far as s. 6 of the General Clauses Act limits its application by saving proceedings commenced before a repealing Act has come into effect. As to the argument of hardship, it does not appear to me that a mortgagor is subject to any injustice by having applied to him the procedure laid down in the Transfer of Property Act, Chapter IV. Taking ss. 67-86 and 87 in con-junction with one another, it is obvious that if the Courts properly discharge the duties thereby imposed upon them, no room for grievance or complaint need be left to him, if he is honestly anxious to discharge the incumbrance on his property, the Courts having full discretion to afford him every reasonable opportunity to do so. As in my opinion clause (c) of s. 2 of the “Transfer of Property Act” does not save the procedure provided is s. 8 of Regulation XVII of 1806, I would answer the question put by the reference in the affirmative.