Kedar Nath Chatterjee v. The King-Emperor .

The Appellant in this case, Kedar Nath Chatterjee, has been convicted of the offence of using as genuine a forged document knowing it to be forged under sec. 471, read with sec. 467 of the Penal Code, and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment.

It appears that one Ram Chandra Mukerji executed in favour of Mahesh Chandra Banerjee a mortgage bond on the 9th of Falgoon 1290. A suit was brought upon this document by Kedar Nath Chatterjee against the heir of Ham Chandra Mukerjee (he being then dead) upon the ground that he was the beneficial holder of the bond, Mahesh Chandra Banerjee being only his benamidar. It was, however, found in the course of the trial of that case, that the bond produced, was not the true document executed by Ram Chandra, but rather a forgery, and accordingly the suit was dismissed. The Appellant was thereupon indicted for the offence of using as genuine a forged document, knowing it to be forged.

That Ram Chandra Mukerjee executed on the 9th Falgoon 1290, a mortgage bond for Rs. 199 is conceded on all hands; but the question that has been raised is this, whether the document that was produced by or on behalf of Kedar Nath Chatterjee in the suit instituted by him for the enforcement of the said bond is the true document. The document that is produced purports to be an exact fac simile of the original mortgage bond, with all the endorsements of registration on the back thereof, as also the seal of the Registrar. But there is internal evidence afforded by the document itself or rather by the endorsements appearing on the back of it that it could not be the true document which was executed by Ram Chandra Mukerjee, and subsequently registered before the Sub-Registrar of Deeds. And there is besides the evidence of the; registration head clerk, in whose handwriting some of the endorsements purport to have been made, as also other evidence for the prosecution, which unmistakably proved that the document in question is a forgery. There can also be no doubt, that the prisoner used the document in the suit that he brought against the heir of Ram Chandra Mukerjee.

It appears, however, that it was the case for the prosecution that the original document executed by Ram Chandra Mukerjee was paid up and discharged, and the document then torn up into two pieces, and that the Appellant Kedar Nath Chatterjee having managed through some of his people to get hold of this torn document, prepared the document in question by forging the writings and the endorsements thereupon.

The learned Judge, however, was unable to hold upon the evidence, such as it was, adduced on behalf of the prosecution, that the case set up by them that the original document was paid up and discharged, was satisfactorily proved; and upon this, it has been contended before us by the learned counsel for the Appellant that it must be taken that the money covered by the mortgage bond was due to Kedar Nath Chatterjee, and, therefore, the document produced by him, though it might be a forgery, could not be regarded as a “false document” within the meaning of sec. 464, I.P.C, which lays down what a false document is, and that therefore the Appellant could not be held guilty of fraudulently or dishonestly uttering a forged document.

That section says:—

“A person is said to make a false document who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals, or executes a document or part of a document, or makes any mark denoting the execution of a document, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was made, signed, sealed, or executed by or by authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, or executed or at a time at which he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, or executed” and so on. This refers us to the definition of a forged document as contained in sec. 463, which says “whoever makes any false document with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person, as to support any claim or title, or cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed commits forgery.” And we find that the words “dishonestly” and “fraudulently” are defined in secs. 24 and 25, I.P.C; sec. 24 says “whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person, or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing dishonestly.” Sec. 25 lays down:—“A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud, but not otherwise.”

The argument that has been advanced to us proceeds upon the assumption that in any given case where the person pro pounding a forged document does not intend to attain wrongful gain to him or cause wrongful loss to another, the document could not be regarded as a false document within the meaning of sec. 464. But the argument loses sight of the distinction which is patent in secs. 464 and 463, read with the definitions to which we have just adverted, between “dishonestly” and fraudulently.” The matter was fully discussed and considered in the case of Queen-Empress v. Abbas Ali and it was held that deprivation, actual or intended is not a necessary ingredient of the intent to defraud re ferentially imported into sec. 464, and by a similar train of reasoning we are led to the like conclusion as to the true construction of sec. 471. And in this connection, we may also refer to the case of Lalit Mohan Sirkar v. Queen-Empress, where a Divisional Court, following two cases,—one in the Madras and the other in the Bombay High Court, clearly pointed out the distinction between “dishonestly” and “fraudulently” occurring in sec. 464, Indian Penal Code, as also to the case of Dhunum Kazee, where a person, in the course of an action brought against him to gain possession of a property, used a forged document for the purpose of supporting his title, though there was no necessity for the use of it, it was held that such user was clearly fraudulent within the meaning of sec. 25 of the Penal Code.

It seems to us that though the act of the Appellant in producing a forged bond in the suit that he brought is not proved to be dishonest within the meaning of sec. 24 of the Penal Code, yet it was fraudulent, because it was with the intent to commit a fraud upon the Court, viz., to make that Court believe that he was entitled to recover money upon the basis of the particular document then produced. The word “fraudulent” denotes an intention to deceive, and the intention of Kedar Nath Chatterjee was clearly to deceive the Court into holding that he was entitled to enforce the bond in question.

The learned counsel for the Appellant, however, has relied upon the case of Queen-Empress v. Sheo Doyal which, no doubt, may be regarded as supporting his contention, but with all deference to the learned Judge who decided it, we are unable to follow it.

Upon these grounds, we are of opinion that the argument advanced before us cannot be sustained.

The result is that this appeal is dismissed.

H.P.C

Appeal dismissed.