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Shadi v. Anup Singh
Sir John Edge, C.J:— In this case one of the sharers in a mahal brought a suit to restrain the defendant, who is also a sharer in the mahal, from continuing to erect certain buildings upon the common ground belonging to the co-sharers. The suit was brought within three or four days after the defendant had commenced to erect his kachcha buildings. The defendant's case was that the land in question was his own exclusive property, that he had a right to it, and consequently a right to exclude the plaintiff and other co-sharers from any participation in or enjoyment of the land in question. The plaintiff's case, in fact, was that the defendant was ousting him, a co-sharer, from a portion of the common land. An interim injunction was granted in the case, and on appeal the District Judge, having regard to the ruling of my brother Mahmood in Paras Ram v. Sherjit, went into the question as to whether on partition the plaintiff could be compensated for the interference with his rights by the defendant and he found that the defendant was building upon land which was in excess of the share that would come to him on partition, and that on partition the plaintiff could not be adequately compensated. Now this finding of fact would in my judgment have entitled the plaintiff to a mandatory injunction to pull down the buildings even if they had been built, assuming that they had been built without the acquiescence of the plaintiff. But in my opinion it was unnecessary to go into the question as to whether or not the defendant was appropriating more of the common lands than would have come to him on partition. The law provides the means by which common lands may be lawfully partitioned in a proceeding in which all the co-sharers will get their fair quantum of the common land, having regard to possession, quality and the amount of their shares. In this case the defendant without having recourse to the Courts to give him lawful partition, proceeded to appropriate to himself lands in which each of his co-sharers had an interest, and thus he proposed to exclude [438] his co-sharers from all use and enjoyment of a portion of common land. We need not in this case consider what a civil Court should do if the defendant has erected at great expense buildings which a Court of equity might hesitate to order him to pull down. All we have got to consider is that almost instantly on the unlawful attempt of the defendant to appropriate, and, in fact, to make partition on his own behalf, one of the co-sharers invoked the assistance of the civil Court to prevent the defendant from interfering with his rights as a co-sharer. In my opinion the plaintiff is entitled to a perpetual injunction. I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Straight, J.:— It is found by the lower appellate Court that 3 bighas, 8 biswas of land on a part of which the defendant Shadi has commenced to make certain erections, was shamilat land, the common property of himself, the plaintiff and other persons. It is clear that almost immediately after the commencement of these erections the plaintiff with expedition went to the civil Court and asked the Court to restrain the action of the defendant Shadi, and obtained an interim injunction to that effect. It has been found by the learned District Judge that the land built upon and occupied by the defendant Shadi was greatly it excess of his share; that his action in commencing the erections upon the land had caused injury, and if allowed to be continued would cause injury to the plaintiff that could not be possibly remedied by partition. Holding this view, and upon these facts, the learned Judge below in the exercise of the discretion vested in him by law has granted a mandatory injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding further with the building, and directing the building, so far as it had proceeded, to be pulled down, and prohibiting the defendant from building upon the land as exclusive owner at any future time. This second appeal, which has been referred to the Full Bench, attacks the discretion exercised by the learned Judge, and before I could interfere in a case of this kind I should require the appellant to satisfy me that the discretion has been improperly exercised. Now I am not going at length into the numerous cases that are to be found in our law reports and in the Calcutta series bearing upon the question. I take it that the [439] rules for our guidance are to be found in chapter X, Specific Relief Act, ss. 54 and 55. The English cases to which reference can be made are, after all, only of use as illustrative of the principles embodied in those from sections from the aspect that the Courts of Chancery in England have had to treat matters of a similar description. It is purely a question of discretion whether the Court can grant relief of this description, and I hold that unless I am satisfied that the District Judge improperly exercised that discretion, I ought not to interfere. As the learned Chief Justice has said, we are not concerned with the question whether if a valuable building had been erected upon the land and there had been a delay on the part of the plaintiff to come into Court and assert his rights, it might not have been within the competence of the Judge to withhold the relief granted. But upon the facts as found by the learned Judge, I cannot say that he has exercised a wrong discretion in granting the injunction, and I therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.
Brodhurst, J.:— I concur with the learned Chief Justice.
Tyrrell, J.:— I concur with the learned Chief Justice and in the order that he has passed in the case.
Mahmood, J.:— I also concur in the order which has been made by the learned, Chief Justice and my learned brethren. All I wish to add is, that, in reference to the rule laid down by me in Paras Ram v. Sherjit the learned Judge upon the evidence before him recorded the following finding:
“I must find that the respondent Shadi has, by building the house, encroached on common land in excess of his share, and as this injury cannot be remedied by partition, the appellant-plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed of having the house pulled down.”
Now I take this to be a finding of fact, as the learned Chief Justice and my learned brethren have taken, rendering the principles upon which my ruling in Paras Ram v. Sherjit proceeded inapplicable, and it is enough to say that, whilst still adhering to the [440] principles to which I there gave expression, I think the reference need not have been made if the authority of the ruling had not been doubted, the reference being suggested by the circumstance that it was a ruling of myself sitting as a single Judge.
Appeal dismissed.
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