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Reference Under Stamp Act, Section, 57

Madras High Court
Aug 9, 1901

The question referred for opinion is, whether an instrument of lease, for a term of three years at a monthly rent of Rs. 190, with a covenant on the part of the lessor to renew the lease at the option of the lessee for a further term of one or two years from the expiration of the said term of three years, is rightly stamped, only with the duty payable on a lease for a term of three years, or whether it should he stamped with the aggregate of the duties payable on a lease for a term of three years and on an agreement to give a lease for a term of two years.

We are clearly of opinion that the instrument has been rightly stamped as a lease for a term of three years and that the Collector was in error in levying an additional stamp calculated upon an agreement to give a lease for a term of two years at the monthly rent of Rs. 190.

Under article 35 of schedule I to the Stamp Act “lease” includes “an agreement to let” and “an agreement to let” has to be stamped with the same duty as a lease. Under section 5 of the Stamp Act, an instrument comprising or rotating to several distinct matters is chargeable with the aggregate amount of the duties with which separate instruments each comprising or relating to one of such matters would be chargeable under the Act; and it is apparently under this section that the Collector has levied the additional stamp duty. It is clear that this section is inapplicable to the transaction and that the instrument in question relates only to one matter and not to two distinct matters. The lessee agree, among other things, to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 190, for the premises in question for a period of three years in consideration of the lessor demising the premises for a period of three years and also agreeing to renew the lease, at the option of the lessee, for a further term of one or two years. If the covenant to renew were dis annexed from the lease, there would be no consideration for the covenant to renew (per Maule, J.,— Worthington v. Warrington(3)). A covenant for renewal at the option of the lessee is an ordinary covenant in a great many leases and for at least two centuries, it has been held to be a Covenant running with the land (per Farwell, J:, in Muller v. Trafford). A mere agreement to lease is not a covenant which will run with the land and will not hind a transferee for valuable consideration without notice of the agreement. The transaction or matter to which the instrument in question relates is single and indivisible and cannot be treated as relating to two distinct matters within the meaning of section 5 of the Stamp Act. The instrument contains only one contract; a demise; the option of renewal of the lease is ancillary to it and forms part of the consideration for entering into the lease.

Worthington v. Warrington is a clear authority for holding that the instrument in question is rightly stamped as a lease for a term of three years only. In that case; the lease was for a term of two years, at a rent of £50 a year, and the lessee also had the right of purchasing the premises at the determination of the lease or at any time during the term of the lease. It was held that a thirty-shilling stamp was sufficient and the contention that it required an additional thirty-shilling stamp for the agreement to sell the premises to the lessee at his option, was over-ruled Creswell, J., in over-ruling the contention observed as follows in the course of the argument:— “This is not more than a covenant to renew, which is usual in leases and which does not, on that account, require two stamps. The lease and the agreement to purchase are the consideration for the rent. If the lease Were forfeited, the right of purchase would he forfeited also.” Phillips v. Phillips supports the same view. In that case it was held that the agreement for a new lease which was contained in an instrument of surrender of a lease for lives was part of the contract and that the reference to it in the deed of surrender was not a “matter or thing,” not “incident to the sale and conveyance,” but was necessarily connected with it. In Referred Case No. 1 of 1876(4) on a reference by the Board of Revenue, it was held that conveyance with the usual covenant of or title, cannot he construed as constituting an indemnity bond, so as to render the document liable to stamp duty as an indemnity bond in addition to the stamp duty to which it is liable as a conveyance. It was there held that an instrument can be regarded as falling under two distinct categories, each requiring a separate stamp, only where there is that is called a distinct consideration for each and not where there is a unity of consideration as in the present case.