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Chunni Kuar v. Rup Singh

Allahabad High Court
Jun 26, 1888
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Bibi Chunni Kuar sued Raja Rup Singh on a bond dated 10th December 1878 for Rs. 25,000 with future interest, claiming also the costs of the suit. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had instituted a suit in forma pauperis in 1877 against Rani Baisni and the Collector for recovery of the Raj Barah estates, which was dismissed. To enable an appeal, the defendant borrowed Rs. 3,700 from the plaintiff and executed the bond promising to pay Rs. 25,000 within a year of recovering possession of the estate. The defendant’s appeal was dismissed, but he later obtained a decree from the Privy Council and possession of the estate on 13th August 1884. The defendant evaded payment under the bond.

The defendant pleaded that the contract was champertous and illegal under sections 23 and 30 of the Indian Contract Act, denied receipt of any money from the plaintiff, and argued that the bond’s payment condition was tied to success in the appeal to this Court, which he did not achieve. The Subordinate Judge of Mainpuri held the claim not champertous, found the defendant had received consideration, but due to the defendant’s impoverished and unsound state at the time of contract, awarded only the amount actually advanced with interest and costs. Both parties appealed against the decree.

The appeals were considered by the present court, which reviewed the facts, including the negotiations involving Maulvi Muhammad Mohsin and Lala Punni Lal, the advances for litigation expenses, and the sequence of appeals leading to the Privy Council decree in defendant’s favor. The defendant repudiated liability under the bond and a subsequent sale deed. The court found the defendant understood the contract, was not unduly pressured except by his poverty, and that the assistance terms were the best available to him.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the bond executed by the defendant was champertous and void under sections 23 and 30 of the Indian Contract Act.
  2. Whether the bond was enforceable given the defendant’s failure in the appeal to this Court but success in the Privy Council.
  3. Whether the contract constituted a hard and unconscionable bargain against public policy.
  4. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full amount claimed or only the amount actually advanced with interest.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

  • The contract was champertous and illegal under ss. 23 and 30 of the Indian Contract Act.
  • The plaintiff did not actually advance any money to the defendant; the expenses were paid by Maulvi Muhammad Mohsin.
  • The bond’s payment condition was limited to success in the appeal to this Court, which the defendant did not achieve.
  • The bond was inadmissible in evidence as it was not registered under the Indian Registration Act.
  • The bargain was unconscionable, against public policy, and should be judged by equitable principles applicable to dealings with reversioners in English law.
  • The plaintiff was not entitled to recover on the bond since she did not alone undertake all expenses of the Privy Council appeal.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The contract was not champertous and ss. 23 and 30 of the Indian Contract Act do not apply.
  • The bond was fairly and reasonably entered into under the circumstances.
  • The principles applicable to dealings with reversioners in English equity law are not applicable to this case.
  • The plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount claimed under the bond.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Coomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee English law of maintenance and champerty not introduced into India; but contracts may be invalid if against public policy. Used to establish that unfair, extortionate agreements encouraging litigation gambling are against public policy and not enforceable.
Srimati Kamini Sundari Chaodhrani v. Kali Prussunno Ghose Equitable doctrine against hard and unconscionable bargains with expectant heirs or reversioners. Applied analogously to consider whether the contract was a hard and unconscionable bargain in the present case.
Beynon v. Cook Equity sets aside hard bargains even without fraud, focusing on reasonableness and protection of reversioners. Referenced to explain the equitable doctrine of relief against harsh bargains and its applicability.
Aylesford v. Morris Presumption of fraud arises from weakness and extortion in contracts; burden on claimant to prove fairness. Used to illustrate the equitable principles protecting vulnerable parties from unconscionable bargains.
Chesterfield v. Janssen Unconscientious use of power arising from circumstances creates presumption of fraud. Discussed to emphasize the need for contracts to be fair, just, and reasonable to be upheld.
Bowes v. Heaps Hard bargains induced by distress may be set aside even absent fraud. Applied to show that absence of fraud does not guarantee validity of an oppressive contract.
Ganesh Prasad v. Sheo Ratan Lall and Fakcer Chand English law of champerty and maintenance not fully applicable in India. Supported the position that Indian law does not adopt English champerty law in full.
Wallis v. Smith Contracts between adults not under disability should be enforced according to parties' intentions. Quoted to stress the importance of upholding contracts unless legislative exceptions apply.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the facts and legal principles surrounding the bond and the litigation funding arrangement. It found that while the English law of champerty and maintenance was not fully applicable in India, contracts of this nature could still be invalidated if they were extortionate, unconscionable, or against public policy. The court carefully examined whether the bond was a hard and unconscionable bargain, considering the defendant’s impoverished state, the necessity of the funding, and the fairness of the terms.

The court acknowledged the equitable doctrine protecting expectant heirs and reversioners from harsh bargains, but noted this doctrine should not be indiscriminately applied to all contracts with high returns or interest rates. It emphasized that contracts between competent adults at arm’s length should generally be enforced according to their terms.

Upon applying these principles, the court concluded that the bond was a hard and unconscionable bargain, as the amount claimed (Rs. 25,000 for an advance of Rs. 3,700) was unreasonable either because it was extortionate or because it reflected a speculative litigation gamble. The contract was therefore against public policy. The court also noted the prevalence of maintenance and champerty abuses in India and the need to carefully scrutinize such agreements.

Despite refusing to enforce the full amount, the court recognized that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the actual amount advanced with interest at a high but not unusual rate (20% per annum) from the date of the bond, plus costs and further interest on the decree amount until payment. The defendant’s appeal was dismissed, and the plaintiff’s appeal was allowed to this limited extent.

Holding and Implications

Partial Allowance of Appeal

The court held that the bond for Rs. 25,000 was a hard and unconscionable bargain and against public policy, and thus not enforceable in full. However, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount actually advanced (Rs. 3,700) with simple interest at 20% per annum from the date of the bond, along with proportionate costs and subsequent interest at 6% per annum until payment.

The defendant’s appeal was dismissed with costs, and the plaintiff’s appeal was allowed only to the extent of recovering the advanced amount with interest and costs. No new precedent was created; the decision reaffirms careful judicial scrutiny of champertous or unconscionable litigation funding contracts in India and the application of equitable principles to protect parties from oppressive bargains.

Show all summary ...

Sir John Edge, C.J and Tyrrell, J.:— In the suit out of which these two first appeals arise, Bibi Chunni Kuar sued Raja Rup Singh on his bond, dated the 10th December, 1878, for Rs. 25,000 with future interest at one per cent. from the date of the institution of the suit to the date of realization; she also claimed the costs of the suit. In her plaint she alleged that the defendant had, in 1877, instituted a suit in forma pauperis against Rani Baisni and the Collector, as Manager of the Court of Wards, for the recovery of the estates of Raj Barah; that the suit was dismissed, and that in order to enable him to file an appeal to this Court, he borrowed from her Rs. 3,700 on the 10th December, 1878, and in consideration [60] of that advance executed the bond in suit, by which he promised her to pay Rs. 25,000 within a year from recovery of possession of the estate. In the plaint it was also alleged that the appeal to this Court was dismissed, and that subsequently the defendant executed a sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff and others in respect of the costs of an appeal to the Privy Council, in which he admitted that the debt sued for would, in future, be due by him, that a decree was passed by the Privy Council in the defendant's favour, and he obtained possession of the estate on the 13th August, 1884, but still evades payment of the debt due under his bond.

The defendant by his written statement pleaded amongst other things that the contract was one of champerty and, as such, illegal, that it was void as being contrary to the provisions of ss. 23 and 30 of the Indian Contract Act; that the plaintiff had not given any portion of the Rs. 3,700 to the defendant; that the moneys for the expenses incurred in this Court were advanced by Maulvi Muhammad Mohsin out of his own pocket; that the bond did not provide that the money would be paid in case of the defendant succeeding in the Privy Council, and that the defendant not having succeeded in this Court, the plaintiff was not entitled to make her claim.

The suit was heard by the then Subordinate Judge of Mainpuri, who held that the claim was not based on champerty; that ss. 23 and 30 of the Indian Contract Act did not apply; that the provision in the bond as to payment on the defendant succeeding was a general one and was not confined to the event of his succeeding in the High Court. The Subordinate Judge found that the defendant had received the consideration of the bond. The Subordinate Judge also found that the defendant's contract was entered into at a time when he was not in a composed state of mind, that at that time the defendant was without means and had to provide for an expense of several thousands of rupees at a critical time, and held that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff was not entitled to the full amount sued for, but only to the amount actually advanced with interest and costs. The Subordinate Judge on the 16th [61] of December, 1886, made a decree for Rs. 6,722-13-9 with proportionate costs and interest at 8 annas per centum, from the date of the Suit to the 15th December, 1886, on the principle sum and thenceforth on the aggregate amount as against the defendant, and dismissed the rest of the claim with proportionate costs to the defendant, and allowed the pleaders' fees in full. From that decree the plaintiff and the defendant respectively appealed. Their appeals were heard by us, and we took time to consider our judgment.

The facts of the case are few and simple. The defendant on the death of his nephew, which happened in or shortly prior to 1877, made a claim to the Raj Barah estates. That claim was disputed, and in order to establish his title to the estates it became necessary for the defendant to institute a suit. At that time and until the defendant obtained his decree in the Privy Council, he was without any means, even the means of subsistence, and had no money except what he from time to time managed to borrow from others. He had, however, a friend, Maulvi Muhammad Mohsin, a vakil, who had previously acted for him and who also acted for him in some of the stages of the litigation as to the Raj Barah estates and in negotiating, amongst others, the loan in respect of which the bond in suit was given. The defendant requested Maulvi Muhammad Mohsin to assist him to bring a suit for possession of the estates. In view of the large expenses which such a suit would probably involve, Muhammad Mohsin hesitated, but ultimately Muhammad Mohsin and Babu Hemraj, a pleader, undertook to institute on behalf of the defendant a suit in forma pauperis. That suit was instituted, on the 24th July, 1877, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mainpuri. Whilst that suit was pending in the Court at Mainpuri, the defendant and Lala Punni Lal agreed that Lala Punni Lal should assist the defendant to take his case to the Privy Council, and should for such assistance raise one lac of rupees. Muhammad Mohsin, on being informed by Lala Punni Lal of this agreement, told the defendant that he had made a mistake in agreeing to give a lac of rupees [62] to Lala Punni Lal without consulting him, Muhammad Mohsin. At that time the defendant had executed a vakalatnama in favour of Muhammad Mohsin and Babu Hemraj, who were conducting the defendant's suit in the Court at Mainpuri. The defendant told Muhammad Mohsin that he had given his word to Lala Punni Lal but that Muhammad Mohsin was to do what he could for him. Muhammad Mohsin replied that he and Babu Hemraj were willing to assist and provide for the expenses in the Court at Mainpuri, but that as the matter had been negotiated with Lala Punui Lal, he, Muhammad Mohsin, would ask Lala Punni Lal not to interfere with the suit in the Court of first instance, and to take Rs. 75,000 for assisting in the conducting of the case in this Court and in the Privy Council, that is, that Lala Punni Lal should receive a bond for Rs. 25,000 if it should be necessary to prosecute or defend an appeal in this Court, and a further bond for Rs. 50,000 if it should be necessary to conduct or defend an appeal in the Privy Council. The defendant's suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge of Mainpuri. After the suit was dismissed in the Court at Mainpuri, it was, at first, intended that the defendant should file an appeal to this Court in forma pauperis, and that Lala Punni Lal should not be called upon for assistance. However, a well-known and most respected vakil of this Court, Munshi Hanuman Prasad, who has recently died, advised that the defendant could not get leave to appeal in forma pauperis except on grounds of law, and that the law did not provide for the re-admission of an appeal after it had been rejected in forma pauperis. The effect of the opinion of Munshi Hanuman Prasad was communicated to the defendant by his general attorney, Ganga Prasad, after which the defendant and Ganga Prasad went to Lala Punni Lal at Mainpuri, and after some discussion Lala Punni Lal agreed to the terms which, as we have above mentioned, had been suggested by Muhammad Mohsin to the defendant, that is to say be agreed to defray the expenses of an appeal in this Court on receiving the defendant's bond for Rs. 25,000, and further, if necessary, to provide for the expenses of an appeal to the Privy Council in consideration of the defendant giving him his bond for Rs. 50,000. [63] Muhammad Mohsin applied to Lala Punni Lal to advance Rs. 3,700 for the purpose of filing and prosecuting the defendant's appeal in this Court. The defendant having executed the bond in suit on the 10th December, 1878, Lala Punni Lal advanced the Rs. 3,700 and that sum was applied in the following manner:—Rs. 2,500 was paid for the stamps required for the memorandum of appeal, Rs. 200 were paid for the translation fees, and Rs. 1,000 paid to the vakils employed on behalf of the defendant in this Court in his appeal, as their fees. Bibi Chunni Kuar was the wife of Lala Punni Lal, in whose favour the bond of the 10th December, 1878, was executed by the defendant. On the 18th December, 1878, the defendant's appeal to this Court was filed through Pandit Ajudhia Nath and the late Pandit Nand Lal, who for the purposes of that appeal were his vakils in this Court. The defendant's appeal was dismissed by this Court on the 7th May, 1880. Shortly before or after the dismissal by this Court of the defendant's appeal, Lala Punni Lal died. After the death of Lala Punni Lal and the dismissal of the defendant's appeal by this Court, Muhammad Mohsin on behalf of the defendant applied to the plaintiff, Chunni Kuar, to advance the money required for an appeal to the Privy Council on a bond being given in his favour. Chunni Kuar replied that she had no one to look after her busiuess, and she was therefore not prepared to undertake the expenses of the appeal alone. The defendant urged Muhammad Mohsin to get an appeal to the Privy Council filed, and represented to him that he, the defendant, would not mind parting with a four annas or an eight annas share in the Raj Barah estate, or giving a lac of rupees for the necessary assistance. After several fruitless attempts to negotiate a loan, Muhammad Mohsin at last succeeded in getting several persons, Chunni Kuar being one of them, to agree to provide for security for the cost of the contemplated appeal to the Privy Council to the extent of Rs. 4,000 and for translation charges, pleader's fee, and other expenses of every kind to the extent of Rs. 8,500, on the terms, which are contained in the deed executed in their favour by the defendant on the 13th March, 1882. In the defendant's deed on the 13th March 1882, the defendant acknowledged his liability [64] to the plaintiff, Chunni Kuar, under his bond of the 10th December, 1878, which is now sued on. The plaintiff, Chunni Kuar, and the other parties, who had agreed as above mentioned, provided the necessary security and the moneys which were required. The defendant filed the appeal to the Privy Council on the 9th November, 1880. On the 14th April, 1884, the defendant obtained a decree in the Privy Council, which established his title to the Raj Barah estates and the accumulated income. The respondents in the appeal in the Privy Council applied for a review of judgment, which application was dismissed. It is admitted on the pleadings that the defendant on the 13th August, 1884, obtained possession of the Raj Barah estates. He has declined to discharge his bond of the 10th December, 1878, and has repudiated all liability under it, and also all liability under the deed of the 13th March, 1882. In addition to the facts which have been found by us as above, we find as a fact that the defendant perfectly understood his position and the effect of the bond of the 10th December, 1878, and the sale deed of the 13th March, 1882; that there was no pressure brought to bear upon the defendant to execute the bond of the 10th December, 1878, and the sale-deed of the 13th March, 1882, other than the pressure of the position in which the defendant owing to his poverty found himself placed; that Muhammad Mohsin and Ganga Prasad acted throughout in the negotiations honestly and to the best of their ability in furtherance of the interests of the defendant, and that there is nothing to show that the defendant could have obtained the necessary assistance for the filing and prosecution of his appeal in this Court on better terms than those on which that assistance was actually obtained, which are the terms contained in his bond of the 10th December, 1878. Without that assistance the defendant could not have appealed to this Court. We also find that it was the defendant who applied to Lala Punni Lal for assistance. Mr. Roshan Lal, who with Mr. Malcomson appeared for the defendant before us, contended in the first place that the bond of the 10th December, 1878, was inadmissible in evidence as it had not been registered under the Indian Registration Act, and, secondly, that on the true [65] construction of the bond, the Rs. 25,000 was payable only in the event of the defendant succeeding in this Court in the appeal which he filed on the 18th December, 1878, and that having failed in that appeal the defendant was under no liability under the bond. As to Mr. Roshan Lal's first point it is sufficient to say that he cited no section of the Indian Registration Act and no authority in support of his contention, and that the Indian Registration Act does not prohibit bonds of this description being given in evidence if not registered. As to his second point, the bond does not, in our opinion, bear the narrow construction which he attempted to place upon it, a construction, moreover, which would defeat the intention of the parties at the time when Lala Punni Lal agreed to advance the money required for the appeal to this Court.

Mr. Malcomson, on behalf of the defendant, contended that the bargain was unconscionable and was against public policy, and that we should apply to the transaction the principles which the Courts of equity in England have applied to dealings with reversioners. It was also contended on behalf of the defendant to that as the plaintiff had not in the event and alone undertaken all the expenses of the appeal to the Privy Council, she was not entitled to recover on the bond of the 10th December, 1878. It appears to us that the bond of the 10th December, 1878, and the sale-deed of the 13th March, 1882, are two separate contracts, and further that as the defendant in the latter document acknowledged his liability under the former, the point, even if it were otherwise a good one, is not now open to him. Mr. Banerji on behalf of the plaintiff contended that the agreement was under the circumstances of the case a fair and reasonable one, that it was nor, unconscionable or against public policy, and that the principles applicable to dealings with reversioners were not applicable to this case. In the course of the arguments of Mr. Malcolmson and Mr. Banerji, the following authorities amongst others were referred to, namely, Srimati Kamini Sundari Chaodhrani v. Kali Prussunno Ghose, Grose v. Amirtamayi [66] Dasi, Tara Sundari Chaodhrani v. The Court of Wards(3), Boodhun Singh v. Luteefun(4), Chedambara Chetty v. Renja Krishna Muthu Vira Puchanja Naikar(5), Fischer v. Kamala Naicker(6), Raja Sahib Prahlad Sen v. Baboo Budhu Singh(7), Ram Coomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee(8), Lord Chesterfield v. Janssen(9), and the notes to that case in White and Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity, Bowes v. Heaps(10), Webster v. Cook(11), Tyler v. Yates(12), Aylesford v. Morris(13), Beynon v. Cook(14), Moothur Mohun Roy v. Soorendro Narain Deb(15), Lalli v. Ram Prasad(16), Banwari Das v. Muhammad Mashrat(17).

If the law of England as to maintenance applied in this country, it is clear to our minds that it would apply in this case, and that it would be our duty to hold that the bond of the 10th December, 1878, was void. As far hack as 1862, it was in the case of Ganesh Prasad v. Sheo Ratan Lall and Fakcer Chand(18) held by the Sadar Diwani Adalat of these Provinces, following a previous decision of that Court and a Full Bench decision of the Court at Calcutta, that the laws and regulations in force in this country did not make it necessary to apply the English law of champerty to its full extent, and no doubt the same would have been held by that Court as to the English law of maintenance. It has now finally been decided by the Privy Council in Ram Coomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee that the specific English law of maintenance and champerty has not been introduced into India. At page 46 their Lordships are reported to have said, “But whilst their Lordships hold that the specific English law of maintenance and champerty has not been introduced into India, it seems clear to them upon the authorities that contracts of this kind or character ought under certain circumstances to be held to be invalid, as being against public policy. Some of the circumstances which would tend [67] to render them so have been adverted to in the two judgments of this tribunal already cited. Their Lordships think it may properly be inferred from the decisions above referred to, and especially those of this tribunal, that a fair agreement to supply funds to carry on a suit in consideration of having a share of the property, if recovered, ought not to be regarded as being, per se, opposed to public policy. Indeed, cases may be easily supposed in which it would be in furtherance of right and justice, and necessary to resist oppression, that a suitor who had a just title to property, and no means except the property itself, should be assisted in this manner. But agreements of this kind ought to be carefully watched and when found to be extortionate and unconscionable, so as to be inequitable against the party, or to be made not with the bona fide object of assisting a claim believed to be just, and of obtaining a reasonable recompense therefor, but for the purpose of gambling in litigation, or of injuring or oppressing others by abetting or encouraging unrighteous suits, so as to be contrary to public policy, effect ought not to be given to them.”

In that judgment most of the decisions in the Privy Council and in India dealing with the subject were considered. The decision of the Privy Council in Srimati Kamini Sundari Chaodhrani v. Kali Prossunno Ghose is of great importance, as it shows that in India the Courts may apply to cases in which the dealings sought to be impugned were not with expectant heirs, reversioners or remaindermen, the doctrines or principles which the Courts of Equity of England have applied to hard or unconscionable bargains with expectant heirs, reversioners or remaindermen. In that case their Lordships are reported to have said (pp. 225 and 226). The finding of the lower Court against fraud and undue influence must now be accepted; a contrary finding would have avoided the whole transaction. But assuming the validity of the mortgage, a question arises whether under the circumstances the rate of interest exacted did not amount to a hard or unconscionable bargain such as a Court of equity will give relief against. The doctrine of equity on this subject was laid [68] down by the Master of the Rolls in Beynon v. Cook and his judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Rhys Beynon was a reversioner or remainderman, Cook was a money-lender who took from him a promissory note for £100, for which he charged £15 discount for six months, and a mortgage of his reversionary interest, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent, per month. The Master of the Rolls made a decree for redemption on payment of the amount advanced, at simple interest at 5 percent, per annum. He observed, ‘The point to be considered is, was that a hard bargain? The doctrine has nothing to do with fraud. It has been laid down in case after case that the Court, wherever there is a dealing of this kind, looks at the reasonableness of the bargain, and, if it is what is called a hard bargain, sets it aside. It was obviously a very hard bargain indeed, and one which cannot be treated as being within the reasonableness which has been laid down by so many Judges.’ This equitable doctrine appears to have a strong application to the facts of this case, where we have a borrower a pardanashin lady; the lender, her own mukhtar, under the cloak of a benamidar; the security an ample one, as abundantly appears; the interest on both mortgages, especially the compound interest on the latter, exorbitant and unconscionable; and a purchaser with full notice of these circumstances.”

It is to be observed that, although their Lordships allude to the fact that the borrower was a pardanashin lady and the lender her own mukhtar under the cloak of a benamidar, they accepted the finding of the lower Court that there had been no fraud or undue influence.

The difficulty which we feel is as to what constitutes a hard and unconscionable bargain. In some of the English cases stress was apparently laid on the fact that the security had not been valued. Yet Sir George Jessel, M.R, in Beynon v. Cook at page 392, after showing that in many instances in which the Courts of equity applied the doctrine under consideration, the value of the security could not be ascertained, expressly stated that “the value [69] of the security is not an element for consideration.” He said at page 393. The object of the rule is to prevent the distress of the reversioner being taken advantage of, and to protect him, according to Mr. Swanston (2 Sw. 150 n.) “against the designs of that calculating capacity which the law constantly discountenances, the distress frequently incident to the owners of profitable reversions, and the improvidence with which men are commonly disposed to sacrifice the future to the present.”

Lord Selborne, L.C in Aylesford v. Morris, having referred to the repeal of the usury laws and the effect of the 31 Vic. c. 4, said, “These changes of the law have in no degree whatever altered the onus probandi in these cases, which, according to the language of Lord Hardwick in Chesterfield v. Janssen, raises from the circumstances or conditions of the parties contracting, weakness on one side, usury on the other, or extortion, or advantage taken of that weakness,—a presumption of fraud. Fraud does not here mean deceit or circumvention; it means an unconscientious use of the power arising out of the circumstances or conditions; and when the relative position of the parties is such as prima facie to raise this presumption, the transaction cannot stand, unless the person claiming the benefit of it, is able to repel the presumption by contrary evidence, proving it to have been in point of fact fair, just and reasonable.” After referring to some of the considerations which had prevailed in cases in which this doctrine of equity had been applied, he, at page 492, said, “But the real truth is, that the ordinary effect of all the circumstances by which these considerations are introduced, is to deliver over the prodigal helpless into the hands of those interested in taking advantage of his weakness; and we so arrive in every such case at the substance of the conditions which throw the burden of justifying the righteousness of the bargain upon the party who claims the benefit of it.”

How the righteousness of the bargain could, if contested, be established we find it difficult to see, if the value of the security at the time when the bargain was made is to be excluded from [70] consideration. In the case of Chesterfield v. Janssen and in Bowes v. Heaps the borrower had offered the security to several persons who had rejected it as not sufficiently advantageous, before it was finally accepted by a party against whom relief was decreed. Sir William Grant, M.B, in Bowes v. Heaps, at p. 119 said, “It is not imputed to them (the defendants) that they used any endeavours to prevail upon the plaintiff to enter into the transaction. They merely acceded to the proposal that was made to them. It is not, however, every bargain which distress may induce one man to offer, that another is at liberty to accept. The mere absence of fraud does not necessarily decide upon the validity of the transaction; as is proved by many cases, from Banny v. Pitt down to Gwynne v. Healon. In the latter, Lord Thurlow says, the defendant is not charged with misleading the plaintiff's judgment or tampering with his poverty. In that case, too, as in this, the bargain had been hawked about and offered to many persons. That, Lord Thurlow says, only shows the distress of the borrower,” and at the same page Sir William Grant also said, “It would not, I think, be endured that a money-lander should take from a distressed man dealing for his reversionary interest, an engagement to pay four to one upon, the contingency of a person, of the age of twenty seven in perfect health, out-living another of the age of thirty-two, debilitated by disease and ruined in constitution by long continued habits of intemperance.” After referring to the nature of the risk in that case, Sir William Grant, at page 120, said, “Allowing the risk to be still considerable, against that must beset the unusual amount of the stipulated return. Combining the two together, it seems to me that there is more inequality in this bargain than existed in some of the cases in which the contract has been set aside,” and be granted relief.

The result of the English cases appears to be that in dealings with expectant heirs, reversioners or remaindermen, the fact that the bargain was declined by others as not being sufficiently advantageous, does not raise a presumption that it was a fair and reasonable [71] bargain; and that until the contrary is satisfactorily proved by the party trying to maintain the bargain, the Court may presume that a bargain which apparently provides in the opinion of the Court, for an unusually high return or for an exceptionally high rate of interest is a hard and unconscionable bargain, against which relief should be granted. The doctrine of equity to which we are referring is, so far as we are aware, applicable in England only to dealings with expectant heirs, reversioners or remaindermen. Sir George Jessel, M.R, in Beydon v. Cook, at p. 392, said, “It has never been said a man can be relieved because he happens to be a reversioner, and the money-lender does not know it, but lends him money upon his promissory note at usurious interest. In order to be relieved, be must have been trusted upon the credit of his expectation.” Many of the considerations stated by the earlier equity Judges in England for the doctrine we are considering do not arise in cases such as that which we have to decide here. We do not gather from the judgments of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Srimati Kamini Sundari Chaodhrani v. Kali Prossunno Ghosc that the doctrine which the Courts of Equity in England have applied to cases of snatching bargains with expectant heirs, reversioners or remaindermen, is to be applied in India to cases except where it would have been applied in England or except where the cases is in some way analogous to a case of snatching a bargain with an expectant heir, reversioner or remainderman, or except there is some fiduciary relationship between the lender and the borrower, although there may be no fraud or undue influence, or except there is incapacity, such as ignorance, on the part of the borrower to appreciate the true effect of his or her bargain. To apply it to all cases where the contracted return was exceptionally large or the rate of interest was high would be for the Judges to make contracts for the parties which they never intended to make for themselves.

In our opinion Sir George Jessel, M.R, in Wallis v. Smith with sound common sense said, “I have always thought, and [72] still think, that it is of the utmost importance as regards contracts between adults, persons not under disability, and at arm's length, that the Courts of law should maintain the performance of the contracts according to the intention of the parties; that they should not overrule any clearly expressed intention on the ground that Judges know the business of the people better than the people know it themselves. I am perfectly well aware that there are exceptions, but they are exceptions of a legislative character.”

We have arrived at the conclusion, but we confess after much doubt and difficulty, that we may hold that this is a case to which we may apply the ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Srimati Kamini Sundari Chaodhrani v. Kali Prassunno Ghose to which we have referred, and which is to be found at pages 225 and 226 of the report of that case. There was in this case, so far as we see, no fraud on the part of Lala Punni Lal or the plaintiff or on the part of the agents of the defendant. The defendant entered into the contract with his eyes open and on the advice of his legal advisers, and we doubt if be could at that time, having regard to the risks of his litigation, have obtained an advance of money on terms more advantageous to himself; but that he could not have done so is not sufficiently established by the plaintiff, and it was for her to leave our minds without any reasonable doubt on the point. As we have pointed out, mere difficulties in negotiating a bargain, or the fact that the bargain was refused by others as not sufficiently advantageous, have not been held to prove that the bargain was a fair and reasonable one and not a hard and unconscionable bargain within the meaning of the rule. Under the circumstances we find that the bargain was a hard and unconscionable one, which we ought not to enforce.

On the ground also to which we shall now refer we are of opinion that we should not enforce this contract. Gambling in litigation and what are called in England maintenance and champerty are unfortunately only too common in this country. The abuses which in 1869, Phear, J., in his judgment in Grose v. [73] Amirtamayi Dasi stated to exist in every Court of civil Justice throughout Bengal, unfortunately exist at the present day in these Provinces. Although fully recognising that in India, as was pointed out by the Lordships of the Privy Council in Ram Goomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Monkerjee, a fair agreement to supply funds to carry on a suit in consideration of having a share in the property, if recovered, ought not to be regarded as being, per se opposed to public policy,” their Lordships were careful to add, “But agreements of this kind ought to be carefully watched, and when found to be extortionate and unconscionable, so as to be inequitable against the party, or to be made, not with the bona fide object of assisting a claim believed to be just, and of obtaining a reasonable recompense therefor, but for improper objects, as for the purpose of gambling in litigation or of injuring and oppressing others by abetting and encouraging unrighteous suits, so as to be contrary to public policy, effect ought not to be given to them.” Now in this case it appears to us that if Lala Punni Lal or the plaintiff believed the defendant's claim to have been a just one or one in which there were not long odds against his chance of success, Rs. 25,000, in the event of success for an advance of Rs. 3,700 could not be and could not have been considered by them or either of them to be reasonable recompense. On the other hand, if Rs. 25,000 were or were considered to be a reasonable recompense in the event of success for an advance of Rs. 3,700, it could only be on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was of such a highly speculative character as to make the odds long against his chances of success and the transaction one of gambling in litigation. In either view we are of opinion that to enforce such a contract as that in this case would be against public policy, as it would be only to encourage parties not interested in a litigation to assist, for their own private purposes, a litigant to pursue a litigation in the success of which on the basis of a just claim they did not honestly believe, or for their assistance in which they required an unreasonably large recompense.

[74] Although we are of opinion that we should not enforce the contract in this case by decreeing the plaintiff's claim for Rs. 25,000, we are also of opinion that we should give, as we now do, the plaintiff a decree for the amount actually advanced with simple interest at the rate of 20 per cent, per annum from the date of the bond, that is to say, from the 10th December, 1878, to the date of this decree with proportionate costs of suit and of the plaintiff's appeal, and with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum on the amount of such advance, interest, and costs, from the date of this decree until payment. The defendant's appeal is dismissed with costs and the plaintiff's appeal is allowed to the extent above indicated with proportionate costs. We have allowed interest at the rate of 20 per cent, per annum as that is not an unusual rate in these Provinces where there is no security or but a doubtful security.

Appeal allowed in part.